version, and U.S. retreats and unilateral accommodations of the “détente” period. Reagan’s fact-filled freedom speeches singled out such U.S. policies as Cold War illusions that invariably emboldened Soviet aggression and reinforced Soviet doctrines like military “first strikes,” the imperialist “Brezhnev Doctrine” to suppress freedom in the Kremlin’s “Socialist Camp,” and pro-Soviet “wars of national liberation.”

15. Reagan, America, and the Defense of Liberty. In establishing a new U.S. Cold War strategy, Ronald Reagan recognized not only the moral and strategic nature of the Soviet threat but also the realities and responsibilities incorporated in the U.S. Constitutional imperatives—“to provide for the common defense” and “to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” Unlike Reagan, a self-styled conservative, many contemporary self-styled “liberals,” “realists,” and “libertarians” appeared not to recognize that these two imperatives are prerequisites for securing for America and Americans (i.e., “we the people”) each and all of the Constitution’s other key objectives: “to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility . . . [and] promote the general welfare.” Without active, indeed proactive, protection and defense of liberty, it is impossible to assure the American idea, dream, and faith summarized in the Declaration of Independence proclamation that: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . . . that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”

16. Reagan’s Overall Cold War “Grand Strategy.” Reagan’s overall revolutionary Cold War “Grand Strategy” reviewed in the chapters of Part II radically changed traditional U.S. strategies and was developed and implemented early. First outlined in his Election Platform of 1980; in a series of early National Security Council and Interdepartmental group organizational, policy and program decisions; and in his National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75, its key components remained effective throughout his two terms. As detailed in the chapters of Parts III and IV of this book and their documents, these components included modernized defense capabilities; national security-based arms control, diplomacy, and international economics; overt and covert support of anti-Communist resistance; and new information and intelligence taking on Soviet “active measures” propaganda, disinformation, and fronts. Analyses, option papers, detailed public statements and reports speak truth to Soviet power, and unmask Soviet deceptions, violations, and aggression through vigorous U.S. public information and public diplomacy efforts were core “soft power” elements of his strategic success.

17. Reagan’s Integrated and Innovative U.S. Defense and Arms Control Strategies. As detailed in the six chapters of Part III, Reagan began in his 1980 campaign platform and early organization of his National Security Council staff and interdepartmental system to integrate defense and arms control strategies on the basis of priority national security criteria to provide for the common defense. His policies sharply contrasted with those of his predecessors and each had to overcome strong opposition in the Congress, media and academic communities, as well as from his own bureaucracy. First, traditional arms control “caps” of the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process permitted buildups and alternatives pressed by the Western “nuclear freeze,” Soviet “moratorium,” and “nuclear disarmament” movements. By contrast, Reagan supported the modernization of U.S. Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and strategic nuclear forces required in response to the unprecedented Soviet nuclear buildup. Second, while assuring U.S. military strength, including nuclear weapons modernization and continued testing—not any unilateral disarmament or nuclear weapons abolition in a nuclear age—he proposed real arms reductions. Both his INF “zero-zero” option and “deep-cuts” at levels of 1/2 in missiles and 1/3 in warheads in his Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) met Reagan requirements for U.S. military sufficiency and for high-confidence verification as certified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. intelligence community. Third, as priority moral and strategic imperatives Reagan supported new anti-missile defense systems (notably the Strategic Defense Initiative) to provide critical deterrence, defense and arms control insurance against Soviet strikes and global proliferation while moving away from the questionable U.S. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine on which both the U.S. “containment” and “détente” strategies relied. Fourth, Reagan proposed required conventional and chemical force modernization to assure U.S. deterrence and defense sufficiency against growing asymmetric Soviet threats and he proposed effectively verifiable arms con- 

[Book pg. xi]