Referenced Documents
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1. Reagan Sets His New Strategy
2. Key American Founding Documents—Four Early Statements; the Declaration of Independence; and the Constitution
3. Washington; Jefferson; and Lincoln on the Sources and Defense of Liberty
4. Martin Luther King Jr. on Christianity; Communism; and the American Dream
5. U.S. Freedom Hymns and the Soviet National Anthem Compared
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2. Marx and Marxist Dictatorship: Dialectical Materialism; Manifesto; and Critique of Gotha Program
3. The First World War: America Enters the War for Democracy—April 1917
4. Lenin Collaborates with Imperial Germany and Overthrows Russia’s (Democratic) Provisional Government—October/November 1917
5. Lenin’s Armistice and Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Imperial Germany Betrays Russia and the Western Allies—March 1918
6. The End of the First World War: America Saves the Western Allies; Eastern Europe; and (Soviet) Russia from German Victory—1918
7. Lenin’s Totalitarian Template; Cheka Terror; Civil War; and the Rapallo Treaty—1917 to 1922
8. Roosevelt’s Diplomatic Recognition of the USSR and Stalin’s Broken Promises on the Path to the Second World War—1933 to 1939
9. Stalin’s Constitution of the USSR—December 1936 and American Naiveté
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2. Soviet-Axis Collaboration: The Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 and the Soviet-Japanese Pact of 1941
3. U.S. “Lend-Lease” Military and Economic Aid to Western Allies and the Soviet Union Indispensable for Victory and Soviet Survival
4. U.S./Allied Global Warfare Against German and Japanese Central Fronts and Homelands Indispensable for Soviet Survival
5. U.S./Allied Agreements with the Soviet Union During and After the Second World War—1943 to 1945
7. Early Warnings: Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech; George Kennan—1946 and 1947
8. Stalin Rejects Three U.S. Peace Steps: U.S. Military Demobilization; the Baruch Plan for Atomic Control; and the Marshall Plan for Economic Recovery
9. The Truman Doctrine and “Two Ways of Life;” Freedom; and Alliances Against the Totalitarians—1947 to 1950
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1. The Origins of the “Containment” Strategy: Truman; Kennan; and Initial U.S. Strategy Documents before NSC–68—1946 to January 1950
2. Truman’s NSC–68: The New U.S. Grand Strategy—April 1950
3. NSC–68: Current Trends; New Defense Requirements; and Follow-on Directives—1950
4. The Korean War—1950 to 1953
5. Truman and Eisenhower: Western and Soviet Block Alliances and Turbulence—1950 to 1957
6. Two Eisenhower Arms Control Proposals: Atoms for Peace—1953; Open Skies—1955
7. Two U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Doctrines: “Massive Retaliation” and “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD)—1952 to 1968 (and Beyond)
8. Khrushchev and the Limits of Soviet “Peaceful Coexistence”—Secret Speech; Suez; Hungarian and Polish Revolutions—1956 to 1960
9. Kennedy: Cold War Crises and Khrushchev—1961 to 1963
10. Radical China: Mao’s Disasters; Lin Piao’s Doctrine; and Sino-Soviet Tensions—1960s
11. Vietnam Becomes a Central Front in the Cold War—1950s to 1960s
12. The Soviet-Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia; the Brezhnev Doctrine of Soviet Imperialism; and Pro-Communist “Wars of Liberation”—1968
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1. Nixon’s “Détente” Strategy—Objectives; Strategic Arms Control; and the SALT and ABM Treaties of 1972
2. Nixon’s Détente Strategy—The U.S.-Soviet “Détente Principles Agreement” and Two Congressional Amendments on “Linkage”
3. The Opening to China and the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972
4. Nixon’s “Vietnamization” Strategy and the Peace Accords of January 1973
5. Three Nixon Crises and their Impact on Detente: Pentagon Papers; Watergate; Impeachment; and Resignation--1971 to 1974
6. Ford and Detente: Congressional Politics; Democratic Party Defense Cuts; and Lost Leverage--August 1974 to 1976
7. Ford and Detente: The Fall of Vietnam and Other Dominoes and Aftershocks--1975
8. Ford and Detente: The Vladivostok and Helsinki Agreements of 1974 and 1975
9. Ford and Growing U.S. Doubts about U.S. Détente Strategy: Soviet Militance and “Team B”
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1. Carter’s Leftward Turn; National Security Policy Divisions; Drift; and Statement on Communism—1976 to 1977
2. Carter Ignores Key U.S. Intelligence and Defense Threat Assessments—1977
3. Carter’s “Neutron” Weapon Controversy—1977 to 1978
4. Carter’s SALT II Arms Control Failure; his MAD Nuclear Deterrence Policy; and Soviet Strategic “First-Strike” Momentum—1977 to 1981
5. Six U.S.-Soviet Cold War “Détente” Periods before Carter; and Soviet Views of “Détente” and “Peaceful Coexistence”: Unlearned Lessons—1918 to 1977
6. Examples of Key U.S. Critiques of Détente; “Eurocommunism;” etc.
7. Soviet Totalitarian Inflexibility; “Détente” Violations; and Other International Blows to Carter
8. A Note on Institutional Catalysts for Change in U.S. Cold War Strategy
9. Carter’s Economic and Political Setbacks and Legacy of “Malaise”
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1. Reagan’s Political Journey and the Reagan Revolution in Cold War Strategy
2. The Revolution Begins—“Let Reagan be Reagan”—A New Path
3. Reagan’s Bipartisan National Security Coalition and Advisory Network
4. Key Catalysts for the Reagan Revolution in National Security
5. Reagan Points to His New Cold War Strategy: Election Campaign Speeches—1979 to 1980
6. Reagan’s 1980 Campaign Platform: The Strategy of “Peace and Freedom” and “Peace through Strength”
7. The Final Campaign Push: From Critique to Crusade—Convention Acceptance Speech and Three Campaign Speeches
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1. Reagan Sets His New Strategy
2. Reagan's Inauguration - Reagan's Political and Strategic Vision
4. The National Security Council (NSC) Process
5. NSC Organization: Reagan’s Early Directives—1981 to 1982
7. Reagan's Emerging Grand Strategy and Early NSC Strategy Documents - 1981 to 1982
8. NSDD 75: Reagan Confirms the New U.S. Cold War Strategy—January 1983
9. A Note on Reagan’s Private Correspondence with Soviet Leaders before Gorbachev (Brezhnev; Andropov; Chernenko)
10. A Short Summary of Reagan’s Economic Warfare Strategy against the Soviet Union
11. A Short Summary of Reagan’s Cold War Strategy and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
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1. Reagan’s 1984 Election Victory; Inaugural Address; and State of Union Speech—November 1984 to February 1985
2. Reagan Remains Reagan; Soviet Leadership Changes; Mikhail Gorbachev’s Rise; Leninist Faith; and Fall
3. 1985 Developments; Reagan Speeches; and the Geneva Summit
4. 1986 Developments: Reagan Speeches; the “Reagan Doctrine;” Updated National Security Strategy; and Reykjavik Summit
5. The Mid-Term U.S. Elections—November 1986
6. 1987 Developments: U.S. National Security Strategy; “Soviet Military Power” Reports; and the Washington Summit
7. 1988 Developments: Reagan’s U.S. National Security Strategy—January 1988
8. Reagan’s Public Statements at the Moscow Summit—May/June 1988
9. Reagan Looks Back at his Cold War Strategy Successes; Statements Near and at the End of his Presidency—1988; 1989
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1. The Soviet Union’s Totalitarian Challenge and Reagan’s New Integrated Defense and Arms Control Strategies
2. Reagan’s 1980 Platform: Policy Foundation for Defense and Arms Control
3. Defense: Initial U.S. Defense Assessments and Supplemental Requests—March 1981
4. Key Reagan Defense Strategy Examples: NSDD 75; Weinberger Doctrine; and Low Intensity Conflict—1983; 1984; 1987
5. Arms Control: Early Strengthening of NSC Authorities—1981 to 1983
6. Public Diplomacy: A “Soviet Military Power” and Arms Control Reports in Reagan’s “Soft Power” Strategy
7. Pastoral Diplomacy: Moral Emphases in Official Correspondence with Religious Leaders—1982 and beyond
9. Turnaround: An Early Reagan Look Back and Ahead—1982
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1. Historical Context: Soviet SS–20; NATO’s “Dual Track;” and “Nuclear Freeze” Before Reagan
2. Reagan Decides on the
3. Facing Down the Soviet
4. Strengthening Public Diplomacy: Rejecting the False “Peace” and “Freeze” Movements—1982 to 1984
5. INF Tests: U.S. Flexibility; NATO Deployments; and the Soviet Walkout—1983 to 1984
6. INF; Elections; the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST); and the Geneva and Reykjavik Summits—1985 to 1986
7. To the Washington Summit and the INF Treaty—1987 to 1988
8. A Look Back and a Look Ahead
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1. Historical Context: The Failed SALT Process; Reagan’s MAD Shock; No Nuclear “Abolition;” and Reagan’s Alternative Strategies
2. Reagan’s Assessments of the Soviet Strategic Buildup and “First Strike” Potential—1980 to 1981
3. Reagan’s U.S. Strategic Force Modernization Program: Communications; Bombers; Submarines; Defenses; and MX—October 1981
4. Reagan’s START Revolution in Strategic Arms Control: “Eureka”—May 1981–June 1982
5. START Negotiations Begin—May 1982 to November 1983
6. U.S. Strategic Force Modernization: Congress; Scowcroft Commission; and Reagan—1982 to 1984
7. U.S. START Flexibility: Trade Offs; Scowcroft Commission; Build-Down; and Soviet Walk-Out - 1982-1984
8. START in the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST): The Second Term—1985 to 1989
9. U.S. Strategic Force Modernization: The Second Term - 1985 to 1989
10. A Note on Strategic Confidence-BUilding Measures (CBMs)
11. Reagan's Continuing Nuclear Deterrence and Testing Requirements
12. A Note on reagan's Nuclear Counter-Proliferation Policy
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1. Historical Context: SDI versus “Star Wars” and MAD
2. Nixon; Détente; MAD; the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)Treaty of 1972; and its Link to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Agreement
3. The Madness of MAD—Soviet 1970s Actions Against MAD; Reagan’s MAD Choices at NORAD; and Reagan’s Early Announcements and Directives on U.S. ABMs
4. SDI; the Scowcroft Commission; and Reagan NSDDs on SDI Consultations and Public Diplomacy—1983 to 1987
5. Reagan Directives and Reports on Full U.S. SDI Compliance with the ABM Treaty
6. Reagan’s Public Diplomacy Reports on U.S.-Soviet Strategic Missile Defense Asymmetries and Soviet Propaganda against SDI—1985 to 1986
7. Reagan Reports on Soviet Violations of the ABM Treaty and other Arms Control Agreements—1984 to 1988
8. SDI and Nuclear and Space Talks (NST)—SDI Never a “Bargaining Chip”
9. ASAT: Reagan’s Anti-Satellite Defense and Arms Control Policies; Soviet “Militarization of Space” Propaganda; and U.S. Reports on U.S. and Soviet ASAT Programs and Arms Control
10. A Note on U.S.-Soviet Civil (and Industrial) Defense Asymmetries
11. Looking Back; Looking Ahead; and Why Ronald Reagan Was Not a Nuclear Abolitionist
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1. Pre-Reagan Historical Context of Conventional and CBW Force Asymmetries and Arms Control
2. Reagan’s Early Warnings on Conventional Force Asymmetries and U.S. Modernization and Defense Requirements—1980 to 1981
3. Soviet Military Power and NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Asymmetries: Early Reagan Administration and NATO Reports—1981 to 1983
4. MBFR Arms Control: Early Reagan Directives and New U.S.-Western MBFR Proposals—1981 to 1983
5. MBFR in The Second Term: MBFR Arms Control; Conventional Force Modernization; and Soviet Treaty Violations—1985 to 1989
6. Integrating Conventional Force Modernization and Arms Control Strategy for U.S. and NATO—1982 to 1988
7. Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW): Reagan’s Policies; Arms Control; U.S. Defense Modernization; and Soviet Violations—1981 to 1983
8. Two U.S. Intelligence Assessments and a Public Report on Soviet CW and Toxin Programs; Use; and Proliferation—1983
9. CBW Decision Year 1984: Soviet Violations; U.S. CBW Defense Modernization; and U.S. Arms Control Initiative
10. CBW Policy in Reagan’s Second Term: Reagan Remains Tough in Negotiations; Public Reports on Soviet Violations; and U.S. “Binary” Modernization—1985 to 1989
11. A Look Back and a Look Ahead
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1. The Historical Context and Defense and Arms Control Impact of Reagan’s Revolutionary Policy on Soviet Arms Control Violations
2. Soviet Arms and Arms Control Deception Practices and Administration Reports on Soviet CW and BW Programs and Violations—1982 and Beyond
3. Strengthened NSC Authority on Assessing Soviet Compliance: Senior Arms Control Group and Arms Control Verification Committee—1982; 1983
4. The President’s General Advisory Committee (GAC) Report on Soviet Compliance—1982; 1983
5. The Arms Control Verification Committee Review and the President’s NSDD 121 Decisions—1982 to 1984
6. Reagan’s January 1984 Report on Soviet Noncompliance; Private Sector Objections; and Going Public
7. U.S. Follow-on Reports on Soviet Noncompliance—1985 to 1988
8. U.S. Reports Refuting Soviet Charges of U.S. Noncompliance—1984 to 1988
9. Confidential U.S. Diplomatic Discussions with the Soviet Union—SCC & Summits
10. Impact and Leverage of Reagan’s Actions on Soviet Noncompliance
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2. Freedom Themes in Reagan’s Presidential Campaign; Platform; and Inaugural Address
3. Early NSC Directives and Coordination of Reagan’s Freedom Strategy and Public Diplomacy
4. Reagan’s Key First-Term Freedom Speeches Against the “Evil Empire”—1981 to 1984
5. Reagan’s Key Second-Term Freedom Speeches Against “The Evil Empire”—1985 to 1989
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1. Historical Context - Afghanistan's Strategic Crossroads; 1970s Turmoil; the Soviet Invasion; and Carter's Confused Response
2. Reagan's Calls for Action and a U.S. Intelligence Report on Cater's
4. Reagan's Secret Correspondence with Soviet Leaders on Afghanistan - 1981
5. Reagan's Public Statements and Reports on Afghanistan; Including Soviet Use of Chemical and Toxin Weapons - 1981 to 1983
5. Reagan’s Public Statements and Reports on Afghanistan; Including Soviet Use of Chemical & Toxin Weapons—1981 to 1983
6. Further Reagan Statements and Public Diplomacy Reports on Afghanistan - 1983 to 1987
7. A Reagan Intelligence Assessment on South Asia in 1982 and Reagan's Increases in Covert U.S. Support to the Afghan Resistance to 1986
8. Reagan's Final Year in Office - 1988: Achieving the Geneva Accords on Soviet Troop Withdrawals
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1. Historical Context Before Reagan’s Presidency—Latin America Becomes a Central Front in the Cold War
2. Reagan Sets a New U.S. Strategy: Campaign Platform 1980; Reagan’s First Year as President—1981
3. An Early U.S. Intelligence Assessment of Soviet Imperialism in Latin America—1982
4. Reagan Presses for his New Strategy—1982; 1983
5. Grenada: Liberation and Captured Documents on Soviet “Active Measures”—October 1983
6. Reagan’s Strategy and the National Bipartisan Commission on Latin America—1984
7. More on the Enemy; Stakes; and Strategy—1984
8. The Second Term: Reagan Steps Up to the Increasing Challenge—1985
9. The Battle Intensifies Further—1986 to 1987
10. Iran-Contra and Beyond: Pressing On—November 1986 to January 1989
11. A Note on Soviet-Cuban Imperialism in Africa
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1. Historical Context: Poland and Eastern Europe in Centuries of Conflict and a Central Front in the Cold War
2. Reagan’s Freedom Strategy and the Mounting Polish Crisis: 1980 Platform; Early NIE and NSC Meetings/Decisions—1980 to December 1981
3. The Crisis Erupts: Poland’s Martial Law; Soviet Invasion Threat and Reagan’s Response—December 1981
4. Reagan Increases Diplomatic and Economic Pressure: NSC Discussions and Directives; Reagan Public Statements; and Freedom Speeches—1982
5. A Major U.S. Public Diplomacy Publication on Poland and Four Communist Myths—1982
6. Reagan Continues to Step Up the Pressure—Decisions; Speeches; Public Diplomacy; and Turning Points—1983 to 1987
7. Beyond Poland: Helsinki Accords; Eastern European Freedom; and the Special Case of the Baltics—1985 to 1989
8. The Path to Freedom in Poland; Eastern Europe; and the Soviet Union in Reagan’s Last Year and Beyond—1988 to 1991
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1. Historical Context: The Soviet Intelligence Legacy and U.S.-Soviet Intelligence Asymmetries—1918 to 1981
2. Reagan’s 1980 Platform: An Early Outline of a New U.S. Intelligence Strategy
3. The First Term: Soviet Intelligence Threats; Reagan’s Strategy; Executive Orders; and Public Statements—1981 to 1983
4. The First Term—Year 1984: Reagan and Casey Public Statements and an NSDD
5. The Second Term: NSC Intelligence Directives and Reagan and Casey Public Statements on Soviet Espionage—1985 to 1989
6. Soviet Espionage: Public Reports by Department of State; CIA; Congress—1982 to 1989
7. Soviet “Active Measures:” Reagan and Casey Public Statements and Administration Reports—1981 to 1989
8. A Note on Terrorism
