



# ISSUES BRIEF

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## Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. and Soviet Proposals

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### UNITED STATES



### SOVIET UNION



#### START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

<b>General Approach:</b>	50 percent reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in a phased manner over seven years from the date the treaty comes into force.  Agreement not contingent upon the resolution of other issues outside START negotiations, as was agreed to by General Secretary Gorbachev at the November 1985 Geneva summit.	50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms within five years, with subsequent negotiations for additional reductions.  Agreement on 50 percent reductions within five years contingent upon the resolution of Defense and Space issues and commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB).
<b>SNDVs:</b>	1,600 ceiling on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). SNDVs include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers.	Same as the U.S. position.
<b>Warheads:</b>	6,000 warhead ceiling, to include ICBM and SLBM warheads and long-range ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles), and with each heavy bomber equipped for gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) counting as one warhead.	Same as the U.S. position.
<b>Warhead Sublimits:</b>	Sublimits of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300 ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.	The Soviets reject the concept of warhead sublimits and have withdrawn their earlier proposals for sublimits of 80-85 percent of warheads on ballistic missiles and 60 percent of warheads on any one leg of the Triad. (Triad refers to ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.)
<b>Heavy ICBMs:</b>	There must be substantial reductions in heavy ICBMs. Heavy ICBMs would be included in the 1,650 sublimit.	50 percent reduction from current levels of heavy ICBMs.
<b>Throw-Weight:</b>	50 percent reduction from the current Soviet throw-weight level, to be codified by direct or indirect limits.	The Soviets claim that an approximately 50 percent reduction in their throw-weight level would result from their overall proposal to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent.
<b>Mobile ICBMs:</b>	Banned.	Permitted.
<b>Heavy Bombers:</b>	Each heavy bomber counts as one SNDV. Each heavy bomber equipped for gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one warhead in the 6,000 limit. Each long-range ALCM would count as one warhead in the 6,000 ceiling.	Same as the U.S. position.
<b>Verification of Compliance:</b>	Exchange of data both before and after the reductions take place, on-site inspection to verify data exchange and to observe elimination of weapons, and an effective on-site monitoring arrangement for facilities following the elimination of weapons. Use of, and non-interference with, National Technical Means (NTM).  Negotiations on the details of verification should take place in parallel with negotiations on reduction of weapons.	Agreement in principle to many aspects of the U.S. proposal for verification of compliance, but the Soviets appear to be more restrictive in terms of access for on-site inspection.  Defer negotiating details.

## INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

<b>LRINF Missile Warhead Ceiling:</b>	<p>Phased reduction in longer-range land-based INF (LRINF) missile launchers to an interim global ceiling of 100 LRINF missile warheads for each side by the end of 1991. U.S. LRINF missile warheads permitted in U.S. territory, including Alaska, and Soviet LRINF missile warheads permitted in Soviet Asia. Continue to seek elimination of all these LRINF.</p> <p>LRINF warheads in Europe reduced to zero for each side by the end of 1991.</p> <p>Agreement on INF reductions not contingent upon the resolution of other issues outside INF negotiations, as was agreed to by General Secretary Gorbachev at the November 1985 Geneva summit.</p>	<p>Zero for each side in Europe by the end of five years; limitation to 100 longer-range land-based INF missile warheads for each side in Soviet Asia and on U.S. territory respectively in same time frame. Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Soviet Asia reduced to 100 warheads deployed beyond striking distance of the United States. U.S. LRINF missile warheads in U.S. territory limited to 100 warheads deployed beyond striking distance of the Soviet Union (i.e., no deployments in Alaska).</p> <p>Same as the U.S. position.</p> <p>Same as the U.S. position.</p>
<b>SRINF Missiles:</b>	<p>The U.S. has consistently required limits on shorter-range INF (SRINF) systems as part of any agreement involving longer-range INF (LRINF) missiles. Within an initial treaty, the U.S. would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Prohibit the development and deployment of missiles in the range between the shortest range LRINF missile (the U.S. Pershing II with a range of approximately 1,800 km) and the longest range SRINF missile (the Soviet Scaleboard with a range of approximately 900 km). There are no U.S. or Soviet missiles in this range band at this time.</li><li>• Have constraints limiting U.S. and Soviet SRINF that are within the range band of the Soviet SS-23 to Scaleboard missiles (approximately 500 to 900 km) to no more than the current Soviet global level, thus ensuring the U.S. right of global equality with Soviet SRINF missile systems.</li></ul> <p>These negotiations are bilateral, and it is inappropriate to include third country systems.</p> <p>Subsequent negotiations focusing on additional SRINF missile constraints or reductions would begin within six months after an initial INF agreement is reached.</p>	<p>Undertake immediate negotiations on SRINF missiles; agreement could be part of initial INF treaty or a separate agreement. Eliminate all U.S. and Soviet SRINF missiles in Europe and U.S. warheads on West German Pershing IA missiles. Each side allowed equal global levels of SRINF missiles with none in Europe. After signing an INF agreement, the Soviets would withdraw Scaleboards from East Europe to the Soviet Union.</p>
<b>Verification of Compliance:</b>	<p>Exchange of data both before and after the reductions take place, on-site inspection to verify data exchange and to observe elimination of weapons, and an effective on-site monitoring arrangement for facilities following the elimination of weapons. Use of, and non-interference with, NTM.</p> <p>Negotiations on the details of verification should take place in parallel with negotiations on reduction of weapons.</p>	<p>Agreement in principle to many aspects of the U.S. proposal for verification of compliance, including exchange of data and on-site inspection to confirm elimination of systems and residual levels. However, there is no provision for on-site inspection of undeclared or suspect sites.</p> <p>Having earlier held that negotiation on verification details should be deferred, the Soviets have now begun to discuss their verification approach.</p>

## Defense and Space

<b>Strategic Defenses:</b>	<p>Following Secretary Shultz's meetings in Moscow in April, 1987, the U.S. proposed a mutual commitment, through 1994, not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for the purpose of deploying strategic defenses not permitted by the ABM Treaty; and during that period to observe strictly all ABM Treaty provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.</p> <p>Such a commitment would be contingent upon implementation of 50 percent reductions to 1,600 SNDVs/6,000 warheads in strategic offensive arms over seven years from entry into force of a START agreement.</p> <p>Acknowledgment that either side shall be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1994 if it so chooses, unless the parties agreed otherwise.</p> <p>The right is preserved to withdraw from the proposed treaty for reasons of supreme national interests or material breach of this treaty, START or the ABM Treaty.</p> <p>To enhance predictability in the area of strategic defenses, U.S. also proposed an annual exchange of data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on respective strategic defense efforts, visits to associated research facilities, and establishment of procedures for reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing.</p> <p>Alternatively, two previous U.S. proposals remain on the table:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• At Reykjavik the President proposed a mutual commitment, through 1996, not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. This commitment would be contingent upon 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms by the end of 1991 and the total elimination of all remaining U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles by the end of 1996. Either side would be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1996 if it so chooses, unless the parties agreed otherwise.</li><li>• In his July 25, 1986, letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, President Reagan proposed that the sides agree not to deploy advanced strategic defenses for a period through 1991. Thereafter, if either side wished to deploy such defenses, it would present a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and eliminating ballistic missiles. The plan would be subject to negotiation for two years. If, at the end of two years, the sides were unable to reach agreement, either side would be free to deploy defenses after giving six months' notice.</li></ul>	<p>Mutual commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years from entry into force of this agreement while strictly observing all the treaty's provisions; space-related ABM research permitted only at ground-based laboratories, ABM test ranges and factories; sides would agree on a list of space-based devices which would not be allowed to be put into space in the course of research.</p> <p>Agreement in Defense and Space is a precondition for strategic offensive force reductions.</p> <p>Before the end of 10 year commitment of non-withdrawal, the sides would begin negotiations to reach a mutually acceptable decision on how to proceed further; Soviet position does not provide for the right to deploy in absence of an agreement.</p>
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