When you get up in the morning with a new idea, how does that get converted into policy? Who do you call? And are you deeply satisfied with the process?

A. Insofar as my relationships with my colleagues are concerned, they are fine. I work easily with the White House staff and, of course, with the President. The President's the boss; I work for him: I don't have a foreign policy; he has a foreign policy. So one of the things that I do—and I did when I was in the government before—is to try to come to understand the President's thinking and his approach. And, of course, I wouldn't be here if I didn't find myself in full sympathy and on the same wavelength as the President. But I see the President frequently, innumerable meetings practically every day over in the White House in one way or another, as the course of business goes on.

In addition to that, the President and I sit down together, just the two of us, regularly; and I have a little agenda I always take to the meetings, and he has one. It's sort of no announced agenda; we just talk and try to informally explore one issue or another. So I don't have any communications problems with the White House at all—quite to the contrary—and I find the working relationships, on the whole, fine. That doesn't mean I don't have arguments with people, and I do. I don't believe in having our arguments in public particularly, but I can assure you, in our councils I express myself and say my views, and I get my way a reasonable share of the time.

But at any rate, if you could point to an Administration where nobody ever disagreed with each other, nobody ever argued, nobody ever said, "Well, just a minute, Mr. President, have you thought of this?" that would be pretty tough. You wouldn't want that. We have good, healthy discussions in this Administration, and the President encourages it. And as far as I'm concerned, I find that he is a great leader and a wonderful human being to work with. Both my wife and I enjoy the President and Nancy and feel that not only are they the President and First Lady but also good friends and good company.

Q. Speaking of arguments, we seem to have a little argument with King Hussein of Jordan. Several weeks ago, in an interview with Judith Miller of *The New York Times*, Hussein expressed considerable disillusionment with President Reagan's policy in the Middle East. One of the reasons he cited was the refusal of the United States to go into the United Nations and reassert its support for UN Resolution 242 and also to reaffirm its previous position that the settlements on the West Bank of the Jordan are illegal. I'd like to ask you whether the United States does continue to support UN Resolution 242 calling for the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories, and whether the United States continues to hold its previous position that those settlements on the West Bank are, in fact, illegal?

A. I think King Hussein has been particularly upset about the difficulties of getting through the Congress our ability to supply him with the military equipment that he feels he needs—and which we feel he needs—to defend himself, not against Israel but against others in his neighborhood, particularly Syria. So I think that frustration is an underlying problem that King Hussein has, and we share that frustration. But I think that if King Hussein were to find himself in the peace process and negotiating with Israel, he would find the attitudes in this country sharply shifted, and that is what we work for.

As far as Resolution 242 is concerned, we support that. The President's September 1, 1982, initiative was directly based on Resolutions 242 and 338 and the Camp David accords. These are all fundamentally consistent ideas and involve the concept of an exchange of territory for peace. That's the formula. But obviously, it's much more complicated than that.

And as far as the settlments are concerned, the President said then, and continues to say—and we have said it on any number of occasions—that we think the continued settlements are not a constructive thing. They are an impediment in the peace process. We have made that statement, and made it and made it.

Q. Do you consider it illegal, sir?

A. As far as the question of legality is concerned, the President has said, and our position is, that they are not illegal. But its isn't a legal question; it's a question of what these mean to the peace process. We think that they are bad for the peace process, and we would like to see them curtailed. We have said that on a great many occasions.

[1]Press release 130 of May 14, 1984. ■

Arresting the Nuclear Genie

by Kenneth L. Adelman

Address before the Mid-America Committee in Chicago on May 2, 1984. Ambassador Adelman is Director of the Arms Control and Disarmanent Agency (ACDA).

It is a pleasure to be with the Mid-America Committee to discuss one of the most critical arms control issues before us: stopping the spread of nuclear weapons or, if you will, arresting the nuclear genie.

I would ask you to pause for just a moment and ponder the following:

• What if Iran or Iraq had the nuclear bomb?

• What if a leader like Qadhafi or an Idi Amin acquired that capability?

• What if the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or another terrorist group acquired nuclear weapons?

Frightening thoughts, I am sure we all agree. But live issues still. Constant vigilance and active policies will be necessary to avoid having these nightmarish thoughts become realities.

Even today, talk about the spread of nuclear weapons to Iran is in the news. A British defense journal recently alleged that Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran is only 2 years away from acquiring nuclear weapons. Our own assessment is that it would take many more years for either Iran or Iraq to develop nuclear weapons, even if they decided to do so.

But even the possibility—however slim—clearly is frightening. For nearly 4 years now, these two countries have been engaged in a bloody war of attrition. Neither has honored even the limited conventions for conflict that have grown up over the years. Iran has used children as suicide troops; Iraq has used deadly chemical weapons. There have been nearly a million casualties on both sides.

If either of these two warring nations had nuclear weapons, does anyone doubt that they probably would have been used? Does anyone doubt that such use would have greatly increased the

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already terrible destruction and loss of life? Does anyone doubt that the use of nuclear weapons, or even only its prospect, would have risked drawing in still other nations, raising the danger of wider conflict? Our interests in the Persian Gulf, as well as those of our European allies and Japan, would be gravely jeopardized.

Look elsewhere at the dangers of nuclear terrorism. Imagine the devastating impact upon the Western economies if one of the key Middle East oil production or distribution facilities were struck by a terrorist attack using a nuclear weapon. Or a terrorist group might seek to smuggle a nuclear weapon into a West European capital or into the United States. The group's objective might be to demand political concessions, to extort financial compensation, even simply to inflict terror and devastation.

The chances of opportunities for a terrorist group to acquire a nuclear weapon increase if the number of nuclear powers increase. Imagine, if you will, a Qadhafi with the bomb. And, I might add, he has stated his ambition to try to get one.

There are more examples, but the point is clear: efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are absolutely critical to our attempts to create a more stable and peaceful world, to strengthen the already frayed fabric of world order.

The spread of nuclear weapons around the globe would threaten not only their new owners' neighbors but also ricochet to hurt the new owners themselves. It would threaten the security and well-being of the United States and our close friends and allies. Indeed, the possible spread of nuclear weapons to any of the many regions of the world characterized by continuing crises and periodic military conflict poses the greatest danger of nuclear weapons actually being used.

Controlling the Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

How can we meet this challenge, or control this threat? We in ACDA wrestle with that question daily since we have major responsibilities in this critical arms control area.

As a start, we need a defense in depth: that is, a broad range of measures and institutions that will reduce the chances that these terrifying weapons will spread still further around the globe. Or—if you will pardon the metaphor with the baseball season getting underway—this is a field in which we can hit singles and perhaps a few doubles but very rarely a home run.

Security and Foreign Policies. A first part of that defense is a range of security relationships, guarantees, and other policies. These are often overlooked in discussions of proliferation problems because they have little directly to do with nuclear weapons spread. By contributing to regional political stability, however, they reduce any incentives countries might otherwise have to "go nuclear." Thus, these tools of our broad security and foreign policies are also indispensable to our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Measures To Control Acquisition of Nuclear Explosives. A second essential element in this defense are measures to slow and impede the technical progress of any country that sets out on the road to acquire nuclear explosives. The United States, has, with some other countries' support, pursued such measures to rather good effect.

Over the past several years, we have led an international effort to upgrade and strengthen controls for nuclear exports applied by the major nuclear suppliers. Just last January, all these suppliers agreed on steps to tighten controls on technology, such as specialized electrical equipment, pumps, and motors used for enriching uranium. "Enriching" sounds innocent, but that process is one of the two paths by which a country could acquire "bomb-grade" material.

We cannot rest as technology marches on. Today, work is underway to deal with the threat posed by other sensitive technologies, particularly those needed to acquire plutonium, another material used to make nuclear weapons.

The U.S. Government is, I can assure you, on the lookout for efforts by countries to pursue a nuclear explosives capability. We have a system for "nuclear export alerts" that plays an important part in trying to impede such pursuit. With early warning of pending purchases of items or technology that can help a country on a road to nuclear explosives, the United States can take action itself, or urge other governments, to prevent the shipment. In 1983, we had more than 100 of these "nuclear export alerts."

Nonetheless, nearly four decades have passed since the first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico, in July 1945. That is another way of saying that nuclear weapons are, in some respects, an old technology—as old, say, as television. The leaders of every country that might be contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons know the most important technical fact about them: they work.

Thus, important as our efforts are to reinforce the technical barricades against nuclear weapons spread, they can in the final result only buy time. In some cases, of course, we can buy a great deal of time. In others, the time may be short. But, whatever time we buy can be valuable in itself. A later political change may bring to power leaders not committed to developing nuclear explosives.

One of our most important problems is how to use wisely the time that has been bought. How do we take advantage of whatever breathing space we gain? The defense in depth can fall apart if that time is not put to good and sometimes hard use.

One way to use that time productively is to work on reducing the motivations, either real or imagined, that can move countries toward nuclear weapons in the first place. This leads me back to the strong and credible alliances and security ties around the world that I mentioned earlier. They are vital for our nonproliferation goals.

This is one reason why the Reagan Administration has sought to buttress our longstanding alliance with South Korea, making clear we have no intention to withdraw U.S. troops needed to preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula. We have also worked to establish a new security relationship with Pakistan, which holds out the best chance of reducing any incentives that country may have to acquire nuclear explosives.

Strengthening International Institutions. Third, fielding a defense in depth also requires that whatever time is available be used to strengthen the international institutions that help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. While we justifiably question the net value of some international agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA as the jargon would have it, is one that is very much in our interest.

Created in 1957, largely as a result of President Eisenhower's initiative, the IAEA has the vital responsibility to verify that nuclear materials in over 700 installations throughout the world are used only for peaceful purposes. Over 90 countries have signed agreements with the IAEA under which they have obligated themselves to provide that agency with detailed information on their nuclear activities and to allow the IAEA to carry out frequent onsite inspections to verify the accuracy of that

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information. More than 1,700 inspections are carried out each year in about 50 countries with active nuclear programs. Each year, more than 6,000 security seals are applied or checked, hundreds of measuring and surveillance devices are used, and nearly a million pieces of data are analyzed.

Countries accepting safeguards on all their nuclear activities demonstrate their peaceful intentions and reduce suspicions on the part of their neighbors. Nuclear activities outside of safeguards in non-nuclear weapons states are, of course, of proliferation concern. For this reason, the United States actively seeks to convince these states to accept comprehensive safeguards on all their nuclear activities. And, last year, President Reagan undertook a major initiative to have the nuclear suppliers require that acceptance as a condition for significant new export commitments.

An effective safeguards system can detect possible misuse of peaceful nuclear technology, thereby ringing the alarm bell. That risk of detection can discourage a country from misusing equipment and materials designed for peaceful nuclear uses.

That leaves a question, of course, of how countries around the world will respond if the alarm bell rings? President Reagan has made clear that any violation of IAEA safeguards or of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or a nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear power would be of grave concern for the United States. Specific sanctions also are provided by U.S. legislation and international agreements in the nuclear field.

But, to be honest, we need to strengthen the prospect of strong sanctions. Those warnings are necessary for an effective preventive system. We need to remind potential proliferators that the response of the United States and others will come down hard if the alarm sounds. A strong manifestation of U.S. resolve can help tip the balance against a country seeking nuclear weapons.

The International Nonproliferation Norm. Fourth, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons also demands that we use the time available to enhance support for the international norm against acquiring these weapons. Past experience here is quite illuminating.

In 1960, France detonated its first nuclear weapon in the Algerian desert. French President de Gaulle immediately sent a congratulatory telegram to his scientists at the site, lauding their great feat and stressing that France, too, now had the access due it as a great power to the most advanced weaponry. Little more than a decade later, in 1974 India detonated a nuclear explosive in the Rajasthan desert. Rather than stressing India's acquisition of advanced weaponry, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi called that blast a "peaceful nuclear explosion" needed to build harbors and dig canals. That is a distinction that we all know has no practical difference. India sought, so to speak, to sneak into the "nuclear weapons club" through a back door.

What these two stories reflect, to my mind, are the changed international mood and expected standard of behavior. Put simply, it is no longer thought legitimate to acquire nuclear weapons.

This changed international norm is best evidenced by the readiness of more than 120 countries to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Under this treaty, non-nuclear nations renounce any future acquisition of nuclear weapons and accept international safeguards on all their civil nuclear activities. Countries with nuclear weapons agree not to assist other countries to acquire these weapons and to negotiate in good faith on agreements to limit and reduce their own nuclear forces.

We continually seek to strengthen this barrier by encouraging the relatively few holdouts to join the treaty. In this Administration 10 new states agreed to adhere. Regrettably, several key countries—such as South Africa, Pakistan, India, and Israel—continue to reject the treaty for a variety of reasons.

Next year a large international conference will be held to review the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We will work long and hard to ensure its success, to demonstrate that the treaty continues to have the support of its many adherents. The world at large can ill afford to allow this crucial arms control treaty to be eroded.

Another example of the nonproliferation norm and a key part of our defense in depth is the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This treaty was promoted and negotiated by our neighbors in Latin America and seeks to create a continent free of nuclear weapons. Most Latin American countries have joined but regrettably not all. All five nuclear-weapons states have agreed to a special protocol to the treaty that prohibits them from deploying nuclear weapons in Latin American countries for which the treaty is in force.

Early in this Administration, President Reagan sought and obtained Senate ratification of a second important nonproliferation protocol to this treaty, thereby removing one obstacle to its complete success. That success will depend principally on the recognition by the few countries in the region that have not yet joined that it is in their interest to do so. For example, a decision by the new civilian Alfonsin government in Argentina to accede to the treaty could contribute greatly to stability in the region. We are actively encouraging Argentina as well as other countries to take all the steps necessary to bring the treaty into force.

Those countries outside these systems and not accepting these norms are, to be sure, major concerns. We need to use the time we buy to bring them closer if not completely into accord with the international nonproliferation norms and responsible behavior of most nations.

In this regard, the President just announced in Beijing our new agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with China. A lot of the "news" has focused on the prospects of nuclear commerce with China. An extremely important result of this recent opening to China has been frequently overlooked.

Within the past months, China has moved to accept many international nonproliferation practices and norms. It has joined the International Atomic Energy Agency. It has stated that it will require recipients of Chinese nuclear equipment or materials to accept international safeguards on such items as a condition of sale. It has made clear that it will not assist or encourage other countries to acquire nuclear explosives.

These three actions are most welcome steps. U.S. discussions on nuclear cooperation with China over the past year—as well as those of other countries—contributed to this beneficial result. That effect may be difficult to calculate, but it clearly serves our nonproliferation goals.

Worldwide Cooperation. Fifth, our defense in depth against nuclear proliferation requires the cooperation of other countries. In the nonproliferation area, like so many others, we simply cannot do it alone—or go it alone.

Cooperation with our European allies, Japan, and other countries which supply nuclear material and equipment—from enriched uranium fuel to large commercial power reactors—is essential if we are to continue to press the technical barriers against proliferation. The cooperation of many neutral

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and nonaligned countries as well is necessary if we are to ensure that the international norm against proliferation remains strong.

The United States and the Soviet Union also have mutual interests when it comes to nonproliferation. Indeed, in the past few years our discussions in this field have been intensive and extensive and on a more regular basis. Our two countries have continued to share similar views in this area for a rather simple reason: the Soviets do not want to see other countries acquire nuclear weapons any more than we do. They know that it will threaten their security.

Cooperation at home is also necessary. Of course, we in the executive branch do not always agree with the Congress on particular proposals to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons spread. This is an area in which reasonable people can and do differ on tactics but not on the goals. And, of course, Members of Congress do not always share our approach. Despite differences of view, the two branches need to work effectively together to achieve our country's abiding nonproliferation goals.

Future Prospects

What about the future? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic about the prospects for avoiding the further spread of nuclear weapons around the world? It strikes me in thinking about those questions that throughout the past decades, the very gloomy forecasts of a world of more and more nuclear weapons states have not held true.

This is one area of arms control—unfortunately there are too few such areas—where we have succeeded far better than was expected. If, in the words of yet another one of Parkinson's laws, the success of a policy is measured by the catastrophes which do not happen, we have to a large degree met that test—and met it well. This arms control success story should not and cannot be ignored.

Let's look back a bit. In 1958 a special committee of the National Planning Association predicted in a monograph *1970 Without Arms Control* that "by 1970, most nations with appreciable military strength will have in their arsenals nuclear weapons—strategic, tactical or both." Similarly, President Kennedy warned of a world in which by 1975 there would be 15–20 nations with nuclear weapons.

Five countries are, as you know, nuclear weapons states. Also, India has detonated a nuclear explosive. Still the pessimistic predictions have not come to pass.

Instead, the United States and many other countries have put those past decades to good use. Through those efforts we have many building blocks against the spread of nuclear weapons.

Now most countries around the world have come to recognize that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is very much in their interest and that if they are not part of the solution, then they are part of the problem.

But we cannot—dare not—rest on past efforts and established building blocks. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons as prophesied by President Kennedy "into the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world" is a continuing challenge.

With patient effort, and high-level attention and public support, I believe that we can meet that challenge successfully. I know that President Reagan feels very strongly about this. I have been in a number of meetings with him and have not only felt but heard him speak of the sense of urgency which nonproliferation demands. The nuclear genie is out of the bottle but we can—and must—arrest its travels. ■

Western Proposals at MBFR Talks

WESTERN STATEMENT, MAY 24, 1984

On April 19 the Western participants [at the mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) talks] put forward an important new proposal. This initiative alters the longstanding Western requirement for formal agreement on the precise numbers of all military personnel in central Europe before any reductions can be taken. It demonstrates Western flexibility by designing an approach for a successful data exchange avoiding a reversion to the unproductive disputes of the past.

In a spirit of compromise, under the new Western approach, we would require an exchange of data prior to treaty signature and before any reductions take place only on a portion of just the ground forces in the area—namely, combat and combat support forces. In setting aside service support forces, we are deliberately excluding a portion of the forces where we believe much of the discrepancy has lain.

By proposing a new mode for discussing data, the initiative allows for resolution of ambiguities regarding what is counted and how it is counted which have contributed significantly to earlier disagreement. Moreover, the new Western approach does not require a formal agreement on precise figures but only that figures fall within an acceptable range of the sides' estimates.

Finally, this new methodology for exchanging data enables the sides to table official force figures in a wholly revised format with no direct connection with figures tabled earlier in the negotiations.

In all these ways, the new Western approach would facilitate a successful data exchange.

In addition, the new Western proposal also meets a number of Eastern concerns on a range of other important issues. For example, the Western proposal:

- Accepts the Eastern idea of a no-increase commitment on manpower in the reduction area following initial U.S.-Soviet reductions;
- Reduces the period required to reach parity from 7 to 5 years, matching effectively the duration of the reduction process proposed by the East; and
- Accepts the Eastern requirement that U.S. and Soviet reductions should be taken in the same form, to allow for reductions by both the United States and U.S.S.R. essentially in units, with no more than 10% to be taken as individuals.

The new Western proposal thus constitutes a determined effort to resolve the most basic standing in the way of progress in these negotiations and provides a series of additional compromises to promote these negotiations.

Any objective analysis will show that, as in the past, nothing in the Western position is designed to afford unilateral advantage to any participant or side.

Our proposal is not put forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis but in a constructive spirit of compromise. We are prepared to discuss any aspects of it. It would be an unfortunate error on the part of the East if the spirit and substances of the Western move were

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