

# A Chronology of United States Arms Reduction Initiatives, 1946-1982

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Introduction

On September 11, 1945, the U.S. Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, wrote President Harry S. Truman a proposal for international control of atomic bombs:

"If the atomic bomb were merely another though more devastating military weapon...it would be one thing... But I think the bomb instead constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts...it really caps the climax of the race between man's growing technical power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control -- his moral power....."

Stimson proposed and the President authorized approaches to the Soviet Union and Western Allies to seek controls over atomic weapons, to use the benefits of nuclear research "for commercial or humanitarian purposes." This led to a study and report, the "Acheson-Lilienthal Report," made public in March 1946, that called for the creation of an international authority that would hold a monopoly over nuclear research and development. This in turn led to a plan presented at the United Nations by American advisor to Presidents and elder statesman, Bernard Baruch.

The United States had begun an enduring search for a world at peace.

This chronology describes the most important milestones in that search. It is comprehensive but not all-inconclusive; for the search by this nation has extended into far-flung avenues. The American effort ranged from the early scrapping of its war machine and the return of millions of Americans to civilian status in a matter of months, to the ongoing effort to grapple with the nuclear genie, to the exploration of ways to prevent more esoteric and equally odious forms of warfare.

It is vital to understand the historical context of the chronology. The United States was scarcely affected by the devastation of World War II. America possessed unchallenged economic, technological and military power. The world knew the immense power of atomic weapons. American officials

were aware of Soviet research on nuclear weapons, yet felt confident of American strength, and willing to give up the nuclear advantage in order to prevent a nuclear arms race. Despite repeated disappointments, this nation has persisted for the past 36 years.

The negotiation process with the Soviet Union has not been easy. Frequently the United States has been confronted by sweeping Soviet proposals with superficial appeal that left out important safeguards, or were in fact highly prejudicial to Western interests and security.

Throughout the past three decades, the United States has emphasized a step-by-step approach, based on scientific and technological research, and sensitive to the concerns of the USSR and other states. The United States has also always stressed the need for verification, believing that without such measures no arms control measure could be trusted. The Soviet Union has often resisted this approach because of Soviet suspicion of any outside presence within the USSR -- a fear not shared by the United States and West European nations. At times, moreover, American desires for verification provided the pretext for the Soviets to slow or cease negotiations or portray the U.S. as the reluctant partner. Quiet diplomacy has not always won global appeal, but it serves the long-range purpose of achieving meaningful results.

The chronology does not show the steady buildup and modernization of Soviet forces of all types while the USSR preached the virtues of detente.

Also, not shown by the chronology, but important to note, is that from the mid-1970s the American public has become increasingly worried about the growth and modernization of Soviet forces, and wholeheartedly supports the "dual-track" approach of improving Western security while renewing arms reduction efforts.

In sum, the chronology is a document of continuity, hope, disappointment, ingenuity, patience and perseverance. It offers hope that in time and despite the growing complexity and danger of modern weapons, we can achieve the traditional American ideal of peace and security.

HIGHLIGHTS OF INITIATIVES FOR ARMS REDUCTION  
BY THE UNITED STATES

- \* June 14, 1946 - The Baruch Plan for controlling atomic weapons
- \* April 16, 1953 - President Eisenhower's "Chance for Peace" proposal
- \* December 8, 1953 - The U.S. "Atoms for Peace" plan
- \* July 21, 1955 - The U.S. "Open Skies" proposal
- \* January 14, 1957 - Comprehensive U.S. proposal for force limitations
- \* October 25, 1958 - The unilateral suspension of U.S. nuclear tests
- \* June 27, 1960 - U.S. proposal for phase-out of different types of forces
- \* September 25, 1961 - President Kennedy's call for comprehensive disarmament
- \* April 18, 1961 - U.S. three-step comprehensive disarmament proposals
- \* July 25, 1963 - The Treaty outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere
- \* January 21, 1964 - U.S. proposal for a verified freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles
- \* August 17, 1965 - U.S. draft for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty
- \* March 18, 1969 - The U.S. initiates study of a ban on nuclear weapons on the seabed
- \* November 17, 1969 - Beginning of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union
- \* November 25, 1969 - U.S. renounces first-use of chemical agents and all methods of biological warfare
- \* November 24, 1974 - The U.S. and USSR agree, at Vladivostok, to a formula for limiting strategic arms
- \* May 26, 1975 - The U.S. and USSR sign SALT I documents
- \* April 13, 1976 - The U.S. proposes the prohibition of further production of chemical weapons and reduction of existing stockpiles
- \* March 1977 - Secretary of State Vance proposes major nuclear arms reductions to the USSR
- \* November 18, 1981 - President Reagan's initiative for arms reduction and world peace

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES  
ARMS REDUCTION INITIATIVES, 1946-1982

June 14, 1946. Bernard M. Baruch, U.S. representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission, submits detailed U.S. proposals for international control of atomic energy. The "Baruch Plan" proposed "the creation of an International Atomic Energy Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material" and including direct control of all potentially dangerous atomic activities and licensing of all other atomic activities. The Authority was to be empowered to send officials into states to conduct comprehensive inspections for violations of the treaty. Decisions of the Authority were not to be subject to veto in the Security Council. The Baruch plan emphasized the fundamental U.S. position that establishment of international control of atomic energy should precede the prohibition of national atomic forces.

January 20, 1953. President Eisenhower, in his first inaugural address, states that the United States stands ready to engage with any and all others in a joint effort to remove the causes of mutual fear and distrust among nations and thus to make possible drastic reduction of armaments. The sole requisites for undertaking such efforts, he continues, are that, in their purpose, they be aimed logically and honestly toward secure peace for all, and that, in their result, they provide methods by which every participating nation will prove good faith in carrying out its pledge.

April 16, 1953. In his major "Chance for Peace" speech, President Eisenhower proposes that nations set limits on the portion of total production of strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes. National military and security forces might be restricted in size either by a numerical limitation or by an agreed national ratio between states. The President suggests that the resulting savings be applied to a fund for world aid and reconstruction. He calls for the conclusion of an armistice in Korea and the solution of outstanding political problems in Indochina, and Malaya, as well as the Austrian Treaty, peaceful unification of Germany and Korea, and the restoration of independence to the nations of Eastern Europe.

December 8, 1953. President Eisenhower presents to the United Nations General Assembly his "Atoms for Peace" plan, calling for the creation of an international atomic-energy agency which would receive contributions from nations holding stocks of nuclear materials and would utilize them for peaceful purposes. The President also welcomes the General Assembly's resolution of November 28 suggesting a Disarmament Subcommittee.

February 18, 1954. At the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union agree to an exchange of views on disarmament or reduction of armaments, as recommended by the United Nations General Assembly.

August 30, 1954. President Eisenhower signs the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, authorizing the exchange with other countries of information for the peaceful use of atomic energy, and supporting the development of commercial nuclear power.

May 26, 1955. The first comprehensive report of Harold Stassen, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament is presented to the President. It stresses the extreme importance of providing against surprise attack, the absolute necessity of stipulations for an effective inspection system in any agreement, and the role of an aerial component and of scientific instruments and photography in such a system.

1. Nuclear Weapons: Neither American nor foreign scientists are able to devise methods for accounting completely for all past production, and the margin of error in known methods is beyond acceptable limits; there is no method that could search out clandestine weapons; the solution is control of the atom bomb, not visionary, unenforceable "elimination."

2. The United States should accept only rigidly reciprocal proposals.

July 21, 1955. Meeting with the Heads of Government of France, the U.K. and U.S.S.R., President Eisenhower makes his "Open Skies" proposal at a meeting in Geneva. The proposal would protect nations against military buildup and surprise attack. He proposes that the Soviet Union and the United States agree immediately to exchange blueprints of their military establishments and to furnish each other facilities for aerial reconnaissance, in order to provide against surprise attack and as a beginning of a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament.

(In a letter to President Eisenhower, September 19, 1955, Soviet Premier Bulganin, criticized the "Open Skies" proposal for not including overseas bases and not covering the broader need for reducing armaments and blanket elimination of nuclear arms. However Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov later recognized the genuineness of the U.S. proposal.)

October 11, 1955. President Eisenhower, in a letter to Bulganin, asks that the Soviets study further his "open skies" proposal and states the willingness of the United States to accept a Soviet proposal for ground-control teams if the Soviets accept aerial inspection. (Bulganin, in a letter to the President, September 19, 1955, had raised objections to the "open skies" proposal and advocated a control-post system proposed by the U.S.S.R. on May 10.)

March 1, 1956. President Eisenhower, in a letter to Bulganin, adds to his "open skies" proposal a statement that the United States is prepared to work out with other nations suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world will no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons. The President indicates that this idea might be combined with his proposal of December 8, 1953, to furnish nuclear materials to an international agency which would utilize them for peaceful purposes.

March 21, 1956. The United States presents to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee a proposal for a demonstration test area of "open skies" inspection. The United States also proposes immediate exchanges, for a test period, of technical missions for purposes of preliminary study of methods of control and inspection.

(The U.S.S.R. proposed on March 24 to the Disarmament Subcommittee the cessation of thermonuclear tests, the removal of atomic weapons from Germany, the reduction of military budgets, and the gradual reduction of conventional armed forces over a period of two years to the levels specified in the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955.)

January 14, 1957. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge presents the January 12 memorandum to Committee I of the United Nations General Assembly. The memorandum sets forth basic policy on disarmament: Future nuclear production would be restricted to peaceful purposes under adequate inspection; action would be taken at a later stage to reduce existing stockpiles and to convert them to peaceful purposes; when future production is effectively controlled, it will be possible to limit and eventually eliminate nuclear tests; first-stage reductions in conventional arms would limit the United States and the Soviet Union to 2,500,000 men and the United Kingdom and France to 750,000 men; at the same time an effective inspection system, including aerial reconnaissance and ground control, would be established; further reductions would depend on major political settlements; space-missile tests would be inspected, and an international armaments agency would come into being at once.

(The Soviet Union on April 30, 1957 introduced partial proposals in the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee. It accepted the January 14 U.S. force levels proposal, provided the Western powers agree to the second-stage force levels proposed by the Soviet Union on May 10, 1955. The Soviet Union suggested that armaments be cut by 15 percent. During the first

stage of disarmament: an international control organ would collect and analyze "information provided by States" on their implementation of the program and would operate control posts in the "western border regions" of the U.S.S.R., the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and the eastern United States. The use of nuclear weapons would be renounced and tests halted at an early date. The Soviet Union would still abolish foreign bases "within one or two years", reduce foreign forces in Germany by one third, and reduce great-power forces in the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.)

August 2, 1957. Secretary of State Dulles presents in the Disarmament Subcommittee a Western paper proposing a combined system of aerial inspection and ground control. All territory of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Canada would be opened for inspection. Alternatively, there might be an Arctic and Bering Straits zone. If the Soviet Union accepted either of these zones, there might also be a European zone from longitudes 10° west to 60° east, bounded on the south by the 40th parallel. The Western powers are prepared, however, to discuss other proposals if the Soviet Union agrees to include a significant part of its own territory in the European zone.

August 21, 1957. The President announces that the United States will be willing, as part of the United States proposal for a first-step disarmament agreement, to include a suspension of testing of nuclear weapons for a period of up to two years under certain conditions and safeguards. These include Soviet acceptance of the United States position that, within that period, there will be initiated a permanent cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and installation of inspection systems to insure performance. The President also states that until such a first-step arms-control agreement comes into force, the United States will conduct such nuclear testing as the security of the United States requires.

(The Soviet Representative in the Disarmament Subcommittee on August 27 attacked the West and accused the United States of designing its inspection proposals "to contribute to the preparation of aggressive war".)

August 29, 1957. Following consultation with the NATO allies and various other nations, the four Western powers present to the Disarmament Subcommittee a working paper entitled "Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament", intended as "a practical, workable plan for a start on world disarmament." This paper contemplates a convention dealing with the following subjects: (1) the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments; (2) military expenditures; (3) nuclear weapons; (4) the control of fissionable material; (5) nuclear-weapons testing; (6) the

control of objects entering outer space; (7) safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack; (8) an International Control Organization; (9) movement of armaments; and (10) suspension of the convention. It is stated that with ratification of such an agreement, followed by honest observance, this plan would (1) stop all nuclear bomb testing; (2) bring a halt in production of nuclear-bomb materials; (3) start a reduction in nuclear-bomb stockpiles; (4) reduce the dangers of surprise attack through warning systems; and (5) start reductions in armed forces and armaments.

January 12, 1958. Replying to a letter from Premier Bulganin December 10, 1957 that had proposed a cessation of nuclear tests, President Eisenhower proposes that an agreement be made to use outer space for peaceful purposes and to cease nuclear-weapons production. The President also says that in converting nuclear-weapons stockpiles to peaceful uses the United States is willing to make a "greater transfer" than the Soviet Union.

(In a letter to the President February 1, 1958, Bulganin stated that the U.S.S.R. will discuss outer space only if the Western powers agreed to prohibit nuclear weapons, cease tests, and liquidate foreign bases.)

August 22, 1958. President Eisenhower in a public statement welcomes the successful conclusion of the Geneva Meeting of Experts and announces that the United States is prepared "to negotiate an agreement with other nations which have tested nuclear weapons for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the experts' report." If this proposal is accepted in principle by the other nations which have tested nuclear weapons, the President's statement continues, "then in order to facilitate the detailed negotiations the United States is prepared, unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing on its part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the negotiations." As a part of the agreement, on a basis of reciprocity, "the United States would be further prepared to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons on a year-by-year basis subject to a determination at the beginning of each year that: (A) the agreed inspection system is installed and working effectively; and (B) satisfactory progress is being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures."

(In a Pravda interview on August 29, 1958, Khrushchev stated that the Anglo-American refusal to discontinue tests at once shows that the West is really opposed to stopping them. A Soviet note on August 30 accepted the United States invitation to a conference, but proposed that the conference be held at Geneva and demanded that it conclude an "agreement on cessation forever of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons" rather than on their suspension on a year-to-year basis.)

October 25, 1958. A statement by President Eisenhower reaffirms United States willingness, in order to facilitate negotiations for the suspension of nuclear-weapons tests and the establishment of an international control system, to withhold testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the negotiations on October 31, 1958. The President notes that the United Kingdom has similarly declared its willingness to suspend such tests and that the United States still hopes that the U.S.S.R. will do likewise.

April 13, 1959. In a letter to Premier Khrushchev, the President offers an alternative approach to a nuclear-test ban. He proposes that if the U.S.S.R. still continues to insist on a veto on the fact-finding activities of the control system regarding possible underground detonations, a beginning could still be made in putting a testing ban into effect by doing it in phases, starting with a prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests in the atmosphere up to 50 kilometers. Meanwhile, the negotiations could continue in an attempt to resolve the political and technical problems associated with control of underground and outer-space tests.

(In a letter to the President on April 23, 1959, Khrushchev rejected the President's proposal of April 13 for an immediate prohibition of nuclear tests at altitudes up to 50 kilometers on the score that it "does not solve the problem" of a complete prohibition of all nuclear testing and would, moreover, falsely mislead the public, "since in fact tests would continue to be carried out underground and at higher altitudes.")

May 5, 1959. A letter of President Eisenhower to Khrushchev urges technical discussions on the possibility of banning nuclear tests to a greater atmospheric height than that mentioned in his April 13 letter. The President again urges the U.S.S.R. either to accept the control measures which would make possible a complete ban on nuclear-weapons tests or to agree to the United States proposal for a partial ban. The President states that the United States is prepared to explore at Geneva Khrushchev's proposal for a predetermined number of inspections in the territory of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., but adds that the number should be related to scientific facts and detection capabilities.

May 14, 1959. At the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference the Western powers present "for the consideration of the Soviet Government a peace plan containing proposals on German reunification, European security, and a peace settlement. Its parts are all linked together, and it must be viewed as a whole. This plan, dovetailing the timing of conventional-force reductions with steps in the reunification of Germany, envisages a gradual and logical development through three stages of "security" and "reunification" into a fourth and conclusive stage where "a final Peace Settlement" would

be signed "with a Government representing all Germany." As regards reduction of armament, the three Western powers and the U.S.S.R. would in stage II restrict or reduce their armed forces to agreed maximum limits, such, for example, as 2,500,000 each for the United States and the U.S.S.R.; and in stage III they would further limit their armed forces, for example, to 2,100,000 each for the United States and the U.S.S.R., with negotiations aimed at still further reductions, for example, to 1,700,000.

(A letter from Premier Khrushchev to the President noted "with satisfaction" United States readiness to study the proposal for a previously determined number of yearly inspections if there are indications from the control posts of violations. The U.S.S.R., however, maintained that this determined number of visits precluded any necessity of voting; the U.S.S.R. agreed that the number of inspections should not be numerous, but rejected the need for any study of criteria in determining the number of inspections. The U.S.S.R. did not object to having the question of the number of inspections reexamined every two years and agreed to the United States proposal for opening talks on measures to detect high-altitude explosions.)

August 26, 1959. The Department of State announces that, under a Presidential directive, the unilateral suspension of nuclear-weapons testing by the United States, which began on October 31, 1958, and was to continue for one year, will be extended to December 31, 1959. This decision was taken, according to the announcement, in the light of the agreed six weeks' recess announced this day by the Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

June 27, 1960. After a long series of proposals and counter-proposals by the West and the Soviet Union, the United States introduces a new program that provides for: prior notification of missile launchings, inspection of mutually-agreed air bases and launching sites, a nuclear production cut-off, and initial conventional force reductions in the first stage. Second-stage measures would include further reduction of nuclear stockpiles and conventional forces. In the third stage, national forces would be reduced to levels required for internal order and contingents made available for an international peace force, and all armaments not required for these retained forces would be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The program emphasizes the need for technical studies, effective control organization, and verification of all measures. Transition from one stage to the next would require approval by the United Nations Security Council.

(The Soviet-bloc representatives withdrew from the U.N. Ten Nation Disarmament Committee, refusing to remain for the presentation of a new United States program. In a letter to President Eisenhower, Premier Khrushchev attacked the Western side for the failure of the Ten Nation negotiations

and said that the Soviet Union has decided to submit the disarmament question to the United Nations General Assembly. Also on June 27, Foreign Minister Gromyko formally requested the United Nations Secretary-General to place the question on the agenda of the General Assembly.)

August 16, 1960. Ambassador Lodge tells the Disarmament Commission that the United States is ready on a reciprocal basis, to transfer 30,000 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium to peaceful uses if the Soviet Union agrees to a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. He also says that the United States is prepared "to shut down, one by one, under international inspection, our major plants producing enriched uranium and plutonium, if the Soviet Union will shut down equivalent facilities."

September 23, 1960. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Eisenhower proposes a series of steps for the peaceful use of space: (1) Celestial bodies should not be subject to national appropriation by any claims of sovereignty; (2) there should be no warlike activities on celestial bodies; (3) subject to appropriate verification, no nation should "put into orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction"; and (4) there should be a United Nations program of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

(Premier Khrushchev submitted a revised version of the Soviet disarmament proposal of June 2, 1960 to the United Nations General Assembly. The proposal called for reduction of Soviet and American forces to 1,700,000 men in the first stage of a three-stage program.)

(Premier Khrushchev told the General Assembly on October 3, 1960 that all nations yearn for disarmament and that this can not be satisfied by a control over armaments; that if the Soviet proposals on disarmament are accepted, it would be ready to accept any Western proposals on international control; that the Soviet Union agrees in principle that international armed forces should be created after disarmament, but cannot admit that Secretary-General Hammarskjold should command them; and that the machinery of the United Nations must be rebuilt so that the Secretariat and the Security Council will reflect the work and interests of the "three main groups" of capitalist, communist, and neutralist states -- the "Troika" concept.)

June 29, 1961. President Kennedy proposed to Congress the establishment of an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

September 3, 1961. In response to Soviet resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan urged the Soviet Union to agree immediately to an uninspected ban on atmospheric

tests. The Western leaders asserted that existing means of detection were sufficient to identify atmospheric nuclear tests.

(Premier Khrushchev, in a New York Times interview, declared that the Soviet Union would not agree to a test ban until general and complete disarmament had been achieved and France had stopped its nuclear tests. On September 9 the Soviet Union formally rejected the Anglo-American offer of an uninspected test ban.)

September 20, 1961. Following intermittent talks, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a joint statement of principles to guide negotiations for general and complete disarmament. The statement recognized the need for international peace-keeping machinery and international control, and the possibility of taking partial measures before agreement was reached on the entire disarmament program. The Soviet Union refused to accept the U.S. position that verification should apply to forces retained as well as forces disbanded under a disarmament agreement.

September 25, 1961. President Kennedy presents to the UN a new U.S. plan for general and complete disarmament, which called upon negotiating states to seek "the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date...and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved." The President calls for (1) immediate signing of a test ban treaty, independently of other disarmament negotiations; (2) ending production of nuclear weapons and preventing their transfer to non-nuclear powers; (3) preventing transfer of control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers; (4) barring nuclear weapons in outer space; (5) gradually destroying existing nuclear weapons and transferring the nuclear materials to peaceful uses; (6) halting the testing and production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and gradually destroying existing ones; (7) earmarking national forces for call by the United Nations to perform peacekeeping duties, and improving the operation of the UN peacekeeping machinery.

(The Soviet Union the same day pressed its plan for a "troika" administration of the UN, rejected by President Kennedy. The Soviet Union proposed eight points to ease tensions and contribute to disarmament: freezing military budgets; renouncing use of nuclear weapons; prohibiting war propaganda; concluding a non-aggression pact; withdrawing troops from foreign territory; preventing further spread of nuclear weapons; establishing nuclear-free zones; and reducing the danger of surprise attack. On October 12, Premier Khrushchev proposed a ban on nuclear weapons for East and West Germany and disengagement in Central Europe. On October 30, the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear bomb estimated at 57 megatons.)

April 18, 1962. The United States introduces new disarmament proposals. Stage one provides for a three-step, 30 percent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles and other major armaments, restrictions on arms production, reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces to 2.1 million, a nuclear production cutoff and transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses, an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons to powers not now possessing them, a test-ban agreement, advance notification of missile launchings, reports on military spending, measures to reduce the risk of war, establishment of an International Disarmament organization, initial peacekeeping arrangements, and a study of measures to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons stockpiles. Stage two provides for a 50 percent cut of remaining delivery vehicles and armaments, a 50 percent reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces from first-stage levels, reduction of nuclear stocks, dismantling or conversion of certain bases, and further peacekeeping arrangements. Stage three provides for reduction of arms and forces to levels required for internal order, elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals, elimination of remaining bases (except those needed for retained forces), monitoring of military research and strengthening of the UN peace force so that no state could challenge it. The first stage would take three years. No time limit is specified for the other stages. Ultimate decisions on timing, etc., would rest with the Security Council.

(The Soviet Union on April 24 rejected the U.S. proposals. The USSR had on March 14 proposed a far-reaching set of measures that lacked adequate verification, suggested an accelerated timetable that could not have been fulfilled, and would have left the West at a serious disadvantage.)

August 27, 1962. The United States and the United Kingdom introduces two new draft test ban treaties. The first calls for a comprehensive ban on tests, enforced by nationally manned control posts under international supervision and obligatory on-site inspection. The second, offered as a second-choice alternative, calls for a limited ban ending testing in all environments except underground, monitored by national means without the need to establish any international verification machinery.

(The Soviet Union rejected the first U.S.-U.K. proposal and criticized the second for legalizing underground tests. It proposed an "understanding" banning underground tests until a permanent solution was found.)

December 12, 1962. At the disarmament talks, the United States introduces proposals to reduce the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication and recommended informal technical talks. The proposals include advance notification of major military movements, installation of permanent observation posts at major transportation centers, exchange of military missions to promote improved understanding,

the establishment of rapid and reliable communications links between major capitals, the "hot line," and the establishment of an international commission on reduction of the risk of war.

(On June 20, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed the "hot line" agreement.)

June 10, 1963. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union announce that high-level talks would be held in Moscow in July to seek agreement on a test ban. In a speech on settlement of cold-war problems, President Kennedy says the United States would voluntarily suspend nuclear tests in the atmosphere pending negotiation of a test ban agreement, provided other countries would follow suit.

July 25, 1963. The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union initial a treaty outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Underground tests are also outlawed if they result in spreading radioactive debris outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control the explosion is conducted.

September 20, 1963. President Kennedy tells the Soviet Union that the United States is prepared to seek agreements to safeguard against accidental wars and surprise attacks, to control the transfer of nuclear weapons, to convert nuclear materials to peaceful uses, to ban underground testing under adequate inspection and enforcement, and to exclude weapons of mass destruction from outer space. He also proposed a joint U.S.-Soviet moon expedition.

January 21, 1964. At the 17-nation disarmament talks, the United States proposes a "verified freeze" of nuclear delivery vehicles; a verified agreement to halt production of fissionable materials for weapons, and the reciprocal closing of nuclear production facilities on a plant-by-plant basis under international verification; the establishment of observation posts against surprise attack, accident or miscalculation; and agreements to prohibit transfer of nuclear weapons to states not now controlling them, to place under international safeguards and inspection all transfer of nuclear materials for peaceful uses, and to ban all nuclear weapons tests (including underground tests) under effective verification and control.

(The Soviet Union proposed reduction of Western and Soviet forces in Germany, together with establishment of inspection posts to guard against surprise attack, a nuclear-free zone in Germany, reduction of military budgets, and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers.)

April 29, 1965. The United States proposes negotiations intended to prevent the use of outer space and celestial bodies for military purposes. This proposal follows similar initiatives launched by the Allies since 1959.

August 17, 1965. The United States submits a draft nuclear non-proliferation treaty to the UN Seventeen Nation Disarmament Committee. The draft would oblige the nuclear weapons powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to the national control of any country not having them. Non-nuclear nations would undertake to apply International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.

(The Soviet Union responded with a draft treaty submitted to the UN General Assembly September 24 that focussed on banning the transfer or emplacement "directly or indirectly" of nuclear weapons to third states not possessing weapons. This proposal was directed against the discussions of the Western Allies of the U.S. proposal for a Multilateral Force, under which the NATO Allies would have shared in the decision-making, support for and maintenance of certain nuclear weapons systems of the U.S.)

June 16, 1966. The United States and the Soviet Union submit to the UN draft treaties regarding peaceful use of outer space. The treaty was signed on January 27, 1967 and entered into force October 10, 1967.

August 24, 1967. The United States and the Soviet Union submit separate but identical texts of a draft treaty to the Seventeen Nation Disarmament Committee on nuclear non-proliferation. Many revisions are considered by the Committee and changes result from debate in the UN General Assembly.

December 2, 1967. The United States announces that to help allay misgivings about its own intentions, it would place all nuclear facilities in the U.S. under treaty safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Administration, excluding only facilities with "direct national security significance."

July 1, 1968. The United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union and 59 other countries sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. On July 9 President Johnson submits the treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia dimmed prospects for early U.S. ratification of the Treaty. Subsequently in February 1969 President Richard Nixon asked Senate advice and consent of the Treaty, received in March, 1969.

March 18, 1969. President Nixon instructs the American delegation to the Seventeen Nation Disarmament Committee to seek discussion of what would be needed for an international agreement prohibiting the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor and pointed out

that an agreement of this kind would, like the Antarctic and outer space treaties, "prevent an arms race before it has a chance to start."

(The Soviet Union on the same day proposed the complete demilitarization of the Seabed, compared to the U.S. focus on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. objected that the Soviet proposal was unrealistic and unverifiable and therefore not genuine.)

October 7, 1969. After several months of negotiations and consultations with Western allies, the U.S. drafts a treaty with the Soviet Union for the control of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, which is submitted to the UN Committee on Complete Disarmament. (The treaty was the subject of prolonged discussion and revision in the United Nations, winning approval on December 7, 1970.)

November 17, 1969. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union begin in Helsinki and continue to December 22, to resume in 1970.

November 25, 1969. President Richard Nixon declares that the United States unilaterally renounces first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and weapons and unconditionally renounces all methods of biological warfare. Henceforth the U.S. biological program would be confined to research strictly on defined measures of defense such as immunization. The President further instructs the Department of Defense to draw up a plan for the disposal of existing stocks of biological agents and weapons.

February 14, 1970. The United States extends its ban on biological weapons to include toxins (chemical weapons produced through biological or microbic processes).

(At first the Soviet Union and its allies opposed the U.S. proposal, which was supported by a number of states, but on March 30, 1971, the USSR reversed its position.)

April 16, 1970. Formal SALT negotiations open in Vienna. Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union continue for two years. The Soviets at first insist on including all U.S. "forward based systems," intended to protect Europe from Soviet attack, but capable of reaching the western portion of the USSR. The United States points out the inequity of such an approach without reference to the varied Soviet medium and intermediate range air and missile systems directed at Europe. Asymmetries in the weapons systems and strategies of the two powers also complicate the negotiations.

May 20, 1971. The U.S. and the Soviet Union announce their intention in the SALT negotiations to complete an ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.

August 5, 1971. The United States and the Soviet Union submit separate but identical draft texts of an international convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, and calling for their destruction.

September 30, 1971. After months of exploratory talks and negotiations by the SALT delegations, the U.S. signs with the U.S.S.R. an "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." The agreement covers three main areas: (1) a pledge by both parties to maintain and improve safeguards against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; (2) immediate notification of each other, should a risk of nuclear war arise from such incidents, or from detection of unidentified objects on early warning systems or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon; (3) advance notice of any planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of the other party.

The U.S. and USSR also sign an agreement to improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link ("hot line").

April 10, 1972. The United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union sign the convention against biological and toxin weapons.

May 26, 1972. The United States and the Soviet Union represented by President Nixon and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev sign the basic documents of SALT I:

(1) A treaty limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems to two ABM deployment areas so restricted and located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for developing one.

(2) An interim agreement limiting competition in offensive strategic arms and providing further time for negotiations. The agreement essentially freezes at existing levels the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers, operational or under construction on each side and permits an increase in sea-launched ballistic missile launchers up to an agreed level for each state, only with the dismantling or destruction of a corresponding number of older inter-continental ballistic missile or sea-launched ballistic missile launchers.

July 26-27, 1972. U.S. Congress holds hearings on weather and other environmental modification for military purposes, and President Nixon orders the Defense Department to undertake an in-depth review of the military aspects of environmental modification techniques. As a result, the U.S. Government seeks agreement with the USSR to explore the possibilities of an international agreement.

June 22, 1973. The United States and the Soviet Union agree to make the removal of the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons a prime "objective of their policies," to practice restraint in their relations toward each other and toward all countries, and to pursue a policy dedicated toward stability and peace.

July 3, 1974. The United States and the Soviet Union sign a protocol that further limits deployment of strategic defensive armaments to one Anti-Ballistic Missile site for each country.

July 3, 1974. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. sign a treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests. The treaty establishes a nuclear "threshold" prohibiting underground tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons.

October 7, 1974. Negotiations begin between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on a treaty to govern underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

November 24, 1974. Meeting at Vladivostok, President Gerald Ford and Soviet Party Secretary Brezhnev announce agreement on a formula for the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The leaders agree that:

(1) The new agreement will incorporate the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977. (2) The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985.

(3) Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement will include the following limitations: (a) Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles; (b) Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs).

(4) The new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985. (5) Negotiations between the delegations of the U.S. and USSR to work out the new agreement incorporating the foregoing points will resume in Geneva in January 1975.

August 21, 1975. Following suggestions by President Nixon to Party Secretary Brezhnev at the Moscow summit in July, 1974, U.S. and Soviet delegates to the UN Committee on Disarmament table identical draft texts of a convention prohibiting military or any other hostile environmental modification activities. After intensive negotiations at the United Nations, the convention is signed May 18, 1977.

March 31, 1976. The State Department and the White House issue an announcement that the United States and the Soviet Union expect to complete negotiations to limit peaceful nuclear explosions within the next several weeks. The talks were an outgrowth of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban treaty limiting weapons tests only.

April 13, 1976. At the Conference of the U.N. Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva, the United States proposes that there be an arrangement to prohibit further production of chemical weapons and to reduce existing stockpiles, as a first step toward a comprehensive ban.

May 28, 1976. In simultaneous ceremonies in Moscow and Washington, Soviet party leader Brezhnev and President Ford sign a treaty which sets a ceiling of 150 kilotons on an individual underground peaceful nuclear explosion.

July 29, 1976. The President submits the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

July 29, 1976. ACDA Director Fred Ikle asks the Conference of the U.N. Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva to examine ways to restrict the international arms trade.

September 3, 1976. The CCD adjourns in Geneva. Among final actions is the submission of a U.S.-Soviet draft treaty banning environmental warfare, which would be forwarded to the UN General Assembly.

September 30, 1976. During a visit to the U.N., Secretary of State Kissinger states that President Ford would soon outline a three-point program on nuclear nonproliferation, in an effort to see strengthened international controls on the sale and reprocessing of nuclear fuels.

October 28, 1976. The White House releases an announcement by President Ford of a new U.S. policy on both domestic and foreign nuclear issues. Included in the plan are a proposal for an international moratorium on the export of nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities for three years, and strengthening the IAEA. It is expected that a proposed U.S. reprocessing facility in South Carolina might become part of an "evaluation program" suggested in the President's statement.

November 19, 1976. In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly, ACDA Director Ikle proposes that the CCD discuss a ban on radiological materials as weapons.

March 30, 1977. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance proposes in Moscow that the two powers agree to substantial reductions of and qualitative constraints on strategic arms. At the same time, the United States presents an alternative proposal for a SALT II agreement similar to the framework agreed to at Vladivostok in 1974.

(The Soviet Union summarily rejected the U.S. appeal for significant reductions in strategic arms, disputing the value of moving away from the Vladivostok framework and claiming the United States proposal would work to the disadvantage of the USSR.)

June 18, 1979. President Carter and Leonid Brezhnev end their Vienna summit meeting with the signing of the second strategic arms limitation treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. The major provisions included: (1) A ceiling of 2400 strategic missiles and bombers for both to be reached within 6 months of entry into force of the treaty, to be reduced to 2250 by 1981; (2) within the ceiling, no more than 1,320 to be equipped with multiple warheads or cruise missiles; of those, no more than

1200 land-based, sea-based or air-to-surface ballistic missiles with multiple warheads; of those, no more than 820 land-based ICBM's with multiple warheads; (3) Soviets to dismantle 270 missiles to reach the 2250 ceiling; (4) Soviets to stop production and deployment of the SS-16 missile; (5) both may build and deploy a single new type of ICBM; (6) on that new ICBM, no more than 10 warheads, no more than 14 warheads on SLBM's; (7) 1972 ABM Treaty remains in effect; (8) a protocol restricts deployment of land-based mobile ICBM's sea-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles and ICBM's, carried in aircraft until after December 31, 1981; (9) an agreement to be monitored by satellites and other intelligence means; and (10) exchange of letters in which Soviets agree not to increase production rate of Backfire bomber.

July 10, 1979. After the years of negotiation, the United States and the Soviet Union present a draft treaty to ban the use of radiological weapons to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament.

November 18, 1981. President Ronald Reagan in a major address proposes a framework for renewed arms control negotiations that focus on the need for major reductions in all types of arms -- a step forward from Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) to Strategic Arms Reduction (START).

As a first step, the President calls for the resumption of bilateral talks between the United States and Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces. President Reagan announces that the United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. The President comments, "This would be an historic step. With Soviet agreement, we could together substantially reduce the dread threat of nuclear war which hangs over the people of Europe. This, like the first footstep on the moon, would be a giant step for mankind."

President Reagan points out that during the past six years, while the United States deployed no new intermediate range missiles, and withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe, the Soviet Union deployed 750 warheads on mobile, accurate ballistic missiles.

The President proposes the opening of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in early 1982 with a pledge to make proposals for "genuinely serious nuclear arms reductions resulting in levels that are equal and verifiable."

President Reagan also calls for efforts to achieve equality at lower levels of conventional forces in Europe. "The defense needs of the Soviet Union hardly call for maintaining more combat divisions in East Germany today than were in the whole Allied invasion force that landed in Normany on D-Day," he states. "The Soviet Union could make no more convincing contribution to peace in Europe -- and in the world -- than by agreeing to reduce its conventional forces significantly and constrain the potential for sudden aggression," he adds.

The President calls for renewed efforts by both sides to develop effective measures that would reduce the danger of surprise attack. He supports a Western proposal at the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

January 30, 1982. Intermediate-range Nuclear Force negotiations between the United States and Soviets begin in Geneva.

March 31, 1982. President Reagan calls for negotiations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. "to substantially reduce nuclear weapons and make an important breakthrough for lasting peace on earth."

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