

SALT II - RENEGOTIATION

ADMINISTRATION & SOVIET POSITION

SOME ADMINISTRATION AND SOVIET SPOKESMEN SUGGEST THAT REJECTION OR SIGNIFICANT AMENDMENT OF THE PROPOSED TREATY WOULD VIRTUALLY END FUTURE SALT NEGOTIATIONS.

CONTRARY ASSESSMENTS

AS INDICATED IN THE ATTACHED STATEMENTS, OTHERS INCLUDING GEORGI ARBATOV, GENERAL ROWNEY, PROFESSOR PIPES, ET AL. HAVE TAKEN DIFFERENT VIEWS.

[U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee  
John Tower, Chairman]

[S.F. Kraemer]

DEC 20, 1979

**SALT II - RENEGOTIATION**

GEORGI ARBATOV

Member, Soviet Praesidium  
Director, USSR Institute  
for the US & Canada  
A Senior Soviet SALT Spokesman

May 27, 1979

ABC-TV  
Issues & Answers

Mr. Koppel:

Dr. Arbatov, President Carter has already left himself, and perhaps -- if the Soviet Union is willing to take it -- the Soviet Union, a loophole. He says if by some chance SALT II is not ratified by the US Senate, he would be prepared to abide by the terms of the treaty as though it had been signed. Would the Soviet Union not be prepared to make the same agreement?

Dr. Arbatov:

I would prefer very much for the treaty to be ratified.... (Inaudible) (?There would be damage?) limitation operations, which would be discussed at the moment when they will be, but I think too much discussions about them now can become some sort of self-fulfilling prophecy.

Mr. Clark:

The realistic possibility, and it may be a probability is that the Treaty will be amended quite significantly in the Senate.... Why aren't you prepared to accept this and if necessary go back to the bargaining table again?

Dr. Arbatov:

Well what does it mean to accept? We know about it. We have to take it as a fact of life that you are difficult partners ....It will be very difficult. At the same time, it is not the end....

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Dr. ARBATOV has been cited as follows by Senator Jake GARN

(from an article by Charles Corddry, "SALT Pact Debated",  
Baltimore Sun, June 5, 1979)

"Senator Garn scoffed at such dire predictions. Mr. Brezhnev had talked publicly of a return to the cold war if the treaty was not ratified, the senator said. But he had asked Georgi Arbatov, the Kremlin's leading 'Americanologist,' what would really happen.

"Though Mr. Arbatov might deny it now, Mr. Garn said, the Russian had told the senator that there would be denunciatory editorials and other complaining for a while, and then the Russians would go back to the negotiating table."

## SALT II - RENEGOTIATION

Lt. General Edward ROWNY (USA, Ret.)  
former JCS representative for SALT

October 9, 1979  
Senate Armed Services Committee  
Hearings, pp. 978-9

Before beginning my statement, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate my belief in the utility of negotiating limitations on strategic offensive arms. More than 20 years ago I began to express my views on the desirability of establishing equal levels of strategic capabilities between the superpowers at the lowest possible levels. It was largely because of my belief in arms control that I was selected to be the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to the U.S. SALT negotiating team. After 6½ years at the negotiating table I have not changed my fundamental belief in arms control, providing, and only providing, that agreements reached do not undermine our national security. Unfortunately, the treaty now before the Senate is detrimental to our national security. If ratified in its present form, the treaty will undercut our ability to deter the Soviet Union from further adventurous and aggressive acts. Rather than help restore stability in times of crisis, the net result of the military imbalance established by the treaty will cause it to detract from that goal. The treaty will undercut or undermine NATO solidarity and allied cohesion.

Because we failed to negotiate an equitable and verifiable treaty, I feel it must be amended. In our zeal to reach an agreement, the United States made too many concessions. We permitted large inequalities favoring the U.S.S.R. to be written into the agreement. To codify and legislate into law an unequal agreement will only exacerbate our strategic inferiority. It will make it a more costly and more lengthy process for us to regain strategic parity. Agreeing to an unequal SALT II will make it impossible for there to be an equal SALT III agreement.

Amending this treaty will not, as some claim, spell the end to arms negotiations. Rather, the U.S.S.R. can be expected to agree to a treaty which is more equitable and more verifiable. The Soviets want and need an agreement on strategic arms for the fundamental reason that they believe an agreement on SALT is in their long-term interests. President Brezhnev has committed his prestige to getting an agreement. He and his advisers, among them undoubtedly his successor, know that the Soviet Union, with one-half the gross national product of the United States, cannot continue to spend 12 to 14-percent of the U.S.S.R.'s GNP indefinitely for arms. They realize that the United States, because of its superior economy and because it possesses by far the greater technological base, if once aroused, can easily outdistance the U.S.S.R. in any competition in strategic armament. Soviet leaders realize that an agreement best permits them to continue their ability to pursue a policy of détente which allows them to spread what they call good socialism at the expense of evil capitalism. Brezhnev and his advisers know that an agreement on SALT will establish a climate of normalization which helps them to gain most-favored-nation status and assists them to get credits on easy terms. It will ease their ability to obtain the technology transfers they so badly need.

Mr. Chairman, I have gone into some length on the reasons why the Soviets want and need a treaty because I feel we fail to understand Soviet objectives and their approach to arms control. Recognizing that we have made SALT the centerpiece of our foreign policy, the Soviets have concealed their own desire for an agreement. Realizing that we have linked our defense planning to expectations from an arms control agreement while they have kept the two separate, the Soviets have had every reason to allow us to woo them, to be the demandeur. Up until now, they have only had to wait us out, confident in the belief that the United States will not only insist that there is an agreement, but will enter into an agreement that is favorable to the U.S.S.R.

**SALT II - RENEGOTIATION**

Dr. Richard PIPES  
Professor, Harvard University

October 16, 1979  
Senate Armed Services Committee  
SALT II Hearings, p. 1311

Senator Tower:

Dr. Pipes, those who support the treaty cast their argument in these terms: Regardless of its flaws, we would be better off with the treaty than without it, and that ratifying this treaty with its imperfections is preferable to rejecting it because of the consequences of rejection.

Along with that theme runs the contention that if we reject this treaty, we reject all prospects of further arms limitation or reduction talks with the Soviets. What is your view on that?

Professor Pipes:

I will answer this question in two ways. I do not like the premise of it, that we are in so bad a situation that we must take any treaty we can get. I think this is a defeatist attitude. That is the mentality that a defeated country has to adopt. France may have had to adopt such an attitude vis-a-vis Nazi Germany in 1940. We are not in that position. I think this country ought not commit itself to any treaty that is not in its opinion a good treaty and one that serves its interest; it ought not accept a treaty just because it is said to be the best it can get.

Nor do I believe that its rejection would lead to the collapse of arms limitation negotiations. I think you can have a great variety of ways of remedying this contingency.

It is entirely possible that one may be able to renegotiate this treaty after a certain initial period of mutual hostility and a lot of noise from Moscow. A new administration in Russia is coming relatively soon; Mr. Brezhnev's health is failing and I understand he has not been seen publicly in over a week. This new Soviet administration may welcome the reopening of negotiations. If Russian and Soviet history give us any guide in this respect, every new Russian or Soviet administration is so weak in its initial period that it is very liberal internally and very passive externally, being willing to make all sorts of concessions to gain time to establish its authority. Therefore, a new Soviet administration may be willing to renegotiate this treaty and make concessions which the old one was not.

Second, we could keep the terms of this treaty loosely in effect even without having a treaty. You can have bilateral agreements on all kinds of issues, but above all I would hope for a renegotiating of the treaty, and I think this is entirely possible.

Senator Tower:

Do you consider it possible that we might ultimately achieve a better treaty in SALT III than what we have now if, in the intervening years we make improvements in our own capabilities across the board from conventional to theater nuclear to strategic capabilities?

Mr. Pipes:

I strongly think this to be the case.

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Dr. Richard PIPES  
Professor, Harvard University

October 16, 1979  
Senate Armed Services Committee  
SALT II Hearings, p. 1320

Senator Warner:

Professor, you said earlier that you felt the tabling followed by the renegotiation was the method that you would recommend. Let's assume that the Senate were to take that final conclusion, would reach it in the framework just before Christmas or maybe perhaps earlier in 1980, from the juncture on, to freeze the calculation, let's just say the Senate makes that decision January 31, what is the timetable that you feel that we could follow in terms of negotiation?

Professor Pipes:

I suspect that, realistically, during 1 year nothing would happen.

Senator Warner:

They would wait for a new President?

Professor Pipes:

Essentially, we would have to wait for a new administration, which would then be able to renegotiate. I can't see the Carter administration being able to go back and renegotiate; I don't think they would be willing to do that.

And during this period, exactly the same thing would likely happen as happened with SALT I--the interim agreement--it was just kept up and both sides essentially maintained its terms without being formally bound by them.

Senator Warner:

Live within the framework of the treaty?

Professor Pipes:

That is correct, which can be easily done because the treaty is designed for an 8-year period, and not much could happen in one year, anyway.

Senator Warner:

And if the Soviets are serious about their attempts to arrive at an arms limitation agreement, in all likelihood they would comply?

Professor Pipes:

I think they would.

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Dr. Richard PIPES  
Professor, Harvard University

October 16, 1979  
Senate Armed Services Committee  
SALT II Hearings, P. 1341

Professor Pipes:

We need adequate systems to blunt their first strike option. That may involve an M-X, that may involve another bomber. It may involve other things, maybe defense. I am not qualified to say. You should go to the technical specialists and ask what would it take to blunt the Soviet strategic forces as deployed in 1985, so that they cannot dream of a successful first strike. That is what is needed. If we have such forces, we can sit down with the Russians and negotiate. If we don't have it, there will be nothing to negotiate.

Senator Exon:

So to sum up, you are saying that we are not in a position at this time to sit down with them--that SALT II obviously is bad in your opinion?

Professor Pipes:

Yes.

Senator Exon:

A big mistake?

Professor Pipes:

It is a mistake.

Senator Exon:

And you also feel that regardless of who was negotiating a treaty with them now it could not successfully be accomplished?

Professor Pipes:

Essentially because we are negotiating with them from a position of increasing weakness. Now I imagine we might, if we fund various programs, even before they are deployed, go to the Russians and propose serious negotiations. You can't bluff them in this but if the moneys are appropriated and the programs are authorized, you can then go to the Russians and say, look, we have shown you we are in earnest. We are going to build this and that. Now let us sit down and talk about a serious arms limitation treaty and cut back forces. Then you can do it because they are reasonable and rational men.

But you have to frustrate their plans of a first strike capability. We have not done so and are not likely to do so as long as we think in our terms and not theirs. You have to think in terms of their strategy, not in ours, which is I think 30 years out of date.