

## Arms Control and NATO INF Modernization

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Background: In order to sustain NATO's deterrent strategy in the face of the massive buildup of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), NATO ministers agreed in December 1979 to modernize the alliance's INF, while pursuing US-Soviet negotiations on arms control involving those forces. This decision was reconfirmed by NATO in May 1982. In the absence of a full arms control agreement arising out of US-Soviet INF negotiations, the US will deploy 108 Pershing IIs and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), beginning in December 1983. The new systems will be mobile and capable of dispersal in times of crisis, thus enhancing their survivability and reducing the danger of a Soviet preemptive attack. These deployments have not been forced on Europe but, rather, were arrived at through a process of genuine consultation and joint decision with our NATO partners. Modernization will not increase the risk of a nuclear war limited to Europe; on the contrary, the deployments will serve to reduce the risks of Soviet attack by reminding the Soviets that they cannot hope to limit a nuclear war to the territory of others.

Soviet deployment: The need for NATO modernization stems from the fact that in the mid-1970s, the Soviets began deploying the triple-warhead SS-20, exacerbating the threat to our European allies and adding to an already destabilizing imbalance in INF.

- The Soviets currently deploy some 315 mobile SS-20s, with 945 warheads, in addition to 280 single-warhead SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, for a total of more than 1,200 warheads on longer range INF missiles (not counting refires). NATO has no similar systems deployed.
- This deployment gives the Soviets a capability to hit, accurately and in great number, targets located anywhere in Western Europe from locations deep within the USSR far beyond the range of any of NATO's European-based systems.

If deterrence is to be maintained, the alliance must move to redress the imbalance, either through negotiation or, in the event a concrete INF arms control agreement obviating the need for GLCMs and Pershing IIs is not achieved, through modernization.

US arms control proposal: NATO's INF modernization has not set back the prospects of arms control but, in fact, has forced the Soviets to accept, in principle at least, the need to limit their own nuclear weapons. As a result of NATO's demonstrated resolve to modernize its nuclear forces, the USSR has been persuaded to put on the negotiating table, for the first time, nuclear forces that threaten the allies. Without NATO modernization, there would be no prospect of reducing the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

We are now negotiating with the Soviets in Geneva on the basis of the President's November 18, 1981 proposal to cancel deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs in exchange for elimination of all Soviet SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s. We are focusing on longer range INF missiles because they are the most destabilizing systems. The US proposal, if carried out, would be a major step toward achieving stability at dramatically reduced levels of forces. During the first round of negotiations in Geneva, the US tabled a treaty that embodied this proposal. Both sides have had a chance to set forth their respective positions and to ask questions about the position of the other side. The talks have been serious and businesslike; we intend to consider Soviet proposals and to negotiate in good faith.

Soviet objectives: Soviet proposals made thus far contain elements that cannot provide a basis for an equitable and verifiable agreement. They would permit the Soviets to keep intermediate-range nuclear missiles while prohibiting comparable US systems. A Soviet proposal outlined earlier this year would not require destruction of a single SS-20 missile, but the proposal would force the cancellation of NATO's modernization program and the virtual elimination of US nuclear-capable aircraft from Europe. The Soviet proposal, based on contrived claims that a balance exists in INF, includes UK and French systems and calls for reductions from an unequal starting point, which would give the USSR an overwhelming advantage.

A so-called unilateral moratorium on further deployment of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles, announced by President Brezhnev, allows the Soviets to retain all of their currently deployed INF missiles but calls for a halt in the NATO deployment preparations, thus prohibiting NATO from fielding comparable systems. Since this "moratorium" was declared, the Soviets have continued to deploy new SS-20 missiles and to construct facilities for still more of them. The Soviet objective clearly is to forestall NATO deployment without sacrificing Soviet INF superiority. NATO must remain committed to modernization of its INF if it is to convince the Soviets that they have no alternative to serious negotiations toward reducing the nuclear threat.