

# Preserving Freedom and Security

June 13, 1984



United States Department of State  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*  
Washington, D.C.

*Following is a statement by Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., June 13, 1984.*

No issue is of greater importance to the Administration or to the American people than war and peace. As President Reagan has said, "We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our principles and friends while preventing a holocaust." There is no escaping this dual responsibility. Indeed, the task of preserving our freedom and security has never been more important or more complex than it is today.

A sound national security policy rests on the conviction that, whatever our differences, the United States and the Soviet Union have a profound common interest in avoiding nuclear war and its unimaginable consequences. A responsible national security policy must include both a firm resolve to maintain deterrent forces and an active pursuit of arms control to restrain competition. That is our policy.

Arms control is not a panacea for our problems around the world. It is one facet of our relationship with the Soviet Union, albeit a very important one.

It is useful to keep in mind what nuclear arms control can and cannot do. Arms control cannot:

- Eliminate the threat of nuclear war. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented.

- Save vast amounts of money. Nuclear forces constitute about 15% of the budget of the Defense Department.
- Substantially reduce casualties or damage should a nuclear war occur. A small number of weapons can do catastrophic damage.

Arms control, however, can:

- Substantially reduce nuclear forces.
- If approached properly (that is, if the constraints encourage an evolution toward smaller, more survivable, and more stable forces on both sides), arms control can enhance stability and reduce the risk of war.

We must bear in mind that progress in arms control requires good faith bargaining on both sides and also depends on many factors beyond the substance of our proposals. For arms control to succeed, we must work to shape the conditions that make success possible: we must maintain the balance of power and ensure the strength of our alliances even as we recognize the legitimate security concerns of our adversaries.

Modernization of our military forces is an important—and essential—element of our approach to preserving the balance and creating an environment in which arms control can be successful. As you know, during the past decade or more, Soviet military expenditures have, in many vital categories, far outstripped our own. The President's modernization

program is designed to restore the balance, enhance deterrence, and increase Soviet incentives to negotiate equitable, verifiable arms control agreements. Modernization is, thus, an integral part of our national security policy that includes both effective deterrence and effective arms control.

In all of the many arms control efforts this Administration has undertaken, we are guided by four objectives.

**Reductions.** We seek agreements that actually constrain the military capabilities of the parties through substantial reductions in weapons and forces, not merely freezing them at existing or higher levels.

**Equality.** The final result should be equal or equivalent levels of forces on both sides. An agreement that legitimizes unequal forces creates instability which could unravel the agreement and may, over time, increase the risk of conflict.

**Stability.** An agreement must improve the stability of deterrence in a crisis. If each side's forces are secure enough to survive an all-out attack, the incentive to preempt in a crisis or confrontation will be minimized. This is an important message of the bipartisan Scowcroft commission's report on the future of our strategic forces.

**Verifiability.** Finally, arms control agreements must be effectively verifiable. In the past, agreements for which compliance cannot be verified have generated mistrust and suspicion rather than reinforced the prospects with greater stability. The President's January report to Congress finding Soviet violations or probable violations of several arms control agreements underscores the need for effective verification.

Building on these four principles, this Administration has undertaken an unprecedented range of arms control negotiations across the whole spectrum of East-West security issues. As part of our effort to create an environment conducive to successful negotiations, the Administration has adopted a policy of not taking actions that would undercut existing strategic arms agreements, provided the Soviet Union exercises equal restraint. This continues to be our policy.

Let me turn now to several of the more significant subjects.

### Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

The major goal of our approach to strategic arms control is to enhance stability and reduce the risk of war through significant reductions in U.S.

and Soviet ballistic missile forces, particularly ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]. As you are well aware, these systems can present special problems. Reduced reliance on ICBMs—especially large MIRVed [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle] ICBMs—would directly diminish the incentive for one side to use its nuclear weapons first in a crisis against elements of the other side's strategic deterrent.

Thus, the heart of our position in START [strategic arms reduction talks] is a substantial reduction in the number of ballistic missile warheads. After close consultation with Congress, we have proposed to accomplish these reductions by means of a "build-down," where each side reduces more weapons than it deploys until the agreed limit is reached.

In addition, we have been sensitive to Soviet concerns that our position requires extensive restructuring of their strategic force. Consequently, over the past year we made several modifications to our original proposal. We tabled a draft treaty that collapsed the two phases envisioned in our original proposal into a single agreement, making clear that all systems would be limited from the outset. We also demonstrated flexibility and solicited Soviet ideas on how to reduce the current large disparity in ballistic missile throw-weight. Finally, the President has communicated our willingness to negotiate tradeoffs between areas of comparative U.S. and Soviet advantage.

Soviet responsiveness to our concerns over the course of five rounds of negotiation has been less than we would have liked, but they have taken some positive steps. While our positions remain far apart, the Soviets have indicated their willingness to discuss reductions in their nuclear delivery vehicles and have offered some changes in their own position. For the most part, however, the Soviet proposals are designed to allow them to retain their advantage in ballistic missile destructive power and even to increase the number of their ballistic missile warheads.

We believe our proposal for tradeoffs could pave the way for future progress. But, unfortunately, the Soviets tied progress in START to preventing INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] deployments in Europe. Last December, they refused to agree to a resumption date for START, apparently due to frustration over their failure to prevent the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs [ground-launched cruise

missiles]. What is needed now is for the Soviets to return to the negotiating table. It is in their interest as well as ours.

### Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

Our proposals in negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces further underscore our commitment to the goal of reductions in nuclear weapons. The President's objective in these negotiations, familiar to all, was even more far reaching than in START—to eliminate an entire category of missiles on a global basis. When the Soviet Union found this approach too far reaching, we proposed an interim solution whereby we would significantly reduce our planned deployments if the Soviet Union would reduce its SS-4s, 5s, and 20s to an equal number of warheads. However, the Soviets rejected this interim approach as well, since any outcome which would allow the deployment of a single U.S. intermediate-range missile is inconsistent with their policy of maintaining a monopoly of such missiles in Europe and Asia. We again modified our position several times during 1983 to take account of express Soviet concerns regarding Pershing II, aircraft limitations, and global constraints.

Nevertheless, the Soviets remained insistent on preserving their monopoly of these missiles. Every Soviet proposal permits none for the United States. Their final idea, proffered immediately prior to breaking off negotiations, would have had each side reduce actual or planned deployments by 572 warheads—thus leaving them 700 warheads and the United States zero.

The Soviet Union attributed its walkout to the initiation of the U.S. deployment of INF missiles in Europe. There is no justification for the Soviet walkout. We negotiated in good faith despite the fact that during the 2 years of negotiation the Soviet Union deployed over 100 new SS-20 missiles with more than 300 warheads. Moreover, many U.S. nuclear weapons have been and are in the process of being withdrawn from Europe under decisions taken by NATO ministers in 1979 and 1983. By the time our INF deployments are complete, more than five warheads will have been withdrawn for every new one deployed.

We are ready to resume negotiations—in both START and INF—at any time and place, without preconditions. Our proposals are fair and workable. All the elements for an agreement are on the table. We hope the Soviet Union will

come to recognize that its policy of non-negotiation and countermeasures is not intimidating Western publics.

### **Nuclear Testing**

On nuclear testing limitations, the Administration determined that the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and its companion, the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, are not effectively verifiable in their present form. On a number of occasions last year, we approached the Soviets and invited them to discuss with us verification improvements to these accords. Each time, the U.S.S.R. rebuffed our request for talks. We remain determined to make progress in this area, but our efforts have been made much more difficult by the Soviet attitude. Possible next steps on this issue are under active review.

### **Space Arms Control**

The United States has long been committed to the exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes. We played a leading role in formulating the considerable body of international law regarding space. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space of 1968 are notable examples. The Charter of the United Nations also includes provisions germane to outer space.

The United States does not seek an arms race in space, nor do we underestimate the current and potential future threat of Soviet antisatellite weapons. The Administration has been seriously studying the question of whether constraints on space weapons or activities could be found that would be equitable, verifiable, and compatible with U.S. security. The President's report on U.S. policy on controlling antisatellite weapons, sent to Congress in April, provides the initial findings of this study. We are continuing on an urgent basis our studies to see whether acceptable measures banning or limiting specific weapons systems can be identified.

### **Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)**

In addition to our efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, we and our allies have continued discussions with the Warsaw Pact nations on the mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces in central Europe. The United States is playing a constructive role, broadening the scope of the East-West arms control agenda and pursuing reductions in conventional forces to lower, equal levels. The major stumbling block for some time has been the discrepancy between the manpower figures provided by the Warsaw Pact and our estimates of those forces. We, with our NATO allies, recently proposed a new initiative designed to resolve this problem, which we hope will lead to serious negotiations on verifiable reductions to parity. The initial Soviet response, however, is not encouraging.

### **Chemical Weapons**

Our major challenge in the area of chemical weapons is to reestablish the longstanding code of restraint against the use of chemical weapons. The United States seeks the total elimination of chemical weapons. In April, Vice President Bush presented to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a draft treaty for a comprehensive ban on their development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use. The draft treaty also contains innovative verification provisions that we hope the Soviet Union will be willing to address. We firmly believe that the chemical weapons problem demands a radical solution, and we are prepared to go forth with one.

### **Confidence-building Measures**

Complementing our proposals to reduce nuclear and conventional forces, we are proposing confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war as the result of surprise attack, accident, or miscalculation. Over the last year, we and the Soviets have held a series of constructive meetings on upgrading the "hotline," the direct communications link between Washington and Moscow.

In START and in INF, we have made a number of proposals, such as for prior notification of ballistic missile launches and major military exercises and expanded exchanges of military force data.

In the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, the United States, with its allies, is pursuing additional measures on notification and inspection of military exercises. The Soviet Union has not accepted these proposals, focusing instead on a declaration of the non-use of force. As the President said in Dublin:

If discussions on reaffirming the principle not to use force, a principle in which we believe so deeply, will bring the Soviet Union to negotiate agreements which will give concrete, new meaning to that principle, we will gladly enter into such discussions.

Lastly, both East and West are already routinely exchanging notification of exercises that might be otherwise misinterpreted. We believe these practices should be broadened and made mandatory.

### **Conclusion**

Ultimate success in these arms control efforts will depend on a number of factors: credible deterrent forces, a strong alliance, and a willingness to work together to conclude balanced and effective agreements which safeguard each nation's interests. But these conditions will, in turn, depend on the qualities that we as a nation bring to the negotiating table: patience, perseverance, and unity. Just as cohesion among allies is crucial to the West's position in such negotiations as INF and MBFR, unity in this country is critical to progress in all these negotiations. If we appear divided, the Soviets will conclude that they can accomplish at least some of their objectives without negotiations, without compromise, and without constraints on their forces. On the other hand, constructive bipartisan support of our arms control proposals and strategic mod-

ernization programs will advance the prospects for arms control.

President Reagan has often spoken of his desire to build a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. His approach is based on credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not yet taken up this challenge. The shrill tenor of recent Soviet statements directed toward the United States is disappointing. While we have shown flexibility in both our INF and START proposals and have made clear

we will meet the Soviets half way should they return to Geneva, they still refuse to reestablish the nuclear arms control dialogue. Success in arms control will require substantial changes in the Soviet approach.

We continue to express our willingness to resume these negotiations any time, without preconditions. We have no intention of sacrificing our basic objectives of reductions, equality, stability, and verification. Yet we realize there

may be more than one way to achieve these objectives, and the President has made clear that there is flexibility in our approach. We stand ready; we have taken the first step. Now it is up to the Soviets to respond. ■

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Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • July 1984  
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Washington, D.C. 20520

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