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CBM INITIATIVES OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

-- In his famous November 18, 1981 speech which announced the so-called "Zero Option" for the total elimination of LRINF missiles, President Reagan included measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding as one of his four major arms control agenda items along with START, INF, and limits on conventional forces such as MBFR.

-- Even prior to that speech, the President had committed the United States to the process which led to the creation of the CDE Conference as an out-growth of the Madrid CSCE Conference.

Bilateral Initiatives with the Soviet Union

-- In 1982, President Reagan proposed that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. provide advance notification of all ballistic missile launches and of major exercises of strategic forces and called for an expanded exchange of data on military forces.

-- Subsequently, the United States proposed in the START Talks the creation of a CBMs working group which the Soviet Union resisted and then agreed just prior to walking out of the talks.

-- In the new negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms in Geneva, the START negotiating group has proposed again that a CBMs working group be created, but the Soviet Union has not responded in the first two rounds of talks.

-- In 1983, based upon an extensive review of new approaches to crisis management and confidence-building, President Reagan endorsed the four recommendations of Secretary Weinberger for:

- (1) an upgrade of the Hotline to improve speed and permit the transmission of facimile transmissions,
- (2) a Joint Military Communications Link (JMCL)
- (3) improved capital to embassy communications for both sides.
- (4) agreements to facilitate exchanges in the event of a nuclear incident involving unauthorized groups or individuals

Other Related Items

-- The Reagan Administration has placed great emphasis on the importance of maintaining stable military balance. Toward that end the Reagan Administration has invested heavily in defense programs including its "Strategic Modernization Program" and has pursued its "Emerging Technologies" initiative with its NATO allies to improve conventional defenses.

-- The Reagan Strategic Modernization Program has included large increases in investment in improved command, control, communications, and intelligence in order to enhance stability, and the Administration has undertaken a number of technical and procedural initiatives to improve crisis management and emergency preparedness.

-- Reagan Administration arms control initiatives in START and INF have stressed deep, perhaps even radical reductions in nuclear arms. The Administration has also stressed the opportunities that its Strategic Defense Initiative might offer for even greater reductions in offensive nuclear arms and a greater emphasis on defensive rather than offensive arms. While the SDI is a research program, some possibilities for its use include limited defenses against accidental launches, improved survivability of deterrent forces and C³I, as well as ~~broader~~ broader possibilities.

-- The Reagan Administration continues to study CBM options such as the concept of Risk Reduction Centers and has worked closely with interested members of Congress in a bipartisan way. In this regard, President Reagan has spoken of the evolution of a more effective crisis management system.

-- Agreements on two of the four Weinberger initiatives have already been reached with the Soviet Union; namely.

(1) In July, 1984, the US and the USSR concluded an agreement to upgrade the Direct Communications Link (DCL), also called the Hotline, with facsimile.

(2) In June, 1985, at the SCC, the two nations concluded an agreement under the Accidents Measures Agreement which is designed to facilitate exchanges in the event of a nuclear incident involving unauthorized parties.

-- In September, 1984, at the UNGA, President Reagan proposed a number of measures to increase openness and understanding including regular cabinet level meetings on a range of bilateral issues, exchanges of information on five-year weapons procurement and development plans, exchange of observers at military exercises, and even an exchange of experts to measure nuclear test yields directly. In July 1985, the President made a unilateral invitation to the Soviet Union to send experts to the US nuclear test site.

-- In May, 1985, at Strasbourg, the President proposed further exchanges of observers at military exercises and locations and regular high level military contacts. He also repeated his offers on other CBMs such as the JMCL and willingness to discuss at the CDE the Soviet Non Use of Force proposal in the context of Soviet agreement on concrete CBMs.

Multilateral

-- The United States worked closely with our Allies to bring about the Stockholm CDE Conference and helped develop the Western position which includes information exchanges on air and ground forces in Europe, forecasts, notifications of, and mandatory invitations to various military activities, on-site inspection of these activities, and procedures for improved communications between participants.

-- At MBFR, the United States has vigorously supported a number of NATO initiatives such as prior notification of "out of garrison activities, troop transfers, controlled entry and exit surveillance points, permitted aerial surveillance, data exchange on ground forces, and non-interference with National Technical Means of Verification.

-- Recently, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan concluded an agreement designed to facilitate communications regarding air traffic in the Western Pacific. This followed the shooting down of a Korean airliner by the Soviet Union in the Far East.