

# The Secretary of State



Speech

March 22, 1976  
Dallas, Texas

Bureau of Public Affairs  
Office of Media Services

## FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the World Affairs Council and Southern Methodist University.*

I have come here today to talk to you about the vital and intimate relationship between America's foreign policy and our national security. It is appropriate that I do so in Texas, a State so long dedicated to a strong and resolute America; a State that has given our Nation three distinguished Americans who presently serve in Washington and whom I am proud to consider friends—Bill Clements, the Deputy Secretary of Defense; George Mahon, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives; and John Tower of the Senate Armed Services Committee. All three of these men have worked long and hard to assure a strong defense for America. All three deserve the grateful thanks of their countrymen.

As Secretary of State I am not, of course, directly involved in the preparation of our defense budget or in decisions regarding particular weapons programs. But as the President's principal advisor on foreign policy, no one knows better than I that a strong defense is crucial for our role in the world. For a great and responsible power, diplomacy without strength would be empty. If we were weak we could not negotiate; we could only hope or accommodate. It is the confidence of strength that permits us to act with conciliation and responsibility to help shape a more peaceful world.

Other nations must not be led to doubt either our strength or our resolution. For how others see us determines the risks they are prepared to run and the degree to which they are willing to place confidence in our policies. If adversaries consider

us weak or irresolute, testing and crises are inevitable. If allies doubt our constancy, retreat and political shifts are certain.

And so, as Secretary of State, I am inevitably a partisan of a strong America and a strong defense as the underpinning of a strong foreign policy. I have a responsibility to make clear to the American people and to other nations that our power is indeed adequate to our current challenges, that we are improving our forces to meet changing conditions, that America understands its interests and values and will defend them, and that the American people will never permit those hostile to us to shape the world in which we live.

I do not accept the propositions that other nations have gained military ascendancy over us, that the Administration has neglected our defenses, or that negotiations to reduce the threat of nuclear war are unwise. These charges sound remarkably like the "missile gap" claims which aroused anxieties in 1960 only to dissolve suddenly a few weeks after the election.

We do face serious challenges to our security. They derive from the unprecedented conditions of the thermonuclear age, the ambiguities of contemporary power, and the perpetual revolution in technology. Our task is to understand the real and permanent requirements of our security rather than to be seduced by the outmoded vocabulary of a simpler time.

What are the national security issues we face? What is the true condition of our national defense?

- First, the inevitable growth of Soviet economic and military power has produced essential strategic equality. We cannot halt this growth, but

we must counterbalance it and prevent its use for political expansion.

- Second, America remains the most powerful nation in the world. It will remain so, if the Congress approves the President's proposed defense budget. But evolving technology and the military programs of others impose upon us the need for constant vigilance and continuing major effort.

- Third, technology has revolutionized the instruments of war and introduced an unparalleled complexity into the perceptions of power and the choices that we must make to maintain it. The defense establishment we have today is the product of decisions taken 10 to 15 years ago. Equally the decisions we make today will determine our defense posture in the 1980's and beyond. And the kind of forces we have will determine the kind of diplomacy we are able to conduct.

- Fourth, as nuclear arsenals grow, the horrors of nuclear war become ever more apparent while at the same time the threat of all-out nuclear war to deter or resist less than all-out aggression becomes ever less plausible. Under the umbrella of strategic equivalence, testing and probing at the local and regional levels become more likely. Hence over the next decade we must increase and modernize the forces—air, land, and sea—for local defense.

- Fifth, while a weak defense posture produces a weak foreign policy, a strong defense does not necessarily produce a strong foreign policy. Our role in the world depends as well on how realistically we perceive our national interests, on our unity as a people, and on our willingness to persevere in pursuit of our national goals.

- Finally, for Americans physical strength can never be an end in itself. So long as we are true to ourselves, every Administration has the obligation to seek to control the spiral of nuclear weapons and to give mankind hope for a more secure and just future.

Let me discuss each of these challenges.

### Long-Range Challenge of Defense

To cope with the implications of Soviet power has become a permanent responsibility of American defense and foreign policy. Sixty years of Soviet industrial and economic growth, and a political system that gives top priority to military buildup, have—inevitably—brought the Soviet Union to a position of rough equilibrium with the United States. No policy or decision on our part

brought this about. Nothing we could have done would have prevented it. Nothing we can do now will make it disappear

But while we cannot prevent the growth of Soviet military strength, we can and must maintain the strength to balance it and insure that it will not be used for political expansion. There is no alternative to a substantial defense budget over the long term. We have a permanent responsibility and need a steady course that does not change with the fads of the moment. We cannot afford the oscillation between assaults on defense spending and cries of panic, between cuts of \$40 billion in Administration defense budget requests over seven years and charges of neglect of our defenses.

This claim on our perseverance is a new experience for Americans. Throughout most of our history we have been able to mobilize urgently in time of war and then to disarm unilaterally when victory was achieved. After World War II we rapidly demobilized our armies, relying largely on our nuclear monopoly to preserve the peace. Thus when the Korean war broke out we were little better prepared than we had been 10 summers previously. Only recently have we begun to understand—and then reluctantly—that foreign policy and military strategy are inextricably linked, that we must maintain defense preparedness over the long-term, and that we will live for as far ahead as we can see in a twilight between tranquillity and open confrontation. We need a defense posture that is relevant to our dangers, comprehensible to our friends, credible to our adversaries, and that we are prepared to sustain over the long term.

### Imperatives of Technology

Technology has transformed the conditions and calculations of military strength in unprecedented fashion.

The paradox of contemporary military strength is that a momentous increase in the element of power has eroded the traditional relationship of power to policy. Until the end of World War II, it would never have occurred to a leader that there might be an upper limit to useful military power. Since the technological choices were limited, strength was largely defined in quantitative terms. Today the problem is to insure that our strength is relevant to our foreign policy objectives. Under current conditions no matter how we or our adversaries improve the size or quality of our

strategic arsenals, one overriding fact remains: An all-out strategic nuclear exchange would kill hundreds of millions on both sides in a matter of hours and utterly devastate the nations involved.

Thus the current strategic problem is virtually the diametric opposite of the historic one. Planners used to pursue increased overall power. Today we have a total strength unimaginable a generation ago, but we must design, diversify, and refine our forces so that they are relevant to—and able to support—rational foreign policy objectives. Historically military planners could treat the technology of their time as stable; today technology revolutionizes military capabilities in both strategic and tactical forces every decade and thus presents policymakers with an ever increasing spectrum of choice.

And yet the choices we make now will not, in most cases, really affect the structure of our forces for from 5 to 10 years—the time it takes to design new weapons, build them, and deploy them. Thus the policies Administrations are able to carry out are largely shaped by decisions in which they took no part. Decisions made in the 1960's largely determined our strategic posture for the 1970's. We can do little to change the impact of those earlier decisions; the Administration in power in the 1980's will be able to do little to change the impact of the decisions we make today. This is a sobering challenge, and it turns national security policy into a nonpartisan responsibility.

In choosing among the options that technology gives us, we—and every Administration—must keep certain principles in mind.

- First, we must not simply duplicate Soviet choices. The Soviet Union has a different geopolitical problem, a different force structure, and perhaps a different strategic doctrine.

- Second, because of the costs of modern forces, we face complex choices. In many areas we face a trade-off between quantity and quality, between numbers and sophistication.

- Third, because of our higher wage scales—particularly for our volunteer forces—any increase in our forces will weigh much more heavily on our economy than on that of adversaries whose pay scales are only a fraction of ours. For this reason, and the value we place on human life, we have always had an incentive, indeed an imperative, to put a premium on technology—where we are

superior—rather than sheer numbers.

- Fourth, we must see beyond the numbers game. Quality confers advantages as much as quantity and can sometimes substitute for it. Yet even we cannot afford every weapon that technology makes possible.

- Fifth, at some point numbers count. Technology cannot substitute indefinitely for numerical strength. The belief that there is an unlimited amount of fat to be cut in the defense budget is an illusion. Reductions almost inevitably translate into a reduction of effectiveness.

America possesses the economic and technological foundation to remain militarily preeminent; we can afford whatever military forces our security requires. The challenge we face is not to our physical strength—which is unequalled—but to our will to maintain it in all relevant categories and to use it when necessary to defend our interests and values.

#### Strategic Forces and Strategic Arms Limitations

Our Nation's security requires first and foremost, strategic forces that can deter attack and that insure swift and flexible retaliation if aggression occurs.

We have such forces today. Our technology has always been ahead of the U.S.S.R. by at least five years; with appropriate effort we can insure that this will continue to be the case.

We are determined to maintain the strategic balance at whatever level is required. We will never allow the balance to be tipped against us either by unilateral decision or a buildup of the other side, by a one-sided agreement or by a violation of an agreement.

But we must be clear what maintaining the balance means. We must not mesmerize ourselves with fictitious "gaps." Our forces were designed according to different criteria than those of the Soviet Union; their adequacy must be judged by our strategic needs, not theirs.

In the middle 1960's we could have continued the deployment of heavy throwweight missiles, following the Titan or the Atlas. But the Administration then in office decided instead to rely—in addition to our large bomber force—on an arsenal of 1,000 new, relatively light, sophisticated, and extremely accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM] and 656 submarine-launched missiles on 41 boats. We deployed these systems rapidly,

halting our buildup of launchers in the 1960's when it was judged that technological improvements were more important than an increase in numbers.

The Soviet Union chose a different course. Because of its more limited technological capabilities, it emphasized missiles whose greater throwweight compensated for their substantially poorer accuracy. But—contrary to the expectations of American officials in the 1960's—the Soviets also chose to expand their numbers of launchers beyond what we had. Thus the Soviets passed our numerical levels by 1970 and continued to add an average of 200 missiles a year—until we succeeded in halting this buildup in the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement of 1972.

Therefore—as a consequence of unilateral decisions made a decade ago by both sides—Soviet missile forces today are somewhat larger in number and considerably heavier in throwweight, while ours are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity, and sophistication. We possess far larger numbers of warheads—8,500 to their 2,500—and we have several hundred more strategic bombers.

Whether we move in the direction of greater throwweight will largely depend on recommendations made by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it is not essentially a foreign policy decision. But in making it we will be governed by our needs not by a compulsion to duplicate the Soviet force structure. The destructiveness of missiles depends on a combination of explosive power and accuracy. For most purposes, as accuracy improves, explosive power becomes less important—and heavy land-based missiles become, in fact, more vulnerable. Since we have stressed accuracy, we may decide that we do not need to approach the level of throwweight of Soviet weapons although nothing—certainly no SALT agreement—prevents us from substantially increasing our throwweight if we choose.

Whatever our decision regarding technical issues no responsible leader should encourage the illusion that America can ever again recapture the strategic superiority of the early postwar period. In the 1940's we had a nuclear monopoly. In the 1950's and early 1960's we had overwhelming preponderance. As late as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 the Soviet Union possessed less than 100 strategic systems while we had thousands.

But today, when each side has thousands of

launchers and many more warheads, a decisive or politically significant margin of superiority is out of reach. If one side expands or improves its forces sooner or later the other side will balance the effort. The Soviet Union first developed an ICBM; we matched it. We then added a lead in numbers of strategic missiles to the lead we already had in bombers; they caught up and surpassed us in missile numbers although we still remain far ahead in numbers of bombers. When our Trident submarines are in production by the end of this decade, we will begin to redress that numerical imbalance as well as improve the flexibility and survivability of our forces.

We were the first to put modern ballistic missiles on submarines and we were the first to put multiple warheads on missiles. Although we remain ahead in both categories, the Soviets found ways to narrow the gap. And the same will be true in the future, whether in missile accuracy or submarine, aircraft, or cruise missile technology.

The pattern is clear. No net advantage can long be preserved by *either* side. A perceived inequality could shake the confidence of other countries, even when its precise military significance is difficult to define. Therefore, we certainly will not permit a perceived or actual imbalance to arise against us and the Soviet Union is likely to follow similar principles. The probable outcome of each succeeding round of the strategic arms race will be the restoration of equilibrium at a higher and costlier level of forces and probably with less political stability. Such temporary advantages as can be achieved are not strategically decisive. The long leadtimes for the deployment of modern weapons should always permit countermeasures to be taken. If both sides remain vigilant, neither side will be able to reduce the effects of a counterblow against it to acceptable levels.

Those who paint dark vistas of a looming U.S. inferiority in strategic weapons ignore these facts and the real choices facing modern leaders.

No nuclear weapon has ever been used in modern wartime conditions or against an opponent possessing means of retaliation. Indeed neither side has even tested the launching of more than a few missiles at a time; neither side has ever fired them in a North-South direction as they would have to do in wartime. Yet initiation of an all-out surprise attack would depend on substantial confidence that thousands of reentry vehicles launched in care-

fully coordinated attacks—from land, sea, and air—would knock out all their targets thousands of miles away, with a timing and reliability exactly as predicted, before the other side launches any forces to preempt or retaliate and with such effectiveness that retaliation would not produce unacceptable damage. Any miscalculation or technical failure would mean national catastrophe. Assertions that one side is “ahead” by the margins now under discussion pale in significance when an attack would depend on decisions based on such massive uncertainties and risks.

For these reasons the strategic arsenals of the two sides find their principal purpose in matching and deterring the forces of the opponent and in making certain that third countries perceive no inequality. In no recent crisis has an American President come close to considering the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In no crisis since 1962—and perhaps not even then—has the strategic balance been the decisive factor. Even in Korea when we possessed an overwhelming superiority, it was not relevant to the outcome.

It is against this background that we have vigorously negotiated mutual limitations in strategic arms. These are compelling reasons for pursuing such talks.

- Since successive rounds of competitive programs will almost certainly yield only equilibrium, we have sought to regulate the competition and to maintain the equivalence that will exist in any case at lower levels.

- Stabilizing the strategic balance frees resources to strengthen our forces in areas where they are most needed; it will ease the problem of enhancing our capabilities for regional defense and in sea power—the areas where an imbalance could have serious geopolitical consequences.

- Agreed limitations and a more calculable strategic relationship will facilitate efforts to reduce political confrontations and crises.

- And, finally, the American people expect their leaders to pursue every responsible approach to peace and stability in the thermonuclear era. Only then can we expect them to support the sacrifices necessary to maintain our defensive strength.

We have made progress toward these goals. In the 1972 SALT agreements we froze antiballistic missile systems in their infancy and thus avoided

potentially massive expenditures and instabilities. We halted the momentum of the Soviet missile buildup for five years—a period in which, because of the long leadtimes involved, we had no capacity for deployment of our own. We intended to use that five-year interval to negotiate a longer term and more comprehensive agreement based on numerical equality and, failing that, to close the numerical gap by our own efforts as our modernization programs developed.

This is precisely what President Ford achieved at Vladivostok a year and a half ago and what we are trying to enshrine in a binding treaty that would run through 1985. Both sides would have equal ceilings on missiles, heavy bombers, and on multiwarhead missiles; this would require the Soviets to dismantle many weapons while our planned forces would not be affected. And neither the weapons of our allies nor our forward based nuclear systems—such as carriers and tactical aircraft—would be included; these had been Soviet demands since 1969.

These are major accomplishments which are overwhelmingly in our interest, particularly when we compare them to the situation which could have prevailed had we failed to achieve restraints on Soviet programs. Nevertheless very important issues remain to be resolved. We will make every effort to conclude a satisfactory agreement, but we will be driven solely by the national interest and not by arbitrary or artificial deadlines.

The SALT agreements are the opposite of the one-sided concessions to the U.S.S.R., as they are so often portrayed. Soviet offensive programs were slowed; none of ours were affected. Nor has the Administration countenanced Soviet violations of the first SALT agreement as has been irresponsibly charged. In fact we have carefully watched every aspect of Soviet performance. It is the unanimous view of all agencies of our Government—only recently reconfirmed—that no Soviet violation has occurred and that none of the ambiguous actions that we have noted and raised has affected our security. But we will remain vigilant. All ambiguous information will be carefully analyzed. No violations will be tolerated. We will insist on full explanations where questionable activity has occurred.

We will maintain the strategic balance at whatever level is required—preferably within the limits of successful SALT negotiations, but if

necessary without those limits. We will not heed those who maintain that all that is required are limited, minimum deterrence forces—to threaten the Soviet civilian population. To follow their advice would deprive us of all options save capitulation and the massive destruction of civilian life; it would create a large numerical imbalance against us which could have significant political consequences, possibly tempting our adversaries and upsetting our friends.

But neither will we be deflected by contrived and incredible scenarios, by inflated versions of Soviet strength, or by irresponsible attacks on SALT into diverting defense resources away from vital areas—the forces for regional and local defense and our Navy. For these are the areas where shortfalls and imbalances can rapidly turn into geopolitical shifts that jeopardize our fundamental interests and those of our allies.

#### Military Strength for Regional Defense

Under conditions of nuclear parity, world peace is more likely to be threatened by shifts in local or regional balances—in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, or Africa—than by strategic nuclear attack. Thus our forces that can be used for local defense deserve our particular attention and increased resources.

The issue is not the simplistic one of the size of the Soviet army. There is nothing new about the size of the Soviet army. During the entire postwar period, the Soviet standing army has always been larger than ours; at times it has been three times the size. The Soviet Union has a much greater landmass to defend and perceives major defense problems both in Eastern Europe and on its Asian front where nearly half of the Soviet army is now stationed. We, by contrast, enjoy the shields of friendly neighbors and wide oceans. And we are linked with close allies with substantial forces of their own.

The new and long foreseen problem is that under conditions of nuclear balance our adversaries may be increasingly tempted to probe at the regional level. This temptation must be discouraged. If leaders around the world come to assume that the United States lacks either the forces or the will to resist while others intervene to impose solutions, they will accommodate themselves to what they will regard as the dominant trend. And an

unopposed superpower may draw dangerous conclusions when the next opportunity for intervention beckons. Over time the global balance of power and influence will inevitably shift to the advantage of those who care nothing about America's values or well-being.

Thus our strong capability for local and regional defense is essential for us and, together with our allies, we must build up these forces. In a crisis the President must have other choices than capitulation or resort to strategic nuclear weapons.

We are not the world's policeman—but we cannot permit the Soviet Union or its surrogates to become the world's policeman either if we care anything about our security and the fate of freedom in the world. It does no good to preach strategic superiority while practicing regional retreat.

This was the issue in Angola. The United States had no significant stake in a purely Angolan civil war. The issue was—and remains—the unacceptable precedent of massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in a conflict thousands of miles from their shores—with its broad implications for the rest of Africa and, indeed, many other regions of the world. The danger was, and is, that our inaction—our legislatively imposed failure even to send financial help to Africans who sought to resist—will lead to further Soviet and Cuban pressures on the mistaken assumption that America has lost the will to counter adventurism or even to help others do so.

It is time, therefore, to be clear that as far as we are concerned Angola has set no precedent. It is time that the world be reminded that America remains capable of forthright and decisive action. The American people know that the United States cannot remain aloof if basic principles of responsible international conduct are flouted and the geopolitical balance is threatened by a pattern of outside interventions in local conflicts.

The United States has made clear its strong support for majority rule and minority rights in southern Africa. We have no stake in and we will give no encouragement to illegal regimes there. The President and I have made clear that rapid change is required and that the opportunity for negotiated solutions must be seized. We will make major efforts to promote these objectives and to help all parties to return to the negotiating table. The proposals made today by [British] Foreign Secre-

tary [James] Callaghan in the House of Commons seem to us a most constructive approach. We welcome them.

But let no one believe that American support can be extorted by the threat of Cuban troops or Soviet arms. Our cooperation is not available to those who rely on Cuban troops. The United States cannot acquiesce indefinitely in the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in distant lands for the purpose of pressure and to determine the political evolution by force of arms.

We have issued these warnings before. I repeat them today. The United States will not accept further Cuban military interventions abroad.

We are certain that the American people understand and support these two equal principles of our policy—our support for majority rule in Africa and our firm opposition to military intervention.

Angola reminds us that military capabilities by themselves cannot solve our foreign policy problems. No matter how massive our arsenals or how flexible our forces, they will carry little weight if we become so confused in our decision-making and so constrained in defining our interests that no one believes we will ever act when challenged.

The issue is not an open-ended commitment or a policy of indiscriminate American intervention. Decisions on whether and how to take action must always result from careful analysis and open discussion. It cannot be rammed down the throats of an unwilling Congress or public.

But neither can we avoid decisions when their time has clearly come. Global stability simply cannot survive the presumption that our natural choice will always be passivity; such a course would insure that the world will witness dangerous challenges and major changes highly inimical to our interests and our ideals.

### Strength and Will of America

If America's defense is to match the Nation's needs it must meet three basic requirements.

- Our strategic forces must be sufficient to deter attack and credibly maintain the nuclear balance.
- Our forces for regional defense, together with

those of our allies, must be clearly capable of resisting threat and pressure.

- And at home we must once again unite behind the proposition that aggression unresisted is aggression encouraged. We must be prepared to recognize genuine threats to the global balance, whether they emerge as direct challenges to us or as regional encroachment at a greater distance. And we must be prepared to do something about them.

These are the real issues our leaders now face and will surely face in the future. They require answers to some hard questions, such as the following: Where can our defense dollars be most productively spent? What programs are needed that are not already underway? What would be the costs of these programs and over what period of time? What, if anything, would we have to give up? What are the premises of our defense policy—against what threats and with what diplomacy?

Administration and critics alike must answer these questions if we are to have an effective national policy. And in this spirit, I have spoken today about the relationship between defense and foreign policy.

Military strength is crucial to America's security and well-being. But we must take care not to become so obsessed with power alone that we become a "Fortress America" and neglect our ultimate political and moral responsibilities.

Our Nation is the beacon of hope to all who love freedom not simply because it is strong, but because it represents mankind's age-old dream of dignity and self-respect. Others before us have wielded overwhelming military power and abdicated moral responsibility or engendered fear and hatred. Our resources—military, industrial, technological, economic, and cultural—are beyond challenge; with dedication and effort they shall remain so. But a world of tenuous balance, of a nuclear equilibrium constantly contested is too barren and perilous and uninspiring. America has always stood for something deeper than throwing its weight around; we shall see to it that we shall never relinquish our moral leadership in the search for a just and lasting peace.

We have gone through a difficult decade not because we were weak, but because we were divided. None of our setbacks have been caused by lack of American power or even lack of relevant

power. The fundamental challenge to America, therefore, is to generate the wisdom, the creativity, and the will to dedicate ourselves to the peace and progress of humanity.

America's ultimate strength has always been the conviction and basic unity of its people. And despite a decade and more of testing—despite assassination, war, and institutional crisis—we still remain a vital and optimistic and confident people.

It is time once again for Americans to hold their heads high. It is important to recall once again some fundamental truths:

- That we are still the strongest Nation on the face of the Earth;
- That we are the most generous Nation in history—we have fed the starving, opened our arms and our hearts to refugees from other lands, and given more of our substance to the poor and down-trodden around the world than any other nation;
- That we are needed to maintain the world's security;

- That we are essential to any hopes for stability and human progress;

- That we remain the bulwark of democracy and the land of promise to millions who yearn for freedom and a better life for themselves and their children;

- That we, therefore, have a responsibility to hold high the banner of freedom and human dignity for all mankind.

Our record of achievements should be but prologue to what this generation of Americans has it within its power to accomplish. For the first time in history we can work with others to create an era of peace and prosperity for all mankind. We shall not fail.

With faith in the goodness and the promise of America we shall master our future. And those who celebrate America's tricentennial will look back and say that this generation of Americans was worthy of the ideals and the greatness of our history.

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