

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSC
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START

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NLS M1206 #1

BY Amj, NARA, DATE 11/4/05

~~TOP SECRET~~

Weinberger / Carlucci / Stele
Rostow / ? / Rowan
Hayward / Gorman
Kulpatrick

[State absent when President arrives]

Pres: tells stories ... \$120 tickets - 12,000 pennies

Judge Clark: units of account & insert to be discussed today - hold on verification - 90% agreement ... do we limit TW directly or indirectly - Bud McF will review charts

Bud McFarlane: criteria = ① carry out strategy ② deep cuts ③ equality ④ easily understanding ⑤ satisfy allies, ⑥ allow for stability — all agree

① substantial difference from SALT II
② 5000 warheads ③ focus on ICBM ④ treat bombers differently ... ultimately 250 on each side ⑤ limit TW, but how?? — STATE & JCS ... 3000 W/H → substantial cut in TW (^{down to} 2-3M kg)
— easily understandable, deep reductions — cons w/ W/H = breakout (even w/ only modest TW advantage) ...
pennies ... accuracy or yield advantage — cons w/ TW = understandability ... verifiability ... Soviets alone called to reduce to 2M (we'd increase) ... Soviets may also wish to limit bomber P/L

Adm Duman: cannot give certainty w/ onsite inspection, but can give high ~~certainty~~ ^{confidence} — (reviews factors that allow high ~~certainty~~ ^{confidence}) — moderate to high w/ mobile ICBMs, high w/ fixed, for W/H's ... (review other measures)

Sh = <10% } confidence
rate = 25-50%

Judge Clark: Roundtable discussion

Haig: (praise Bud's summary) ... must focus on both military and political aspects ... all agree on ^{BM} 5000 w/Hs (= 1/3 reduction from current levels) — ~~no~~ no more than half could be 1034 w/Hs — require Soviets to do 60% reduction in their best systems) — 3 major problems w/

TW: ① TW above current levels ... 1.3 to 2 ... paper equivalence but real disparity ② 65% cut for Soviets in TW ... not credible ③ hard to verify TW ... 14 leg uncertainty equivalent to 180 SS-18s — ceiling of 850 missiles is most significant guard against breakout — go beyond satellites for verification, but wait on decision until after fix position

Weinberger: vital disagreement (passes out chart) — if we just limit warheads, we'd play into hands of Kennedy & Hatfield — not the relevant measure, since yield is the real measure, and one gets at yield through TW — it can be easily understood — not relevant that Soviets wouldn't like proposal ... (analogy to) what Soviets are doing at INF now — verification uncertainties affect every proposal — *speech should be specific

Hayward: Should I discuss certification and position?
 (... do both...) — T/W important, but JCS think we should get at it indirectly... combination of (1500 ICBM) w/4s & 850 missiles ^{gets} our big cut — if you take T/W as principal indicator, you'll end up less... we'll end up w/ imbalance in T/W, no matter what our position is

Rostow: important difference in principle remains — recommend in speeches you talk about # of warheads and their destructive capacity, % going into detail on how we measure that — we essentially agree w/OSD position... (refer to Chart) (shift confusion as people shuffle paper)... most fundamental objection to State/JCS position is that it would be profoundly destabilizing (fewer airpoints would encourage larger warheads)... press in direction of smaller warheads, which would decrease attractiveness of 1st strike — Committee on the Present Danger's experience was that people had strong views on reaching agreement, but did not understand details... that's not the function of the American people — cites (—) that Soviets prepared to negotiate on T/W — my former memo was that unless we restore... — START & INF are not the centerpiece of our foreign policy — Soviets will have no motivation to enter into agreement, unless we convince

④

course carries substantial risk — we haven't solved the MX problem, established a strong nil presence SWA, etc. — we're all recommending the same goal of equal deterrence

(Jean Kirkpatrick leaves)

Gen Rowley: are the goals understandable & can we negotiate? — my preference is that we set goals and then phase — are goals plausible? ... set goals, then do the "possible" first — will they come down? ... we're giving up SBMs later on ... they fear D-5 ... we give up something in long run, ask them to give up something in the short run

Judge Clark: evidence is in for your later decision — move to START insert for May 9th

Weinberger: 3 quick points — U.S. cut vs. add to get to parity — Soviets did negotiate in WWF where only they cut

Judge Clark: insert ... comments?

Rostow: add consultation w/ Cong'l leaders (...to allies)

Weinberger: add on-site verification

Haig: disagree ... not before we agree on what to verify

Rostow: save verification for later speech

Howard: Chiefs don't have issue that ^{on-site} ~~on-site~~ ^{more worried select} ~~choice where only on-site~~ ^{would work} should be in or out of speech ...

Baker: are we checking on prior statements by Pres Reagan re: verification, etc.

Inman: sooner or later you'll have to decide what degree of confidence you want

Haig: you're faced w/ sharply divergent views -
campaign statement for long-term goal
excellent (don't pose threat to one another) -
add to that now that we'll proceed over
time to that goal - taking 2500 warheads
away will drive them to smaller missiles
- put equal T/W forth at a later
stage - capture essence of both positions
but in a more realistic way - Soviets
won't negotiate T/W

Weinberger: on phased approach, comment that comes to mind is that in long run all will be dead - Soviets will negotiate TW

Judge Clark: (cites Gold article of yesterday ... rendition of 16 Apr mtg. et al.)
compulsion to give argument to press a mystery to me

Rostow: another mtg.?

Clark: yes, on interim measures, after Pres. decides

Pres: if W/Its, do you not automatically achieve TW? (Haig: almost same)

Weinberger: no — Rostow: no ... Haig: requires they do all, we do nothing — Wein.: INF ... never get them to table)