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WASHINGTON

February 1, 1983

National Security Decision Directive Number 19

U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL POLICY

To enhance United States national security interests, and specifically, to promote our policy objectives in the area of chemical weapons arms control, the United States, following the February 1 opening of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament's (CD) 1983 session, will:

- (1) Table, in the CD, the interagency document entitled "U.S. Detailed Views on the Contents of a Chemical Weapons Ban," dated January 14, 1983; and
- (2) Support a change in the CD Chemical Weapons Working Group mandate to negotiation of a complete and verifiable chemical weapons ban. Focus will be on development of effective verification and compliance arrangements.

With respect to the status of the paper entitled, "U.S. Detailed Views on the Content of a Chemical Weapons Ban," it is to be understood that:

- The paper is a framework for discussion, and is to serve as the basis for U.S. participation in CD negotiations on a chemical weapons arms control agreement;
- The paper is subject to modification and further refinement, as deemed appropriate to safeguard U.S. security and foreign policy interests; and thus
- -- The paper does not constitute a formal United States negotiating position on a proposal for the actual text of any eventual agreement in this area.



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
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It is also to be understood, in this regard, that the United States' decision to support CD negotiations on a complete chemical weapons ban:

- Requires that the modernization of short- and long-range chemical weapons proceed on an urgent basis to enable the United States to gain negotiating leverage in the area of chemical weapons arms control, and so that the United States has a credible and effective deterrent/retaliatory capability until such time as a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons has been obtained;
- -- Will require that we continue to make the direct connection between Soviet and surrogate use of toxin and other chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia and the need for effective verification and compliance measures in any future chemical weapons agreement; and
- -- Is made without prejudice to decisions the United States may make concerning initiation of CD negotiations in areas or on issues other than chemical weapons arms control.

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