

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
90850

29

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Security Planning Group Meeting  
June 6, 1986, 11:00 a.m. - 11:45 a.m., Situation Room

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

State:  
Secretary George P. Shultz

Treasury:  
Secretary James A. Baker, III

OSD:  
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Justice:  
Attorney General Edwin Meese, III

OMB:  
Director James C. Miller

CIA:  
Director William J. Casey

JCS:  
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.

White House:  
Mr. Donald T. Regan  
Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC:  
Mr. Rodney B. McDaniel

Minutes

Admiral Poindexter introduced the meeting by noting that the approaching summer break in the Geneva arms control negotiations provided an opportunity for fresh thinking aimed at developing new proposals for the fall. The Soviets clearly wanted to lock us into a period of ABM treaty adherence, and this presented opportunities and challenges.

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M05-016 #9272

~~SECRET~~ BY LOJ N.S.A. DATE 12/21/05

~~SECRET~~

44

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Secretary Shultz then outlined the overall state of the relationship, concluding that the Soviets are at a fork in the road where they can either choose to wait out the President--gambling that Congress will cut the defense budget--or go for an agreement that will allow them to reduce their military spending on the premise that Ronald Reagan is their best hope for selling an agreement to the American public. He argued that USG priorities for the year should be: restore budget cuts to defense and international functions, work on alliance relationships, and go for a good arms control agreement.

Admiral Poindexter opened a general discussion with the observation that an arms control agreement represented both the greatest opportunity and the greatest challenge to the Administration. In re-examining our current position, the main issue was the ABM treaty versus SDI--how to position ourselves so as to bring Congress along in funding SDI, while working the treaty issue, developing a concept for transition to a defense-based deterrence, and coming up with a viable concept for sharing. In addition, the other arms control areas must also be addressed. He proposed that the interagency group be tasked to develop proposals for consideration by the NSPG. The output of these deliberations should be a private initiative and/or a public speech.

The President observed that Gorbachev has an internal dilemma, heightened by Chernobyl--we need to reach an agreement which does not make him look like he gave up everything. We cannot give away SDI, but we can make clear we do not seek a first-strike capability. He was thinking of something like an agreement now that, if SDI research proves out, and recognizing that both sides are now free to conduct research under the ABM treaty, we would when we got to the point of needing to test, invite the Soviets to observe our tests, but that actual deployment by either side would depend on movement towards total elimination of strategic nuclear missiles--in this way, both sides would see SDI not as a threat, but as a defense against a madman.

The meeting ended before general discussion could continue. Admiral Poindexter announced there would be a follow-on meeting.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~