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
Secretary Shultz

Building Confidence and Security in Europe

January 17, 1984



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Following is an address by Secretary Shultz before the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Stockholm, Sweden, January 17, 1984.

First, my thanks to the people and Government of Sweden for their warm hospitality as hosts of this conference. It is particularly appropriate here in Stockholm to recall the heroic deeds of Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who, in the last 2 years of World War II, saved thousands of Hungarian Jews from annihilation. I commend our Swedish hosts for their long tradition, exemplified by Raoul Wallenberg, of active and selfless dedication to the cause of peace and human rights.

Let me also acknowledge the contributions of the neutral and nonaligned participants in the Helsinki process. They have added a healthy balance and perspective to a decade of crucial deliberations on a wide range of vital European issues. Their participation in this forum offers them an historic opportunity to advance the cause of peace and stability in Europe today.

We are gathered here, in the words of the concluding document at Madrid, to negotiate and adopt "a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe." We are here to make progress toward a specific goal: to reduce the danger of surprise attack, miscalculation, or misunderstanding.

Benjamin Franklin once wrote: "One powerful prince keeping an army always on foot makes it necessary for his neighbors to do the same to prevent surprise." Today, the power of princes has waned, but the threat from large armies and surprise attack has grown. And anxiety about surprise attack can have the perverse result of encouraging preemption or increasing the risks of war by miscalculation.

While we must heed the lesson of the 1930s, when weakness encouraged aggression, we must never repeat the tragedy of 1914, when statesmen let technology drive decisions and when nations stumbled blindly into a disastrous war. Therefore, the United States and its allies have long favored measures to increase openness and improve communication, to provide greater reassurance against surprise and greater insurance against miscalculation.

The confidence-building measures in the Helsinki Final Act were one positive step. Here at Stockholm, we hope to build on what has been achieved and discussed elsewhere. We should look for ways to make surprise attack more difficult; to make miscalculation less likely; to inhibit the use of military might for intimidation or coercion; to put greater predictability into peaceful military exercises in order to highlight any departures that could threaten the peace; and to enhance our ability to defuse incipient crises. Our aim, to use the current phrase, is to increase the transparency of military activity in Europe.

To achieve these goals, the United States and its allies will put forward in the coming weeks a series of specific proposals. We will propose that the participants in this conference agree:

- To exchange information about the organization and location of our respective military forces;
- To provide annual previews of military exercises;
- To provide advance notice of significant military activities;
- To invite observers to such military activities;
- To enhance the capacity for rapid communications among our governments in times of crisis; and
- To provide for means to verify each other's compliance with the undertakings agreed at this conference.

We view these proposals as only a beginning. They will be designed to concentrate our deliberations, from the very outset, upon specific, concrete, realistic, and useful steps. The focus should be on practical accomplishment, as distinguished from empty promises of good intent. The United States is fully committed to the principles of nonaggression contained in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. But it would be a cruel hoax on the peoples of Europe for this conference to pretend that new reaffirmation of existing—and all too often violated—pledges represents progress in European confidence-building.

We will welcome and examine in a positive spirit any proposals by any member state; we will judge them by the criteria agreed upon at Madrid—that they be militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe.

We have assigned one of America's most experienced ambassadors to represent us at this conference. James Goodby has participated for over a decade in the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process and in America's search for effective arms control. His efforts here will have our government's full support.

The Helsinki Process

As we pursue these practical steps, we must bear in mind that building confidence and building security have a broader dimension. If we are truly to give the peoples of Europe an added measure of assurance about their future, the nations gathered here must apply themselves not only to the immediate

tasks of this conference but also to the more fundamental issues that are at the heart of the problem of European security.

As we agreed at Madrid last September, this conference is "a substantial and integral part" of the Helsinki process. The Helsinki process is an historic attempt to deal comprehensively with the interrelated problems of mutual security, economic relations, contacts between our peoples, the basic human freedoms of our peoples, and standards of international conduct. The 1975 Final Act was an eloquent statement of aspirations, to which the United States gladly subscribed because its principles were rooted in our own philosophy and tradition.

But no such document is self-executing; no such standards of conduct are self-enforcing. It is the achievement of Helsinki to have embedded these principles and standards permanently into the discourse and consciousness of European affairs. It was an accomplishment of Madrid to reinforce the element of accountability in the process. The challenge before us today is to strengthen the forces working for these ideals and to continue to hold nations accountable for their failure to live up to them.

Europe is the cradle of the modern world. It gave birth not only to the industrial revolution but to much of modern culture, modern political thought, as well as the forms of modern diplomacy. Integral to Europe's heritage are the ideals of freedom, democracy, and national independence that have inspired the people of the United States and other peoples around the globe. Europe—all of Europe—deserves true peace and true security. Since 1945, Western Europe has seen a great reconciliation of old enmities and a great resurgence of freedom, prosperity, unity, and security. It is a crowning achievement of the European tradition in which the United States has been proud to play a part. But throughout the same period, an artificial barrier has cruelly divided this continent—and, indeed, heartlessly divided one of its great nations.

This barrier was not placed there by the West. It is not maintained by the West. It is not the West that prevents its citizens free movement or cuts them off from competing ideas.

Let me be very clear: the United States does not recognize the legitimacy of the artificially imposed division of Europe. This division is the essence of Europe's security and human rights problem, and we all know it.

Human rights remain central to any discussion of European security. As the Helsinki Final Act declares, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom is "an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation." The attempt to impose division on Europe is inevitably a source of instability and tension.

Since the days of Woodrow Wilson, my country has understood that true peace and security in Europe depend on a foundation of basic freedoms—not least of which is the right of peoples to determine their own future. The Helsinki process is an historic, peaceful effort to ease, and in time to end, the division of Europe. Confidence-building in the larger sense means pursuing the work of Helsinki—through practical steps to break down barriers, expand human contact and intellectual interchange, increase openness, and stretch the boundaries of the human spirit.

East-West Relations and Arms Control

Yesterday President Reagan reaffirmed my country's commitment to three broad aims:

- To reduce, and eventually to eliminate, the threat and use of force in solving international disputes;
- To reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world; and
- To establish a better working relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

The United States will pursue these broad aims diligently at this conference and in every forum and every channel. We believe in dialogue and in solving problems. We believe in realistic and meaningful engagement with others to advance the cause of peace.

History has seen many attempts to negotiate limits on numbers or characteristics or uses of major armaments. Before World War I, Great Britain and Germany negotiated on ways of limiting naval construction, particularly of battleships, and on ways of enhancing mutual confidence about each other's construction plans.

Between World War I and World War II, there were extensive negotiations to limit the building of capital ships, including a significant naval disarmament agreement negotiated under American auspices in 1922. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 attempted to ban war as an instrument of policy.

These efforts, of course, failed to prevent war. The lesson of history is that efforts to prevent war or control weaponry do not operate in a vacuum. They are a dimension of international politics and cannot be divorced from their political context.

Therefore, while we pursue this effort with great energy—in Stockholm and all other forums—we must bear in mind that progress depends on many factors beyond the substance of the proposals or the ingenuity of the negotiators. For arms control and confidence-building to succeed, we must also work to shape the conditions that make success possible. This enterprise cannot prosper in conditions where some nations seek global or regional military superiority or resort to threats or intimidation as instruments of their foreign policy. Let me say for my country that the United States seeks no such superiority.

We in the West must, therefore, maintain the balance of power; we must maintain the cohesion of our alliances; and on this secure foundation we must seek to engage others in concrete efforts to resolve political problems peacefully. On this basis, we firmly believe pragmatic progress in East-West relations is possible. The example of Berlin under the Quadripartite Agreement is an instructive example of lasting progress achieved through unity, resolve, and genuine negotiation.

For more than a decade, the United States has engaged the Soviet Union in a series of negotiations on arms control and arms reduction. Over the past 3 years, we have actively pursued negotiations on the reduction of strategic weapons; on the reduction or elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe; on mutual and balanced force

reductions in Europe; on banning chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament; on confidence-building measures to strengthen nuclear stability; and on enhanced safeguards against nuclear proliferation.

These negotiations have been valuable channels of communications between East and West; they raised mankind's hopes that the serious differences of political philosophy and ideology between us did not have to lead to war.

Some of these negotiations have now been interrupted by the Soviet Union. This tells us a great deal about which side is eager for progress.

Nevertheless, the door remains open. We are ready for negotiations whenever the Soviet Union is prepared. In this regard, I am pleased to announce that, in coming months at the conference on disarmament in Geneva, the U.S. negotiators will be presenting a draft treaty for the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons on a global basis. We will work in a similar spirit for early progress in other arms control forums, once resumed.

Arms control initiatives are part of a broader American effort to build a more stable, consistent, and constructive East-West relationship—a relationship not marked by the abrupt shifts, exaggerated expectations, and dashed hopes of the last decade.

While pursuing arms control, we have also sought to engage the Soviet Union in a candid dialogue on those regional crises and conflicts that threaten peace and poison our relationship. At the same time, we have proposed a range of bilateral measures to enhance both crisis communication and

normal communication between us, to build confidence and reduce any chance of misunderstanding or miscalculation.

In Brussels last month, I joined my North Atlantic colleagues in extending to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries "the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation, and reciprocity." "For the benefit of mankind," the Alliance foreign ministers declared in Brussels, "we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage."

Let us, therefore, embark here and now upon this renewed, open, and comprehensive East-West political dialogue. Let us so conduct ourselves in our deliberations that historians of the future will mark this gathering as a turning point in East-West relations. Let the opening of this conference, which itself marks an important expansion in the scope of East-West negotiations, also mark a new step in the broader relationship. We are prepared to move forward. ■

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