Active Measures:


August 1986
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Catherine Kanner

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Department of State Publication 9630

Released August 1986
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Foreword

This document contains the principal chapters of a report submitted in August 1986 to the US Congress by the Secretary of State. It was prepared in fulfillment of Section 1247 of H.R. 2086, passed in July 1985. The report was compiled by the interagency Active Measures Working Group, comprised of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the US Information Agency.

The conclusion to be drawn from this report is that there is a massive and highly organized effort by the Soviet Union and its proxies to influence world opinion. This effort includes public diplomacy to enhance the Soviet image abroad and to further Soviet policy objectives. It also includes a persistent, widespread program of disinformation and deception designed to discredit the US image abroad and disrupt US foreign policy objectives. This program has achieved successes in the past; without effective responses by the US, it constitutes a threat to US national interests.

Soviet active measures have shown no diminution since General Secretary Gorbachev came to power. During 1985-86, virtually the entire Soviet leadership directly responsible for active measures changed; the new leaders have a more eclectic view of world politics and are younger. Also, the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is responsible for many active measures, has been reorganized. These changes indicate a renewed emphasis on active measures and perhaps an increase in both quantity and quality of such deceptive activities for the foreseeable future.
Table of Contents

Foreword ................................................................................................................................................... iii

Chapter 1. Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 1
  Definition ........................................................................................................................................ 1
  The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus ................................................................................ 2
  Soviet Active Measures in the United States ................................................................................ 2
  Soviet Front Organizations ........................................................................................................... 2
  Forgeries: An Instrument of Active Measures .......................................................................... 3
  Agents of Influence ......................................................................................................................... 3

Chapter II. The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus ........................................................................... 5
  Outlets for Soviet Propaganda ....................................................................................................... 6
  The Apparatus for Propaganda Management ............................................................................. 13
  The Propaganda Process ............................................................................................................... 15
  Soviet Propaganda Techniques and Recent Improvements .................................................... 16
  Conclusions and Prospects .......................................................................................................... 17
  Appendix: The Soviet Campaign Against SDI .......................................................................... 18
  Footnotes ...................................................................................................................................... 19

Chapter III. Soviet Active Measures in the US ....................................................................................... 21
  Soviet Forgery Operations ............................................................................................................. 22
  Use of Soviet Media Representatives ......................................................................................... 23
  Soviet Efforts To Influence Peace and Disarmament Movements ............................................ 25
  Soviet Efforts To Control the International Women’s Movement ............................................. 29
  The Soviet Campaign To Influence Religious Organizations .................................................. 29
  Efforts to Influence US Presidential Elections .......................................................................... 30
  The 12th World Festival of Youth and Students ......................................................................... 31
  Soviet Influence in the United Nations ......................................................................................... 32
  An Assessment of Soviet Active Measures in the US ................................................................. 33

Chapter IV. Soviet Front Organizations .................................................................................................. 35
  Table A: International Communist Front Organizations, 1985 ................................................. 36
  World Peace Council (WPC) ......................................................................................................... 37
  World Federation of Trade Unions ............................................................................................... 38
  The Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF) .................................................... 38
  The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) ................................................................. 39
  International Union of Students (IUS) .......................................................................................... 39
  Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) ............................................................... 39
  The Christian Peace Conference (CPC) ......................................................................................... 40
  International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) ........................................................................... 41
  International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) ......................................................... 41
  World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) ....................................................................... 41
  World Federation of Teachers Union (FISE) ............................................................................... 42
  Asian Buddhists Conference for Peace (ABCP) .......................................................................... 42
  Esperantists Movement for World Peace ...................................................................................... 42
Definition

The term active measures is a literal translation from Russian, "aktivnyye meropriyatiya," which denotes covert or deceptive operations conducted in support of Soviet foreign policy. Active measures are distinct both from espionage and counterintelligence and from traditional diplomatic and informational activities. The goal of active measures is to influence opinions and perceptions of governments and/or publics to achieve a specific response.

Deceptiveness is the essence of active measures—disinformation and forgeries, front groups, influence operations, media manipulation, and clandestine radio broadcasts. Often these measures involve covert activity, but not necessarily so.

Covertly implemented Soviet active measures are the responsibility of Service A of the Committee on State Security’s (KGB’s) First Chief Directorate, which works in close coordination with the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). All Soviet agencies and representatives abroad are potentially available to support or participate in Soviet active measures campaigns. Techniques include the following:

- **Disinformation and Forgeries**
  
  Disinformation, a deliberate attempt to deceive public or governmental opinion, can be oral or written. Forged documents are frequently used in attempts to discredit individuals, institutions, or policies in such a way as to damage US foreign policy interests.

- **Front Groups and Friendship Societies**
  
  The ID coordinates activities of such front organizations as the World Peace Council (WPC) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), as well as local fronts and friendship societies. Fronts normally present themselves as nongovernmental, nonpolitical organizations engaged in promoting such desirable goals as world peace.

- **Nonruling Communist and Leftist Parties**
  
  The ID is also responsible for liaison with nonruling communist and leftist parties, including socialist and social democratic parties. Contacts with these parties are usually overt, and are used to persuade the parties to carry out specific political action or propaganda campaigns on behalf of the USSR.

- **Political Influence Operations**
  
  Agents of influence disguise their KGB connection while taking an active role in their nation’s governmental, political, press, business, labor, or academic affairs. Their object is to convert their influence in those realms into real policy gains for the Soviet Union. At times, the Soviets use unwitting contacts to achieve similar results.

- **Media Manipulation**
  
  The Soviets or other opponents of the United States frequently place falsely attributed or nonattributed materials in print and broadcast media. These materials, which contain propaganda and/or disinformation, may appear in a variety of media, such as regular publications, clandestine broadcasts, or specially printed brochures.

Although the term active measures is taken from Russian and we generally think of active measures as being Soviet in origin, active measures may occasionally be generated against the United States by other foreign powers. Yet, no state uses active measures techniques as extensively or as effectively as the USSR.

In studying active measures it is important to understand that propaganda and other efforts employed by the Soviets to influence public perceptions—such as cultural programs, radio broadcasting, and publications—may not be active measures in themselves, but may be the vehicles used to promote and sustain active measures. For example, a forgery—definitely an active measure—might surface accusing the US of plotting to assassinate a
foreign leader. Even after being exposed by the United States as a forgery, the content of the forged document may be repeated, for instance, by Novosti news agency. Thus, Novosti, an official propaganda and information organ, is used to promote an active measure. For this reason, Soviet propaganda and public diplomacy efforts and means must be taken into consideration when examining active measures.

The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus

The policies for propaganda, as well as for active measures, are decided by the Politburo, with inputs from the International Department and other party and government bodies. This large, highly centralized structure was reorganized in the spring of 1986, with the apparent intent of streamlining decision making. The new head of the ID, former Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoliy Dobrynin, brings to his job considerable knowledge and experience of how to deal with open societies. With these changes, it is quite possible that not only the quantity of active measures and propaganda will increase, but also the quality and sophistication.

The Soviets devote major resources to dissemination of anti-Western propaganda to a worldwide audience. The primary vehicles are radio broadcasting (more than 2,200 hours per week in more than 80 languages) and news services (TASS has offices in 126 countries, and Novosti news service distributes information to at least 5,000 press and information organs in 110 countries). Cultural activities, scholarships (more than 55,000 Third World students in the USSR), film, television, and publication of books and magazines also play a part.

Soviet Active Measures in the United States

Soviet active measures in the United States are designed to discredit the US Government, promote Soviet foreign policy objectives, and influence US public opinion against US military, economic, and political programs. The primary Soviet vehicles for this are the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) and its front groups, the two most prominent of which are the US Peace Council (USPQ) and the National Council of American Soviet Friendship (NCASF). The Soviets place extensive reliance on these groups to support active measures and propaganda campaigns within the United States.

Soviet KGB officers responsible for covert active measures operations are in frequent contact with officials of these groups. The Soviet fronts in the United States have been particularly instructed to devote considerable attention to the US peace movement. CPUSA and its fronts (along with several noncommunist organizations) have been involved in the organization of several mass demonstrations against US Government policies, including the April 20, 1985, “April Actions for Peace, Jobs and Justice.”

The KGB is also keenly interested in religious groups in the United States as a potential vehicle for the exercise of political influence and, more recently, as a means of manipulating opposition against US disarmament policies, particularly increased spending for SDI. Also, as part of its campaign against US security policies, the KGB seeks to cultivate and target influential US citizens, particularly government officials, journalists, and political activists.

Soviet Front Organizations

Since the early 1920s the USSR has used front organizations as a means of gaining worldwide support for its policies. Fronts are designed to appeal to a broad range of opinion and to conceal their links to the USSR and international communism. They invariably support Soviet propaganda themes, attack the West, and never criticize the USSR.

The best known and largest front is the World Peace Council (WPC). Founded in Paris in 1949 as the World Committee of Partisans for Peace, the WPC has been based in Helsinki since 1968. It now has more than 140 affiliates including the US Peace Council and the British Peace Assembly. The WPC maintains extensive links to other communist fronts. Although it claims otherwise, most of its expenses are met by the Soviets and their East European allies. Like all of the other Soviet fronts, the WPC operates under the general direction of the ID.

There are several other major fronts. Virtually every profession and interest group has an appropriate front: organized labor, scientists, lawyers, Third World peoples, women, youth, students, journalists. There are also “fronts-of-fronts,” groups established by parent fronts to address particular issues. A good example of this activity is the Generals for Peace, a front of the WPC.

Fronts have extensively utilized the UN system via consultative membership in the United Nations as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Eleven fronts, including the WPC, have differing types of NGO status in one or more of the UN councils and agencies.

The Soviets have tried to use the fronts to influence the West European peace movement toward unification on an exclusively anti-US platform, but this effort has not been successful. The fronts find it
difficult to cooperate with groups who have criticized Soviet as well as Western policies.

**Forgeries: An Instrument of Active Measures**

Soviet use of forgeries has, we believe, increased in recent years, and has become more sophisticated. Our best evidence that the Soviet Government is a source of forgeries comes from numerous KGB defectors, but rarely can we be absolutely certain that a given forgery is Soviet. We are forced to rely on circumstantial evidence, analysis of the document itself, and the determination of whom the forgery ultimately benefits.

Forgery can be easily exposed as fakes, but denial may never entirely offset the initial damage, which can be compounded by repeated references to the original forgery in Soviet or procommunist media, often months or years after the primary surfacing.

Forgeries are prepared by KGB specialists under the supervision of the Active Measures Section, Service A, of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate. In certain cases, however, where timeliness is important, the fake may be prepared by the local KGB residency and take on an imperfect character associated with a “rush job.” But given sufficient time, virtually any type of document can be forged. Still, even the best forgery can be unmasked by analysis of errors that one experienced in the mechanics and wording of US Government documents can detect.

The effectiveness of a forgery often depends more on the predisposition of the recipient than on the quality of the forgery. A recipient who is suspicious of and hostile toward the United States is far more likely to credit a forgery than one who is not. Because of increasingly sophisticated journalists, many forgeries never achieve uncritical publication and appear only in communist or communist-dominated media.

**Agents of Influence**

Agents of influence are individuals who support and promote Soviet interests, either openly or covertly. Often, the KGB is involved, but agents of influence may come from virtually any profession. Often, these individuals are recruited early in their lives and are not called upon to represent Soviet interests until they have achieved an influential position in government, business, academia, or media.

Agents of influence are motivated by a variety of factors. Some may be blackmailed, but many support the USSR for such other reasons as ideological affinity, ego, political expediency, or financial reward.

Arne Treholt, a former Norwegian Government official, provides one of the best examples of a recent agent of influence. Recruited in his early years, he was activated by the Soviets after he took on a responsible government position years later. He actively advocated Soviet policies and positions in the conduct of his responsibilities, and helped the Soviets to receive favorable results during negotiations on several issues. In 1985, Treholt was convicted and jailed as a Soviet spy.
Chapter II
The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus

The Soviet Union devotes major resources to convey Soviet views and disseminate anti-Western propaganda to an increasingly large and diverse audience. Moscow’s primary instruments for attacking Western initiatives and promoting Soviet policies on a day-to-day basis are its news agencies and radio broadcasting, as well as reporting in the foreign media. Many other activities that serve a propaganda function—cultural activities, scholarships, and high-level visits, for example—are used in an effort to evoke in foreign audiences a positive sentiment toward the Soviet Union and negate Western influence.

TASS, the Soviet Union’s official news agency, has offices in 126 countries. The USSR’s “unofficial” news agency, APN (Novosti), distributes information to at least 5,000 press and information organs in 110 countries. In contrast to TASS, APN places emphasis on preparing propaganda tailored for individual countries, particularly developing countries. This effort includes using foreign nationals, introducing a new teletype service, and relying more on photographic materials. APN also conducts a grant program that brings substantial numbers of foreign journalists and public officials to the USSR. The program, which in 1983 had 2,000 recipients, is designed to encourage recipients to speak and write favorably about the Soviet Union upon their return.

The Soviets have the capacity to reach virtually every corner of the globe with their radio broadcasts. For the past 20 years the Soviets have gradually been increasing their radio broadcasts. By the end of 1985 they were broadcasting 2,215 hours per week in 82 languages. In addition to their overt broadcasts, the Soviets run two “unofficial” stations, which purport not to be run by the Soviet Government, and sponsor some clandestine radio stations that support Soviet views.

The Soviets have a number of outlets for their television broadcasts but, for the near term, Soviet television is unlikely to have a major propaganda impact. All direct broadcasts are aimed primarily at the domestic audience and are conducted in Russian. They can be picked up outside the USSR, but only with special, expensive receiving equipment. The Soviets do, however, place television programs abroad through official agreements and by various Soviet representatives abroad providing television materials, usually at low or no cost, to commercial outlets.

The Soviet Union carries out an extensive cultural exchange program worldwide. As of 1985 the USSR had intergovernmental agreements or formal programs with 120 countries. For the Soviets, “cultural relations” is a broad term that includes such activities as science, education, literature, music, sports, and tourism. The breadth and diversity of their cultural activities enable the Soviets to appeal to a wide variety of foreign audiences. The Soviets also provide numerous foreign scholarships, particularly to students from developing countries. In December 1984 more than 57,000 students from developing countries were studying in the USSR.

International communist-front organizations, although only covertly associated with the Soviet Union, are an integral part of the foreign propaganda effort. These organizations hold conferences, sponsor demonstrations, and produce publications which are designed to rally world opinion around Soviet causes.

Propaganda policy is decided by basically the same authority that approves Soviet foreign policy—the Politburo—with inputs from the CPSU Central Committee’s International Department and other party and government bodies. A large, highly centralized organization ensures that propaganda supports policy and that the propaganda is flexible enough to meet policy changes. The coordination of the propaganda effort with the Soviet media organs is largely the job of the ID.

Credibility of its news and information is a serious problem for the Soviet Union. One means to combat this problem is repetition. A particular theme is channeled through a number of outlets, both overt and covert, on the assumption that multiple appearances will add to that theme’s credibility. Increasingly, the USSR is using the foreign media as a vehicle for its propaganda. Soviet commentators, particularly since Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary, have been appearing regularly in the foreign media to present the Soviet version of issues and events.

Timeliness is also a problem. Various incidents have shown that the propaganda effort breaks down quickly when instructions from the top are not forthcoming or when bureaucratic interests are conflicting. Close party controls and inflexible bureaucratic procedures also contribute to inertia.
and delays. Soviet leaders have acknowledged that these delays mean that their interpretation of events is not the first one heard by foreign audiences and thus loses some of its impact. The presence of a strong leader may reduce some of those delays. Additionally, Gorbachev has reorganized the propaganda apparatus by merging the now-defunct International Information Department with other Central Committee departments. This change is unlikely to resolve the conflicting bureaucratic interests that have caused problems in the past on issues of major importance.

Outlets for Soviet Propaganda

Press Agencies

The Soviet news agencies occupy a central position in most of the Soviet Union’s foreign propaganda endeavors. A number of Soviet papers and news services have representatives abroad, but the most active foreign propaganda vehicles are the press agencies—TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) and APN (Agentstvo Pechati Novosti). The primary role of these agencies is to respond to world events, particularly actions by the United States, and to publicize Soviet policies.

TASS, the oldest of the Soviet news agencies, is the official news service of the Soviet Government and party and the acknowledged authoritative voice for the Soviet political bureaucracy and leadership in affairs of state. TASS’s responsibilities are quite broad; it collects and disseminates information for domestic and foreign audiences and provides commentaries to explain the official Soviet viewpoint.

TASS also has a substantial overseas representation more than 400 staff (Soviet nationals), including correspondents, engineers, and typists. It has correspondents accredited in 126 countries nearly every country that has relations with the USSR. In most major capitals of the world there are several TASS correspondents and often several locally hired office personnel and stringers.

TASS provides copy to foreign news agencies, newspapers, radio and television networks, and ministries of information. In the past 20 years the number of countries receiving TASS has almost doubled to 115. And, as of 1985, its information went to more than 600 networks, agencies, newspapers, and radio stations.

A major selling point for TASS service is its low cost. At full price it is substantially cheaper than Western news services, a major advantage for Information agencies in developing countries that are short on the hard currency needed to buy the services of foreign press agencies. Moreover, the Soviets have provided it free of charge to some countries.

From the standpoint of many recipients, the chief drawback of TASS service has been the failure of the Soviets to tailor it to meet the needs of specific foreign consumers; hence, most national agencies, particularly in developing countries, have found only a small portion of the service usable.

Agentstvo Pechati Novosti (APN) purported to be an unofficial, nongovernmental organ. It was formed in 1961 by a group of ostensible Soviet “public organizations.” Like all Soviet information agencies, however, it is controlled by the Communist Party. APN provides “supplementary” material on all aspects of the political, economic, and cultural life of the USSR not normally covered by TASS, and occasionally duplicates TASS reporting on issues. It has a wider variety of methods and uses a less stilted writing style than TASS to deliver Moscow’s message to foreign audiences.

As of 1983, APN provided products to 5,000 information organs in 110 countries. Its products include books, articles, press releases, interviews, surveys, and photo-illustrations to be distributed to the foreign press, information agencies, publishing houses, and radio and television organizations. The APN publishing house produces books, guides, and booklets in more than 50 languages with combined editions of around 17 million copies annually. Additionally, APN publishes both abroad and at home a number of journals, newspapers, and pamphlets for foreign audiences, some of which are:

- Soviet Weekly—published in the United Kingdom and disseminated weekly to more than 70 countries.
- Soviet Life—published monthly in the United States for the American public.
- Soviet Land—published biweekly in 13 native languages of India.
- Moscow News—weekly newspaper in Russian, English, French, Spanish, and Arabic, with a total circulation of about 1 million in 140 countries.
- Sputnik—a monthly illustrated digest journal disseminated in several languages in 100 countries.

In the late 1970s APN headquarters in Moscow had about 2,100 personnel of whom 1,100 were journalists and approximately 1,000 were technical and administrative personnel.
APN places great emphasis on preparing propaganda tailored for individual countries, particularly developing countries. APN is increasingly using foreign nationals in its foreign activities, because the Soviets believe that local personnel understand their audience better and are able to operate more freely and more effectively than Soviet citizens. The introduction in July 1983 of a new teletype service called APN Press Information for News Agencies of the Developing Countries was another effort to attract the developing countries. Additionally, APN places a high priority on providing photographic and other illustrative materials to the foreign press because, in developing countries with populations at a basically low level of literacy, the people are frequently influenced more convincingly by photo-information.

An important propaganda and active measures activity of the USSR is the APN grant program for visits to the USSR. As of late 1983, the grant program had about 2,000 recipients annually, including journalists, writers, and public figures from more than 80 countries. During their trips to the Soviet Union, the selected foreigners travel around the country to sightsee and meet with Soviet political leaders, academics, and others. Upon returning from the USSR, the foreign guests annually publish as many as 3,500 articles devoted to the Soviet Union.

TASS positions are useful to the intelligence services for a variety of reasons. TASS offices are usually located outside the diplomatic installation, facilitating clandestine movements. Also, TASS correspondents do not usually put bylines on their regular news articles (although they do on their commentaries), thus making it difficult to ascertain how much writing a journalist is doing. APN is also a valuable cover for the Soviet intelligence services, especially because many of its products are written in the Soviet Union, leaving little work for its correspondents abroad.

Soviet journalists—whether intelligence officers or not—can play a major role in political influence activities. Journalists have better access to a wide range of individuals than do Soviet diplomats and trade officials. Through frequent contact over extended periods of time, these journalists try to build rapport and influence the views and reporting of their colleagues.

**Publications**

The Soviet Union is one of the world’s largest exporters of printed material. In 1982 the Soviet Union officially exported about 50,000 titles and more than 70 million copies of books and pamphlets, a figure that does not include those disseminated through means other than direct sales—the sale of rights, free distribution, copublishing, publication abroad, and book exchanges with libraries and other institutions. According to a Soviet book trade official, in the period between 1973 and 1982 the Soviet Union increased its book exports more than 2.5 times. Soviet official statistics on the ruble value of Soviet exports of printed matter (including books, journals, newspapers, and other material) indicate that the monetary value has more than tripled in the past decade. In 1973 the value of printed-matter exports was 23.5 million rubles, whereas by 1984 it had increased to 74 million rubles.

Soviet publications have the advantages of low prices and ready availability. They appear to have large readerships mainly in countries where Western publications are expensive or are difficult to obtain. The Soviets participate in a number of domestic and foreign book exhibits annually. The Moscow Book Fair, which has been held every 2 years since 1977, is of major importance to the Soviets. Publishers from around the world display their books there in the hope of boosting sales. The Soviet book agency Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga (MK) did more than 100 million rubles worth of business in the 1985 fair. More than 100 publishers participated, compared with 94 publishers in 1983. The number of companies and organizations represented increased from 1,535 in 1977 to 3,300 in 1985.

There are six major Soviet publishing houses involved in the export of books: Aurora, Mir, APN, Progress, Raduga, and Russkiy Yazyk. Soviet books have a number of outlets abroad, including bookshops owned by local communist parties or friendship societies, book fairs, Soviet embassies, and cultural and “friendship” organizations.

MK, an all-union association under the Ministry of Foreign Trade, is the conduit for the selling and buying of publications abroad. It handles all foreign trade in books, newspapers, magazines, music, phonographic records, tape recordings, illustrations, postage stamps, and foreign “rights” to Soviet publications. MK has ties with more than 1,000 firms in 140 countries.

MK does most of its work with the communist parties of various countries and with their bookstores and publishing house outlets. It uses these outlets to fund the activities of the local communist parties and to get out propaganda materials, mostly in the native language. MK tends to emphasize materials of a political nature targeted to influence the local population.

**Periodicals**

According to official Soviet statistics, in 1981 the Soviet Union produced 245 journals and periodicals for foreign readers. Many of these were printed...
outside the Soviet Union, probably because of the poor quality of Soviet printing and the legal advantage of circumventing local laws against importing communist literature. Some periodicals are printed in other communist countries, on foreign presses under contractual arrangements, by certain international organizations and other groups under communist influence or by Soviet embassies in local languages. Some foreign-language periodicals include:

- **Soviet Literature**—monthly distributed in 10 languages to more than 100 countries.
- **Soviet Woman**—monthly published in 14 languages.
- **Culture and Life**—monthly published in 5 languages.
- **New Times**—weekly published in 9 languages.
- **Soviet Union**—monthly published in 20 languages.
- **Asia and Africa Today**—monthly published in Russian, English, French, Arabic, Persian, and Portuguese.

**Radio Broadcasting**

The Soviets have long recognized the propaganda value of radio as a medium unrestricted by geopolitical boundaries; Lenin stated that radio would be “a newspaper without paper and without distances.” The Soviets have had for some time the capability to reach virtually all parts of the globe with their radio broadcasts, and in the past few years have been intensifying their effort by adding more broadcasts in a variety of languages. By the end of 1985, total Soviet international broadcasting exceeded 2,215 hours per week in 82 languages.

Many union-republic radio centers located near the southern Soviet border have been given foreign broadcasting responsibilities. Sometimes they broadcast in the native languages of their republics to audiences across the border that speak the same or similar languages, as in the case of Radio Yerevan’s Armenian service. They also broadcast in the languages of non-Soviet target audiences, such as transmission from Baku and Tashkent in Persian. Other republic radio centers that have foreign responsibilities are the ones in Dushanbe, Kiev, Riga, Tbilisi, Vilnius, Alma-Ata, Tallinn, Vladivostok, and Minsk. Together, they broadcast almost 400 hours per week.

The focus of Soviet radio broadcasts has changed little in the past 14 years. Europe and Asia are still high in Soviet broadcasting priorities, while Africa and North America appear to have moved up slightly. Broadcasts to Latin America probably would be greater were it not for the role of Cuban broadcasts in the area. In 1985, Cuba was the leading communist broadcaster to Latin America with about 235 hours per week of transmissions.

Radio programming consists of news, commentary, and features (the subjects of which range from political, economic, and trade affairs to science, culture, education, and sports), interspersed with music. The structure and style of the programming are repetitive; many programs are played two or more times in a day or a week. Moreover, official policy lines are set forth in authoritative statements which in turn form the basis for lower level commentary, which reinforces the theme. The broadcasts to specific target audiences discuss local and regional topics, in an effort to create listener interest.

In the past few years the Soviets have improved their radio broadcasts both quantitatively and qualitatively. These improvements have included:

- Introducing a new English-language service in 1978, called the Radio Moscow World Service, now broadcast continuously throughout the world.
- Increasing the total external broadcasts by 75 program hours per week in 1980, the largest increase in more than 10 years.
- Revamping and increasing Radio Moscow’s French broadcasts to form a new service called Radio Moscow International in 1983—on the air 46 hours per week and beamed to both Europe and Africa.

In addition to programs emanating from Radio Moscow and the union republics, a special foreign radio service known as Radio Peace and Progress (RPP) was initiated in 1964. Analogous to APN, RPP was established as a station of Soviet “public organizations” which claims to be a nongovernmental broadcasting station. Its self-defined task is to promote mutual understanding and trust among the people of all countries,” but in practice it seems to concentrate on the continents of Asia and Africa. RPP uses the technical facilities of Radio Moscow, although the Soviet Government disclaims any responsibility for the content of the transmissions.

In 1985 RPP produced 141 hours per week in 12 languages. Although the themes addressed are standard ones that follow the official line, RPP broadcasts are sometimes notably more tendentious and outspoken than those of Radio Moscow, purveying propaganda lines for which the Soviet Government might wish to disclaim responsibility. RPP programming is customarily tailored to individual target audiences. The propaganda is often
directed at countries with which the Soviet Union maintains friendly relations. In the late 1960s, for example, RPP's commentaries on Indian politics caused irritation in and protests from India's government and press.

Radio Magallanes was a Chilean radio station that operated in Santiago until the fall of Salvador Allende. Radio Peace and Progress offered it airtime and it has broadcast from the USSR since January 1977. The station broadcasts in Spanish to Chile 7 hours per week, and is hostile toward the Pinochet regime.

The USSR has engaged in extensive clandestine radio broadcasting since World War II. Most clandestine radio stations disseminate anti-regime material to target countries. Many of them work for the cause of a local, pro-Soviet communist party. Over the past two decades, new stations have appeared and old ones disappeared, as political changes have occurred. Two clandestine radio stations currently operate from Soviet territory: Radio Ba Yi (or 1 August), and the National Voice of Iran.

Since its initiation in April 1979, Ba Yi has cast its commentaries so as to suggest that it is presenting the views of dissidents in the Chinese armed forces. Technical observations, however, indicate that the transmitter is located in the Soviet Far East. Ba Yi attempts to foment disaffection with policies of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and indirectly encourages support for Soviet positions. Its broadcasts are irregular and in the past have been suspended for varying lengths of time for technical and, possibly, political reasons. For example, during the summer of 1985, Ba Yi shut down briefly during a period when negative commentary on the PRC in Soviet media was substantially reduced. This shutdown, apparently a political gesture to the Chinese, lasted only about 6 weeks.

Founded in 1959, the National Voice of Iran (NVOI) began broadcasting in Persian; since at least 1967 it has also broadcast in Azerbaijani. NVOI's broadcasts, 9 hours per week, are vehemently anti-Khomeini and sometimes promote the communist Tudeh Party.

The Soviets apparently also support at least one and possibly two other clandestine radio stations that began broadcasting in Persian to Iran in 1984. The Radio of Iranian Toilers broadcasts 10-1/2 hours per week from a location in northwest Afghanistan, near Herat. The program is designed to convey to Tudeh members in Iran that the party is still functioning. The Soviets probably also support another clandestine broadcast—the Voice of the Iranian Communist Party—which is on the air 21 hours per week.

The USSR also supports the two clandestine radio stations broadcasting to Turkey and the Middle East from Eastern Europe—Our Radio (Bizirn Radyo) and the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party. The two stations portray themselves as voices of the Turkish people and working class. The stations strike at the Evren regime and at Turkey's ties to the West, and defend Soviet policies. In 1985 Our Radio broadcast about 72 hours per week, and the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party about 58 hours per week.

**Television**

The potential of television as a medium has long been recognized by Soviet propagandists. They have stated that “public opinion is, in our day, having an ever greater influence on world affairs. In view of this, great efforts are being made by states to shape public opinion on a worldwide scale, and the mass media—especially television—are being used for this purpose with increasing sophistication.”

There are five means through which the Soviets can get television programs broadcast abroad: Intersputnik, a communications exchange with East European and a few other countries; Intervision, a program exchange run by the International Organization for Radio and Television; official agreements between Gosteleradio and foreign information agencies; Soviet domestic broadcasts transmitted via communications satellite; and the placement of Soviet programming abroad by Soviet representatives.

Intersputnik is an organization that leases capacity on Soviet satellites for the exchange of television programs and other communications among its member and user countries. The programming is a combination of that provided by Intervision; Soviet domestic programming; programming from the individual user and member countries; and, occasionally, West European programs and some material from Western news organizations.

Intersputnik provides the USSR with a number of political and propaganda advantages. The organization coordinates radio and television news, as well as the exchange of television programs among member and user countries. It coordinates the daily exchange of television programs among member stations, and the USSR supplies about one-third of its programming. It disseminates programming abroad through daily exchanges with its West European counterpart, Eurovision. This exchange is unequal, however; in 1984 Eurovision took only 388 news
items from Intervision, compared with more than 7,000 news items that Intervision took from Eurovision.

Many Soviet television programs are currently shown abroad within the framework of bilateral agreements worked out by Gosteleradio, which has jurisdiction over radio and television operations and foreign broadcasting organs. For example, Gosteleradio and the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information signed an agreement this year whereby both parties will send each other television features and documentaries about their own countries as well as radio programs and recordings of music. Similar agreements recently have been signed with Finland, the Turner Broadcasting Company in the United States, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

In their attempts to expand broadcasting capabilities to cover the USSR, the Soviets have created the technical infrastructure needed to send their domestic television beyond their borders. They can beam television signals to virtually any place on earth via their satellites. However, special expensive equipment must be used to receive the signals from all of their satellites. Even with the newer Ekran series, special antennas and signal converters are necessary.

With the proper equipment, stations and/or receivers beyond the borders of the USSR can pick up Soviet television “live.” The legality of individual receiving installations is in question in most European countries; they are illegal in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands and are heavily restricted in most other countries. There appears to be a market, however, for Soviet television on cable and subscription TV systems; government approval is granted in most countries. Some cable television systems in Europe carry a limited amount of Soviet programming.

The Soviets have had some success in placing their television programs abroad when they have moved outside official agreements. Representatives from APN, Gosteleradio, and the Soviet Embassy play a major role in providing television materials, particularly to commercial outlets. The type of programming provided varies from country to country. It almost always includes cultural films and programs, and often includes children’s programs, documentaries, and international news items. Soviet efforts in the early 1980s were limited by the unattractiveness of Soviet material in competition with the outside world—a frequent complaint was that it was too propagandistic—and a scarcity or lack of television sets and/or television equipment and networks in the developing countries. As with the news services, however, Soviet television broadcasts are often provided at low or no cost, and the media in some developing countries have few alternatives.

The Soviets recently have made great progress in improving the quality of their television broadcasts, which have been widely known for dull format, poor sound and photography, and “talking heads” news with no live footage. They have been improving the format, presentation, technical quality, and program mix of their broadcasts. News broadcasts in particular appear to have been modeled after Western television and have included some US footage of US troops training in Central America. Despite these changes, however, Soviet television remains well below the standard of Western broadcasts.

Aside from the format and content shortcomings, Soviet television broadcasting suffers from a major problem for foreign audiences—it is in Russian. The Soviets may begin to tailor television broadcasts to foreign audiences in the future, but there are currently no indications that they intend to do so. The Soviets may feel that the expense of improving their television broadcasts and tailoring to foreign audiences outweighs the benefits of such an effort. Television equipment is still scarce in most developing countries, a major target of Soviet propaganda. Moreover, to compete effectively with the West in the area, the Soviets would have to make substantial improvements in both their broadcasting capabilities and their programming. More likely, the Soviets will continue their efforts to access foreign television, rather than revise their own for foreign broadcasting.

Cultural Activities

The Soviet Union undoubtedly leads the world in the scale and scope of its cultural exchanges. This is no coincidence: one of the most important principles of the Soviet state’s cultural policies has always been to encourage and support cultural exchanges between countries and nations. It is our belief that cultural exchange between nations is important for creation of the new society’s culture.

—Soviet journalist V. Popov

The Soviet Union maintains cultural relations with 140 countries worldwide. Unlike other forms of propaganda, Soviet cultural activities do not usually contain a specific political message. Most seek to instill in the viewer or participant a general feeling of admiration or good will for the Soviet Union. For the Soviets, “cultural relations” are a broad concept that includes such activities as science, education, literature, the graphic arts, music, public health, sports, tourism, and disaster relief.

Soviet cultural contacts are extensive in scope and diversity, and they are growing. In 1975 they were two and one-half times their 1965 level, according to Soviet statements. The Soviets offer something for just about everyone, from sports to the fine arts, and there is virtually no aspect of culture or
The Soviet Union prefers to conduct its cultural relations on a planned basis through cultural agreements. As of this year, it has intergovernmental agreements and programs with 120 countries. Cultural agreements are negotiated and directed by the Cultural Relations Department of the Foreign Ministry, headed by Yuriy Kirichenko since 1982. Bilateral cultural agreements often provide for such activities as those detailed below.

In 1984 more than 100 artistic collectives, over 400 soloists, and 40 exhibitions were sent by the USSR Ministry of Culture to West European countries alone. Soviet cultural presentations worldwide consist of Soviet artistic touring groups, such as ballet companies, symphonies, dance groups, and smaller musical groups; exhibits of photographs, books, and art; and the circus. Although the quality and renown of a touring group often depend on the competition appearing in a country and the potential commercial rewards for the Soviets, they manage to send them to all the countries that want or agree to have them.

According to a study by USIA in 1983, Soviet cultural presentations, even those in the developing countries where the Soviets normally send “lesser” artistic groups and companies, were well received worldwide. This was particularly true in Latin America and Western Europe, where the companies performed for often large and diverse crowds. Cultural exhibits, including those of art, books, and photographs, also were often popular but normally drew smaller crowds. Contrary to the purpose of most cultural and information activities, some of those exhibits focused on political themes, with emphasis on such topics as the arms race. In Nicaragua, Soviet books and photos emphasized propaganda against capitalism, imperialism, and US “interventionist” activities.

Through their participation in trade exhibits, the Soviets seek to portray their industrial achievements, progress, and power; to present the USSR as a model for economic and industrial development; to display Soviet industrial items, machinery, and tools for export; and to provide an opportunity to pass out literature and show films. Soviet participation in trade and technical exhibits is a minor effort when compared with other cultural and information activities—the Soviets participated in or sponsored fairs in only 42 countries in 1983. However, as the fairs and exhibits undoubtedly reach a different audience than most cultural activities, they provide a good complement.

When Soviet participation in trade exhibits is not part of bilateral cultural agreements, participation is coordinated by the USSR Chamber of Commerce, which also manages the Soviet exhibits. In the early 1980s there was no noticeable increase in Soviet participation in trade fairs worldwide except in Latin America where, between 1982 and 1983, the Soviets increased their participation in fairs and exhibits from five to nine countries.

The Soviets utilize cultural and information centers, libraries, and reading rooms abroad as centers for short- and long-range programs to disseminate Marxist-Leninist ideology; to expose urban audiences to selected aspects of Soviet culture and achievements; and to induce sympathy, understanding, and support for Soviet policies and programs. Russian-language training is usually provided at these centers because of the potential utility of local citizens trained in Russian for Soviet aid projects and the long-term potential of such training as a vehicle for indoctrination.

The cultural facilities of the USSR abroad range from small reading rooms to multistory centers that may contain a library, a theater, an exhibit area, and classrooms. They may be part of the diplomatic mission, separate from the mission but run by diplomatic “cultural” officers, or they may be run by local Soviet friendship societies or sympathetic political parties. As of 1983 the Soviets supported in some fashion at least 97 facilities in 56 countries.

Operational responsibility for stocking Soviet libraries abroad, and probably for the overall physical arrangements of the center, rests in the Ministry of Culture. The activities of the facilities usually include seminars, lectures, films, exhibitions, language instruction, and cultural programs. Many have libraries stocked with books in Russian and the local language or languages. The target audiences are primarily students, younger members of the working class, and dissatisfied members of the intelligentsia. The degree to which polemical literature is stocked depends upon local conditions.

The library-cultural center is a point at which the direct dissemination of Soviet propaganda and information can be accomplished, questions can be answered, and attitudes favorable to the Soviet Union can be fostered. Where authorized, these centers provide legal public meetingplaces where like-minded individuals and groups can get together. Although a cultural center is too public and too obvious to be used for clandestine meetings, it can help identify potential sympathizers. In short, although the audiences of some centers may well be small, the assets that the centers provide the Soviets far outweigh the sometimes small number of individuals who use them.

Between the late 1960s and 1983 the number of foreign students in the USSR more than quadrupled. The management of the program and the students within the USSR is the responsibility of the Minister
of Higher and Secondary Special Education. Soviet foreign educational activities sponsored by this ministry are concentrated in the developing countries. As of December 1984, there were approximately 57,485 students from developing countries studying in the USSR, and an additional 3,000 technical trainees left their countries in 1984 for training in the USSR. The Soviets hope that many in this group will return home as potential leaders sympathetic to Soviet causes. Educational exchanges with the developed countries, on the other hand, are used by the Soviets primarily to collect scientific and industrial information. The number of students in the Soviet Union from the West is less than 8,000.

Most student exchanges with the USSR are arranged through bilateral cultural agreements. However, some scholarships are provided through Soviet embassies and consulates, foreign communist parties, and such “public” organizations as friendship societies and front groups. The Soviets have been known to recruit students without the permission of the local government. For example, according to an article that appeared in the Thai daily The Nation in 1979 the Soviet Embassy staff in Bangkok decided to recruit Thai students itself, without the approval of the Thai authorities. The article also stated that the Thai Foreign Ministry estimated that about 200 students had left, undetected, for the USSR.

The extent and impact of educational exchanges vary from region to region. As of 1983, Soviet educational exchanges were virtually nonexistent in East Asian and Pacific countries, and limited to a small number of countries in Western Europe. However, educational exchanges are now one of the most significant of the Soviets’ cultural and informational activities in Latin America, the Near East, and Africa. In the period from 1979 to 1983, they increased more than 40 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, and more than doubled in the other two regions.

For undergraduates, the scholarships generally cover expenses for 4-6 years’ study plus transportation. (There are no tuition fees for higher education in the USSR.) Additionally, students were receiving a stipend of 90 rubles per month in 1984. Similar arrangements are made for graduate students and technical trainees.

Although the Soviets place a great deal of emphasis on their program, it is not without its flaws. A major problem is nonrecognition of Soviet degrees in many countries, which in effect deprives or severely limits graduates in finding employment upon returning home. In many countries where the degrees are accepted, they are often not highly regarded. Many students do not find their experiences in the USSR rewarding and return with a dislike for the country, bitter complaints of racial discrimination (by Africans in particular) resentment at having to learn Russian and sit through tiresome Soviet propaganda sessions, and a growing understanding of the limitations of the Soviet system. Thus it is not surprising that in some countries not all available Soviet scholarships are taken.

On the other hand, many foreign students find the experience a positive one. Soviet-trained graduates provide a large contingent of doctors, engineers, and agronomists in some African countries, and a few have even risen to high government posts. Moreover, the Soviets have recently made attempts to organize their “alumni” in some African countries, a program that could be of propaganda value to them.

Like trade fairs, Soviet sports activities attract foreign audiences that may not be drawn by other forms of Soviet propaganda, and they often get wide media coverage. The Soviets send a wide variety of teams abroad, including basketball, gymnastic, soccer, and ice hockey. They also send coaches and trainers for training teams in other countries, and they occasionally donate sports equipment. Moscow values these activities because they provide exposure, help build good will and contacts, and supply the opportunities to create audiences more favorable to the USSR, particularly among the young.

The USSR Committee of Physical Culture and Sport has control over athletes and athletics in the Soviet Union, and supervises their participation in international and binational competitions and other activities.

Front Organizations

The Soviet Union directs and heavily subsidizes 13 major international front organizations and several hundred minor front and friendship organizations. Although the organizations strive to appear independent and democratic, they are widely known to be instruments of Soviet foreign policy. Front organizations are commonly grouped with Soviet active measures because their association with the USSR is not acknowledged by the Soviet Union. However, they are controlled propaganda organs that strive to rally world opinion to Soviet causes. Among their numerous activities, most of which get wide media coverage, are meetings, rallies, conferences, and demonstrations. Additionally, all of the major front organizations issue a regular publication as well as ad hoc writings which tout the Soviet line.

The major front organizations were created to appeal to a variety of audiences. The largest organization is the World Peace Council, and others include the Women’s International Democratic Federation, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the Christian Peace Conference. One front
organization of particular value to the USSR in its media activities worldwide is the International Organization of Journalists, which has five schools in the Eastern bloc and Cuba that it uses to train journalists from developing countries.

The Apparatus for Propaganda Management

The Soviet propaganda management apparatus is a large, highly centralized structure. Propaganda policy is formulated by the same bodies that create Soviet foreign policy, thus ensuring that propaganda supports policy. Moreover, the centralization of the apparatus means that propaganda can be flexible—lines can be changed whenever policy requires it. However, another consequence of that centralization is that the propaganda effort breaks down quickly when instructions from the top are slow or nonexistent.

The ultimate authority for propaganda policy is the CPSU Politburo, presided over by General Secretary Gorbachev. Additionally, there are three CPSU secretaries with responsibility for propaganda issues: senior secretary Yegor Ligachev and junior secretaries Aleksandr Yakovlev and Mikhail Zimyanin. The responsibility for developing, coordinating, and implementing foreign propaganda within the framework established by the Politburo rests largely in the international, Propaganda, and Bloc Relations Departments of the CPSU Central Committee, and with the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of State Security. Some of the leading personalities involved in the propaganda apparatus are profiled below.

- Mikhail Vasil’evich ZIMYANIN

Party secretary since 1976 ... responsible for internal ideology, propaganda, and counterpropaganda—an increasingly important area as Soviets try to “neutralize” Western effects on Soviet society ... spent early career in Belorussian party ranks ... moved to foreign service after Stalin’s and Beria’s deaths in 1953 ... served as ambassador to North Vietnam and Czechoslovakia and briefly as deputy foreign minister ... in 1965 became chief editor of Pravda and a full member of CPSU Central Committee ... age 71.

- Yegor Kuz’mich LIGACHEV

Member, Politburo, since April 1985, and Secretary, CPS Central Committee, since December 1983 ... age 64 ... chief party ideologue with general oversight for propaganda-related activities ... also supervises cadres policy ... engineer by training ... first secretary of Tomsk Obkom during 1965-83.

- Anatoliy Fedorovich DOBRYNIN

Chief, International Department, CPSU Central Committee, since March 1986 ... age 66 ... served as ambassador to the US during 1962-86 ... will bring extensive expertise in US-Soviet relations to the ID.

The International Department

The ID plays a major role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. It coordinates and reviews inputs on Soviet foreign policy matters from the Foreign Ministry, the KGB, the military, and the various research institutes, and apparently develops from those inputs policy proposals that go to the Politburo. It has special responsibility for overseeing CPSU relations with nonruling communist parties and other foreign leftist parties and front groups.

The ID plays a major role in the propaganda process. Ideas for propaganda and active measures campaigns originate in the ID, as well as in the Politburo and the KGB. In addition to its role in the formulation and coordination of propaganda campaigns, the ID contributes to the propaganda effort by working with the groups it oversees, particularly front organizations, to promote, coordinate, and fund propaganda campaigns.

The ID is also responsible for the publication of the monthly journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism, known in English as the World Marxist Review. Although ostensibly the Review is an international publication and edited in Prague, the editorial board is controlled by the ID. Through this publication the ID openly communicates policy lines to foreign groups.

The ID was headed by Boris Ponomarev from its inception until the 27th CPSU Congress in March 1986, when Ponomarev was replaced by Dobrynin.

The Propaganda Department

Before 1978 the Propaganda Department was the principal CPSU organ overseeing media operations both at home and abroad. The foreign aspect of the Propaganda Department’s job was assumed by the International Information Department (IID) until March 1986 when it was disbanded. As noted, the
Propaganda Department probably shares responsibility for propaganda on international subjects going to the domestic audience, with the other Central Committee departments having foreign affairs and propaganda responsibilities—the ID and the Bloc Relations Department. With the abolition of the IID, the Propaganda Department’s responsibilities could be broadened once again to entail some aspects of foreign propaganda.

- Aleksandr Nikolayevich YAKOVLEV

Chief, Propaganda Department, CPSU Central Committee, since March 1986 ... age 62 ... veteran propagandist and international affairs specialist ... responsible for promoting ideology in all party, government, and other Soviet organizations ... defines and communicates the leadership’s main policies and concerns to the Soviet public ... has written some harsh anti-US propaganda in recent years ... studied at Columbia University 1959-60 ... deputy chief and then-chief of the Propaganda Department during the early years of the Brezhnev regime ... ambassador to Canada 1973-83 ... director of Institute of World Economic and International Relations during 1983-85.

The Committee for State Security

The KGB can affect decisions on propaganda campaigns through its chief, Viktor Chebrikov—a Politburo member. The KGB is always involved in the implementation of Soviet active measures. According to Stanislaw Levchenko, Service A (the KGB’s Active Measures component) worked with the ID and the III) (before it was disbanded in March 1986) in formulating and coordinating active measures campaigns. The KGB’s covert activities often parallel and support the objectives of Soviet overt propaganda.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The MFA can play a role in the key decisions on propaganda campaigns through its head, Eduard Shevardnadze—a member of the Politburo. At a lower level, the MFA has a role in the coordination of propaganda. Major articles and books on foreign affairs, particularly those on diplomatic affairs, require Foreign Ministry clearance. The Press Department reads the articles; the regional and area departments clear book manuscripts in their specialties.

The MFA also has a prominent role in the implementation of propaganda campaigns. The Press Department in Moscow serves as a major outlet for propaganda on international issues. In 1984 it started a regular press briefing, usually conducted by Press Department chief Vladimir Lomeyko, using a “Western format” with Lomeyko fielding questions from both Soviet and Western reporters. In addition, the press departments of Soviet embassies overseas often issue written policy statements and, more recently, have been conducting their own press briefings.

The Foreign Ministry’s Department for Foreign Cultural Relations negotiates and directs Soviet cultural agreements. Moreover, through its embassies and consulates abroad, the ministry organizes and supervises many cultural and information activities abroad.

State Committees

Four state committees are heavily involved in the propaganda apparatus: Goskomizdat, Glavlit, Gosteleradio, and Goskino. Although they are ostensibly independent organizations, they effectively operate as extensions of the party apparatus in administering the day-to-day affairs of many of the propaganda outlets.

All publication activities in the Soviet Union, including those affecting foreign dissemination, are controlled by Goskomizdat—the State Committee for Publishing Houses, the Printing Industry, and the Book Trade. Goskomizdat, established in 1972 as a continuation of the Committee on the Press, supervises the publishing and printing industry and exercises national control over the thematic trend and content of literature. A “superconglomerate,” as of 1978 Goskomizdat supervised 200 publishers, 60,000 bookshops and kiosks, 360,000 libraries, and all printing establishments in all Soviet republics. It is responsible for the employment of 350,000 workers in those establishments.

Officially attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, Glavlit, or the Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press, is in practice subordinate to the KGB and the Central Committee. Glavlit maintains a countrywide network of censors, estimated to number at least 70,000. Its responsibilities include radio and television broadcasts as well as printed media. Located at printing plants, editorial offices, and broadcasting studios, Glavlit censors scrutinize all media material before stamping it for public release. Its mission is to ensure that no information affecting the security of the Soviet state appears in public communications. The KGB and Glavlit jointly prepare the censor’s Index, a classified handbook on “state secrets” that may not be disclosed in the media. The Index also incorporates Defense Ministry instructions.

In 1957, radio and television operations were removed from the Ministry of Culture’s jurisdiction and established as a separate entity. It was formally established as a Committee of the USSR Council Ministers in 1962 and elevated to State Committee
in 1970. Now, the State Committee for Television and Radio broadcasting, known in the Soviet Union as “Gostele radio,” is responsible for organizing the internal and external broadcasting activities of the Soviet Union and directing all domestic recording activities in the country. The Ministry of Communications is responsible for the facilities and personnel used to transmit, relay, and broadcast radio and television signals.

The State Committee for Cinematography, Goskino, headed by Filipp Yermash since 1972, plans and directs all activities concerning the making and distribution of Soviet films. It is also responsible for international contacts in the area of cinematography.

The Propaganda Process

The party maintains control of the propaganda apparatus by issuing general policy guidance and appointing personnel to key positions. Broad policy guidance on the direction of Soviet propaganda is given in the occasional speeches or messages by party officials with responsibility for ideology and propaganda—General Secretary Gorbachev and Secretaries Ligachev, Yavkovev, and Zimyanin.

Ideas for propaganda campaigns in support of Soviet policies can originate in the Politburo, the KGB, or the ID. The Politburo votes on campaigns and then issues a directive to the organizations involved which calls for them to take whatever measures are needed to carry out the campaigns.

There are regular meetings of the heads of the major media organs and representatives from the ID, MFA, and KGB where guidance is given, apparently based on directives from the Central Committee. The meetings once were chaired by Zimyanin, but have probably been chaired by Ligachev since he assumed responsibility for propaganda. The coordination of foreign propaganda campaigns outside the planning meetings is largely the responsibility of the IID, working on instructions from the ideology secretaries and the Politburo.

Delays in Propaganda Responses

The Soviet propaganda apparatus has been unable to handle a number of major foreign policy issues quickly. Such delays probably have been caused by the absence of strong leadership in the Politburo as well as by bureaucratic coordination and logistical requirements. In some crises it has taken 7 to 10 days for guidance from Moscow to reach the offices abroad that need it. Similar delays in responses have been evident in the improvised reporting on Afghanistan, the Korean Airlines (KAL) shutdown, and the grounding of a Soviet submarine off the Swedish coast.

Leadership Dissatisfaction

The Soviet propaganda apparatus has long been the subject of leadership concern and criticism because of its perceived inability to compete effectively with other foreign media. In the early 1970s the Brezhnev regime resorted to a series of personnel and organizational changes in an effort to improve the performance of Soviet media organizations. In spite of those efforts, the various media services continued through the 1970s to demonstrate serious coordination problems and failed to tailor their output for maximum effect on foreign and domestic audiences.

Evidently because of leadership concern about Soviet foreign propaganda, the International Information Department was established in early 1978. The IID publicly received its charter at the next Central Committee plenum in November 1978. Then-General Secretary Brezhnev told the Central Committee that the propaganda media had been ineffective in dealing with economic and social life and in the treatment of international events and called for reports that were more timely, factual, and better analyzed. He indicated the seriousness of Soviet concern by announcing that the Politburo had set up a special commission to study ways to analyze the problems he had outlined and to improve “ideological, mass-political work.”

Brezhnev’s criticisms were apparently directed at the Propaganda and International Departments, which had borne most of the responsibility for international propaganda before the formation of the IID. His charges were probably intended to clear the way for Zamyatin to take control of foreign propaganda.

Criticism of the apparatus continued in 1979, when the Central Committee issued a decree calling for the increase of “party-minded zealfulness” of media. In the decree, foreign policy information was found to be particularly derelict in melding “persuasiveness and concrete analysis with a forthright attitude toward the ideological enemy.” This decree, in particular, highlights the central dilemma facing the Soviet propaganda apparatus: establishing credibility as a source of information while supporting Soviet interests.

Leadership criticism of foreign propaganda underwent a subtle change in 1983. In addition to the now-standard calls for more substance and promptness, the leadership appeared concerned about the style of Soviet propaganda. In June 1983, Chernenko attacked the “cliche dispatches and commentaries” appearing in Soviet media and criticized Moscow’s “foreign policy propaganda” as not sufficiently “active and
masterful” in combating the West’s “antisocialist bias.” Without enhancing the “appeal and journalistic qualities” of material addressed to foreign audiences, Chernenko said, the USSR “cannot hope for success in foreign policy propaganda in the long term.”

Gorbachev, whose active role in Soviet propaganda has been apparent in the stream of propaganda initiatives from the Kremlin since he took office, apparently is taking a more activist role in Soviet propaganda activities than his predecessors. He has made major revisions of Soviet propaganda activities and policy, and restructured the entire apparatus, beginning with the abolition of the IID.

Soviet Propaganda Techniques and Recent Improvements

In the past few years, and particularly since Gorbachev’s appointment as General Secretary, the Soviets have developed a variety of methods for getting their ideas across. Although the methods differ, the purpose seems to be the same: to keep world attention focused on Soviet proposals, policies, and reactions.

Press Conferences

The practice of press conferences is not new in the Soviet Union-Soviet leader Khrushchev gave a few in his time-but what is new is their frequency and form. With regularity, Soviet spokesmen and the General Secretary are fielding questions from reporters before a battery of television cameras. The Soviets value press conferences as a chance to state positions to international audiences with hopes that the press conferences can promote the Soviet position.

Gorbachev’s news conferences in Geneva and Paris highlight this trend. In addition, since mid-1984 press briefings have been held in the Soviet Foreign Ministry at least once a month. Their increased frequency appears to be related to Moscow’s evident dismay at the public relations debacle it suffered after the KAL incident and the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) reduction talks walkout, which coincided with increasing concern on the part of the Soviet leadership over Moscow’s “counterpropaganda” capabilities.

No small factor in the leadership’s appreciation of the news conference is the credibility of the institution, achieved from its similarity to its Western counterpart. There are, however, some notable differences between the Foreign Ministry press briefings and those in the West. Although some questions are received orally, many are submitted in writing and deposited in small boxes at either side of the stage, where they are periodically picked up by Soviet officials. This procedure assures the briefers that the questions they want to answer will get asked, and in a manner favorable to them. Additionally, it gives officials a chance to consider an answer before speaking or, perhaps more to the point, not to answer the question at all.

Access to Foreign Media

The Soviets are getting better at using the Western media to their advantage. With increasing frequency, the Soviet view of an international event or some aspect of Soviet foreign policy is being presented abroad by Soviet spokesmen. It is now common to see such Soviet officials as Georgiy Arbatov, Leonid Zamyatin, or Vladimir Pozner being interviewed by Western TV commentators or press correspondents.

A recent example of the new accessibility of Soviet spokesmen was the performance of Soviet officials in Geneva in November 1985. Arriving well before the summit, the Soviets deluged journalists with a series of briefings, stacks of translated press releases and Gorbachev speeches, and a press luncheon. A Western journalist noted that the information curtain that separates normally tightlipped Soviet officials from Western journalists in Moscow parted in Geneva, and the Soviet spokesmen seemed eager to make themselves available.

Another Soviet method for gaining access to the foreign media has been through the cooperation of some foreign journalists stationed in Moscow. For many foreign journalists, reporting in a Soviet-biased or pro-Soviet manner can result in gaining access to otherwise inaccessible Soviet officials or receiving “inside information.” Moreover, if foreign journalists refuse to cooperate, they may be the target of provocations, and some journalists have been charged with “hooliganism,” espionage, or illicit behavior and have been deported.

When the Soviets have been unsuccessful in getting foreign journalists to write their stories, they have found another means of getting foreign coverage: purchasing advertising space in newspapers. The advertisements almost always carry a political message, and are usually purchased by the Soviet Embassy.

Controlled Leaks

Approved government leaks from official and unofficial sources help the Soviet Union gain access to the foreign media with “hot news” items. Soviet or Soviet-backed sources occasionally provide information to the Western press or Western officials on Soviet affairs, particularly leadership issues. One example of this is Viktor Louis, a major source of information on Soviet dissident Andrey Sakharov. He provided Western correspondents with a film of
Sakharov in 1985 that was intended to show Sakharov as healthy and well-cared-for. Sakharov’s wife, Helena Bonner, has since stated that the film, was made up of clips taken by the KGB before Sakharov’s illness and misrepresented the state of his health at the time it was released.

The New General Secretary

The primary architect of the more open Soviet approach to public diplomacy has undoubtedly been Gorbachev. His flair for public relations was first revealed to the West during his December 1984 visit to the United Kingdom several months before his ascension to power. Observers there were struck by his openness, candor, and willingness to discuss tough issues. His performance no doubt reflected his preferred personal style, a style he has since used effectively with domestic Soviet audiences. But it also reflected his keen appreciation of the importance of openness in dealing with Western audiences.

Since becoming General Secretary, Gorbachev has continued this more open style and translated it to the rest of the Soviet bureaucracy. His own press conferences and personal interviews have been matched by Soviet spokesmen at lower levels. Soviet officials are now willing to discuss issues, such as human rights, which were shunned in the pre-Gorbachev era as “interference” in internal Soviet affairs. The initial Soviet reaction to the Chernobyl nuclear accident demonstrates that there are limits to this new Gorbachev style, but there is no question that his approach has increased the effectiveness of Soviet public diplomacy in the West.

Exploitation of UN Information Organs

The USSR became directly interested in developing the United Nations as a propaganda vehicle in 1954 when it saw some hope of winning the vote on certain international issues. In recent years it has been successful on many occasions in using the United Nations to support USSR propaganda activities worldwide.

The Soviets have tried to gain control of the UN Secretariat’s news service-the Political Information and News Service (PINS). PINS was established by the United Nations to provide the UN Secretariat staff and member states with synopses of media reports. A Soviet national, Vyacheslav Ustinov, heads the office that supervises PINS. He has delegated editorial responsibilities to his special assistant, another Soviet. A review of PINS products indicates an anti-US bias and an absence of unfavorable coverage of the USSR.

The UN Department of Public Information (DPI) plays a crucial role in the government’s propaganda efforts, despite the fact that the resolution which established the DPI decreed that it should not engage in propaganda. The DPI arranges for national and international media coverage of UN activities. The influence of Soviet officials working in the department frequently results in the presentation of a selective and distorted image of the UN’s activities, and the DPI occasionally issues pamphlets, such as one issued in late 1984 on colonialism, which are grossly biased against Western countries.

Soviets in the UN Secretariat are instructed to arrange for the UN Secretary-General to make favorable references to the statements of Soviet leaders or announcements of the Central Committee. The Soviets circulate these statements as well as Soviet Government announcements in UN documents. As a matter of practice, the United Nations allows documents of any delegation to be entered in the record and circulated as official UN documents. The fact that they have been circulated in the United Nations is used by the Soviet press and other media in a way that gives the propaganda placement more credibility.

Conclusions and Prospects

There are no objective means for measuring the overall effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in influencing policies abroad, but the huge investment the Soviet Union has made in its propaganda effort-radio broadcasting, news agencies, publications, and cultural and information activities-attest to its high regard for propaganda instruments as political tools.

In spite of this massive effort, Soviet leaders have continually voiced concerns about the quality of their foreign propaganda. Improving the credibility of their news and information is the most serious problem for the Soviets. They combat this shortcoming in part through repetition-presenting their propaganda on a particular theme through various media outlets, hoping that each will add to the credibility of the other to produce a convincing story. They also use the foreign media as vehicles for their propaganda, in the hope that their ideas will gain the Western media’s credibility. Soviet commentators, particularly since Gorbachev became General Secretary, appear regularly in the Western media to present the Soviet views on issues or events.

Timeliness is also a serious problem that, on major issues, will not be solved easily by the Soviets. Various incidents have shown that their propaganda effort breaks down quickly when instructions from the top are not forthcoming or when bureaucratic interests conflict. Close party controls and inflexible procedures also contribute to inertia and delays. Soviet leaders have acknowledged that those delays mean that their interpretation of events will not be the first one heard by foreign audiences, thus reducing its impact. The presence of a strong leader may reduce some of those
delays. Even a reorganization of the apparatus, however, is unlikely to resolve the conflicting bureaucratic interests that have caused problems in the past on issues of major importance.

The Soviets are currently undertaking a massive new effort to educate people around the world about Soviet policies and proposals because they feel that their ideas are not being heard. The Soviets are likely to initiate the following propaganda developments in the near future:

- Increase the use of radio and television;
- Improve the supply of publications, especially books, with most of the increase probably going to developing countries;
- Further tailor propaganda for individual countries and regions.

In addition, TASS and APN will almost certainly continue to increase the number of subscribers to their services, offering them at low or no cost; and Soviet commentators will make increasing use of the foreign media as a propaganda outlet.

Appendix: The Soviet Campaign Against SDI

The Soviet Union is orchestrating a worldwide campaign to undermine domestic and foreign support for the US Strategic Defense Initiative. The USSR has been hostile to SDI since it was first announced by President Reagan in March 1983. Moscow’s efforts began to coalesce into an organized campaign in 1984 when the Soviets proposed to hold talks on “preventing the militarization of space.”

The Soviet program against SDI has consisted of a combination of diplomacy (particularly arms negotiations), propaganda, and active measures. The Soviets have previously launched similar campaigns against several US/NATO strategic programs: the 1950 campaign to ban the atom bomb, which culminated in the Stockholm Peace Appeal; activities against the US development of an antiballistic missile (ABM) system, which began in the late 1960s; the campaign against the NATO deployment of the enhanced radiation weapon, or neutron bomb, in 1977 and 1978; and the ongoing effort to undermine NATO’s 1979 decision to modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces and the subsequent deployment of those forces. In contrast to those campaigns, the program against SDI appears to have broader appeal; the focus is on audiences not only in industrialized countries but also in developing countries.

Political Influence Operations

Moscow has extensively employed various forms of political influence operations as a means of discrediting SDI. Using Soviet front and other “nonpolitical” groups, Moscow has attempted to manipulate such professional groups as journalists, scientists, businessmen, academics, and physicians. Through contacts with such groups, the Soviets seek to generate pressure against SDI among influential individuals who ordinarily would probably avoid association with Soviet propaganda.

A month after SDI was proposed in 1983, General Secretary Andropov suggested that Soviet and US scientists should meet and explore the consequences of SDI. Since then, Moscow has used its own scientists and scientific institutions, including those not directly associated with space research, as a means of insinuating Soviet views into Western scientific and political forums. A popular theme is that SDI is technically unachievable, can be easily countered, and is exorbitantly expensive.

Front Organizations

The Soviet Union has used front organizations to mobilize grassroots support for its policies—an effort similar to the anti-INF campaign. In particular, Moscow seeks to influence the significant antinuclear sentiment that exists in Western Europe by employing front-inspired activity against SDI.

In early 1985, Yuriy Zhukov, chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, which helps coordinate many activities of front organizations, declared that “peace campaigners cannot abort their efforts” because supporters of SDI “have once again stepped up their activity.” In addition, Pravda claimed that “mass” opposition to SDI could infuse a “new scope to the antiwar movement” if it merged with existing peace sentiment in Western Europe. Soviet front activities aimed at undermining SDI include:

- World Peace Council (WPC)

A WPC Presidium meeting was held in Moscow in March 1985. An appeal that called on “the world’s peoples to raise their voices in a powerful campaign against the militarization of space” was adopted.

The International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces (ILFPF), a WPC front organization, held a conference in early December 1985 in Vienna which issued the following declaration: “The object now is to stop the arms race and prevent Star Wars.”

The Generals for Peace and Disarmament, an organization linked to the WPC, held its fourth meeting in Vienna in May 1986. Representatives from 14 countries reportedly “sharply denounced the US SDI plan that destabilizes the military-political situation in the world and whips up the arms race.”

- World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

During the 37th session of the WFTU, held in Moscow in October 1985, the trade union movement was urged to take “resolute action” against “Star Wars.” The WFTU also adopted a resolution denouncing SDI at the conclusion of this session.

A trade union seminar of Asian and Pacific countries sponsored by the Vietnamese affiliate of WFTU was held in Hanoi in May 1986. A seminar press release declared that the struggle against “plans for space militarization” was an important task of trade unions in all countries.

- Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

WIDF supported an antinuclear month in March 1986 under the slogan “Preventing the Militarization of Outer Space—Peace on Earth and in Space.”
• **World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)**

Gorbachev, in a statement to the WFSW Congress in Moscow in 1986, declared that “Peaceful space is an important precondition for banishing the war danger from the life of the people.”

• **Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)**

An AAPSO-sponsored conference on “Bandung and the Present,” held in Tanzania in July 1985, concentrated criticism on the United States, particularly SDI. Its final communiqué stated that “outer space belongs to mankind in general and it should not be turned into an arena of nuclear confrontation.” Dobrynin addressed the 14th session of the AAPSO Council in May 1986, criticizing the “creation of new types of ‘superweapons,’ above all space weapons,” and declared that “the struggle against the threat of nuclear war is also the struggle for the development of the liberated countries and peoples.”

• **Christian Peace Conference (CPQ)**

The “Karlovy Vary Consultation,” held in Czechoslovakia and organized by the CPC in December 1984, focused on the “Movement Toward the Militarization of Outer Space Glamorized by the ‘Star Wars’ mentality.” The All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists, affiliated with the CPC, held a plenary session in Moscow during April 1986. A resolution was adopted that urged “the Christians of the whole world” to treat with “particular censure” the development of “Star Wars.”

• **International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)**

The Association of Soviet Lawyers, a Soviet disarmament group apparently under the auspices of the Academy of Science’s Law Institute and an affiliate of the IADL, participated in an arms control conference in Moscow during March 1985. Soviet participants wanted to focus strictly on space matters, especially SDI.

• **World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)**

The Twelfth World Festival of Youth and Students, sponsored by the WFDY, met in Moscow in July 1985. In his address to the festival participants, Gorbachev stated: “And everyone should ask himself. What has he done to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used again, either on earth or in space, to eliminate those weapons completely and for good.”

• **International Union of Students (IUS)**

Youth from countries of Asia and the Pacific participated in a meeting in Hanoi on Peace, Security, Development, and Cooperation, sponsored by the IUS, WFDY, and the WPC, in May 1986. Participants from 13 countries expressed support for Soviet arms control initiatives, including “preventing the spread of the arms race into outer space.”

### Nonruling Communist Parties

The Soviet Union has sought to mobilize nonruling communist parties in opposition to SDI and in favor of Soviet policies. The International Department, which exercises influence over more than 70 communist parties, has infused local communist groups with the importance of initiating actions against SDI. For example, TASS reported in October 1985 that Vadim Zagladin, then deputy chief of the ID, declared that “all communist parties now consider it their main task to struggle for averting the threat to a thermonuclear war and for preventing militarization of outer space.” Activities against SDI by pro-Soviet nonruling communist parties include:

- The Argentine Communist Party organized a meeting in Buenos Aires in August 1985 which emphasized opposition to the arms race in space.
- Local communists urged the Belgian Government in April 1985 to “reject participation in the implementation of President Reagan’s notorious Strategic Defense Initiative.”
- The Canadian Communist Party congress was held in April 1985 with the theme “Peace-Stop Star Wars.”
- A joint communique issued during September 1985 by Gorbachev and French Communist Party leader Georges Marchais declared that the “Star Wars” project, “far from ending the arms race, spreads it to outer space.”
- The “Star Wars” program was criticized during the 39th congress of the British Communist Party in London in May 1985.
- In a speech at the 27th CPSU congress in March 1986 Rene Theodore, secretary general of the Haitian Communist Party, mentioned “Star Wars” as a symptom of the “destructive madness inherent in imperialism.”
- A statement by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India in January 1986 accused the “US and the Star Wars program” of “unleashing the arms race.”
- Gorbachev and Italian Communist Party General Secretary Natta met at Chernenko’s funeral in March 1985 and agreed that their two parties would strive jointly to end the arms race “both on earth and in outer space.”
- The Communist Youth Federation of Sri Lanka, in an article published in Problems of Peace and Socialism in March 1986, criticized “US plans for the militarization of space.”

### Footnotes

1 Among the Soviet newspapers that have representatives abroad are Pravda, Izvestiya, Trud, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Novoye Vremya, Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, Selskaya Zhizn’, Literaturnaya Gazeta, Krasnaya Zvezda, Sovetskaya Kultura, and Sovetskaya Rossia.

2 APN’s founding organizations were the Union of Journalists, Union of Writers, Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, and National Union for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge.

3 Clandestine broadcasting is defined as that which does not admit to, or attempts to mislead listeners about, the origin of transmission.
The members and users of Intersputnik include the USSR, Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iraq, Laos, Libya, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, Syria, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Vietnam.

IRT members include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iraq, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Laos, Mali, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, Sudan, the USSR, Vietnam, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Other major international communist front organizations are: the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the International Union of Journalists, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the World Federation of Scientific Workers, the World Federation of Teachers’ Unions, and the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace.
The Soviets use the term active measures, a literal translation of the Russian phrase *aktivnyye meropriyatiya*, to describe covert or deceptive intelligence operations aimed at promoting Soviet foreign policy goals. Soviet active measures may cover a wide range of activities, including the following:

- Written or oral disinformation.
- Use of forged documents.
- Covert influence of foreign media through controlled assets and press placements.
- Use of foreign communist parties and front organizations.
- Manipulation of international front organizations.
- Clandestine radio broadcasting.
- Covert political and economic support for insurgents, separatist movements, opposition groups, and political parties.
- Political influence operations utilizing agents of influence, manipulation or private communication channels, deception, and exploitation of willing and unwilling contacts.

The Soviet leadership takes a long-term view of its active measures operations directed at the United States. These operations are designed to discredit the US Government and promote a favorable climate for Soviet foreign policy objectives. Their objectives include the following: to influence both world and US public opinion against certain US military, economic, and political programs; to disrupt relations between the United States and its allies; and to demonstrate that the policies and goals of the United States are incompatible with the ambitions of Third World countries.

The Soviet leadership views active measures as an important instrument to carry out its foreign policy goals and objectives. The highest level of the Soviet Government, the Politburo of the Central Committee, ultimately approves the major themes of Soviet foreign policy and active measures operations. Under the Politburo’s general direction, a large and complex bureaucracy designs and implements specific active measures campaigns. These campaigns are implemented and controlled by a powerful CPSU Central Committee department, the International Department, and the Committee for State Security.

The ID is responsible for the overall supervision of active measures operations and designs many of the specific active measures operations and campaigns. The ID also implements active measures operations through its mandate to control and direct pro-Soviet communist parties, international front organizations, and such Soviet friendship societies as the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF). These organizations are largely financed and controlled by the Soviet Union, and their campaigns are principally directed at the policies of the United States and other NATO countries. Because they pretend to be nonaligned, independent organizations that promote such causes as peace and disarmament, these front organizations often attract broader public support and are usually more effective than openly pro-Soviet communist parties and organizations.

Communist front organizations have also played a prominent role in Soviet efforts to establish reliable channels of influence in the United Nations and in Third World countries. The Soviets’ commitment to “anti-imperialism” often establishes a common focal point of interest for independent organizations of women, peace groups, youth, and students. Some Third World organizations, normally under financial stress and lacking organizational expertise, see benefits in conducting joint programs with well organized Soviet controlled front groups.

The KGB is primarily responsible for covert active measures operations throughout the world. Service A is the main headquarters component of the KGB responsible for the overall supervision and management of KGB active measures. In the United States, those KGB officers responsible for political intelligence collection provide support to the ID by handling many of the monitoring and liaison functions in connection with the Soviet front organizations. Several KGB officers currently assigned to the United States are in regular contact with officials from the CPUSA, the NCASF, and other front groups. In addition, the KGB is responsible for developing agents of influence, planting media stories, and surfacing forgeries in support of active measures campaigns.

It is important to note that many active measures operations utilize overt or semi-overt elements as well as clandestine or covert ones. Many active measures
are planned and executed by intelligence officers (10s), but CPSU and government officials, journalists, academicians, representatives of other Soviet public organizations, and a network of proSoviet international front organizations, communist parties, and individuals are also used to implement these active measures operations. Thus, active measures involve virtually every element of the Soviet party, state, and private sector, and they are closely integrated and coordinated with traditional diplomatic activities and long-term Soviet foreign policy objectives.

**Soviet Forgery Operations**

The Soviet Union conducts forgery operations to discredit the United States and its allies, influence political action and public opinion in the United States and abroad, and promote worldwide Soviet foreign policy goals. These forgeries are often designed to supply the “factual evidence” needed to prove the disinformation that Moscow has already advanced through other active measures operations and propaganda. Many of the Soviet forgeries are aimed at influencing Third World countries as well as the United States. The Soviets try to get forgeries and disinformation stories printed in the noncommunist media. If successful in their efforts, they usually will reprint these news accounts in their own media. Even when the US Government issues prompt denials of the authenticity of a forged document, the Soviets believe that the denial will never entirely offset the damage caused by the initial release of the news story based upon the forgery.

Many US Government officials and organizations have been targets of Soviet disinformation and forgery operations. Although most forgeries surface overseas, the information and documents used in these operations are often acquired in the United States. Through defector sources and FBI investigation of KGB operations in the United States, the FBI has determined that KGB residencies collect the types of documents and information that subsequently surface, in altered form, in forgery and disinformation operations.

**Forged KKK Letters to Olympic Committees**

In an effort to discredit the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic games and bolster support for their boycott of them, the Soviet Union began a widespread disinformation campaign during July 1984. It featured three forged documents, two of which allegedly were produced by the Ku Klux Klan, threatening Third World athletes with bodily harm if they participated in the Olympic games. Based upon FBI investigations and analysis of the letters, the conclusion is that they fit the pattern of other Soviet forgery operations and were part of the overall Soviet active measures campaign to discredit the Reagan administration and its handling of US-USSR relations.

The first two versions of the Olympic hate leaflets were mailed from the United States to various national Olympic committees in more than 20 countries. One version, sent to 10 African states, was directed against blacks only, while a second flyer sent to Asian nations was directed against blacks and Asians. Both leaflets allegedly were sent by the KKK and threatened the physical security of athletes from Africa and Asia if they participated in the Los Angeles games. This theme dovetailed with the Soviet justification for their own nonparticipation in the event; i.e., that the United States was unable to guarantee the security of their athletes.

Attorney General William French Smith announced shortly after the letters’ discovery that they were KGB forgeries and part of a major Soviet disinformation effort. Linguistic analysis revealed that the leaflets were not written in colloquial American English, and contained errors likely to have been made by a Russian speaker. Both envelopes containing the leaflets were postmarked from the Washington, D.C. area, well within the 25 mile restricted area for Soviet diplomats. The forgeries received considerable publicity in the world press, but not one recipient on the Olympic committee withdrew its team from the games, perhaps because of the swift response by US officials in publicizing the origin of the letters.

In addition, the timing of the KKK letter to coincide with the visit of Secretary of State Shultz to Malaysia is indicative of a desire to make the most of these circumstances for propaganda purposes. During this visit, TASS published an article saying that the KKK had “expressed in an extremely base manner what the architects of American policy have in their minds.” The article said that the Reagan administration “has mounted such ferociously antisocialist activities as has made participation of sportsmen from Socialist countries in the Los Angeles Olympics impossible.”

The third forgery was a somewhat less sophisticated Olympic hate leaflet, containing a photomontage of lynchings, etc., encompassed within the Olympic rings. It also contained the printed message “Welcome to Los Angeles” and “White Society.” The leaflet was originally mailed from Algeria to the chairman of an African National Olympic Committee, but identical copies were subsequently distributed to other African and Asian delegations at the Olympic Village in Los Angeles.
Forgeries of FBI Documents

Two forgeries that surfaced in the United States were designed to discredit the FBI and ultimately the Reagan administration. Although the FBI has not definitely determined that these forgeries were perpetrated by the KGB, the forgeries are comparable to those produced in past operations by the KGB.

In June 1983 an unsigned letter from a “practicing Catholic from a Latin American country” was sent to H. E. Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, the archbishop of Chicago. Attached to the letter was a document allegedly from Edward J. O’Malley, the then-assistant director of the FBI’s Intelligence Division, to Mr. Edward D. Hegarty, special agent in charge of the FBI’s Chicago Field Office. The document dated May 18, 1983, and written on Department of Justice stationery, ordered FBI agents in Chicago to conduct “complete surveillance” of Cardinal Bernardin to secure information discrediting him. Marked “confidential,” the letter also recommended that special agents conduct “full operational surveillance” of especially active Roman Catholic bishops and additional “counteractions” to undermine the initiatives of peace education courses conducted under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church in schools and parishes.

The letter came to the attention of the FBI in July 1983 when a member of the Cardinal’s office called the Chicago Field Office about the matter. The document is a complete fraud, and the FBI publicly denounced the document in the media as a “crude forgery.”

The document was designed to discredit the FBI and the Reagan administration by alleging that the FBI was involved in a campaign to monitor the activities of the Catholic Church in the peace movement and to discredit Cardinal Bernardin. Cardinal Bernardin was chairman of the committee that drafted the pastoral letter denouncing nuclear war, which was approved by the Roman Catholic bishops in early May 1983.

The second forgery surfaced in the United States in January 1984. An anonymous cover letter purporting to reveal a 1947 letter to the House UnAmerican Activities Committee from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was sent to reporters and other people in the Washington, D.C. area. Attached to the cover letter was a copy of the alleged “Hoover letter” dated October 15, 1947. It concerned House Committee investigations of political activists in Hollywood and expected testimony before the committee by the President of the Screen Actors Guild, who at that time was Ronald Reagan. The letter implies that Mr. Reagan was working in collusion with the FBI and the Committee on Un-American Activities concerning communist infiltration into the Hollywood film world.

The FBI denounced the forgery in the news media and stated that the letter contained stylistic touches that Mr. Hoover would never have tolerated, some in violation of the rules for FBI correspondence. The forgery was obviously designed to discredit the FBI and President Reagan by raising the issue of “McCarthyism.”

Use of Soviet Media Representatives

Soviet communications media are controlled by the Soviet Government or the CPSU. All Soviet media, including radio and television stations, news agencies, and printing facilities, are state-owned and therefore are subordinate to Soviet political and intelligence goals. News is frequently suppressed and often distorted and manipulated.

The Novosti Press Agency was established in 1961 to disseminate news and feature articles, commentaries, and photographs about Soviet life to foreign countries. It also publishes books, brochures, magazines, and a variety of other materials in many foreign languages. Novosti claims to be commercial and unofficial, but is under Soviet Government control. The leading Soviet newspapers are Pravda, the official organ of the CPSU, and Izvestiya, the official newspaper of the Soviet Government.

TASS, the official news agency of the Soviet Government, is administered by the USSR Council of Ministers. Both TASS and Novosti send large numbers of correspondents on foreign assignments around the world; however, Pravda, Izvestiya, Radio Moscow, and other Soviet media organizations also have limited numbers of correspondents in many countries. TASS prepares special classified background reports on foreign countries and their leaders, as well as digests of the uncensored foreign media, for use by high-ranking Soviet officials.

Because TASS assists the news agencies of developing countries by providing free or minimally priced news service, Moscow has achieved a substantial and growing media presence in the Third World. By contrast, private wire services from the United States usually offer no subsidies and are fiscally constrained from providing services to developing countries that lack sound financial standing. Moscow has also lent its support to regional news agencies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Intelligence Officers in Media Positions

The Soviet intelligence services frequently utilize media positions in the United States as an overt cover for their intelligence officers (IOs). For example, on known Soviet IO-who, until his recent departure was a correspondent for Soviet Radio and Television in the United States--aggressively cultivate contacts in an effort to explain the rationale for Soviet policies, and gathered information on an subject which showed the negative side of life in America. Soviet correspondents are especially encouraged to cover such topics as labor unrest, poverty, unemployment, and nuclear disarmament.

TASS Coverage of the Olympics

The same Soviet IO mentioned above and another IO also a correspondent position as his cover prepared reports on the 1984 Olympic games in Los Angeles. Their reporting included articles on the forged KKK hate letters that were sent to African and Asian nations. Later, the tactics of the Soviet journalists switched to one of attempting to “shock” the world over the materialistic nature of the games.

On May 14, 1984, Marat Gramov, chairman of the USSR National Olympic Committee, declared in a statement distributed by TASS: “Our nonparticipation is on the conscience of the Reagan administration which ... did everything possible to thwart our participation.” Gramov alleged that the US security services had planted representatives of terrorist and extremist organizations in the Organizing Committee, had devised methods for kidnapping Soviet citizens and for persuading them to defect, and were even prepared to use “psychotropic preparations which upset the nervous system.”

One of the more blatant items of disinformation directed against the Olympics was reported by TASS on June 28, 1984. This TASS report is reprinted below:

The Israeli intelligence service “Mosad,” which specialized in political assassinations and maintains close ties with the US Central Intelligence Agency, has taken under its direct control at the request of US special services the so-called “security department” of the Los Angeles Olympics and is preparing to use it for staging all kinds of provocations and for mass spying on “unreliable elements.” This follows from the results of the study of the situation in the host city of the 1984 Olympics carried out by a group of journalists on the assignment of the Japanese publishing company “Shueisha.” According to the data obtained, a high-ranking official of “Mosad” has taken over the special “Department for Anti-Terroristic Struggle” under the organizing committee of the Olympics with the blessing of the FBI and the US police. The Department is manned with professionals from the Israeli intelligence service and with so-called “private” agents. It is feared that under the pretext of combating terrorism, the “security department” can stage repressions against the “unreliable elements” on the eve of the Olympics. These include, in the first place, activists of progressive public organizations and fighters against racial discrimination and the oppression of the national minorities in the United States by shifting on to the “Mosad” men the major part of the functions connected with the carrying out of these dubious operations. Washington obviously tries to shirk responsibility for possible provocations or terrorist actions during the 1984 Olympics.

The report of journalists stresses that the system of total spying on the population unprecedented in the history of the United States is now in effect in Los Angeles. It practically reduces to naught the right to private life and other basic civil freedoms of Americans. This spying is of clearly political nature and has nothing to do with ensuring true security in Los Angeles where dozens of murders and bandit attacks take place every day. The report stresses that residents of the host city of the 1984 Olympics have actually been turned into hostages of the Reagan administration and special services which are trying to use international sports competitions for furthering their sinister aims.

The above account, although not widely publicized in the United States, was wired to TASS offices around the world.

Soviet Media: Alleged US Political Prisoner

On July 5, 1984, a correspondent for Novosti, Vladimir A. Simonov, interviewed Leonard Peltier at the US Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. Peltier was convicted of the 1975 shooting deaths of two FBI agents on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota and currently is serving two life sentences. The Soviets singled out Peltier, a leader of the American Indian Movement (AIM), as a US “political prisoner” and victim of American injustice.

After Peltier staged a protest fast that became public in June 1984, the Soviet press printed several stories charging that he was starving himself to protest human rights violations and alleged lack of freedom to practice his American Indian religious rites. In July, Simonov interviewed Peltier for about 50 minutes and held a short press conference to tell local reporters that Peltier appeared to be suffering from the aftereffects of his fast. Simonov said of Peltier’s condition: “He is weak and extremely depressed.” However, Medical Center spokesman Paul Taylor said Peltier had been eating regularly since his arrival and was not being treated for any medical or health problems.

This sudden interest in Peltier was almost certainly a carefully organized attempt by the Soviet Union to divert attention from the treatment of Andrei Sakharov, the well-known Soviet dissident. At the time, Sakharov reportedly was on a hunger strike in protest of the unwillingness of Soviet officials to allow his wife, Yelena Bonner, to leave the USSR to seek medical treatment. To counter the US scientists and others who sent letters to Moscow protesting the Sakharovs’ treatment, a number of noted Soviet scientists sent letters to
Washington protesting Peltier’s condition. There appears to be a concerted effort by the Soviet Government to convey the impression to its own citizens and to the world that Peltier is a “political prisoner.”

Soviet Efforts To Influence Peace and Disarmament Movements

The Soviet Union continues to devote manpower and resources in overt and covert attempts to influence US peace and disarmament movements. The KGB has covertly requested its contacts in the peace and nuclear disarmament movements to continue to report on meetings, participate in upcoming conferences, and obtain information on individuals who are active within the movement. Several KGB officers currently assigned to the United States have been in regular contact with the leaders of Soviet-controlled organizations such as the CPUSA, the US Peace Council, and the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. In addition, the KGB is particularly interested in information concerning the US peace movement’s plans for conferences or demonstrations, its organizations and leaders, and its relations with European antiwar groups.

Communist Party of the USA

The CPUSA has historically been one of the most loyal, pro-Soviet communist parties in the world and continues to receive substantial financial support from the Soviet Union. Although relatively small and politically weak, the CPUSA continues systematically to promote Soviet views on arms control proposals and the peace movement through its overt publications and party operations, and through a network of front organizations in the United States.

Since the late 1970s, the ID has provided direction to international front organizations, the CPUSA, and CPUSA front organizations concerning the issues of arms control and disarmament. The Soviets have urged these organizations to mount campaigns against the neutron bomb, NATO theater nuclear force modernization, administration defense policies, and more recently the SDI. The CPUSA has sponsored and participated in demonstrations and rallies, formed coalitions with other peace organizations and sponsored seminars and workshops to promote Soviet views and to influence the US peace movement.

Henry Winston, national chairman of the CP traveled to Moscow in early 1984 to meet with the Peace Commission of the USSR. This commission has contact with various peace activists and groups in the United States.

The CPUSA has directed its major front organizations to support Soviet arms control and disarmament initiatives. The FBI has determined that there are several groups in which CPUSA members have leadership roles or take an active part. Some of these groups are spinoffs from traditional CPUSA fronts, and some deal with arms control and peace. These organizations are often more effective than the CPUSA in reaching and forming coalitions with other organizations because they are not always easily identified as CPUSA-controlled or pro-Soviet organizations.

The CPUSA and its front organizations were involved in organizing a coalition of more than 80 organizations which sponsored a series of mass demonstrations on April 20, 1985. These demonstrations were part of a carefully planned 4-day protest called the “April Actions for Peace, Jobs and Justice” that was held April 19-22, 1985. Also included as sponsors were a large number of noncommunist groups from the following areas: peace, antinuclear, civil rights, labor, religious, environmental, veteran, and minority groups.


National Council of American-Soviet Friendship

The NCASF, originally formed in 1943 by the CPUSA, currently consists of approximately 24 active US chapters. Future plans call for at least one chapter in each of the 50 states. The NCASF claims to be an independent and impartial organization that depends entirely on legitimate contributions for financial support. In actuality, the Soviet Union, through the CPUSA, provides funding for NCASF operations.

Publicly, the NCASF continues to state that its purpose is to promote friendship and understanding between Soviets and Americans through cultural and educational programs as well as travel exchange programs. In practice, however, the NCASF works to advance the foreign policy and propaganda objectives of the USSR. The NCASF operates as a CPUSA front group which provides the Soviets with an excellent conduit to promote the active measures campaigns, meet with US persons of influence, spot and assess US persons for recruitment operations, and influence certain groups of activists in the US peace movement.
The NCASF is used by the Soviets as a bridge to reach people who would be reluctant to participate in an openly pro-Soviet disarmament organization.

Soviet direction of the NCASF is channeled through the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SOD), with ultimate authority resting with the International Department. Soviet representatives of SOD are in regular contact with NCASF officials and direct the NCASF to conduct activities to support Soviet active measure campaigns.

The NCASF is currently sponsoring more visits by Soviet groups to the United States. These groups are generally referred to as “Goodwill Tours” and are composed of culturally oriented Soviets traveling under B-2 tourist visas. Many of these tours have been “peace” oriented and illustrate a Soviet attempt to present themselves as friendly, peace-loving people. One KGB officer expressed a clear and strong interest in having more Soviet entertainment groups visit in order to encourage more contact with larger US audiences and with persons in the US entertainment business. The recent increase in local NCASF chapters in various cities affords these Soviet groups an expanded geographic range within the United States.

These NCASF local chapters act as sponsors, handle such logistical requirements as hotel reservations, and arrange various forums and functions with a variety of domestic groups. During these visits, the NCASF is in a position to assist the KGB in conducting its operations in the United States. The NCASF provides a mechanism that allows KGB personnel the freedom to travel to various US cities where they previously had limited access or to travel in areas closed to Soviet diplomats assigned in the United States. The NCASF can also provide assessments of Americans for possible targeting and recruitment by the KGB.

A appears that since late 1984 the role of the NCASF has been expanded with the establishment of direct links with the Committee of Youth Organizations (CYO). Soviet officials directed the NCASF to play a significant role in the 12th World Youth Festival in Moscow and in the newly formed Soviet-American Youth Conference (SAYC). This latter organization has replaced the now-defunct Forum for US-Soviet Dialogue, which allegedly had not followed the Soviet line and had tried to run itself independently. The first SAYC was scheduled to be held in the United States in August 1986.

NCASF is involved in some areas of the United States in pairing similar American and Soviet cities in order to promote peace and friendship between them. It is through this type of activity that the Soviets establish ties with the local political arena in various US cities and also attempt to exploit US citizens and organizations who have a genuine desire for world peace and nuclear disarmament.

Other independent pairing projects, not controlled by Soviet front organizations, do attempt to gain support for bilateral nuclear arms control by creating better understanding between the citizens of both countries. Soviet authorities find the CPUSA’s own efforts to control the pairing projects in the United States. The independent pairing projects also present an interesting logistical problem for the CPUSA. It reportedly is increasingly difficult for the CPUSA to screen the large amounts of US mail sent to Soviet citizens and communities.

**World Peace Council and US Peace Council**

The WPC is the largest and most active Soviet international front organization, with affiliates in approximately 141 countries. It is one of the Soviet Union’s major instruments for political action and propaganda in the nuclear disarmament movement and its current campaign is clearly directed at US defense and arms control policies.

WPC activities in the United States are coordinated by its affiliate organization, the USPC. Key leadership positions in the USPC have always been held by trusted CPUSA members who carefully guide their organization along Soviet lines.

The USPC, founded in November 1979, has consistently worked to promote the causes of the WPC and has regularly espoused the policies of the Soviet Union. Because the USPC increasingly suffers from being exposed as a communist front, it has become less open about its communist affiliations. Early USPC letterheads openly showed affiliation with the WPC, yet a 1985 letterhead no longer shows it. By examining some of the organization’s activities, the links between the USPC, the WPC, and Soviet interests are revealed.

A prime example of pro-Soviet activities carried out by the USPC on behalf of the CPUSA is its participation in the organization and direction of a demonstration on June 12, 1982, coinciding with the UN Second Special Session on Disarmament. Two leaders of the USPC and CPUSA were active participants in the executive meetings that planned the demonstration. Both representatives actively campaigned to direct the focus of the demonstration exclusively against US nuclear weapons systems and away from Soviet weapons systems.

Additionally, one of the CPUSA officials, in a speech to a CPUSA conference, linked the “peace” activity with support for terrorist and insurgent groups in South Africa, El Salvador, and the Middle East. He reaffirmed the “inseparability of the struggle for disarmament and support for the liberation movements
such as the African National Congress of South Africa, South-West Africa People’s Organization of Namibia, FMLN-FDR of El Salvador, and the Palestine Liberation Organization;” and affirmed that “anti-interventionism movements gaining great strength in churches, unions, communities and campuses represent an inseparable part of the anti-Reagan all-people’s front.”

According to articles in several non-communist publications, there were substantial internal problems in the planning committee as a result of the insistence of USPC/CPUSA representatives that the rally should focus exclusively on US arms control and disarmament policies. An article by Ronald Radosh in The New Republic, January 31, 1983, recounts the USPC’s campaign to “tone down the official rally call so that it was not equally addressed to the United States and the Soviet Union.”

These revelations are consistent with the public statements of the USPC/CPUSA, which claim a significant communist impact on the committee proceedings. In a brochure titled The New Red Scare: An Open Letter, the USPC defends communist participation in the peace movement, stating that communists “also bring to the movements in which they work a sometimes-missing sense of organization, direction and ideological cohesiveness.” This brochure, which the USPC has distributed to nearly all major US peace organizations, claims that the USPC played “a key role in the development of the June 12 demonstrations.”

The June 12 committee’s official declarations were specifically directed against the United States, as demonstrated by this statement:

The demonstration addresses all governments which have developed nuclear arms and which compete in the international arms race, but its primary focus is on the US Government. Possessing more nuclear bombs than all other countries combined and leading the technological, first-strike weapons race, the US Government is least willing to stop its nuclear insanity.

The Soviets were satisfied that the USPC/CPUSA was successful in directing the focus of the rally against US arms control and defense policies and later boasted in a propaganda booklet:

... it is a fact, said Pravda’s special correspondent A. Vasilyev, who was in New York City on June 12, that during the seven hours of the demonstration and rally attended by a million people on the day I did not see a single anti-Soviet placard. I asked my acquaintances and friends about it, and some of them said that there had been some small groups, maybe one or two placards in a thousand.

The CPUSA also claimed that the party and the USPC played a major role at the rally at the United Nations on June 12. According to a June 1982 CPUSA memorandum:

The Party was extremely active in working to make the June 12th Demonstration an outstanding success. The Party contingent itself was historic, with many districts participating in the distribution of the special edition of the Daily World. The Party was represented in the National June 12th Coalition (the committee planning the rally) and some districts were represented in local coalitions.

But we still have much to do. This is a critical period for the peace movement... We can’t let the unity and enthusiasm that brought over a million people to New York City and another million throughout the country dissipate ....

It is important for us to join with others who are building local peace councils. The Peace Council plays a special role in the peace movement. It is the only peace organization which consistently links the struggle for peace with the struggle against US military intervention, and it takes principled positions with respect to anti-Soviet propaganda of the Reagan administration. Every new peace council which comes into existence improves the ideological health of the peace movement.

The close ideological and operational links between the WPC and the USPC are enhanced by overlaps in personnel and use of mutual symbols. For example, USPC activists regularly serve on the WPC secretariat based in Helsinki, Finland.

The USPC logo is one that has been used by European communists for a number of years... It consists of a dove of peace and a clenched fist. The East German communist party used the logo on a 1978 pamphlet titled What Does Peace Have To Do With Struggle? It indicated that the logo had first been used by the Finnish Delegation to the 1973 Communist Youth Festival in East Berlin. The West Germany affiliate of the international Soviet front, Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, has also used the logo.

The WPC held a major international conference in Toronto, Canada, on November 23-25, 1984. The meeting was called a World Dialogue for the Prevention of Nuclear War for Disarmament and Peace. It was attended by numerous leaders of national peace movements from around the world, including a US Delegation. The USPC coordinated and controlled the US Delegation by discreetly asking only selected peace movement leaders, trade unionists, elected officials, and leaders of other proSoviet front organizations to attend.

In addition, the USPC lobbies for specific Soviet arms control proposals and initiatives in its contacts with US Government officials and activists in the peace movement. The USPC recently disseminated a history of Soviet arms control proposals in an effort to show the USSR as more active than the United States in promoting arms control and disarmament.
World Federation of Trade Unions

The WFTU, currently headquartered in Prague, Czechoslovakia, is a pro-Soviet international trade union organization that claims a total membership of 206 million. Of this number, 130 million members are from the Soviet Union, and about 90 percent of the total membership is from communist-controlled countries. The WFTU is controlled and directed by the International Department of the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), which in turn is directed by the CPSU Central Committee’s International Department.

Since 1949, when it came under communist control, the WFTU has been a major Soviet propaganda arm, its ultimate aim being to set up a unified, worldwide communist trade union organization and to support Soviet foreign policy. In the 1950s, the WFTU was expelled from France and Austria for its subversive activities.

One of the major priorities of the WFTU and the CPUSA is to mobilize trade unions in the United States to join the pro-Soviet peace and disarmament movements. The Soviets emphasized to US trade delegates the importance of mobilizing the trade unions to join the huge peace and disarmament rally in New York City in June 1982 and, more recently, the numerous smaller rallies held in various cities across the nation in April 1985.

US labor unions for the most part do not support the WFTU. Consequently, many of the activities on behalf of the WFTU in the United States are conducted by the CPUSA and its front organizations. CPUSA national headquarters has tasked its chapters to focus on the infiltration of labor and trade unions. CPUSA members have been able to join the locals of such trade unions as the United Auto Workers, United Steelworkers, and the International Longshoremen’s Association.

The WFTU and the CPUSA believe that this is an ideal time to influence trade unions, because of the Reagan administration’s economic policies and budget cuts and the unemployment problems in the US industrial sector. These topics and others are routinely discussed in such monthly CPUSA sponsored labor publications as Labor Today and Economic Notes.

At least two issues will receive attention from the WFTU during the next year. The first issue will deal with Soviet efforts to denounce and neutralize the SDI program. The second, closely associated with the first, will concentrate on “Economic Conversion.” This concept, to divert funds from military hardware to domestic spending, has been utilized in the past by Soviet-controlled organizations as a means to combat Western military development, by emphasizing the tremendous cost of defense programs. The highly publicized cost of SDI has provided the necessary impetus to revive the viability of Economic Conversion in Soviet active measures operations that will be directed against SDI and the military budget program of the Reagan administration.

US-USSR People’s Peace Treaty

The US-USSR People’s Peace Treaty is one of the more recent Soviet efforts to influence US public opinion in favor of current Soviet foreign policy priorities and to exert pressure on US Government officials to effect changes that are favorable to Moscow. Through the US-USSR People’s Peace Treaty Organization, the Soviets hope to enhance their position in the following active measures campaigns directed at the United States: opposition to the SDI program, support for the “nuclear freeze” concept, the pledge of no first-use of nuclear weapons, and influence in the ongoing Geneva arms talks.

The principal control and direction for this program come from the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace in Moscow, which in turn works closely with the NCASF and the USPC. Essentially, the operation is a petition campaign to collect millions of signatures on a “People’s Peace Treaty” addressed to the President of the United States, the General Secretary of the CPSU, and the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. The stated aim of this program is “to influence the negotiations in Geneva to speedy and substantial arms reductions.” The campaign will follow the model of the Stockholm Peace Appeal, launched in 1950 by the WPC and regarded by the communists as a considerable success. Organized decades ago, this Soviet-controlled disarmament operation sought an absolute ban on atomic weapons at a time when the Soviet Union’s nuclear capability was limited.

Exerting public pressure on the United States in such a way as to strengthen the Soviet hand in the Geneva negotiations appears to be the principal immediate objective of this project. Playing on the fear of nuclear war through the use of simplistic formulas and slogans while presenting Soviet policy in its usual “peace-loving” guise is a tried, tested, and sometimes effective method of achieving this objective.

Soviet Efforts To Control the International Women’s Movement

The Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF) is the principal worldwide Soviet front organization dealing with the women’s movement. The East Berlin-based WIDF claims to have 135 affiliated organizations in 117 countries. Estimates in 1966 claimed a total membership of more than 200 million;
however, most members are from communist countries.

WIDF’s avowed aims are to unite women regardless of race, nationality, religion, or political opinion so that they may win and defend their rights as citizens, mothers, and workers. Its stated goals are to establish friendship and solidarity among all women and to ensure worldwide peace.

In actuality, the WIDF is carefully controlled and directed by the Soviet Union and its front organizations. The WIDF has close relations with other Soviet front organizations, particularly the WPC. The president of the WIDF, Freda Brown of Australia, and the secretary general of the WIDF, Mirjam Vire-Tuominen of Finland, are members of the WPC Presidential Committee and work closely with that Soviet front organization.

The Soviet Union launched an intense campaign to exploit the UN women’s conference in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1985. This campaign was a continuation of a longstanding attempt to control and manipulate the women’s movement. The Soviets started targeting these conferences in 1975 when the United Nations declared the beginning of the UN’s Decade for Women (1976-85) and 1985 as the International Women’s Year. The UN General Assembly accepted the World Plan of Action adopted at the first UN World Conference on Women, held in Mexico City in 1975. The plan set 5-year minimum goals for the advancement of women in such areas as education, employment, and political participation. The second UN World Conference on Women was held in Copenhagen in 1980. The international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) helped organize and participated in the conference.

The third UN conference, officially titled “The World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievement of the UN Decade for Women: Equality, Development, and Peace,” was held July 15-26, 1985, in Nairobi, Kenya. Only governmental delegates, representatives of intergovernmental agencies, and official observers attended the conference. The conference reviewed and appraised the achievements of the UN Decade for Women, identified obstacles and developed strategies for improving the situation of women, and made recommendations for action to the UN General Assembly.

There was a parallel meeting for NGOs called “Forum ’85.” This convention was held July 8-17, 1985, in Nairobi and was officially open to “everyone concerned with the status and condition of women.” “Forum ’85” used the same themes as the UN conference: “Equality, Development and Peace.” The achievements of the Decade for Women were reviewed, and strategies were proposed to overcome obstacles for attaining the goals of the World Plan of Action by the year 2000.

A wide range of international organizations were represented at these two events. All the major international Soviet front organizations and many of their national and local affiliates were represented at the forum and the conference. Moscow’s objectives were to have representatives from its front groups introduce issues that clearly indicated that the United States was the principal threat to world peace and the main supporter of the apartheid policies of South Africa. Efforts were also made to show that US imperialism was the cause of the economic oppression of women in Third World countries. These Soviet themes were advanced under the general heading of “the effects of racism and militarism.”

The US affiliate of WIDF is known as Women for Racial and Economic Equality (WREE). This CPUSA front organization did its part to advance the Soviet line at the Nairobi conference. WREE was a main participant in the “Women’s Coalition for Nairobi 1985” which organized a national seminar on “The Effects of Racism and Militarism on Women’s Equality.” This event took place in New York in late May 1985 and was supported by a number of CPUSA fronts and independent organizations. The seminar documented the status of women in the United States, and plans were made to distribute the document at the world conference and forum in Nairobi. This document presented the condition of women in the United States in such a way as to reflect unfavorably on both the foreign and the domestic policies of the United States. For example, they depicted women as suffering from racism and economic oppression resulting from the domestic budget cuts and military spending increases by the Reagan administration. This theme is constantly repeated in the CPUSA’s newspaper The Daily World and numerous other communist publications.

The Soviet Campaign To Influence Religious Organizations

It is clear from developments within the past 2 years that the Soviet Union is increasingly interested in influencing and/or manipulating US churches, and religious organizations and their leaders. This campaign represents Soviet appreciation that churches and religious institutions are an important factor in the formation of US public opinion. The objective appears to be to generate a solid block of opposition against increased US military spending for new weapons systems, specifically SDI, and to enhance the peace and nuclear weapons freeze movement.

Previous Soviet efforts were directed more at limited elements within the Christian community. This new campaign has targeted the members and leaders
of a broad range of religious institutions in the United States. In an effort to neutralize perceived anti-Soviet feelings, the Soviets have directed increased efforts against the more conservative religious groups and leaders in the United States. One example of this new active measures campaign is the Soviet use of disinformation about the degree of religious freedom in the Soviet Union. West European churches are also targets of this campaign, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany.

**Christian Peace Conference**

The CPC is a major Soviet-backed international front organization that has, since its founding in 1958, sought to influence opinion within church related groups on a variety of topics. The CPC has its headquarters in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and always has been directed by a prominent Soviet or East European theologian or religious figure.

The current president of the CPC is Bishop Karoly Toth of Hungary, who is also a member of the Presidential Committee of the WPC. Bishop Toth is especially adroit at presenting Soviet policies and actions in such a way that they will be viewed favorably by US and other Western church officials, clergy, and laymen. Toth has many contacts in the US religious community, and enlarging and developing those contacts is a principal reason for his visits to the United States. Toth is known to be an unfailing and consistent defender of all Soviet actions, though his methods are less crude than those of most Soviet propagandists. In international religious circles he has defended the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, martial law in Poland, and the shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007.

During the 1970s, the CPC focused on promoting Soviet interests in the Third World, but in the 1980s it has focused its attention on disarmament and security issues. Soviet organizational and financial control within the CPC is well documented.

The CPC is quick to advance its own “theology of liberation” when it discusses communist national liberation movements in Third World nations. This “theology” recommends supporting those revolutionary movements and demanding that Western churches rid themselves of their bourgeois values. Thus, the basic Marxist theories of confrontation between the proletariat and bourgeoisie appear as part of the CPC doctrine. In a 1975 publication the CPC stated:

> The churches of these countries must free themselves of the bourgeois social ties. The churches existing in Western society need liberation at least as urgently as the proletarian masses.

The Sixth All-Christian Assembly convened in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on July 2-3, 1985, and was attended by nearly 800 representatives from at least 90 countries, including the United States. These assemblies have taken place in Prague every 3-7 years: 1961, 1964, 1968, 1971, and 1978. Moscow views them as an opportunity to influence religious opinion against Western foreign and defense policies.

During the sixth CPC assembly, the Soviets attempted to intensify their efforts to unify the peace movement under their control, enhance the influence of the Soviet Union within international religious circles, and align themselves with a significant segment of the international religious community.

**Other Soviet Fronts and the Religious Movement**

Front organizations in the United States are also being mobilized to further the Soviet effort to influence US churches. In April 1984 the executive director of the NCASF, Reverend Alan Thomson, issued a three-page memorandum to all NCASF affiliates titled “The Churches in the Struggle for Disarmament.” Thomson urged that coalitions be formed with the churches to oppose the policies and actions of the US Government on military, arms control, and other issues. He pointed out that the churches are the largest and most influential nongovernmental institutions in this country. Thomson’s memorandum is directed, in part, at overcoming the prejudice that exists among NCASF members against working with religious leaders.

Recently, the WPC and the USPC are actively participating in the Soviet effort to manipulate the US religious community. The USPC has begun to develop a Religious Circles Committee (RCC) to help the USPC work more effectively among religious oriented peace activists. To further this goal, the USPC is urging local chapters to identify members who could help in the formation of RCC in an interfaith manner.

**Efforts To Influence US Presidential Elections**

The CPUSA helped to sponsor a “Vote Peace in ’84” rally at the Democratic National Convention in San Francisco on July 16, 1984. According to CPUSA estimates, the rally was expected to draw as many as 250,000 labor, peace, and human rights demonstrators. Although the rally was held, the turnout was extremely small and had little publicity.

The Soviet efforts to influence the US Presidential election of 1984 included numerous attacks on the Republican platform and on President Reagan. Moscow utilized its media network vehemently to
significant political and economic ramifications. Early in 1984, the Soviet Union initiated a series of active measures operations directed against the Reagan reelection campaign. Oral and written disinformation was used extensively to purvey false or misleading information about the Reagan campaign.

The FBI publicly denounced a probable Soviet forgery that surfaced in the United States in January 1984. This forgery, dated 1947, purported that Ronald Reagan was working in collusion with the FBI and the House Committee on Un-American Activities concerning communist infiltration into the Hollywood film world. The forgery was designed to discredit President Reagan by raising the issue of "McCarthyism" during an election year.

The CPUSA announced in 1984 that nothing was more important than the defeat of President Reagan. It used its front organizations and publications to attempt to convince the US public that the reelection of President Reagan would be a grave mistake and have significant political and economic ramifications.

The 12th World Festival of Youth and Students

The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS) are two Soviet front organizations which have jointly sponsored a series of 12 World Youth Festivals since 1947. The 12th World Festival of Youth and Students was held in Moscow from July 27 to August 3, 1985. Recent estimates indicate that 20,000 delegates from 157 countries took part in the activities, which mixed politics with sports, entertainment, and international friendship. The US National Preparatory Committee (USNPC), which was staffed by high-ranking CPUSA and NCASF members, sponsored 300 delegates and 250 observers to attend the 1985 festival.

The Soviets used this festival as a political stage for the USSR to attack President Reagan, US "imperialism," and the US military buildup, and to tempt to influence world opinion on peace issues and nuclear disarmament. Such Soviet organizations as Soviet Friendship Societies, the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR, and the Rodina Society were directed to commit their resources and personnel to the festival and the theme of nuclear attempt disarmament. The Rodina Society, a Moscow-based organization that develops and maintains cultural relations with Soviet emigres worldwide, is known to be dominated by the KGB, which utilizes these cultural exchanges as a cover for its illicit operation. The festival brought the Soviets into close contact with numerous influential political, academic, religious, and media leaders, as well as thousands of politically active youths from around the world.

Through CPUSA and the CPUSA front organization representatives in the USNPC, Soviet officials carefully screened the Americans who applied to participate in the World Youth Festival. It is known that the KGB exploits such events to spot and assess youth who appear to be sympathetic to communism or the USSR. The ultimate KGB goal is to recruit individuals who may eventually acquire sensitive positions and be able to collect intelligence information or support Soviet intelligence operations. In addition, several reports indicated that Soviet officials did not want disruptions or serious disagreements to arise during the conference and therefore carefully screen US applicants to determine their attitudes toward the USSR.

The International Preparatory Committee (IPC) for the 12th World Youth Festival announced that the issue of preventing nuclear war was one of the main themes of the festival. This action by the IPC furthers the major Soviet active measures campaigns directed against the SDI research program and NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. Other themes of the festival were the "Fortieth Anniversary of the Defeat of Fascism" and the decisive role of the Soviet Union in defeating Nazi Germany. The festival also attempted to link the struggle against apartheid with the antiwar struggle. US Delegation members were instructed to show that the United States was the principal cause of both evils and told that they must bring the people involved in the anti-apartheid movement into more general opposition to US policy.

The USNPC for the 12th World Youth Festival determined that the Soviet slogan for the festival, "For Anti-Imperialist Solidarity, Peace and Friendship," was not suitable for use in the United States because the obviously biased language might negatively affect public opinion and endorsements. Thus, the USNPC decided to use the slogan "The Friendship of Young Generations Can Bring Peace Among Nations." Festival posters received from the WFDY and the IPC containing the "anti-imperialist" slogan were not used by the USNPC. Other NPCs, such as Portugal's, did the same thing in order to make the festival more acceptable to noncommunists, from whom support was sought. The IPC position was that the local NPCs could formulate their own slogans in keeping with local political conditions.

The CPUSA and its front groups held many of the leadership positions in the USNPC and played a major role in determining who attended the festival as representatives of the United States. The USNPC attempted to secure as many endorsements for the festival as possible from local governments, public officials, and prominent citizens. USNPC organizers
also made a special effort to get trade and labor unions
to offer their support.

Most of the 20,000 delegates who attended the 12th
World Youth Festival were well screened by the Soviet
Union and its front organizations prior to their
selection as delegates or observers. Thus, many
delegates were strongly predisposed toward Soviet
policies; this Moscow event reinforced their
preexisting positions on Soviet programs. These
delegates and the Soviet Union therefore view the 12th
World Youth Festival as a huge success.

But to some delegates the 12th World Youth
Festival was only a propaganda show of the Soviet
Union. These delegates were disillusioned over the
lack of genuine debate on such issues as human rights,
Afghanistan, Poland, and the Soviet buildup of nuclear
weapons. In some cases, the Soviet authorities even
confiscated “offensive” political and religious
publications. Because of the strict Soviet domination
and control of the festival events, Moscow’s political
standing among previously sympathetic youth,
particularly from Western Europe, was damaged.

Soviet Influence in the
United Nations

The Soviet Union is effectively utilizing the United
Nations and its specialized agencies to further Soviet
foreign policy goals and intelligence-gathering
objectives. At UN Headquarters in New York, the
Soviets have intelligence officers under diplomatic
cover not only in the Soviet mission to the United
Nations, but also in the UN Secretariat. Every
individual employed by the UN Secretariat must take
an oath to carry out his/her duties and responsibilities
as an “international civil servant of the United
Nations” and not accept instruction or guidance from
any government. In actuality, the Soviets assigned to
the UN Secretariat report directly to the Soviet mission
and thus are part of the Soviet bureaucracy which is
controlled by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Soviet
intelligence services, and the CPSU Central Committee
in Moscow.

The Soviet intelligence services use their UN staff
assignments to support worldwide intelligence and
active measures operations; monitor and manipulate
UN activities; collect scientific and technical
information of value to the Soviet Union; and spot,
assess, and recruit intelligence sources and agents of
influence.

Soviet active measures in the United Nations have
focused considerable attention on the issues of nuclear
arms control and disarmament. In 1978, the United
Nations proclaimed the week beginning on October
24 as Disarmament Week, a week devoted to “fostering
the objectives of disarmament.” Disarmament Week
has now become an integral part of the World
Disarmament Campaign, which was launched from the
Second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982.
Although the stated ideals of the World Disarmament
Campaign are commendable, a variety of
Soviet-sponsored front organizations and agencies are
in a position to exploit these ideals and influence or
manipulate the campaign.

The Soviet Union has effectively exploited the
system of NGOs at the United Nations for active
measures objectives. Although NGO representatives
cannot vote at the United Nations, they may attend
conferences, sessions, and meetings as observers,
submit papers which become part of the official record,
and at times speak at meetings. The NGOs are prime
targets for Soviet penetration and/or control because
of their potential to influence voting members in the
United Nations, worldwide public opinion, and the
internal politics of their own countries.

NGOs may be affiliated with the UN system in a variety of ways. For example, an NGO may be
affiliated by a committee within the Secretariat and “listed” with the UN Department of
Public Information at the UN headquarters in New
York. NGOs can be given some form of consultative
status with a particular UN Headquarters in New
York or with a particular UN agency, such as the UN
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) or the Department of Disarmament Affairs.
The form of affiliation that is the most desirable and
the highest degree of recognition throughout
the UN system is Category I consultative status with
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

The Conference of Non-Governmental
Organizations (CONGO), which has consultative
status with ECOSOC, is the largest and most
influential nongovernmental institution within the UN
system and is officially recognized as such by the
United Nations, its Secretariat, and various agencies.
It is the spokesman for about 200 international
organizations associated with the United Nations. Most
of these organizations belonging to CONGO are
neutral, nonpolitical groups representing a wide range
of viewpoints. Religious organizations, professional
societies, and public service associations form the bulk
of CONGO’s membership. However, the following
major international Soviet fronts are also members:

Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization
(AAPSO)
Christian Peace Conference (CPC)
International Association of Democratic Lawyers
(IADL)
International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)
CONGO’s executive body is called the board. The 20-member CONGO board currently includes five Soviet front organizations: AAPSO, CPC, IADL, WIDF, and WFTU. These organizations constitute a dominant force on the board because they operate and vote as a coordinated and disciplined bloc.

At the very least, the Soviet fronts on the Board will be able effectively to influence the planning, organization, and agendas for a number of important CONGO meetings and conferences and for NGO participation in many UN-sponsored events. The major CONGO conference on the International Year of Peace, held under CONGO and UN auspices in January 1986, was only one of many events which the fronts were able to control through their leadership of CONGO.

The Soviets have considerable control over the Political Information and News Service (PINS) which was established by the United Nations to provide Secretariat staff and member states with summaries of media reports. Supervision of PINS was assigned to the office of UN Secretariat, Under Secretary General Viacheslav Ustinov.

The Soviets have used their influence over PINS to select and edit press items which are used on a daily basis by UN members and employees. A review of PINS articles indicates an anti-US bias and an absence of unfavorable coverage of the Soviet Union.

### An Assessment of Soviet Active Measures in the US

In the United States, Soviet intelligence officers actively target and seek to cultivate influential US citizens, government officials, journalists, and political activists. Much of this activity is overt in nature, although Soviet intelligence officers are always alert for the opportunity to recruit Americans who are in positions to facilitate or assist Soviet active measures operations. In addition, Soviet intelligence officers in the United States are responsible for the collection of information, documents, and stationery which are used in disinformation and forgery operations, and for operations to surface disinformation and forgeries in this country. The CPSU’s ID, with the assistance of the KGB, directs and clandestinely funds a network of international Communist front organizations and the CPUSA and its front organizations. These organizations, in turn, are used by the Soviets to promote Soviet foreign policy views and to spread Soviet propaganda and disinformation to influence the US Government.

The Soviet Union relies extensively on the CPUSA and its front organizations to support Soviet active measures campaigns in the United States. Front organizations of the CPUSA tend to be more effective than the Communist Party because they are not as easily identified as pro-Soviet or communist dominated organizations.

One of the major Soviet active measures campaigns currently underway in the United States and Europe is the Soviet campaign to undermine the SDI research program. The Soviets are specifically interested in exploiting disagreements and creating divisiveness between the United States and its NATO allies on this issue. In the United States, the CPUSA and its front organizations have been directed to undertake operations to influence the activities of independent peace organizations. One objective of the Soviet campaign is to influence US and European peace and disarmament organizations to focus only on the American SDI program, while ignoring Soviet strategic defense programs.

One of the most frequently used Soviet active measures techniques is the surfacing of forged documents. Although most forged documents surface overseas, there have been some recent forgeries which have first appeared in the United States, such as the forgeries relating to the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles. Soviet forgeries have been particularly effective in Europe and Third World countries. The Soviets believe that even when the US Government issues prompt denials of the authenticity of a forged document, the denial will never entirely offset the damage caused by the initial release.

Soviet active measures in this country do contribute to worldwide active measures campaigns against the United States. It is often difficult to judge the effectiveness of specific active measures operations. However, the Soviets believe these operations have a cumulative effect and are detrimental to US foreign policy and national security interests. Furthermore, the Soviets believe that their active measures operations in the United States do contribute to their overall strategy to advance Soviet foreign policy interests, influence US Government policies, and in general discredit the United States.
Chapter IV

Soviet Front Organizations

Traditionally, the term front has referred to an umbrella organization that unites a variety of groups. Since World War II, the term has been used increasingly to refer also to organizations which are not independent, but are controlled directly or indirectly by the Soviet Union. Both definitions apply in this paper. Soviet control of front groups is ordinarily concealed; for example, Soviet citizens rarely occupy the positions of president or secretary general, and Soviet affiliates claim merely to be equals of those from other countries. Soviet fronts unite different groups in support of USSR policies: communists, socialists, “liberation movement” members, and any others who will cooperate. Table A (page 36) lists the major Soviet front organizations, where they are headquartered, their size, and when they were founded.

Many of the current Soviet international fronts had less effective counterparts in the interwar period. The Comintern ran the pre-World War II fronts from a multinational bureaucracy in Moscow, tightly controlled by the CPSU.

The CPSU’s International Department directs all front activity through the appropriate Soviet national affiliate of that particular front. A Soviet representative on the secretariat at the headquarters of the international front usually is the general manager of the organization and takes direct orders from Moscow. If there is no Soviet secretary, the senior Soviet vice-president performs this function. In addition to Soviet administrative input, funding is used to help maintain control. However, the Soviets pay only for the activity they want undertaken.

Additional coordination between fronts is required to ensure that they have unified positions in support of Soviet policies. To this end, each of the major fronts and some of the minor ones are represented on the World Peace Council—the largest and most important Soviet international front.

In addition to the interfront coordination provided by the WPC, there are periodic meetings involving most major fronts and some minor ones. Recently, such meetings have been stepped up from once to twice a year. Other types of joint activities are often undertaken; e.g., two worldwide fronts may sponsor a meeting, or a worldwide front may host a meeting in conjunction with its regional affiliate and a national affiliate.

Soviet control and coordination of front organizations are most evident when the fronts respond with either silence or outright support to such events as the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. On rare occasions when fronts do not toe the line, there are significant repercussions. Some of the top leaders of the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Christian Peace Conference, and the International Union of Students—all based in Prague—opposed the Czech invasion of 1968, which resulted in purges in these organizations.

Some post-World War II international fronts attracted noncommunist members owing to wartime Allied cooperation. Since that time, however, a number of contentious issues have led to a decline in international support for the fronts. As the Cold War developed, pro-Western elements, unable or unwilling to combat Soviet domination, withdrew from many fronts during 1948-50. Following Tito’s break with the Cominform in 1948, Yugoslav affiliates were expelled from such organizations. Since the mid-1960s and the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese and Albanians have boycotted the Soviet international fronts, although they have remained members of most of these organizations. Finally, after some West European communist parties developed policies independent of the Soviet Union, the French gave up the secretary generalship of the World Federation of Trade Unions and the World Federation of Democratic Youth, while the Italians gave up the presidency of the WFDY and withdrew from the WFTU altogether.

With such a history and image, the fronts have found it difficult to attract noncommunist supporters. To expand their constituency, Soviet policymakers developed “fronts-of-fronts,” usually by setting up new organizations. Most of the new fronts-of-fronts are regional extensions of existing worldwide Soviet fronts, new occupational groups established as part of the peace movement, or groups set up to pursue some other worthy cause. The regional groups, mostly established in the Third World, usually have overlapping membership with the older, more traditional fronts. Most of these new fronts-of-fronts do not have a Soviet directly in the secretariat or administrative offices of the organization, and many do not have Soviet membership.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Front</th>
<th>Year founded</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Claimed Membership</th>
<th>Affiliates</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Ulanbaatar</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian Peace Conference (CPC)</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>ca.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>120 plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Union of Students (IUS)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>10 million</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL)</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Havana</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF)</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>East Berlin</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>150 million</td>
<td>ca.270</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>ca.40</td>
<td>70 plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>206 million</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Peace Council (WPC)</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Helsinki</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>142 plus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A: Major International Communist Front Organizations, 1985
World Peace Council (WPC).

The WPC is the preeminent Soviet international communist front organization. Although no membership figures are published for the WPC, it is the largest front organization in the world. It is unique in that other fronts have slots on the WPC Council and Presidential Committee. It has avoided some of the early defections that plagued other major front organizations, but has twice been forced to move its headquarters because of subversive activities—from Paris in 1951 and from Vienna in 1957. Its research arm, the International Institute for Peace, remains in Vienna.

The WPC Council is theoretically the organization’s top policymaking body and consists of some 1,500 members appointed by its constituent national affiliates, other international fronts, and all members of the Presidential Committee. The Council meets every 3 years and elects the president, vice presidents (50), secretary general, and members of the Presidential Committee. The latter consists of about 250 members, meets once a year, elects members of the WPC Secretariat, and identifies countries to be given slots on the WPC Bureau.

In 1983, the WPC Bureau had 54 members including the president, vice-presidents, secretary general, and representatives from selected countries, but at least 11 vice-presidents and a secretary general were added in 1986 when the bureau was designated the WPC’s main executive body. It meets as often as necessary, but has an approximately 20-member secretariat employed fulltime at its Helsinki headquarters.

At the April 1986 meeting of the WPC, Soviet Peace Committee president Yuriy Zhukov led a successful move to reestablish the post of secretary general and appoint Finnish communist Johannes Pakaslhti to the position. Zhukov also proposed the expansion of the secretariat to include more West Europeans, and this appears to have been adopted.

Also by April, former Soviet Peace Committee first vice-president Oleg Kharkhardin replaced the relatively low-ranking Tair Tairov as the principal Soviet member and the day-to-day manager of the WPC Secretariat. These moves indicate that the Soviets are exercising tighter control over WPC President Romesh Chandra, a Politburo-level member of India’s Communist Party, and that East-West issues may be given precedence over those concerning the Third World.

The WPC is registered with several UN bodies as an NGO. In 1981, it failed to attain the highest category of NGO recognized by ECOSOC, although other Soviet fronts have achieved that premier level.

It failed owing to British and US initiatives which disputed the WPC contention that it received no governmental funding, criticized its policies for being one-sided, and noted that it often espoused policies diametrically opposed to the UN.

The WPC enhances its role as the executor of Soviet front group activity through complex ties to the other front organizations described below. In addition, it directs or coordinates activities of other groups, not necessarily recognized as direct Soviet front organizations, that consistently support Soviet positions on geopolitical issues. Examples of these groups and the degree of interinvolvement include:

- **International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces (ILFPF)**

  The ILFPF was founded in 1973 with WPC President Chandra as its president, and current Soviet WPC secretary Oleg Kharkhardin as its executive secretary. ILFPF members have been active in WPC triennial peace congresses. Chandra, Polish communist leader Tomas Travnicek, and Edith Ballantyne, ILFPF vice-president and secretary general of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, were cochairpersons of the 1983 WPC World Peace Congress in Prague. Hermod Lannung, ILFPF vice-president and chairman of the World Federation of World Federalists, was the organizer of the 1986 WPC World Peace Congress in Copenhagen. The ILFPF is considered a front for the WPC.

- **International Committee for European Security and Cooperation (ICSCE)**

  ICSCE’s president, Rev. Canon Raymond Goor, has long been a WPC “observer.” One of the ICSCE secretaries is Yevgeniy Silin, a Soviet. Vitaliy Shaposhnikov, deputy CPSU ID chief and one of three Soviets serving on the WPC Presidential Committee, also plays a significant role in the ICSCE. The ICSCE is considered a regional affiliate of the WPC.

- **Generals for Peace and Disarmament (GPD)**

  A London-based organization of ex-NATO commanders of flag rank; at least four of the 13 GPD members are double-slated on the WPC. One of these, Portugal’s Francisco da Costa Gomes, is a WPC vice-president. The GPD is considered a WPC front.
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

The WFTU has evolved into one of the Soviet Union’s most significant front organizations, owing in part to the importance Moscow places on trade unions. It is one of only two fronts having a WPC vice-presidency.

The WFTU, like the WPC, was forced twice to move its headquarters from Western capitals because of subversive activities, before finally settling in Prague. It initially lost membership with the onset of the Cold War when socialist-oriented trade unions withdrew to form the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). It again lost credibility in 1978 with the withdrawal of Italy’s Eurocommunist trade union federation. The WFTU has recouped some of its losses by forging close links with regional trade union confederations in the Third World.

The WFTU has organized a large bureaucracy along geographic and functional lines. It has a congress which meets every four years; the next meeting is scheduled for East Berlin in September 1986. The WFTU General Council meets annually and has a full and an alternate member from each of its 90 affiliates representing 81 countries and trade union internationals (TUIs). The WFTU Bureau consists of the president (Hungarian Communist Politburo member Sandor Gaspar), six vicepresidents, a secretary general (Sudanese Communist central commiteeeman Ibrahim Zakhariya), and a full and an alternate member from each of 34 selected national affiliates and TUIs.

In theory, control flows from congress to council to bureau to president and secretary general, but in practice it seems to emanate from Boris Averyanov, whose Soviet secretary seated in Prague. Averyanov represents the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), whose International Department he formerly headed, and which appears to be the top of the actual WFTU chain of command.

The WFTU directs 11 TUIs which function as subsidiaries. This is significantly different from the WPC, which acknowledges only one subsidiary, the International Institute for Peace. Each TUI appears to have a Soviet secretary and is a constituent part of the WFTU. They are organized according to industry, with headquarters mostly in Soviet bloc capitals (the exception is Helsinki).

The WFTU is attempting to gain influence throughout the Third World. It cooperates closely with the Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin America (CPUSTAL), headquartered in Mexico City; the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU), Damascus; the Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), Accra; and the Asian and Oceanic Trade Union Coordinating Committee (AOTUCC), New Delhi.

Each of the above groups has a core of WFTU national affiliates, but also has been able to enlist non-NFTU unions. CPUSTAL and AOTUCC are small and communist-oriented. CPUSTAL has a slot on the WPC proper, and the new AOTUCC secretary was formerly WFTU’s Asian secretary. The ICATU, and OATUU are the trade union organs of the Arab League and Organization of African Unity, respectively, and are the sole labor federations in their regions. Each has a slot on the WPC Presidential Committee.

The WFTU General Council session held in Moscow last year provided insights into WFTU subsidiary organizations and fronts. The TUIs, the four federations noted above, and other communist international labor organizations attended, including the International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament (the “Dublin Committee”) and the International Organization of Miners.

The Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

The WIDF theoretically ranks third in importance among the Soviet front organizations. It is the only front other than the WFTU to have a WPC vice-presidency, although it has not been as visibly active as its size and WPC position would seem to warrant. It did not suffer from early defections in the post-World War II era because it did not have any major noncommunist affiliates. It lost membership, however, during the Eurocommunism upheaval in the 1960s when its Italian affiliate withdrew from full membership in 1964, and its French affiliate relinquished its leadership slot in 1969.

The WIDF governing body is its world congress which meets every 3 to 6 years and was scheduled in Moscow in June 1987. The WIDF Council, elected by the world congress, is supposed to meet annually. It, in turn, elects a bureau and fulltime secretariat. WIDF president Freda Brown (Australia) and secretary general Mirjam Vire Tuommen (Finland) are both communists. The Soviet secretary, last reported to be Valeria Kalmyk, representing the Soviet Women’s Committee, is assumed to be the general manager of the front.

The WIDF, like WFTU, has de facto regional affiliates in Africa, the Arab world, and Latin America: the All-African Women’s Organization (AAWO), Algiers; the Arab Women’s Federation (AWF), Cairo; and the Women’s Continental Front (FCM), Managua. AAWO has a slot on the WPC Presidential Committee. The FCM’s first “coordinator” (the late Doris Tijerino)
also served on that body, but represented Nicaragua rather than the FCM.

The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

The WFDY is a Soviet international front organization which has attempted to attract the support of students and Young people. Although it has no WPC vice-president, it is one of only three organizations which have two regular members on the WPC Presidential Committee.

The WFDY history and structure are similar to those of other major Soviet fronts. The anticommunists who left the organization in 1950 did not provide any serious competition.

Theoretically, the WFDY is governed by an assembly which meets every two to four years and is scheduled to meet again in Budapest in November 1986. The assembly elects an executive committee which is supposed to meet semiannually. Only 67 of the 270 affiliates are represented on the executive committee. A smaller bureau, which meets when required, apparently includes the fulltime secretariat members as well as the president, vice-presidents (10), secretary general, treasurer, and some 13 selected additional country representatives.

The WFDY is unusual in that it does not have a Soviet secretary. It is assumed that the Soviet vice president gives on-the-spot guidance when needed. In 1980, Vesvolod Nakodkin, representing the Komsomol and/or the Committee on Youth Organizations (KMO), was the Soviet vice-president.

The WFDY has been successful in attracting communist and socialist national organizations as affiliates from at least nine countries, primarily from the Third World. The organization also cooperates occasionally with the Socialist International’s International Union of Socialist Youth.

The WFDY has three subsidiary organizations: the International Committee of Children’s and Adolescents’ Movements (CIMEA), the International Bureau of Tourism and Exchanges of Youth (BITEJ), and the International Voluntary Service for Friendship and Solidarity (SIVSAJ). It appears to have de facto regional affiliates in the Arab Youth Union, Cairo, and the Pan African Youth Movement, Algiers. Other organizations with which the WFDY has cooperated include: the Council of European National Youth Committees, the Ecumenical Youth Council of Europe, the Nordic Youth Center, and the International Union of Socialist Youth.

With its student counterpart, the International Union of Students, the WFDY cosponsors World Youth Festivals. These festivals are held every few years and attract an average attendance of 10,000-34,000 people. They are the largest international front meetings held under “unofficial” Soviet auspices.

International Union of Students (IUS)

When the president of the IUS criticized the 1968 USSR invasion of Czechoslovakia, both he and the organization’s secretary general, Nuri Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn (Iraq), were replaced. Husayn, however, reemerged as the secretary general of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization.

The highest IUS body is its congress, which meets every two to four years, and last met in April 1984 in Sofia. The congress elects the executive committee, which contains representatives of 53 of the organization’s 112 affiliates.

The secretariat includes the president, 13 vice presidents, the secretary general, 12 secretaries, and the treasurer. As with the WFDY, there is no Soviet secretary and it appears to be the Soviet vice president who manages the organization. Although the secretariat is normally a fulltime working body, it is not known if its non-secretary members live in Prague. The current president is Josef Skala of Czechoslovakia, the secretary general is Georgio Michaelides of Cyprus, and the Soviet vice-president is Sergey Chelnikov, representing the Student Council of the USSR.

The IUS cooperates most closely with the WFDY, with which it cosponsors world youth festivals and other events. Its president sits on the WPC Presidential Committee and it has de facto regional affiliates in Latin America, the Arab world, and Africa: the Latin American Continental Students Organization (OCLAE), Havana; the General Union of Arab Students (GUAS), Damascus; and the All Africa Students Union (AASU), Accra. The OCLAE has a slot on the WPC Presidential Committee filled by its Cuban secretary general, Angel Arzuaga Reyes, and the AASU has a slot on the WPC itself. The IUS is believed to also be connected to the International Federation of Medical Students Associations, which sent representatives to the WPC’s June 1983 Prague Assembly.

Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)

AAPSO was founded in 1957 as an extension of the WPC. Its focus has been on “liberation movements” and other specific Afro-Asian matters.
It has two regular slots on the WPC Presidential Committee, and at least three of its vice presidents-South Africa’s Alfred Nzo, Iraq’s Aziz Sharif, and the Congo’s Vital Balla—are also vice presidents of the WPC. Many AAPSO national affiliates are concurrently their nations’ WPC affiliate (e.g., in Afghanistan, Bahrain, the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Jordan, Libya, Malta, the Philippines, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen). AAPSO and the WPC jointly run an International Committee Against Apartheid, Racism, and Colonialism in Southern Africa (ICSA).

Despite the definitive linkages, AAPSO has been more successful than most groups in avoiding the image of being a Soviet front. In large part this is due to Egypt’s role in the organization. AAPSO headquarters have always been in Cairo and its president-currently Abd-al-Rahman Sharqawi—is always appointed by the Egyptian Government. Egypt’s break with the Soviets, illustrated by the expulsion of Soviet advisory personnel in 1972 and President Sadat’s renunciation of the Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1976, was a setback and made Soviet control more obvious. No meeting of AAPSO’s highest body, its conference, took place between January 1972 and May 1984 even though it had met every 2 or 3 years previously.

Following the 1978 assassination of Ali Sabri, AAPSO’s Egyptian president/secretary general, the two jobs were separated. Nuri Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn, an Iraqi, became secretary general and remains so today. The organization has consistently followed the Soviet line and has diverged from that of Egypt.

The AAPSO Council is subordinate to the AAPSO Conference and contains representatives from some 70 national affiliates (approximately 15 additional European and American associate members presumably have a voice but do not vote). It has met irregularly. The council elects an executive committee which meets twice a year. A presidium-which in 1984 included the president, vice-presidents (21), the secretary general, and representatives from 26 additional countries-has met on the average of about once a year since it was established in 1974. In 1985, the permanent secretariat in Cairo consisted of the secretary general, four deputy secretaries general, at least 10 secretaries, and a support staff.

Other organizations have close ties to AAPSO. The Afro-Asian Writers Association (AAWA), an NGO which attended the 1983 Prague WPC Congress, appears to be an AAPSO subsidiary. The Havana-based Organization of Solidarity With the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL) originally was set up in 1966 to replace the AAPSO; but the Sino-Soviet dispute interfered, and OSPAAL has remained more or less a relatively inactive regional extension of AAPSO in Latin America.

An OSPAAL delegation’s coordination meeting with the AAPSO leadership in October 1983 and OSPAAL’s apparent hosting of a meeting of the major fronts in October 1985 may presage an increase in its activity. Secretary General Rene Anillo Capote (Cuba) represents OSPAAL on the WPC Presidential Committee; the late secretary general of the AAWA, Alex La Guma (South Africa), was a WPC member. Another related regional organization is the Libyan dominated Arab People’s Congress, headquartered in Tripoli, but also having a slot on the WPC Presidential Committee.

The Christian Peace Conference (CPQ)

The CPC is a Soviet front organization aimed at enlisting support of the world Christian community. It has significant ties to the WPC. CPC president Karoly Toth sits on the WPC Presidential Committee, and CPC vice-president Richard Andriamanjato is a WPC vice-president representing Madagascar.

The All-Christian Peace Assembly meets every five to seven years, the last meeting being in July 1985. It elects a continuation committee of about 100 members which has met about every 18 months. It is apparently responsible for electing both a working committee of about 50, meeting twice a year, and a separate international secretariat of about 25 members, meeting three times a year.

The president, continuation committee chairman, secretary general, and vice-presidents constitute the presidential board, which is part of the working committee but not (except for the secretary general) of the international secretariat. There is a permanent office staff, and the newly elected Soviet deputy secretary general, Archpriest Georgiy Goncharov, representing the Russian Orthodox Church, is assumed to be the general manager. Other top officers include president Toth, continuation committee chairman Filaret of the USSR, and secretary general Lubomir Mirejovsky of Czechoslovakia.

The CPC is unique in that its regional affiliates are organic parts of the organization itself and may thus be considered subsidiary organizations: African CPC, Dar-es-Salaam; Asian CPC, Bangalore; and CPC in Latin America and the Caribbean, Havana. The CPC does not represent European Catholics, who are under the Berlin Conference of European Catholics, East Berlin.
International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)

The IOJ was another front formed in the immediate postwar era whose pro-Western elements soon withdrew when Soviet domination became evident. In addition to its normal front activities, it sponsors training centers for Third World journalists in Budapest (for radio and TV), East Berlin (for newspapers and magazines), Sofia (agriculture and economics specialty), Prague (newscasting specialty), and Havana (presumed regional center).

The IOJ congress, scheduled to meet every four years (in Sofia in October 1986), elects an executive committee and a presidium. It is not known which body elects the fulltime secretariat. Chief officers are president Kaarle Nordenstreng, Finland, and secretary general Juri Kubka, Czechoslovakia; Boris Sakharov is the Soviet secretary representing the USSR Union of Journalists.

The IOJ’s secretary general sits on the WPC Presidential Committee, and its Latin American de facto regional affiliate, the Federation of Latin American Journalists (FELAP), Havana, has a slot on the WPC proper. The IOJ also cooperates with the Union of African Journalists and Federation of Arab Journalists (FAJ), presumed de facto regional affiliates in those respective areas. FELAP secretary general Luis Suarez Lopez, Mexico, is an IOJ vice president, as is FAJ chairman Saad Qasim Hammudi, Iraq.

The International Federation of Social and Democratic Press and the Prague-headquartered International Radio and TV Organization also sent representatives to the Prague June 1983 WPC meeting. Little is known of the former, but the latter, which has full members in only four officially noncommunist countries (the near-communist Nicaragua, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan plus Finland), takes part in the collective meetings of the major fronts.

International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)

The IADL is a Soviet front organization aimed at the world legal and legislative communities. The IADL and the World Federation of Scientific Workers are the only major fronts not represented directly on the WPC Presidential Committee. The IADL, however, has a slot on the WPC itself, and first vice-president Gerhard Stuby, Federal Republic of Germany, and vice president Jean Salmon, Belgium represent their respective countries at the WPC.

IADL congresses have met irregularly every two six years (last in Athens in October 1984). IADL has a council, a smaller bureau elected by the congress, and a fulltime secretariat. The main officers are president Joe Nordmann, France; first vice-president (and former secretary general) Gerhard Stuby, FRG; and Secretary General Amar Bentoumi, Algeria. Semyon Ivanov represents the Association of Soviet Jurists on the Secretariat.

The IADL has a joint working group with the WFTU Legal Commission. It also cooperates with the IOJ on an International Committee for the Defense of Journalist Rights.

The IADL has a number of subsidiary organizations, mostly de facto regional affiliates, which support Soviet propaganda themes. The AntiImperialist Tribunal of Our America (TANA), Managua, has a seat on the WPC Presidential Committee—currently occupied by TANA president Guillermo Torriello Garrido, Guatemala. The IADL vice-presidents from Colombia and Cuba sit on the TANA executive committee.

The secretary general of the Arab Lawyers Union (ALU), Cairo, is Zuhayr-al-Midani, Syria, another IADL vice-president. The ALU formerly had a seat on the WPC Presidential Committee. The International Committee of Inquiry Into Israeli Crimes Against Palestinian and Lebanese Peoples, the International Commission on Inquiries Into the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile, and the International Federation of Women in Legal Careers were represented at the WPC’s June 1983 Assembly and are believed to be connected to the IADL.

In other activities, the IADL has issued frequent statements condemning noncommunist governments for alleged cases against civil rights. It takes only an anti-US stand on disarmament issues, has supported the Afghanistan Government and the Sandinistas, and has condemned Israel’s involvement in Lebanon.

World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)

The WFSW is a Soviet front organization in the scientific area which frequently undertakes genuine scientific related projects to attract noncommunist membership and support. It has permanent standing committees on science policy, disarmament, and socioeconomics. The WFSW supports the USSR on disarmament issues and condemns SDI.

The WFSW General Assembly has met every two to four years (last in July 1986 in Moscow). The assembly elects an executive council of some 40 members and a bureau consisting of the president, vice-president, secretary general, deputy secretary general, assistant secretaries, and heads of regional centers (in Algiers, East Berlin, and New Delhi). The July General Assembly reelected president Jean Marie
Legay, France, and elected a new secretary general, Stan Davison, UK. It is not known if Soviet vice-president O. M. Nefedov was reelected.

The WFSW has a close relationship with the WPC and the WFTU and meets periodically with other major fronts. It has had no direct representation to the WPC since the 1980 death of its former president, E. H. S. Burhop of the UK, who sat on the WPC Presidential Committee.

World Federation of Teachers Union (FISE)

The FISE is actually a WFTU trade union international. It operates somewhat independently within WFTU, for it takes part in the coordination meetings of the major fronts (the only TUI to so do). It therefore is considered a front organization for purposes of this report.

The FISE has no direct slot on the WPC but its president, Lesturuge Ariyawansa, Sri Lanka, is a member of his country’s WPC delegation. Daniel Retureau, France, is FISE secretary general, and the Soviet secretary is Dmitri Turchaninov, presumably representing the USSR Union of Education and Science Workers.

The FISE has a conference every two years (last in Sofia in 1985) which apparently elects an administrative committee. It has a small secretariat at its headquarters—five persons identified as members. In addition to its ties with the WFTU and WPC, it cooperates with the Confederation of American Educators and the Federation of Arab Teachers.

Little is known about FISE subsidiaries and cooperating organizations. The Quito-based Latin American Confederation of Associations of University Professionals has no known ties to the FISE, but its president, Leonidas Plaza Verduga, Ecuador, sits on the WPC. The Paris-based International League for Child and Adult Education sent a delegate to the June 1983 Assembly in Prague, but nothing further is known of its possible connection to the FISE.

Asian Buddhists Conference for Peace (ABCP)

The ABCP is a Soviet front organization aimed at the world’s Buddhists. It has especially close ties to the WPC, a phenomenon shared with AAPSO and CPC, the other major fronts formed after the immediate post-World War II era. It has two members on the WPC Presidential Committee and seven members on the WPC Council. This representation is relatively high for a front organization not in the mainstream.

The ABCP’s governing body is its General Assembly (last met in Vientiane in February 1986). Its president, the Ven. Khambo Lama Kharkhoo Gaadan, and presumably its secretary general, Lubsen Tseren, are Mongols. The key Soviet in the organization is believed to be Khambo Lama Jimba Jamtso Erdeneer. In 1983 he was chairman of the Central Religious Board of Buddhists in the USSR and, as a member of ABCP Executive, one of its seven members on the WPC. We have no additional information on the ABCP organizational structure and functions.

Esperantists Movement for World Peace

The Esperantists Movement for World Peace had three slots on the WPC during 1983-86, two of them occupied by president Imre Pethes, Hungary, and secretary general William Gilbert, France. Its headquarters location and size are unknown. It is also a member of the Universal Esperanto Association (UEA). The UEA is the parent organization of the World Organization of Young Esperantists (TEJO), which sent a delegate to the June 1983 WPC-sponsored assembly in Prague.
Chapter V

Forgeries: An Instrument of Active Measures

The use of forgeries to deceive an enemy or affect public opinion has been a staple of disinformation almost throughout modern history, but no states have used this tactic as extensively as have the Soviet Union and its allies. During the period 1945-75, approximately three or four forgeries were detected each year. Since 1976 the number of detections has more than doubled, and the rate has increased further in the 1980s. Old forgeries have also been recycled for use with new audiences.

Forgeries can be more easily exposed than other types of active measures largely because careful analysis can often demonstrate convincingly that the document is a fake. The best evidence the United States has that the Soviet Government is a source of forgeries is statements by numerous KGB defectors; they have described how the Soviet bloc governments use forgeries as an active measures tool. But it should be noted that in many cases we are not certain who produced a particular forgery. We are forced to rely on circumstantial evidence until we obtain confirmation from a defector or through intelligence reporting. We can say, however, when a forgery is designed and released in such a way that it benefits Soviet and/or bloc policies vis-a-vis US policy interests, and conforms to a pattern evident in previous forgeries of Soviet origin, that the forgery may well be a Soviet active measure.

Forgeries are effective in at least three ways:

1. Even when unpublicized in the media, a forgery can cast aspersions on targeted governments and on individuals. This type of forgery, the “silent” forgery, can be the most damaging of all, for the victim does not know that the forgery is being circulated and may never get the opportunity to refute it. The forgery becomes an unknown factor directly affecting the victim’s relations with the recipient government.

2. When publicized, forgeries force the target government to spend time, effort, and funds on refutation.

3. Denial will never entirely offset the damage done. Defectors tell us that even when the purported author disclaims the forgery, the Soviets calculate that people will assume “where there’s smoke there’s fire.” This doubt can be compounded by repeated reference to the forgery and its contents by the Soviet Union and/or its allies.

Once the initial cycle of surfacing, analysis, and exposure-denial has receded from public memory, reference to the forgery often resurfaces in Soviet or sympathetic publications. These stories repeat the forgery without mentioning the fact that the document has been discredited. This pattern, the “echo effect,” has been repeated almost indefinitely in many cases, including a faked US Army field manual on US plans to destabilize foreign governments and a faked speech by former US Representative to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick.

The forgeries chosen for repeated recirculation are generally those that deal with broad themes relating to alleged US plots to destabilize Third World nations, or directly reinforce Soviet foreign policy goals. For example, the Kirkpatrick forgery—which alleged US support for, among other things, the breakup of India into several independent nations and the exploitation of world hunger as a political weapon—has resurfaced many times and in many varied contexts, sometimes referred to by name, sometimes not.

Operational Aspects

Proposals for forgeries and other active measures may originate either in KGB headquarters or in the KGB residencies in the target country. Whatever the source of the proposal, the local residency and Moscow collaborate closely. Depending on the sensitivity and importance of the document, approval of the forgery may come from the KGB leadership, the CPSU Central Committee’s, or the CPSU Secretariat itself.

KGB specialists prepare the forgery under the supervision of the Active Measures section, Service A, of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate. In cases when timeliness is of overriding importance, some forgeries probably are prepared in the local residencies without much assistance from KGB headquarters. These forgeries are often characterized by a lack of technical and linguistic expertise characteristic of a rush job.
Although any KGB agent or asset may surface a forgery, the operation is under the control of the chief of the presidency’s active measures section.

**Themes and Timing of Forgeries**

Forgeries are typically used to support general Soviet propaganda themes, including charges of:

0 US-directed subversion activities against Third World regimes.

0 US and NATO Alliance opposition to arms control and disarmament, with a focus on such issues as the installation of intermediate-range nuclear force missiles in Western Europe and the Strategic Defense Initiative.

0 US support for unpopular governments.

0 Inhumane practices, such as US use of biological and chemical weapons, particularly in the Third World.

Often forgeries will place several of these themes in the same context, such as the Tyner letter, which raised the theme of US-South African military cooperation along with that of chemica I/bio logical warfare.

Although most major forgeries, we believe, require months of preparation, some credible fakes can be produced in very short periods of time. Forgeries most often occur during certain circumstances or in conjunction with specific types of events, such as those listed below:

0 **Intense anti-US propaganda campaigns.** Forgeries can be used to substantiate major themes of a Soviet propaganda offensive.

0 **Catastrophes and assassinations.** After such major international events as acts of terrorism or deaths of foreign leaders, forgeries or other disinformation efforts often surface to allege US responsibility. For example, after the deaths of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, President Jaime Roldos of Ecuador, and General Omar Torrijos of Panama, Soviet media were replete with stories and commentary insinuating US complicity in the deaths.

0 **Western press criticism of the Soviet bloc.** Western charges that the Bulgarians and the KGB were connected to the papal assassination attempt were probably a factor in production of the Rome cables forgery, which described the “Bulgarian Connection” as a CIA-inspired plot. Also, Western press reports on probable communist use of chemical and biological weapons in Afghanistan and Cambodia may have produced charges of US chemical warfare in Central America and allegations that the United States was breeding “killer mosquitos” in Pakistan.9

0 **Widely publicized incidents.** The stationing off US nuclear missiles in Western Europe set the scene for the Jorgenson letter. This forgery attempted to exploit any negative European sentiment by falsely stating that NATO was going to requisition homes in Denmark for military exercises.

**Technical Aspects**

Almost anything can be forged. Forgeries have included entire issues of *Newsweek* magazine, a complete US Army field manual, maps, classified cables, intelligence reports, and personal letters.

Forgeries may be complete fabrications like the Kirkpatrick speech, the US Army field manual 3031B, or the Rome cables, altered versions of genuine documents such as the Swanepoel letter or the Northrop letter;10 or composites of several documents, some of which are genuine, some of which are not.

The Soviets have shown considerable technical expertise in fabricating US Government documents, but the quality varies greatly. Still, even the best forgeries can usually be unmasked by analysis. A knowledge of US policy is indispensable in detecting forgeries. Often a document may not “feel” right, or may be at variance with clearly expressed policy. Forgeries may also contain errors that one experienced in the wording of US documents can detect. These can be obvious format errors, a wrong typeface, poor grammar, or an inappropriate classification. Forgeries often contain statements the US Government simply would not make, such as the letter from US Ambassador von Damm to the Austrian Defense Minister calling on Austria to integrate its air defense system into that of NATO and thereby violate its neutrality. To help determine whether a document is a forgery, several factors must be closely examined:

0 **Surfacing**

The document must reach the intended audience without revealing its origin. It is typically mailed without a return address or...
with a spurious return address, or merely appears on a journalist’s or government official’s desk. Forgeries of alleged Soviet origin are always sent out or delivered without a request for payment. There is often no direct link between the person sending the document and the recipient, ensuring that the recipient has no chance to ask questions of the person delivering the document. A forgery is most credible if it is surfaced in noncommunist—particularly Western—media, but this has become more difficult over time for the Soviets to accomplish, given the increasing awareness by journalists of Soviet active measures. Forgeries often surface in procommunist media with a predisposition to believe the worst about the United States or may be deliberately placed in noncommunist media by a paid journalist.

0 Cover Letters

The document is often transmitted with a covering letter which attempts to reinforce the forgery. The cover letter usually summarizes the forgery and explains the author’s motive for transmitting it in terms of outrage over the forgery’s revelations. The letter is generally untraceable and usually unsigned or signed with an illegible signature. The major problems that the Soviets have occur in surfacing the forgeries. Anonymous cover letters and plain white envelopes are too well known to Western journalists. In the case of the Schweitzer letter, when the anonymous method of surfacing failed, the perpetrators were forced to use a human contact which revealed the probable source of the forgery. In the Skantze forgery, another forged document, a cover letter, was used to give credence to the original forgery.

0 Format

The Soviets expend great effort to collect samples of forms, letters, stationery, and signatures as models for their efforts, but forgeries almost always contain small errors of format. Government procedures frequently change and their accurate duplication is almost impossible for an outsider to achieve.

0 Language

The texts of forged documents often indicate that they are not prepared by native speakers of current American English. One may find use of the British versus American spelling or note examples of stilted phraseology or word choice more appropriate to a 19th-century author. Some expressions often appear to be literally translated from Russian; for example, the word “concretized” in the Defense Mapping Agency letter.

0 News Value

In most cases the forgery tries to achieve uncritical publicity, therefore the document must be newsworthy. It may thus bear a high classification or purport to be the correspondence of a senior government official. The name of every postwar US President has appeared on a forgery.

0 Timing

Forgeries are often linked to current issues. The sudden appearance of a purportedly secret document can in itself be a warning of fraud.

0 Photocopies

Forgeries rarely appear in an original form. (The only recent exception is the von Damm letter.) They are almost always circulated in photocopy form. This facilitates preparation of fake documents on genuine stationery via a “cut and paste” method in which a genuine signature and letterhead can be juxtaposed with a fake text or, as in the case of the Northrop letter, a fake address placed on top of a genuine text.

The use of photocopies—and generally it is a photocopy of a photocopy, etc.—makes the task of analysis more difficult. It is more difficult to disprove a document when one does not have a paper sample of the original, a typeface capable of specific identification, or a clear letterhead.

0 Content

Forgeries tend to avoid specific allegations but may highlight statements that complicate US relations with another government or exacerbate anti-US sentiments. For example, the Jorgenson letter attempts to create anti-US feeling among the Danish population, and the von Damm letter implies US actions against Austrian neutrality.

The Soviet formula for forgery is basically that it be low key and appear authentic. Forgeries usually refer to genuine officials, use actual letterheads and forms, follow rather logical scenarios,
and cleverly exploit existing strains in international relations.

**Impact**

Behind the uncritical acceptance of forgeries often lie the prejudices of the deceived. Thus, the effectiveness of a forgery may depend as much on the mental predisposition of the recipient as on the skills of the forger.

To some extent, the acceptance of a forgery as real depends on the credibility given it by the reporter--often, a newspaper reporter. Because of sophisticated and informed journalists, many forgeries never achieve uncritical publication, or they appear only in communist or communist-dominated media.

Combating a forgery after it has surfaced is difficult. Even if serious journalists consider it unsubstantiated, a forgery becomes news if enough people have heard of it; the journalist has difficulty ignoring it after it has been reported elsewhere. Any replay is at least a small victory for the perpetrator, even if couched in skepticism. The only way truly to counter the technique of forgery is to heighten awareness in target countries, particularly among journalists, of the possibility of active measures and their potential for damage.
Examples of Forgeries

L Embassy Rome Cables

Description

The cables purported to be telegrams from the US Embassy in Rome to the State Department in August and December 1982. The August cable called for a concerted effort to draw public attention to the Bulgarian and Soviet connections of accused papal assassin Mehmet Ali Agca. It implied the involvement of Italian intelligence, leading members of the governing Italian Socialist Party, and other leaders and political figures in the plot. The December cable commended the success of this effort to link Agca with the Bulgarians.

These forgeries are excellent. They are clearly the product of a skilled and knowledgeable organization with great technical resources, not the work of an isolated individual or small group. To the average reader there are no distinct flaws in the format or the text. The discrepancies that enabled Embassy Rome to discredit the cables were the absence of identifying numbers, such awkward wording as “spynest Sofia” and “US services” which are not State Department style, and a misuse of the TAG system (a State Department information reference system) in which the forger used the symbol SU for the Soviet Union when it really refers to the Sudan, and the fact that both cables were addressed to USIS when it should have been USICA in August and USIA in December.

Purpose

The cables were designed to meet a current Soviet foreign policy need: to discredit growing suspicions of Soviet-Bulgarian involvement in the attempt to assassinate the Pope.

Surfacing

On July 13, 1983, the cables appeared in the advance edition of the leftwing Roman news weekly Pace e Guerra (Peace and War). Copies of the article were distributed to news agencies. The article contained allegations of a US plot to implicate the Bulgarian secret police and the KGB in the plot to kill the Pope. That same day, July 13, two members of the Italian Parliament from the Democratic Party of Proletarian Unity, who were elected on a joint list with the Communists, wrote US Ambassador Maxwell Rabb stating that they had received these documents and that they were calling for a parliamentary investigation. The Ambassador in a letter to the deputies branded the documents as forgeries. The Embassy successfully persuaded the responsible Italian press that the cables were the product of an effort to disinform Italian public opinion.

The cables have been continually resurfaced by TASS and other communist publications. The cables were repeatedly cited in a 1984 series of articles on the Bulgarian connection in Literaturnaya Gazeta and also appear in the book, John Paul H. Antonov, Agca--The Network (La Filliere) by French communist lawyer Christian Roullette. The cables were cited continually during the coverage of the 1985 Antonov trial by Soviet and other procommunist media.
II. The von Damm Letter

Description

The fabricated letter is addressed to Austrian Defense Minister Friedhelm Frischenschlager from US Ambassador to Austria Helene von Damm. It proposes the integration of Austria’s air defense radar system into that of NATO—a flagrant violation of Austrian neutrality. It also comments on the increased risk to Europe from the stationing of modernized US missiles. The letter is the only forgery in recent years to appear in an original, not merely photocopied version. It is on genuine embassy letterhead stationery and typed on a machine identical to that in the Ambassador’s office. The Ambassador’s signature, however, reveals that it was copied or traced carefully and haltingly. There are microscopically evident deposits of dried ink where the forger stopped and started again to draw the signature. The German is considered to be the product of a native speaker. (Ambassador von Damm, the purported author, was born and educated in Austria.) This was clearly a highly sophisticated piece of work.

Purpose

The letter was designed to damage US-Austrian relations on the eve of the Austrian President’s state visit to the United States. Also, it might have been designed to affect negatively the US image among other West Europeans who would question the seeming US manipulation of NATO.

Surfacing

The original copy of the letter was received by Defense Minister Frischenschlager on February 15, 1984. It was identified as a forgery but no announcement was made. A copy was later sent to the Austrian magazine Basta, which forwarded it to its parent publication Karier. The Defense Ministry immediately informed the newspaper that the letter was a fake. Kurier and other Austrian newspapers printed stories identifying the letter as a forgery and as a probable Soviet active measure.
Sehr geehrter Herr Bundesminister,

Gestatten Sie mir, dass ich Ihnen meine engste Verbundenheit zum Ausdruck bringe. Ich habe die Ehre Ihnen zu versichern, an einer breiten Zusammenarbeit auch weiterhin interessiert zu sein.


Um eine solche Gefahr zu vermindern, mochte ich Sie im Namen der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten dazu veranlassen überprüfen zu wollen, in welcher Art und Weise die Republik Österreich im Falle eines sowjetischen Atomangriffes den Westen beistehen könnte. Vor allem sollte in Betracht gezogen werden, dass eine wirksame Einschaltung Ihres Luft Raum-Uberwachungssystems in das der NATO offensichtliche Vorteile für die gemeinsame Verteidigung in sich birgt. Das von Ihnen verwendete italienische System ist kompatibel und eignet sich ausgezeichnet für die Einschaltung in das süd-deutsche oder norditalienische Netz; in gegebenen Fall ist die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten bereit, die notigen technischen und finanziellen Mittel aufzubringen.

Ich darf Sie darüber informieren, dass eine ahnliche Anregung unsererseits von zuständigen Regierungskreisen eines anderen neutralen Landes befürwortet wurde.

Erlauben Sie mir, Herr Bundesminister, auch diese Gelegenheit zu benutzen, um Ihnen meine ausgezeichnete Hochachtung zu versichern.

Helene von Damm

Herr Bundesminister für Landesverteidigung
Dr. Friedhelm Frischenschlager
Wien
Very respected Mr. Federal Minister:

Permit me to express to you my closest attachment. I have the honor to assure you that I continue to be interested in a broad cooperation.

As is also known to you, the countries of Western Europe, as a result of the stationing of modern American intermediate-range missiles, must expect Russian countermeasures. The Soviets have not only declared their intention to install atomic missiles in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, but the work connected with this is already in an advanced stage. This situation holds great risks not only for the NATO countries but also for all neutral democracies.

In order to diminish such a danger, I would like to have you please examine in what way and manner the Republic of Austria could assist the West in the event of a Soviet atomic attack. Above all, it should be considered that an effective insertion of your airspace surveillance system into that of NATO holds obvious advantages for the common defense. The Italian system used by you is compatible and is excellently suited for insertion into the southern German or northern Italian network; in the given case, the government of the United States is willing to provide the necessary technical and financial means.

I am permitted to inform you that a similar suggestion on our part was endorsed by responsible government circles in another neutral country.

Allow me, Mr. Federal Minister, also to use this opportunity to assure you of my excellent respect.

signature

Helene von Darn

Mr. Federal Minister for National Defense
Dr. Friedhelm Frischenschlager
Vienna
III. The Defense Mapping Agency Letter

Description

This letter purports to be a reply from the US Defense Mapping Agency to the South African Defense Force complying with a request for satellite maps of Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique. Although the letter is on DMA stationery, it is replete with improper spelling, poor punctuation, and incorrect word choice. General Dutton, to whom the letter was addressed, was not in South Africa at the time the letter surfaced, but was South Africa’s Ambassador to Chile, where he had been for several years. A curious aspect of the letter was the use of the word “concretize.” While it would appear to make no sense in English, it is a direct translation of a Russian word that could be used properly in the sentence in which it appeared.

Purpose

The forgery is part of an ongoing campaign designed to damage the US image in Africa by depicting a close military cooperation between the United States and South Africa despite a continuing US arms embargo.

Surfacing

Early in 1984, an African newspaper provided one of our embassies with a copy of this letter. The embassy queried the Defense Mapping Agency, which responded that the letter was a fake and illustrated various discrepancies. The letter was never published and thus represents something of a success story, illustrating how US efforts to inform journalists about active measures have complicated the uncritical publication of forgeries.
L/G: J. R. Dutton  
South African Defense Force (SADF)  
Defense Headquarters  
Potgieter St.  
0001 Pretoria, South Africa

Dear Sirs:

We are able to process your order as requested; we have several maps and charts of Angola, Zambiq, and Mozambique made by satellites.

Before sending the required maps and charts, your request must be concretized; please, inform us about the exact scale.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

RICHARD D. ALRED  
Chief  
Requisition Processing Division
IV. The Olympic Hate Letters

Description

The leaflets purport to be the product of the Ku Klux Klan and are designed to discourage Asian and African athletes from participation in the Los Angeles Olympics, threatening them with bodily harm. One version, sent to 10 African countries, was directed against blacks only. Another version, sent to Asian nations, was directed against blacks and “yellows.” The leaflets are not written in standard American English and contain errors typical of a Slavic-language speaker in use of the definite article. The vocabulary seems stilted and a bit 19th century (e.g., the word “curs”). Even the Ku Klux Klan’s name was used incorrectly. The leaflets seem to have been something of a rush job. (Following Western media refutations, TASS replayed the fakes with corrected usage of the Ku Klux Klan name.)

Purpose

The leaflets were part of an effort to tarnish the Los Angeles Olympics and bolster support for a boycott of the games. The theme is closely related to the Soviets’ justification for their own nonparticipation in the games—that the United States was incapable of guaranteeing the security of Soviet athletes.

Surfacing

Shortly after the Soviet Union announced its boycott of the 1984 Olympics, the leaflets were mailed out in unmarked envelopes to 20 national Olympic committees from US post offices in Virginia and Maryland, both within a 30-minute drive of Washington. Attorney General William French Smith announced that the letters were KGB forgeries and part of a major Soviet disinformation effort. The US denial of the letters authenticity was credible. Not one recipient Olympic committee withdrew its team from the games.
AFRICAN MONKEYS!

A GRAND WELCOME AWAIT YOU IN LOS ANGELES!

WE HAVE BEEN TRAINING FOR THE GAMES BY SHOOTING AT BLACK MOVING TARGETS. IN LOS ANGELES OUR OWN OLYMPIC FLAMES ARE READY TO INCINERATE YOU. THE HIGHEST AWARD FOR A TRUE AMERICAN PATRIOT WOULD BE THE LYNCHING OF AN AFRICAN MONKEY.

BLACKS, WELCOME TO THE LOS ANGELES OLYMPICS!

WE'LL GIVE YOU A RECEPTION THAT YOU'LL NEVER FORGET!
Olympic Games for Humans, Not Apes!

Since ancient times the Olympic games have demonstrated the strength and dexterity of the superior race - the white race. In kindling the Olympic flame and glorifying the might of the white man, the ancient Greeks in their wildest dreams could not imagine their descendants competing at Olympics with black and yellow apes.

We shall put an end to this. The blacks and yellow will not be permitted to defile America's stadiums. We have forced the Soviets out of the Olympics. We shall not permit the apes to be present either!

If your curs dare to come to the summer Olympics in America, they will be shot or hanged.

All Olympic gold medals to the whites only!

Death to the blacks and coloreds!
V. The Jorgenson Letter

Description

This letter, allegedly signed by Danish General K. Jorgenson, informs Copenhagen area residents that their homes are going to be requisitioned by US troops participating in September 1983 NATO exercises. The Danish is considered to be imperfect, according to linguistic analysts. Interestingly, the letter refers to USCINCEUR Plan 100-1, a wellknown fake US document that has surfaced many times since it first appeared in 1967.12

Purpose

The letter was designed to create hostility among Danes toward NATO and the United States.

Surfacing

The letter was sent to elderly and handicapped citizens in the Copenhagen area. The forgery was exposed in the Danish press which implicated a communist youth group as being responsible for distribution of the letter.
Til beboere!

I anledning af den igangværende Amlef-Express øvelse skal der herved meddeles, at forsvarstid lige nu er påbegyndt, og derfor bliver nogle af de områder, som tidligere har været frie for trusler i forbindelse med øvelsen, nu foreskrevet til beboerens tilstedeværelse.

1. US-Stridskrafterne har nemlig tildelt en sådan område og enhed, at de kan udføre nogle øvelser, der vil være vigtige for de nærmeste år.

2. For at sikre, at beboerne får mulighed for at vurdere de nogle såvel som endtiden vigtige aspekter, har der været tildelt nogle områder, hvor beboerne kan tjene som en del af øvelsen.

Dette brev er skrevet for at fortælle beboere om, hvad der sker i øvelsen og at deres tilstedeværelse er vigtig forøvelsen.

Med venlig hilsen

K. Jørgensen
Forværskommanderet
Soviet Active Measures: Forged Letter

Informal translation of letter as published in Copenhagen daily Politiken, September 8, 1983:

To the Residents:

On the occasion of the current Ample Express Exercise, you are informed that the Defense deems it necessary to implement sections B and K of USCINCEUR Plan 100-1:

B - U.S. Forces are entitled to occupy any area and any installation which are considered necessary by the Supreme Commander for completing the unit's tasks and to provide the necessary safety for the unit.

K - U.S. Forces can carry out the military operations which are necessary.

To make the Exercise realistic and to establish an ideal cooperation between the population and foreign troops, we find it necessary to requisition your living quarters for a short time.

You will be informed later about the time when we expect to arrive, and you will also get further details about how your quartering is to be organized.

The Defense Department points out that you cannot expect to have your home at your disposal during the short confiscation, and it will therefore be expedient if you pack what is needed in a small bag in advance. Any damage to your living-quarters will be paid in full. Further information can be obtained from the above-mentioned address.

With kind regards,

R. Jorgensen
Chief of Defense
VI. The Schweitzer Letter

Description

This letter is allegedly a communication to Chilean President Pinochet from Interamerican Defense Board president, US Army Lt. Gen. Robert Schweitzer. It describes a purported movement of Chilean troops to El Salvador and Honduras. The document appears on genuine IADB letterhead and closely adheres to IADB style. The Spanish is idiomatic and believed to be the work of a native speaker.

Purpose

The letter aims to link Chile with the counterinsurgency in El Salvador and implies a close level of US-Chilean military cooperation that does not exist in fact.

Surfacing

The document surfaced in late 1984 in Rome where it appeared on a journalist’s desk. The journalist checked with Embassy Rome, which declared the piece to be a forgery. Although the journalist did not publish the letter, it later appeared in an Italian news service story originating in Mexico. When that news service was advised of the forgery, it investigated. It determined that an inexperienced local employee in Mexico had run the story without checking with the US Embassy. He had obtained the document from a representative of the Cuban/Nicaraguan-supported insurgent movement of Guatemala.

When the initial anonymous attempt at surfacing the forgery failed, the perpetrators were forced to use a human source, thus exposing their hand. The forgery was later replayed throughout the world, with emphasis particularly in the Western Hemisphere but also in European countries. The IADB and the OAS disavowed the letter, but considerable damage probably was done, given the wide press attention the letter received.
61

C-XX 8 (NOTE: FIRST TWO NUMBERS NOT LEGIBLE)

INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD
2500 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20441

YOUR EXCELLENCY
AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE
CAP. GRAL. OF THE ARMY
PALACIO DE LA MONEDA
SANTIAGO

ESTIMATED MR. PRESIDENT:

I am happy to inform your excellency that the delivery to Chile of the new armament requested will be decided very shortly. It has pleased me to know, via Mr. Motley, that you have shown a strong interest in broadening our cooperation in the military area. We esteem your profound understanding of the peculiarities of the new international situation and the initiatives of President Reagan, which aim at strengthening our common defensive capacity.

I would like to assure your excellency that you will continue to have our decided support in your efforts to strengthen liberty and democracy in Chile.

With respect to our joint actions in Central America, I would like to suggest to you that it would be convenient that the first Chilean units be transferred to El Salvador and Honduras by March. Our representatives in said countries will receive instructions within two weeks. Together with your representative we will deal with the other problems of our cooperation in one of the next meetings of the JID.

With the greatest oath of my highest consideration and personal esteem towards your excellency, you are greeted very attentively by

(SIGNATURE: ROBERT L. SCHWIEZTER)
ROBERT L. SCHWIEZTER
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U.S. ARMY
PRESIDENT
Su Excelencia
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
Presidente de la República de Chile
Cap. Gral. del Ejército
Palacio de la Moneda
Santiago

Estimado Sr. Presidente:

Me complace informar a Su Excelencia que la entrega a Chile del nuevo armamento solicitado será decidida en el más corto plazo. Me ha causado agrado el saber, a través del Sr. Mottley, que usted ha mostrado vivo interés por ampliar nuestra cooperación en el terreno militar. Estimamos su profunda comprensión de las particularidades de la nueva situación internacional y de las iniciativas del presidente Reagan, encuadradas a fortalecer nuestra capacidad defensiva común.

Quisiera asegurar a Su Excelencia que seguirá usted contando con nuestro decidido apoyo en sus esfuerzos por fortalecer la libertad y la democracia en Chile.

Con respecto a nuestras acciones conjuntas en América Central, quisiera sugerirle la conveniencia de que las primeras unidades chilenas sean trasladadas a El Salvador y Honduras ya en marzo. Nuestros representantes en dichos países recibirán instrucciones dentro de dos semanas. Junto con su representante trataremos los demás problemas de nuestra cooperación en una de las próximas reuniones de la JID.

Con los mejores testimonios de mi más alta consideración y estima personal hacia Su Excelencia, saluda a usted

Muy atentamente,

Roberto L. Schweitzer
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Presidente
VII. The Tyner Letter

Description

A letter allegedly from Walter Reed physician C. F. Tyner to a high-ranking Defense Department official describes the upcoming visit to the United States of a team of medical experts from the South African military. The team would study the effects of certain drugs that could be used in military applications, i.e. torture, interrogations, crowd control. The inconsistencies in the forgery included spelling errors and the facts that Dr. Tyner would not be reporting directly to Dr. Borsting on such a matter and that Dr. Borsting’s title is not correct.

Purpose

The letter is another attempt to imply close military links between the US military and the South African Defense Force and damage the standing of the United States among African nations. The letter also alleges US use of drugs for military purposes, an allegation that relates to previously expressed charges of chemical warfare.

Surfacing

The letter appeared in the media of several African countries in the latter part of 1985, linked to bizarre charges of alleged South African-US-Israeli research into an ethnic bomb that would affect only nonwhites. A copy of this letter was also sent to a prominent black legislator who alerted the Defense Department to its content.

The Soviet Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda reported the story on December 27, 1985, attributing it to a Malagasy newspaper. After quoting the forged letter, the Soviet publication referred to “the racists and their transatlantic patrons,”
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WALTER REED ARMY INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH
WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20312

IN REPLY REFER TO: SGRD-UWI

UNCLASSIFIED

Dr. Jack R. Borsting
Assoc. Secretary of Defense, Comptroller
Department of Defense
Pentagon, Rm 3E922
Washington DC 20310

26 March 1982

Dear Dr. Borsting:

The Division of Neuropsychiatry at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research will be pleased to co-sponsor a group of medical experts from the South African Defence Force for the study of the effectiveness of tranquilizers and neuroleptics in special conditions.

I cannot, unfortunately, make a commitment at this time for the salary of more than four researchers, as we have recently had a 25% budget reduction. I hope, however, that some of these funds will be restored at a later date, in which case we can review the matter.

Yours sincerely,

C.F. Tyner
C.F. Tyner, MD
Director
Division of Neuropsychiatry
VIII. AIDS in Jamaica Pamphlet

Description

During the spring of 1985, a pamphlet titled Jamaica: Attention AIDS, appeared in several international airports and was distributed in Kingston, Jamaica. It claimed to be from the German section of Moral Majority which does not exist. It warns travelers to Jamaica and Haiti of the dangers of AIDS. Jamaica in fact had no AIDS problem. The tract is written in poor, normative French.

Purpose

The document is designed to discourage travel to Jamaica, specifically to the Western-supported International Conference of Democratic Youth occurring in Kingston at that time. The forgery coincided with a Soviet propaganda campaign against the Jamaica Youth Festival, which the Soviets saw as a rival to the Moscow Youth Festival held the same year.

Surfacing

The pamphlet was distributed at European airports, particularly to youths who appeared that they might be delegates to the aforementioned conference.
Halte à la propagation du SIDA !

C'est à la l'ordre du jour. Ce fléau nouveau de l'humanité, connu sous le sigle SIDA (syndrome immuno-déficient acquis) a fait aux États-Unis plus de 3 500 mille morts et leur nombre croît chaque jour de manière terrible. Les cas du SIDA ont été enregistrés dans 33 pays du monde entier. Hélas, ce ne sont pas seulement les homosexuels, qui sont frappés par cette maladie, parmi les victimes il y a des gens intégrés et même des nouveau-nés.

Les malades deviennent des proscrits de la société, la comparaison avec les malheureux, contaminés par la lèpre ou la peste au Moyen-Age, n’étant pas exagérée. D’après les recherches scientifiques, le SIDA est une maladie contagieuse d’origine virale de provenance des États-Unis, de la Jamaïque et de l’île de Haïti. Les voies de transmission du SIDA sont encore discutées parmi les spécialistes. Il est quand-même sûr que les contacts sexuels ne représentent pas le moment dangereux exclusif. Il se peut que des années passent avant que la maladie ne frappe et le porteur du virus sans malaise peut contaminer des milliers de gens, la maladie se répand comme une avalanche.

Aujourd'hui, faute de quarantaine, la seule possibilité de se protéger c’est d’éviter les pays d’origine du SIDA, c’est à dire notamment la Jamaïque et l’île de Haïti et d’observer scrupuleusement la code moral général. De votre part appelez aux gouvernements, institutions scientifiques et églises qu’ils mettent à la disposition des moyens suffisants pour lutter contre l’épidémie en question!

La majorité morale
section allemande
IX. The USIA Questionnaire

Description

This document purports to be a questionnaire sent by USIA to citizens of foreign countries. It asks a wide variety of highly personal and sensitive questions regarding finances, political ideology, organizational memberships, political opinions, and family. The English is excellent; it is a very clever fake.

Purpose

We believe that the perpetrators hoped that the recipients of this questionnaire, which was mailed with a covering note on USIA stationery, would take considerable umbrage and would denounce the United States for asking these types of questions and seeking to gather large amounts of intelligence related data.

Surfacing

The questionnaire was mailed out in several Southeast Asian countries in 1984, generally to intellectuals or journalists, many of whom were considered to be liberal in their political ideology. The State Department became aware of the questionnaire when some respondents returned completed versions to various US embassies. Journalists and governments were alerted, and the anticipated press stories never occurred.
The following questionnaire is part of a study of tendencies which are now developing in the ASEAN countries. It is being done under the auspices of the United States Information Agency and is meant to improve relations between the United States and ASEAN. This process depends considerably on people whose role in policy-making is decisive.

The study is interested in your background, environment, work and opinions. We would like to know about you personally, believed to be an individual who has had sufficient life and social experience to provide the answers to the questionnaire. Therefore, for the success of this study it is vitally important that every individual who receives a questionnaire, fills it in personally and returns it.

All of your answers will be confidential. None except the research staff associated with the study will have access to your answers.

Only your consideration and cooperation make this type of research possible.

Thank you very much.
Are there, in your opinion, any anti-U.S. feelings in your country?  ____ Yes  ____ No

If yes, do you consider them to be:

1.  ____ strong
2.  ____ moderate
3.  ____ weak

C-15. Do you prefer the guarantee of human rights or insuring your well-being?  ____________________________

C-16. Does your country need United States military assistance?  ____ Yes  ____ No

If yes, which kind?  ____________________________

C-17. Do you think your country should take part in creating the special armed forces within ASEAN to suppress rebellions and international terrorism?  ____ Yes  ____ No

C-18. Do you support an unofficial military alliance of the ASEAN countries?  ____ Yes  ____ No

C-19. Do you agree with certain ASEAN politicians who advocate military cooperation on a free-will bilateral basis?  ____ Yes  ____ No

If no, which solution in the military field do you think would be acceptable to the ASEAN countries?  ____________________________

C-20. Do you think the ASEAN countries should set up a military-political alliance similar to ANZUS?  ____ Yes  ____ No

If no, do you consider it better for them to join a broader military-political organization? Please define which one.

C-21. Do you agree that the ASEAN countries had better abandon the domestic production of arms and buy modern armaments from the United States?  ____ Yes  ____ No

C-22. Are there any obstacles or barriers in trade relations of your country with the United States?  ____ Yes  ____ No

If yes, please specify.  ____________________________
X. The General Skantze Letter

Description

This letter purports to be from US Air Force General Lawrence Skantze to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger; it suggests that the United States needs bases in Turkish-held northern Cyprus to host US soldiers and their families when they are evacuated from Western Europe in the event of a nuclear war in Europe. The letter, which is totally false, refers to “the U.S. President’s strategic schemes in Europe.”

The letter is written in a style that betrays its writer as a normative English speaker.

Purpose

To accuse the United States of planning a limited nuclear war in Europe and to cause anti-American feelings among the Greek Cypriots by claiming that the United States does not have an evenhanded policy regarding Cyprus.

Surfacing

The letter was sent to the Greek Cypriot newspaper Simerini and published November 28, 1985. To lend credence, it was sent with a cover letter purportedly signed by British M. P. Sir Frederic Bennett, a strong supporter of the Atlantic Alliance. This letter too was a forgery, but it served to authenticate the original forgery. Sir Frederic exposed the forged letter attributed to him. On January 28, 1986, the London Daily Telegraph reported this case and attributed the forgery to the KGB. It also reported that the Cypriot newspaper that had carried the forgery now admitted that they had been duped.
Για την εκκένωση της Ευρώπης
προορίζεται η Κύπρος;

ΣΕ ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΗ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΑΚΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ

ΜΙΑ ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ
ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΩΔΗΣ

Νέοι Αμερικανικοί στρατιωτικοί, των αεροπορικών των και άλλων Αμερικανικών πολιτικών, σε υπνοδοτική πυρηνική πόλεμο στην Ευρώπη. Οι αντιπόλεμη στρατηγικές από αυτή την άποψη έχουν την ιστορία τα 1963 και 1984.

Οι βόμβες στη Βόρεια Κύπρος δεν έχουν ούτε οριστικά διακυβεύ

Η αναφορά στο μυστήριο των συμμαχικών μας στην εναλλακτική διάλεκτη είναι ακόμη και μια σημαντική ενότητα. Τα νέα νεκρά στην Ευρώπη και το Νότιο Κύπρο, υποδεικνύουν την ανεξεταστική χρήση των πυρηνικών αρμοδιοτήτων της Ευρώπης.

Συμβουλές και προβλέψεις της Συμβουλίου Αυστριακής, Λιβερικής Αντιπολιτείας και του Νέου Αμερικανικού Στρατηγού.
XI. The Kirkpatrick Speech

Description

This forged USIA cable purported to report the text of a speech presented by US Ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick to the February 1982 American Conservative Political Action Conference. Although the forgery contained numerous items that were designed to anger a nonaligned audience, such as suggestions that the United States planned to use food aid as a weapon and was planning to destabilize several Third World regimes, the point that attracted most attention in India was the allegation that the United States supported Indian separatist movements and favored the “Balkanization” of that country. The speech also included unflattering remarks about Indira Gandhi’s government. Ambassador Kirkpatrick never made the speech attributed to her.

Purpose

The forgery was part of a series of active measures aimed at Ambassador Kirkpatrick and was intended to damage US-Indian relations. We believe that this highly sophisticated disinformation effort was also designed to influence representatives attending the March 1983 meeting of nonaligned nations in New Delhi.

Surfacing

The forgery first surfaced in the January 25, 26, and 28, 1983, issues of the New Delhi newspaper Patriot, which has carried many previous items of Soviet disinformation. It was repeated in the February 6, 1983, issue of Link, a leftwing weekly. Its surfacing in January was probably premature and allowed the US Embassy in New Delhi to expose is false both the document and its themes A number of leading Indian newspapers exposed the document as “Soviet disinformation.” Nevertheless, the forgery and the “Balkanization of India” theme have frequently reappeared in Soviet and bloc propaganda, as well in noncommunist publications unaware of the document’s exposure.
OPERATION BALKANIZATION

AMERICAN DESIGNS ON INDIA

Patriot's revelations about the Master Plan of the CIA as spelled out by the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Mrs. Jean Kirkpatrick, has created indignation in the patriotic forces in the country. The American Centre in India issued a contradiction, quoting Mrs. Kirkpatrick, that this disclosure was nothing but "pure and malicious disinformation, a total fabrication." Patriot's Editor came out with a rejoinder and gave more facts to substantiate the existence of this document.

Since then a large number of readers of Patriot and Link have been urging us that the full text of this document should be published. We are therefore publishing the full text of this document along with the photos of the covering letter.

A careful study of the document makes it clear that the "Operation Balkanization of India" has been conceived as a part of Washington's new geo-political strategy for the developing countries to achieve the objective of establishing its "political and military dominance over key strategic areas" because these countries are "driving for fuel control of their natural resources" and because a "drastic radicalization of the non-aligned movement" is taking place. Apart from this there is an attempt on the part of the West to establish a "permanent American military presence in such areas." It is also seeking to establish a "dominant influence in the regions of the Third World where there are governments which pursue an open or concealed anti-American policy". In this connection countries like Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Iran, Libya, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique as well as Algeria and India are the special targets of attack of the new American policy. It is in this context that India figures prominently in this document.

The document specifically mentions that "the Gandhi regime pursues an anti-American policy on a number of issues" and pointedly mentions that India's "weakness lies in its many unresolved domestic and international problems" and that "there is a need for growth of separatist movements to the extent that there is a possibility of balkanization of India, which would destroy its influence in the Third World and elsewhere". But it does not leave it at that. In unmistakable terms, it says that "even if India does not succumb to balkanization, the non-Communist opposition to Indira Gandhi might consolidate its ranks and create an increasing possibility for the emergence of a realistic alternative government".

The document states more than what it reveals because the document itself mentions that "the United States could watch the erosion of the Nehru-Gandhi tradition, almost irrespective of the form it takes with some complacency".

It is for the patriotic forces of India to analyze the real significance of this American Plan, fully comprehend what Washington has in mind for our great nation and draw appropriate lessons.

Full Text of the Kirkpatrick Plan

Americans appreciate the opportunity to discuss an issue which is common to all nations in this administration - our policy toward the United States. A parallel interest of present concern is the United States. A parallel interest of present concern is henceforth referred to as the United States.

Patriot's Editor

February 1, 1982

27 Link
stability a remodelling of the entire system of world trade relations. Detente has also triggered interest in economic cartels and new political groupings which damage the world far more seriously than the totalitarian systems. The Third World has been siding with the Communist bloc in the United Nations, turning the organization into a forum for anti-American propaganda leading to resolutions damaging to American interests. This tendency has been increasing with every passing year. It harms the image of the United States in the Third World and has found reflection, among other things, in drastic radicalization of the non-aligned movement. We must counter this development by rejecting detente in favour of tougher diplomatic action, economic measures and an increased American presence in the Third World.

In emphasising this call for more vigorous policies, I am not suggesting that the picture is wholly black. The Third World is not a cohesive international structure or a single entity. It is divided in several ways by such factors as different levels of development, disparities of wealth, ideological cleavages and personal rivalries. These offer us promising opportunities for a new hard look at our foreign policy and a new vision of separating the sheep from the goats and taking tougher and firmer unilaterals decisions—appropriate to each category. While holding to our own principles for ourselves, it would be absurd to apply them too rigidly to most of the Third World countries whose people have no experience of their practical application and little conception of their meaning.

In the struggle for the Third World, the United States must be capable of decisive action in many areas to which I now propose to draw your attention.

We must do everything to limit Soviet influence in the Third World.

We must establish political and military dominance over key strategic zones, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, South Africa, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans including the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, and over regions producing essential raw materials. A multiplicity of ends must be used for this purpose, including special operations to seize the sources of essential raw materials in the event of internal or external pressures threatening suspension of their production or delivery. A corollary of this is a permanent American military presence in such areas.

We must also seek a dominant influence in regions of the Third World where there are governments which pursue an open or concealed anti-American policy. To indicate the vast scope of this problem, I may give as example Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Iran, Libya, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, as well as Algeria, India and Madagascar. These are nations to be isolated, restrained or set against one another. While we should not flinch from the threat or even the use of force in extreme cases, a necessary first step is the fostering of divisions in the Third World and the prevention of a united front of developing countries hostile to the interests of the United States. To this end, a method which should be used more consistently than in the past is the enlistment of help from friendly countries which play a major role in local influence, such as Egypt, South Africa, Zaire, Morocco, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the ASEAN nations. In parallel, we must oppose any uncoordinated moves by our allies in respect to the producers of raw materials if these moves undermine our positions. I do not have to tell you that our allies need us more than we need them.

Social development in the countries of the Third World must be protected from the corrupting influence of Marxist ideology and other political or religious doctrines detrimental to the ideals of the free world. It should be instrumental in the most developed essential groups in these countries, as well as on the world public, that all trends in the development of society in the Third World which reject our historical, political and economic experience are clearly linked with organised international terrorism and, more specifically, with the growing threat of Soviet domination.

We must ensure a reliable supply of oil and other raw materials and the unimpeded export of our own goods. These relations cannot be based on the previously proclaimed principle of mutual dependence because this principle, or rather catchword, distorts the real corruption of forces and exaggerates the importance of the countries of the Third World, prompting them to make foolishly unrealistic demands which neither the United States nor any other industrial nation can meet. We must ac-

Lia

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FEBRUARY 5, 1953

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World. But adversely affected regimes should seek compensation by encouraging a greater influx of private capital into their economies which would benefit them more in the long run. Meanwhile American businessmen would contribute more actively to the implementation of US foreign policy while making substantial profits as a solid contribution to the US balance of payments. The administration is prepared to make vigorous efforts to support a major export drive in Third World markets hitherto.

I have spoken mainly of economic matters. I now turn to military aid. It is the administration's view that more, not less, emphasis should be laid on military assistance—and not merely assistance limited to the supply of equipment. It should harness the recipients more firmly to the strategic plans of the United States by means of standardized equipment and training, and by defence agreements and joint maneuvers to demonstrate our military capability and global reach. Existing limitations on arms deliveries to the Third World should be lifted. Careful control must be enforced to ensure that these arms do not fall into the hands of the Communist Bloc or of such terrorist organizations as the Farabundo Marti Front in El Salvador, the ANC in South Africa or SWAPO in Namibia. Countries shown to have transferred American arms without due authorization must be severely sanctioned. The sale of arms must be a major component of our foreign policy strategy. Its importance will steadily increase together with the role of special operations and the procurement of intelligence. We should also keep in mind that both Moscow and our Western allies are competing for the arms markets of the Third World, and it is, if excessive restrictions should not inhibit the aggressive salesmanship of American companies. The natural scruples of a free society should be tempered by the recognition that we live in a world as it is, not in one we would like it to be.

That concludes my statement of general considerations. I will now deal with regional issues, beginning with our nearest neighbours in Latin America.

This region has always been of extreme importance to the security of the United States, a truth manifested long ago in the Monroe Doctrine. It is of vital necessity to retain our traditional influence there so as to

The first page of Jean Kirkpatrick's "statement" sent to "all important posts" in March 1982.

FEBRUARY 6, 1983
ensure our access to its raw materials and their free and undisturbed transport to the United States.

The main problem for the United States in this region today is to reinforce the commitment of OAS member states to the Rio Treaty and to broaden its practical application so that any violation of stability in Central or South America would provide sufficient grounds for the automatic implementation of the mechanism calling for mutual assistance.

The activities of the Castro regime in Cuba have aroused serious concern for the stability of the continent. We cannot tolerate the continuation of activities which could lead to the emergence of other hostile regimes in close proximity to the borders of the United States. A blockade of Cuba is in force, and we are actively pursuing a policy of restricting her influence in the surrounding countries. Several options are under consideration for tightening the diplomatic, economic, psychological and military pressures on the Cuban regime. In addition, there is a special plan, conceived within the framework of controlling terrorism, which will show our resolve to use all available means to counter any interference in the region.

We are following closely the alarming events in El Salvador which have developed as a result of the terrorist activity of rebel elements stimulated and fostered from outside the country. To help stabilize the situation we are stepping up all round assistance to the lawful government. Steps are also being taken to prompt other countries in the region to share responsibility for the future of El Salvador. We have prepared respective measures in respect of Nicaragua, where, in the pre-Cuban regime, being stabilized which could spread its influence to El Salvador and beyond. We shall continue to exert political, economic and, if necessary, other forms of influence on the Mexican government in order to inject some measure of consistency into its foreign policy. It is a leading power in the area and its frequent and inexcusable violations in the past have positively encouraged unfavourable developments.

The Pentagon is deepening the task of ensuring strategic coordination between our Pacific and Atlantic fleets. The significance of the Panama Canal is thereby enhanced and it is imperative for us to guarantee the United States unimpeded use of the waterway. Our strategic interests also call for a permanent US military presence in the Panama Canal Zone, Guantnamo and other strategic locations in the Caribbean. In this connection, we have a special interest in uniting the help of our friends in the Third World to block the adoption by the UN, the non-aligned movement and other international organizations of any resolutions on Central America which could embarrass the United States.

Acting on the advice of the Secretary of State who is personally following developments in the Caribbean Basin, President Reagan has set up an inner operations group, consisting of senior State Department and Pentagon officials and fully empowered to take urgent action in the event of a deterioration of the situation.

We attach great significance to our ongoing efforts to create a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation to match the NATO system in the north. If we succeed in our enterprise, we would expect the formation of such an alliance to play a major part in strengthening our positions in Latin America and Southern Africa. The main difficulties to be overcome arise from the uncertain attitudes of Brazil and Argentina toward the issues of the traditional rivalry between the two countries. As for the government in Pretoria, it has expressed its unsatisfactory approval for the project.

And now for one of the thorniest of the world's problems — the situation in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. Here we have an extremely sensitive and unstable zone, a stage of fierce rivalry for political and military influence, and guaranteed access to essential raw materials, major lines of oil and communications. As we pass through this area as well as the oil routes via the Mediterranean and round the Cape, it is also the home of strategically pursued rivalries of almost incomprehensible variety and complexity offering ideal opportunities for the fomenting of mischief.

American policy in this vortex is based on a balanced strategy encompassing the fact that the process of establishing peace and the process of cooperation in the sphere of security supplement each other. That is why we attach such great importance to the maximum possible build-up of our military presence in the region and in military agreements with friendly regimes. To this end, we envisage the strengthening of the political and military positions of Israel, which is our closest ally and a catalyst for dissent within the region hostile to Jerusalem. This dictates the maintenance of Israel's permanent military superiority over its local enemies. We continue to support the view that the participation of the PLO in any Middle Eastern settlement can be possible only if it reverts its policies, abandons its terrorist tactics and unequivocally acknowledges Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders. At the same time, we should not lose sight of the fact that we can strengthen and develop our relations with nations which, like Egypt, are prepared to help us resolve existing and potential conflicts in a manner we are able to accept. In this connection we attach special significance to our relations with Saudi Arabia, Oman and the smaller States of the Gulf and the Red Sea. We believe that they fear the spread of Soviet influence, the dangerous situation of Iran and the erratic and mischievous policies of the Libyan leader, and that they are therefore ready for closer military cooperation with the United States. We are pursuing similar aims in Jordan and have not yet given up all hope of Iraq...

Our long-term strategy envisages the regeneration of a majority of the Arab countries toward greater reliance on the United States in the face of threats, communal expansion in the Gulf. Our current policy should be directed toward the creation of conditions which would prompt Arab nations to seek our support as the most reliable guarantee of the stability of existing regimes. We intend to step up our role of mediator in Lebanon to increase American influence there and reduce that of Moscow's Arab allies. At the same time, we will strengthen the power of containment with respect to such countries as Syria, Libya and South Yemen by means of diplomatic, economic and military pressures.

The State department and the Pentagon are cooperating closely, under presidential directive, to neutralize the efforts of certain Asian and African governments to achieve the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. This would restrict our military presence not only in the Indian Ocean but also in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and a number of African countries as well. It would create serious difficulties for our rapid deployment force, the essence of which is to take immediate action in the event of an oil embargo, rebellions or revolutions in the oil producing nations, or an outbreak of local con-
...most states with which could effect oil deliveries to the United States and its allies. For these reasons, the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean is out of the question. On the contrary, we must strengthen our forces in the area.

At this point, I would like to emphasize that the administration's efforts to weaken the Soviet Union must be coordinated with the United States' efforts to limit our military presence in the Indian Ocean to a mere token force. A token force might invite the very aggression which was designed to deter and then be unable to repel it. Our military presence in the Indian Ocean must not only be substantial in itself, but capable of rapid reinforcement. We are not playing war games in this vital area.

Now, the conflict between Iran and Iraq is a special case; we have been careful not to intervene directly in the war since it serves to weaken the regimes of Tehran and Baghdad, both hostile to the United States, and helps our efforts to activate friendly democratic forces which might emerge after prolonged bloodletting. Yet the administration is aware that the defeat of the Hussein regime could have a negative impact on the United States, for we have not opposed the grant of aid to Iraq from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan. As for Iran, we are following developments closely since the further spread of Shiite terrorism and subversion would be a recipe for chaos which would endanger the political, economic and military interests of the United States throughout the region. I should mention here that we must also keep in view the attempts of some of our allies in France, for instance, to exploit Middle Eastern tensions to promote their selfish national interests. This could strengthen the oil-producing countries and reduce the leading role of Israel. It could seriously undermine our strategy throughout the Middle East. The Afghan crisis and Moscow's military intervention led us to launch a major diplomatic and propaganda campaign in the Third World to agitate relations between the Soviets and the Islamic nations. These campaigns had a powerful impact on such countries as Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Greece, to mention but a few. This led to an increase in domestic and anti-American trends in the Muslim world, as was shown dramatically at the Islamic conference of January and May, 1981. Our relations with Pakistan have taken a particularly favourable...
Africa, which has recently become yet another arena of bitter struggle against Communism for influence and access to raw materials. It is a struggle which the United States cannot afford to lose. We must be guided, by hard facts, not by abstractions, by sentiment. The main goal of this administration in Africa is to ensure the stability of the South African regime and to terminate its racial isolation. Yet the United States must also retain, and when possible improve, its relations with the countries of black Africa. These objectives are difficult to reconcile with one another. But there is some promise in the sustained attempt to associate important nations such as Nigeria and Zaire, together with the front-line states, with peaceful reforms to solve the problems of separate development in South Africa. We have no quarrel with separate development as such. Only with the apparent unfairness of its implementation. We are prepared to help Pretoria in mitigating that unfairness. As President Reagan long ago reminded us, the South African whites stood beside us through two world wars and deserve better from us than a perpetual cold shoulder. We must firmly reject the application of sanctions against South Africa. Its economy is far too closely intertwined with that of the United States and its allies to permit such irresponsible action. Nor should we try to restrain its efforts to build up a strong defence capability, since we want the South Africans to participate in SADIC and play a leading role in the defence of the oil routes round the Cape. These considerations transcend the limits of Africa and must be cornerstone of our policy in the continent.

Our trade with black Africa is important and must be promoted with energy, but not at the cost of weakening the economy or defence potential of South Africa. The stand of black African countries on other international issues must also be given due weight. Of most immediate interest is their attitude to our determination to exclude the Marxist SWAPO from any say in the future of Namibia. We will also be warned by the extent to which they have supported or resisted the policies of the Soviet Union and its surrogates. The administration is taking steps, including the reinforcement of US influence in their neighbourhood, to curb African countries which pursue extremist policies and encourage terrorism. In this connection I may mention Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Algeria and Benin, among others. President Reagan has personally ordered effective measures to undermine the dictatorial Libyan regime and to dissuade the Cuban presence in Africa. I need hardly tell you that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia has a serious obstacle to the restoration of a moderating Western influence in countries which have experienced radical, social and political upheavals, with generally disastrous results. We must spare no effort to remove the Cuban factor from the African continent even if it means entailing the resources of Pretoria.

We attach particular significance to those parts of East Africa which border directly on the Middle East. Our policy is to encourage military cooperation with Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. This should include a stronger military presence and an unimpeded right to the use of air and sea bases. More active encouragement in the form of material aid should be extended to the separatist movements of Ethiopia in Eritrea, Tigre and Ogaden. The governments of Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Somalia are already perusing us in that direction. Elsewhere in Africa, our traditionally friendly relations with nations such as Zaire, Morocco and Tunisia should be developed in the shape of stronger political, economic and military cooperation, while the strategic importance of the African island states, Madagascar, the Seychelles and Mauritius, is moderate Government in the islands. You are all well aware that the activities of the OAU are sometimes detrimental to US interests, we propose to strengthen the moderate forces within the organisation, those which are prepared to compromise on major African and other international problems. The possibilities of the OAU have been generally neglected by previous administrations. We intend to remedy that error of omission, and hope confidently that we shall soon see progress in consonance with our long-term interests.

In conclusion, I will warn on certain special supporting measures to secure our vital interests in the world over and to restore our somewhat diminished prestige. As a result of the weakness of the Carter administration, we did not support the Shah of Iran. Although we should have done everything in our power to do so. Now we are paying the price. If we had not abandoned our adversary, Cuba would not have penetrated Nicaragua. There are other examples to demonstrate that things seem to have been a sort of parable of the American involvement. With the advent of the new administration, our mental attitudes must be completely changed. The use of force has always been part of the historical process and, apart from nuclear war, we need not fear it. American interests can be defended only by decisive action. If we are convinced that the measures we take are to our advantage, then we must persist to the end, without heeding the objections of our European allies, still less of the Third World.

Several government agencies, working in close cooperation with the State Department, under the direction of the President, contribute to the effective implementation of our strategy and policy in the Third World.

Thus, the CIA has been granted wider powers. Upgrading of the CIA is fully justified by the current international situation which reflects a menacing confrontation with the Communist bloc. Wholesale criticism of the agency encouraged by the former administration was unfair.

Well considered and contrary to the national interest, the President deems it necessary to restore confidence in the intelligence community. He recommends a daring and active approach to the procurement of intelligence and the mounting of special operations, especially in the Third World.

Great importance is attached to vigorous propaganda in support of our Third World policy, we must counter the unrelenting onslaught of Communist propaganda which seeks to influence public opinion in the poorer countries and incite them to hatred of the United States and the West in general. This calls for the reorganisation of the international communication agency and the peace corps with a view to increasing their effectiveness in propagating the American way of life throughout the world. The outcome of the battle for the minds of the present and potential leaders of developing countries is of major importance for the success of our policies. The nations of the Third World must be made to see the United States as the guarantor of their security in the face of Communist expansion as the only friend who can give them effective aid and support.
Footnotes

7Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive). Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. 96th Congress,
8Soviet Active Measures, Special Report No. 110. September, 1983,
US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington,
D.C., September 1983, p. 6.
9Soviet Active Measures: An Update, Special Report No. 101. US
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.,
July 1982, p. 3.
10Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive). For information
on the Swanepoel letter and the Northrop letter, see Soviet Active
Measures, Special Report No. 110, p. 5.
11Also see the Aviation Personnel letter in Soviet Active Measures:
Focus on Forgeries,” Foreign Affairs Note, US Department of State,
Washington, D.C., April 1983, Figure 6. It uses the phrase
“competent bodies,” a Russian euphemism for security services
which has no similar meaning in American English.
12Soviet Active Measures. Hearings before the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives. 97th
One of the most threatening and difficult-to-identify Soviet active measures is the use of agents of influence—individuals used covertly to inject Soviet-favored views into government, political, journalistic, business, labor, and academic circles of foreign countries. While the term “agent of influence” is normally used to distinguish foreign individuals engaged in influence operations from those who collect intelligence, in some cases agents are used for both. KGB officers are usually involved in these operations, but Soviet journalists, academicians, and other officials may play a role as well.

**Types of Relationships**

The KGB uses several terms to characterize different types of Soviet relationships with foreigners used in influence operations. These terms reportedly are used loosely, and the relationships vary from case to case in the extent of cooperation involved, the degree of leverage or control the Soviets are able to exert, the frequency of contact, and the type of reward received by the foreigner. Rewards range from financial payments to such intangible benefits as publicity of the collaborator’s accomplishments or the promise of special channels of communication to the Kremlin.

Three of the terms used by the KGB in reference to agents of influence are:

0 A **trusted relationship** is one between a foreigner in a high position and a Soviet who may or may not be an intelligence officer. The extent to which the foreigner-called a trusted contact-cooperates with the Soviets ranges from very limited to complete cooperation.

0 A **controlled agent of influence** is a foreigner who has actually been recruited by the KGB. Often these individuals are developed as agents in their youth and later achieve prominence. The KGB often, but not always, provides financial assistance. Once the individual has been recruited, he may not be contacted again until he has reached a position of importance.

0 A **special contact** is an individual who maintains a relationship with the KGB in a country that has close relations with the USSR, and where active KGB recruitment of agents is constrained by political considerations. Although the special contact does not receive a regular salary from the KGB, the relationship is often reinforced by gifts and other forms of attention.

The motivations of foreigners whom Moscow regards as agents of influence or special contacts can vary widely. Some individuals cooperate with the Soviets basically because they are flattered by Soviet attention and favors. Others cooperate out of fear; a time-honored KGB practice is to compromise foreigners visiting the USSR so as to make them vulnerable to blackmail later. Still other individuals cooperate largely because of ideological compatibility or because their own tactical political objectives coincide with those of the Soviets. In addition, some foreign leaders may find it convenient to maintain a tie to the KGB in the belief that it serves as an effective channel for expressing views to Moscow.

**Foreign Targets**

The USSR undoubtedly puts a high priority on influencing government policies as directly as possible by developing agents within the senior leadership of foreign governments and their support staffs. But the KGB also targets individuals and organizations within leading opposition circles who may be able to exert pressure on the ruling government, or may in time become members of the government. In addition, the KGB targets individuals who are expected to become opinion leaders, such as journalists and academics. Soviet intelligence tries to recruit individuals across the political spectrum. While it presumably is easier for the Soviets to establish relationships with foreigners of compatible ideological orientation, Soviet intelligence officers are encouraged to find some common ground or interest that enables them to develop connections with non-leftists—even political conservatives—as well. In noncommunist countries, the KGB places special value on relationships with foreigners who are not identified as communists.
mainly because of their greater credibility and operational freedom. 

Most of the information on agents of influence has been derived either from Soviet and bloc defectors or from investigations and arrests of suspected agents. It is always difficult to determine just how much influence the Soviets are able to exert through agents, but the following cases demonstrate the variety of individuals that are targeted by the Soviets and the opportunities available to Moscow to shape foreign policies and opinions through these agents.

The Arne Treholt Case

Arne Treholt, head of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry Press and Information Office, was convicted in June 1985 and sentenced to 20 years for working as a Soviet agent from 1974 until his arrest in January 1984. Treholt reportedly had first come into contact with the Soviets in 1967 when he was a young political activist and journalist, but was not activated as an agent until he became a secretary to Jens Evensen, the Norwegian Minister for Trade and Shipping. Subsequently he served as an embassy counselor at Norway’s UN Delegation in New York and spent a year as a student at Norway’s Defense College.

Treholt was convicted primarily for his espionage work for the Soviets, but he also had substantial opportunity to influence Norwegian policy. For example, he played an important role in the 1970s negotiations between Norway and the USSR on delimitation of the continental shelf of the Barents Sea, and he had a hand in the gray-zone fisheries agreement between the two countries. While we have no specific information that Treholt lobbied on Moscow’s behalf, the fisheries agreement that he helped to negotiate was later criticized as biased toward the USSR. During this period, Evensen also resurrected the concept of a “Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone,” a favorite Soviet theme in arms control propaganda.

Other High-Level Officials

While the Treholt case is the most infamous recent one involving a high-level official, a number of other Soviet agents have been in positions where they could influence their governments’ policies. For example:

Hirohide Ishide—a former Japanese labor minister, Liberal Democratic Party member of the Japanese Diet, and head of the Dietmen’s League for Japan-Soviet Friendship—retired in 1983 after being publicly identified by former KGB officer Stanislav Levchenko as a Soviet agent of influence. An example of Ishide’s promotion of Soviet interests occurred when Victor Belenko landed his Soviet MiG-25 in Japan in 1976. According to Levchenko, Ishide, under KGB instructions, lobbied the Prime Minister and his cabinet colleagues to return the plane to the USSR without examining it.

Sidek Ghouse, political secretary to Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister, was arrested in 1981—shortly before his boss became Prime Minister—and subsequently convicted as Soviet agent. The Malaysian Government also expelled three Soviet Embassy officers accused of recruiting Ghouse. Although not known to have engaged in active measures operations during his three years as KGB agent, Ghouse would have been well positioned to do so within the Prime Minister’s office.

The Soviets have also routinely tried to develop influence assets in Third World countries closely aligned with USSR. For example, according to Soviet defector Vladimir Sakharov, the Soviets in Egypt were involved with recruiting local politicians in the 1960s, and claimed to have coopted Ali Sabri, chairman of the Arab Socialist Union-Egypt’s ruling and sole legal party at the time.

Another example is provided by documents captured in Grenada after the US rescue mission there. They suggest that Moscow, in addition to influencing Prime Minister Maurice Bishop directly, also attempted to influence the policies of Bishop’s government through contacts with Bernard Coard, the leader of the subsequent coup against Bishop.

Penetrating the Opposition

The KGB has also been active in recruiting agents within major opposition parties. One of the apparently more successful of these operations was its penetration of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the largest opposition party in Japan. The JSP has been particularly attractive to the Soviets because of its longstanding antinuclear positions. According to Levchenko, during the 1970s the KGB had more than 10 agents of influence within the JSP—including several members of the Japanese Diet—and through them could control the party’s political platform. KGB influence over the party probably has waned since then because of Levchenko’s revelations and the JSP’s move toward the political center to improve its popularity. However, several individuals who were publicly identified by Levchenko as “trusted contacts” continue to participate in JSP affairs.
The Soviets have also sought to penetrate opposition peace and antinuclear groups—particularly in Western Europe—to put pressure on their governments. In 1983, a Soviet second secretary was expelled from West Germany for trying to enlist agents to influence the West German antinuclear movement. During the same year, the Swiss Government expelled the director and ordered the closure of the USSR’s Bern-based Novosti bureau, charging that the bureau had been used as a center for the “political and ideological indoctrination” of young members of the Swiss peace and antinuclear movements.

**Targeting Journalists**

The Soviets also give high priority to recruitment of foreign journalists who can help shape the opinions both of elite audiences and of the general public. The KGB uses these individuals to place articles—including disinformation and forgeries, to influence the editorial line of newspapers, and to publish special letters. KGB officers normally meet with their press assets to give them guidance on what to write, and frequently provide financial support. The Soviets have been particularly adept at penetrating and manipulating the media in the Third World, but they have also had some significant successes in the more sophisticated press of Western Europe and Japan:

- One of the more celebrated cases was that of Pierre-Charles Pathe, a French journalist convicted in 1979 of acting as a Soviet agent since 1960. The Soviets provided funds to Pathe so he could publish a private newsletter, and they reviewed his articles which subtly pushed the Soviet line on a wide range of international issues prior to publication. The subscribers to Pathe’s newsletter included almost 70 percent of the members of the French Chamber of Deputies and almost 50 percent of France’s Senators.

- Another important agent of influence was Danish journalist Arne Herlov Peterson, who was arrested in 1981 and charged with carrying out illegal activities for the USSR. Although he was not convicted, the Danish Government made available evidence that Peterson apparently was recruited several years earlier by the KGB. He served the Soviets by publishing Soviet-supplied anti-NATO propaganda tracts, conveying funds to peace organizations, and disseminating Soviet-prepared forgeries. Peterson received from the Soviet Embassy gifts, free travel, and cash payments.

- Levchenko claimed that in Japan the KGB had agents in most of the major newspapers and media outlets. One of them, the editor of one of the largest newspapers in Japan, resigned in 1983 after being publicly identified as a Soviet agent. He had reportedly been involved in a number of Soviet active measures, including the surfacing of the forged “last will and testament of Chou En-lai”—an operation considered by the KGB to have been very successful. Other media assets apparently continue to promote Soviet interests in Japan. For instance, one journalist identified by Levchenko as a “trusted contact” published a story in 1984 supporting the Soviet version of the KAL shootdown.

**Other Influence Channels**

In addition to regular agent-of-influence operations, the Soviets establish other types of relationships to influence foreigners. For example, the KGB—along with the CPSU’s International Department—use Soviet academics to try to influence the ideas of their Western counterparts. Both the KGB and the ID play a role in selecting Soviet participants for foreign conferences, and Soviet delegates commonly receive guidance from the ID. Moscow doubtless hopes that Westerners will accept Soviets affiliated with “think tanks”—such as the Institute of the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Science—as bona fide nonpolitical colleagues, and that Westerners will underestimate the extent to which these individuals are operating under Moscow’s instructions.

The USSR also uses Soviet citizens as unofficial sources to leak information to foreign journalists and to spread disinformation that Moscow does not want attributed directly. One of the most prolific of these individuals is Vitaliy Yevgeniyevich Lui—better known as Victor Louis—a Soviet journalist who several KGB defectors have independently identified as a KGB agent. In addition to his leaking such newsworthy items as Khrushchev’s ouster, the imminent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the reassignment of Marshall Ogarkov, he has been used to try to discredit the memoirs of Stalin’s daughter Svetlana and, more recently, to surface a videotape on the physical condition of Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov. After the Chernobyl accident, Victor Louis was the vehicle for publicizing distorted statements by Sakharov that implied he was supportive of the Soviet handling of the accident and critical of the Western reaction to it.