In conjunction with the ongoing nuclear and space talks (NST) in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other current arms control negotiations, the Administration has provided the following summary of the most recent U.S. initiatives on various arms control issues and a chronology of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations and expert-level meetings in 1986 and to date in 1987.

Strategic Offensive Forces

On May 8, 1987, the United States tabled at the nuclear and space talks in Geneva a draft START [strategic arms reduction talks] treaty text which provides for 50% reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear arms. The draft treaty, which reflects the basic areas of agreement on strategic arms reductions reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at Reykjavik last October, provides for 50% reductions by both sides to 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads, with appropriate sublimits, over a period of 7 years after such a treaty enters into force.

The U.S. draft treaty, in addition to the overall limits, provides for specific restrictions on the most destabilizing and dangerous nuclear systems—fast-flying ballistic missiles, particularly the Soviet heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). To this end, we have proposed limits and sublimits on ballistic missile warheads, missile throw-weights, and heavy ICBMs. Our proposal also includes detailed rules designed to eliminate any ambiguity as to what is agreed, and extensive verification provisions—including onsite inspection—designed to ensure that each side can be confident that the other is complying fully with the agreement.

By tabling this draft treaty, the United States seeks to build on the significant progress made in START and to provide a vehicle for resolving the remaining outstanding issues, especially the need—for the purpose of ensuring strategic stability—for sublimits on ballistic missile warheads. Unfortunately, progress has been delayed by Soviet insistence on linking a START agreement to measures which would effectively end the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The United States will not accept any measures which would cripple or kill the SDI program. Due to the promise it holds for a safer means of deterrence, the SDI program is vital to the future security of the United States and its allies.

The United States believes that the draft START treaty provides a solid basis for the creation of a fair and durable agreement to bring about—for the first time in history—deep reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the U.S.S.R. The United States is ready to do its part to achieve such an agreement and hopes the Soviets will demonstrate similar determination.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

Western determination to adhere to NATO's 1979 "dual track" decision in response to Soviet deployment of SS-20s is now paying off. NATO's resolve to redress the INF imbalance through deployment of U.S. longer range INF (LRINF) missiles, while seeking to negotiate with the Soviets to reach an INF balance at the lowest possible level, has brought us to the point where prospects for a U.S.-Soviet agreement for significant reductions in INF missiles are bright.

On March 4, 1987, the United States tabled a draft INF treaty text at the NST talks in Geneva. The basic structure of an INF agreement—the nature and level of LRINF missile reductions—had been agreed upon by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev last October at Reykjavik and is reflected in the draft U.S. treaty text. This calls for reductions to an interim global ceiling of 100 warheads each on LRINF missiles on U.S. and Soviet territory, with none in Europe. The United States and our NATO allies continue, however, to prefer a zero LRINF missile outcome—the global elimination of this entire class of missiles—and will continue to press the Soviet Union to drop its insistence on retaining the remaining LRINF missiles.

In response, the Soviet Union tabled on April 27 its draft INF treaty which reflects the basic agreements on LRINF issues made at Reykjavik. A number of key issues remain to be resolved. The...
most important of these issues is verification. Any INF agreement must be effectively verifiable if it is to enhance stability and increase the security of the United States and its allies. The United States has proposed a comprehensive verification regime to enhance compliance. The Soviets have noted that they will be seeking verification in some of the basic areas which we require, which Mr. Gorbachev accepted in principle at Reykjavik. These include, for example, data exchange, onsite observation of destruction, and effective monitoring of remaining LRINF inventories and associated facilities, including onsite inspection. However, they have yet to provide the needed details.

Another major issue concerns shorter range INF (SRINF) missile systems. We and our allies continue to insist that an agreement on these systems must be bilateral in nature, concurrent with an initial INF treaty, effectively verifiable, and provide for global equality. Soviet efforts to include the systems of any country other than the United States and the U.S.S.R. in an INF agreement are unacceptable.

Resolution of these and other outstanding issues will demand considerable hard bargaining. The United States continues to do its part to resolve these issues and move forward toward an INF agreement. It is up to the Soviet Union to show the same commitment to real progress.

Defense and Space Issues

During Secretary Shultz’s April 1987 meetings in Moscow and subsequently at the NST talks in Geneva, the United States made a new proposal on defense and space issues. This new proposal incorporates the following elements:

- Both the United States and the Soviet Union would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
- This commitment would be contingent on implementation of agreed START reductions, i.e., 50% cuts to equal levels of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads, with appropriate sublimits.
- The agreement would not alter the sovereign rights of the parties under customary international law to withdraw in the event of material breach of the agreement or jeopardy to their supreme interests.
- After 1994, either side could deploy defensive systems of its choosing, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

To build mutual confidence by further enhancing predictability in the area of strategic defense, and in response to stated Soviet concerns, the United States also proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union annually exchange data on their planned strategic defense activities. In addition, we seek to have the United States and the U.S.S.R. carry out reciprocal briefings on their respective strategic defense efforts and visits to associated research facilities, as we have proposed in our Open Laboratories Initiative. Finally, we have proposed establishing mutually agreed procedures for reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing.

Chemical Weapons (CW)

In April 1984, the United States tabled at the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a comprehensive treaty banning development, production, use, transfer, and stockpiling of chemical weapons to be verified by various means, including prompt mandatory onsite challenge inspection. At the November 1985 Geneva summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on all aspects of a comprehensive, global chemical weapons ban including verification. Since then, we have held five rounds of bilateral CW treaty talks. A sixth round is anticipated in the summer of 1987.

Although the bilateral treaty discussions have narrowed some differences, and the Soviets finally admitted in March 1987 that they possess chemical weapons, important differences remain on a number of key issues. For example, on the crucial issue of verification of treaty compliance, the United States calls for mandatory “challenge inspections” to investigate suspected violations. The Soviets still insist that acceptance of challenge inspection be voluntary. Although they recently indicated that mandatory challenge inspection procedures could apply to certain limited cases, they continue to insist on a right of refusal that would weaken a CW convention and increase the possibility for cheating.

In addition to treaty discussions, we are working with allies and other friendly countries and with the Soviets on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons. Primarily in response to the continuing use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, the United States and 17 other Western industrialized countries have been consulting since 1985 to harmonize export controls on CW-related commodities and to develop other mechanisms to curb the illegal use of chemical weapons and their dangerous spread to other countries. Also, in the two bilateral meetings with the Soviets in 1985, we reviewed export controls and political steps to limit the spread of chemical weapons.

Nuclear Testing

The United States is fully committed to seeking effective and verifiable agreements with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing limitations. To this end, the President has proposed a practical, step-by-step process. He has proposed that the United States and U.S.S.R. begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda for these negotiations would first be to improve verification provisions of the existing Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Once these verification concerns had been satisfied and the treaties ratified, the United States and U.S.S.R. would immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program—in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons—of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

The United States has made concrete, practical proposals to make progress on nuclear testing limitations. In July 1985, the President invited Soviet experts to come to the U.S. test site to measure the yield of a U.S. test, bringing with them whatever equipment they deemed necessary. In December 1985, he proposed a meeting of official U.S. and Soviet technical experts to discuss verification. In March 1986, he invited Soviet experts to come to Nevada to examine the CORRTEX [Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus Time Experiment] method for yield measurement, to receive a demonstration of the CORRTEX system, and to measure a U.S. test.

Finally, in the summer of 1986, the Soviets agreed to have experts from both sides meet to discuss without preconditions the broad range of nuclear testing issues. The experts met in Geneva in July, September, and November 1986, and January and May 1987. Discussions have focused on verification techniques—CORRTEX in particular—as well as the agenda for formal testing negotiations. During Secretary Shultz’s April trip to Moscow, he and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed that the experts should explore joint verification activities which might help evaluate the effectiveness of verification techniques.
Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

The 35-nation Stockholm CDE conference adjourned September 22, 1986, with the adoption of a set of concrete measures designed to increase openness and predictability of military activities in Europe. These measures, which are built around NATO proposals, provide for prior notification of all military activities above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, observation of military activities above a threshold of 17,000 troops, and annual forecasts of upcoming military activities. The accord also contains provisions for onsite air and ground inspections for verification. Although modest in scope, these provisions are the first time the Soviet Union has agreed to inspection on its own territory for verification of an international security accord.

Bilateral Confidence-Building Measures

On May 4, 1987, U.S. and Soviet negotiators reached agreement on a draft joint text to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in their respective capitals. This agreement, which is the direct result of a U.S. initiative, is a practical measure that will strengthen international security by reducing the risk of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that might result from accident, misinterpretation, or miscalculation. The centers would play a role in exchanging information and notifications required under existing and possible future arms control and confidence-building measures agreements.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

On December 5, 1986, NATO tabled a new initiative designed to meet Eastern concerns. The proposal deferred the Western demand for data agreement on current forces prior to treaty signature. The Soviets had claimed that this Western demand was the primary roadblock to agreement. The proposal also called for a time-limited, first phase withdrawal of 6,000 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet troops, followed by a 3-year, no-increase commitment by all parties with forces in the zone, during which residual force levels would be verified through national technical means, agreed entry/exit points, data exchange, and 30 annual onsite inspections. Thus far, the Soviets have not responded constructively to the Western initiative.

NATO High-Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control

This task force presented its report on the direction of NATO's conventional arms control policy to the North Atlantic Council on December 11, 1986. At that meeting, NATO ministers produced the "Brussels declaration," which states NATO's readiness to enter into new negotiations with the Warsaw Pact aimed at establishing a "verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels" in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. NATO began discussions in February 1987 to develop a mandate for new negotiations. The Brussels declaration also calls for separate negotiations to build upon and expand the results of the CDE.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

On December 15-18, 1986, the United States and the Soviet Union met in Washington for the eighth round in an ongoing series of consultations, which began in December 1982, on nuclear nonproliferation. These consultations covered a wide range of issues, including prospects for strengthening the international nonproliferation regime, support for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the mutual desire of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency. These consultations are not negotiations but, rather, discussions to review various issues of common concern. The United States and the Soviet Union share a strong interest in preventing the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons and have agreed to use these consultations as a forum for discussion and exchange of views.

Chronology:

January 1, 1986—June 1, 1987

U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Negotiations

Nuclear and Space Talks

Round IV: January 16—March 4, 1986
Round V: May 3—June 26, 1986
Round VI: September 18—November 13, 1986
Round VII: January 15—March 6, 1987 (INF continued to March 26)
Round VIII: Begun on April 28 (INF) and May 5, 1987 (START and defense and space talks)

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Multilateral)

Round IX: January 28—March 16, 1986
Round X: April 15—May 23, 1986
Round XI: June 10—July 18, 1986
Round XII: August 19—September 19, 1986—agreement concluded

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

First Round of Followup Conference: November 4—December 20, 1986
Second Round of Followup Conference: January 27—April 11, 1987
Third Round of Followup Conference: May 4—July 23, 1987 (proposed ending date)

Conference on Disarmament (Multilateral)

Chemical Weapons Committee Rump Session: January 13—31, 1986
Spring Session: February 4—April 25, 1986
Summer Session: June 10—August 29, 1986
Chemical Weapons Committee Chairman's Consultations: November 24—December 17, 1986
Chemical Weapons Committee Rump Session: January 6—30, 1987
Spring Session: February 2—April 30, 1987

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (Multilateral)

Round 38: January 30—March 20, 1986
Round 39: May 15—July 3, 1986
Round 40: September 25—December 4, 1986
Round 41: January 29—March 19, 1987
Round 42: May 14—July 2, 1987 (proposed ending date)

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Round I: January 13, 1987
Round II: May 3—4, 1987—agreement concluded, ad referendum

U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Expert-Level Meetings

Nuclear and Space Talks

August 11—12, 1986, in Moscow
September 6—7, 1986, in Washington
December 2—5, 1986, in Geneva at the negotiator level

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks

August 6—7, 1986, in Moscow
September 10—11, 1986, in Washington
Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
August 14-15, 1986, in Stockholm

Chemical Weapons Treaty Talks
January 28-February 3, 1986, in Geneva
April 15–25, 1986, in Geneva
July 1-18, 1986, in Geneva
October 28–November 18, 1986, in New York City
February 16–March 5, 1987, in Geneva

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Experts Meeting: March 31–April 15, 1987, in Geneva

Chemical Weapons Nonproliferation Discussions
March 5–6, 1986, in Bern
September 4–5, 1986, in Bern

Nuclear Testing
First Session: July 25–August 1, 1986, in Geneva
Second Session: September 4–18, 1986, in Geneva
Third Session: November 13–25, 1986, in Geneva
Fourth Session: January 22, 1987, recessed on February 9, resumed on March 18, concluded on March 20 in Geneva
Fifth Session: May 18–May 29, 1987, in Geneva

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
May 5–6, 1986, in Geneva
August 25, 1986, in Geneva

Nuclear Nonproliferation Talks
December 16–18, 1986, in Washington

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