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The Soviet Union

THE SOVIET UNION

In the week of May 22-29, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union took a decisive turn away from the confrontations of the past quarter-century. We agreed to limit the growth of strategic weaponry. We established a set of basic principles to govern our relations. And we constructed a framework of agreements leading to more normal bilateral cooperation.

Each of the accords signed in Moscow was a significant achievement in itself. Never before have two adversaries, so deeply divided by conflicting ideologies and political rivalries, been able to agree to limit the armaments on which their survival depends. Nor has there been, at any time in the postwar period, a code of conduct that both sides could accept as the basis for regulating their competition and channeling their efforts toward more constructive endeavors.

But beyond their individual merits, the summit agreements taken together represent a major advance toward a goal set forth at the beginning of this Administration: to effect a basic change in our relations with the Soviet Union in the interest of a stable world peace from which all countries would benefit.

In considering the course of Soviet-American relations during the past year, it is important to understand the nature of the specific agreements, the conditions that have made these achievements possible, and what the future may hold.

THE INITIAL APPROACH: 1969--70

Four years ago, our relations with the Soviet Union and international relations generally were still dominated by the fears, anxieties, and atmosphere of the Cold War. The invasion of Czechoslovakia had recently occurred. While the Soviet Government made overtures for better relations, its motives seemed largely tactical. Yet, beneath the surface, it was apparent that the pattern of world politics was in the process of major transformation. The salient features of this change have been described in my previous Reports. Certain elements had special relevance for our relations with the Soviet Union.

--Divisions within the Communist world had deepened; state and national interests of the major Communist powers were increasingly reflected in their policies toward non-Communist countries.

--The realignment of political forces in the Communist world coincided with the economic revival of Western Europe and Japan, reinforcing the trend toward multipolarity.

--In particular, the more nearly equal strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union suggested that conditions might be optimal for reaching agreement to limit strategic competition.

Recognizing these international trends, this Administration began in 1969 to reassess our relations with the Communist countries. Certain aspects of Soviet-American relations were clear: the postwar rivalry with the Soviet Union was not a result simply of misunderstanding, or personal animosities, or a failure to create a good atmosphere for negotiations. The conflict was rooted in deeper differences: irreconcilable ideologies, the inevitable geopolitical competition of great powers conducting global policies and, to a certain degree, bureaucratic momentum and the disillusionment created by decades of fluctuation between hopes and tensions.

To break the pattern of the postwar period required policies that distinguished between the sources of conflict and their external or temporary manifestations. We needed not merely a better climate for our relations, but a new environment in which the United States and the Soviet Union could exercise their special responsibilities for peace. Ultimately we hoped to

create mutual interests in maintaining and developing an international structure based on self-restraint in the pursuit of national interests.

The approach we adopted reflected certain general concepts. --It was no longer realistic to allow Soviet-American relations to be predetermined by ideology. We had to recognize, of course, that many basic Soviet values would remain inimical to ours. Both sides had to accept the fact that neither was likely to persuade the other through polemical debates. But ideological elements did not preclude serious consideration of disputed issues.

--Irrespective of ideology, any relationship between two great powers would be highly competitive. Both sides had to recognize, however, that in this continuing competition there would be no permanent victor, and equally important, that to focus one's own policy on attempts to gain advantages at the other's expense, could only aggravate tensions and precipitate counteractions.

--Both sides had to accept the fact that our differences could not be hidden merely by expressions of goodwill; they could only be resolved by precise solutions of major issues.

--Both sides had to understand that issues were interrelated; we could not effectively reduce tensions through marginal agreements or even an isolated agreement of importance. Experience had shown that isolated accomplishments were likely to fall victim to tensions and crises in other aspects of the relationship. Thus, if we were to achieve more than a superficial change, we had to address a broad range of issues.

--Finally, we would judge Soviet actions rather than words. The basic criterion would be a willingness to act with restraint. We would respond constructively to Soviet initiatives; progress in one area would help maintain momentum in other negotiations. We would also make it clear that aggressive behavior could imperil our entire relationship. By linking all aspects of Soviet-American relations, we could hope that progress, if it came, could lead to a broadly based understanding about international conduct.

These general principles were translated into specific proposals during 1969 and 1970.

After a painstaking evaluation of all aspects of limiting strategic arms, we agreed to begin negotiations in November 1969. On other disarmament matters, we revived negotiations on prohibiting nuclear arms from the seabeds and took up the new challenge of limiting biological warfare.

In Europe, we reconfirmed NATO proposals to begin discussing mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe where the concentrations of opposing forces were heaviest. We proposed to approach the issue of European security by negotiating, first of all, improvements in the situation in Berlin. The Berlin negotiations would be critical, not only because that divided city had been the scene of tense confrontations in the past, but because it was also the keystone in West Germany's effort to create a more normal relationship with its Eastern neighbors. That normalization would, in turn, influence the new prospects for a wider discussion of European security and cooperation, including a possible conference of European governments, Canada, and the United States.

As for economic relations, I indicated that the United States was prepared to have normal economic exchanges with any country that was equally willing to move toward normal relations in both political and economic fields.

On the Middle East, we agreed to discussions with the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, and we encouraged the Arab governments and Israel to undertake direct negotiations.

In this initial period, we tried to create circumstances that would offer the Soviet leaders an opportunity to move away from confrontation through carefully prepared negotiations. We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide

spectrum of negotiations and would become convinced that its interests, like ours, would be best served if this process involved most of our relations. We sought, above all, to create a vested interest in mutual restraint.

Our relations with the Soviet Union passed through several tactical phases. It was apparent that Soviet policy had contradictory tendencies. Some factors pointed toward a more stable relationship with the United States; others suggested a continued probing for tactical gains. In this period, we dealt with these contradictory manifestations by responding to positive efforts and demonstrating firmness in the face of pressures. I opened a direct channel to the Soviet leaders so we could discuss the issues frankly and privately.

The first phase, lasting throughout 1969, was marked by obvious caution, as we made only limited progress in engaging major issues but achieved some improvement in the tone of exchanges. In the spring of 1970 we agreed to negotiate on Berlin, and the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) moved from initial explorations to concrete discussions.

A period of tension, however, occurred in 1970 over the Soviet role in Egyptian cease-fire violations in the Middle East, the Syrian attack on Jordan, and Soviet naval activities in Cuba. Similar tension arose from the crisis in the Indian subcontinent for a period in late 1971. Such developments gave us grounds for serious concern, and we reacted vigorously.

At the same time, the Soviet Union pursued a policy of relaxing tensions in Europe, suggesting that its strategy was to differentiate between the United States and our allies. This tactic, however, had limited potential since European issues were inseparable from the strategic framework of U.S.-Soviet relations. Moreover, the Soviet emphasis on certain bilateral relations lacked a general European framework, which could not be developed without the United States or without considering the impact of a controlled relaxation of tensions in East Europe.

THE ROAD TO THE SUMMIT

Thus we passed through a series of episodes that gave the Soviet Union no advantage and achieved no fundamental change. In each phase we sought to demonstrate the wisdom of restraint and the dangers of its absence. At the end of 1970, it appeared that the tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations might lead the Soviet leaders to reconsider their relations with the United States. I felt that an opportune moment had arrived for new initiatives to end tactical maneuvering and to move toward accommodation.

Despite the erratic developments of 1969 and 1970, some positive trends were evident. As I said at the United Nations in the fall of 1970, we shared certain compelling common interests, above all an interest in reducing the dangers of war. That the Soviet Union shared this concern was reflected in the continuation of the negotiations on strategic arms limitations, the mutual willingness to pursue an agreement on Berlin and the insulation of these serious issues from developments in Southeast Asia.

In the winter of 1970-71 Soviet leaders were looking toward their Party Congress, where broad policy guidelines are usually enunciated. It appeared at the time, and even more clearly in retrospect, that the broad changes in the nature of international relations, as well as their experience of the previous two years in relations with us, were having an impact on their preparations. It was thus a promising moment to delineate the progress that could be made if certain decisions were taken.

--SALT negotiations were temporarily deadlocked over whether to negotiate an agreement limiting anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) alone, as the Soviets insisted, or an agreement embracing both defensive and offensive limits. For the United States, it was essential that an initial SALT agreement should begin to break the momentum in the growth of offensive forces. If the buildup continued unchecked, it would almost certainly produce dangerous strategic instabilities--especially if limitations on missile defense created a premium on striking first. This was not a tactical dispute, but a major substantive issue that could only be resolved by high-level political decisions.

--The treaty reached between West Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1970 had changed the character and significance of the Berlin negotiations among the Four Powers. Ratification of this treaty depended on the outcome of the negotiations over Berlin. And it was general Western policy that the prospect for a wider European dialogue on security was similarly conditioned on a Berlin agreement that would safeguard access to the city and its links to the Federal Republic. Thus, progress on Berlin would also involve basic decisions in Moscow.

Through intense and private exchanges with the Soviet leaders, a breakthrough was made, first in SALT, then in the Berlin negotiations.

--A new framework was created for SALT in May 1971 maintaining the link between offensive and defensive limitations, as the United States believed essential. At the same time, we agreed to concentrate our efforts on ABM limitations. Since these systems were not extensively deployed, we envisaged a permanent treaty. We also agreed to work out an interim accord limiting certain offensive weapons. Both agreements would be completed simultaneously.

--The Berlin agreements were blocked by conflicting legal positions on the status of the city and on West Berlin's ties to the Federal Republic of Germany. Progress became possible in July and August 1971 when all concerned agreed to seek an agreement that dealt concretely with the practical question of how to maintain West Berlin's many links to the Federal Republic, including unimpeded access to West Berlin by road and rail.

These breakthroughs on major substantive issues made it possible to look toward a summit meeting.

The SALT discussion resumed in July 1971, building on the political framework agreed upon with the Soviet leaders. Two agreements were signed in September—one to improve the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow, and the other to reduce the likelihood of an accidental nuclear war by exchanging information on certain missile testing activities. The breakthrough on Berlin led to the signing in September of 1971 of the first part of the Four Power Agreement, which in turn opened the way for further negotiations between East and West Germany on the technical questions of access to the city.

My private communications with the Soviet leaders had included the possibility of a meeting at the highest level. My views on this question of a meeting had been stated in the first weeks of my Administration: a meeting at the summit would only be justified if it were carefully prepared and if there were sufficient reasons to believe that it would be the most effective way of proceeding toward solutions of major questions. By the fall of 1971, it appeared we could meet these conditions. Thus, when Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Washington in October 1971, we agreed that a summit meeting would be held, not for its own sake, but as a culmination of concrete progress and as a means of stimulating further advances. It was agreed the meeting should be held in May 1972.

I envisaged this meeting as having four aspects: --As political relations improved, it became possible to initiate discussions on a wide range of projects for bilateral cooperation. In themselves, these projects were not crucial to our relationship. But cumulatively, as cooperation in such fields widened and deepened, they would reinforce the trend toward more constructive political relations. In the pre-summit period we discussed cooperation in science, technology, health, the environment, outer space, and maritime activities. The prospect of a summit meeting gave these discussions a special impetus and high-level attention. At the summit, these discussions could culminate in a series of agreements.

--Advances in political relations had by that time made it possible to address economic relations. The starting point was the removal of long-standing obstacles to closer commercial contacts--such as the unsettled World War II lend-lease debt. Then we could go on to establish long-term arrangements for expanding trade and other types of economic cooperation on a scale appropriate to the size of our two economies.

--The summit could complete the first phase of the SALT negotiations and provide impetus for the next, even more far-reaching phase.

--Finally, on the basis of all of these specific achievements, carefully prepared in the previous months of painstaking negotiations, the summit would afford an opportunity to review the whole range of international issues and to delineate certain fundamental principles to govern U.S.-Soviet relations in the future.

Thus, the summit could redirect the momentum of the past and chart a new direction in our relations with the Soviet Union, creating in the process a vested interest in restraint and in the preservation of peace.

THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

We prepared for and conducted the summit on this basis. We sought to establish not a superficial "spirit of Moscow" but a record of solid progress. The number and scope of the agreements that emerged make it clear we accomplished that goal.

Bilateral Cooperation. The prospect of a meeting at the highest level accelerated the negotiations on bilateral matters. At the summit it was thus possible to conclude agreement on significant cooperative projects.

--Cooperation in the exploration of outer space, including a joint experiment in rendezvous and docking of Apollo and Soyuz space vehicles during 1975.

--Cooperation in solving the most important of the problems of the environment.

--Joint efforts in the field of medical science and public health.

--Expanded cooperation in many areas of science and technology and establishment of a Joint Commission for this purpose.

--Cooperation between the American and Soviet navies to reduce the chances of dangerous incidents between ships and aircraft at sea.

Since the summit, all of the agreements have been carried out as expected. Our space agencies have conducted preliminary tests of models of the spacecraft docking system and crew training will begin this summer. The Joint Committee on Environmental Protection met in Moscow in September 1972 and planned 30 collaborative projects on a variety of subjects, including air and water pollution. Programs for cooperative research on cancer and heart disease were developed by our public health authorities in October and November 1972. The Joint Commission on Science and Technology met in Washington in March 1973 and agreed to carry out some 25 projects in such fields as energy, chemistry, biology, and agricultural research. American and Soviet naval officers will meet this year to review the agreement on reducing incidents between ships and aircraft.

This process of cooperation has begun to engage an ever widening circle of people in various professions and government bureaus in both countries. Direct contact, exchanges of information and experience, and joint participation in specific projects will develop a fabric of relationships supplementing those at the higher levels of political leadership. Both sides have incentives to find additional areas for contact and cooperation, and I anticipate further agreements patterned on those already concluded.

Economic Relations. In the past, many in the United States believed trade could open the way to improved political relations. Others argued that increased economic relations would only strengthen the power of a potential adversary. In fact, trade and other aspects of economic relations could never flourish if political relations remained largely hostile. Occasional business transactions might be worked out on an individual basis. But without some reasonable certainty that political relations would be stable and free from periodic turbulence, both sides would be reluctant to enter into long-term commercial relations. Nor would the Congress support an expanding economic relationship while our basic relations with the Soviet Union were antagonistic. With these considerations in mind, in the earlier years of this Administration I linked the expansion of economic relations with improved political relations.

Since progress was being made in the pre-summit period in removing sources of political tension, I authorized explorations in the economic sphere. I sent the Secretaries of Commerce and Agriculture to the Soviet Union for discussions. The Soviet Ministers of Foreign Trade and Agriculture came to the United States for the same purpose. We began negotiations on a maritime agreement to make concrete arrangements for orderly transport of goods between the two countries.

By the time of the summit, sufficient progress had been made so that in my discussion with the Soviet leaders we were able to agree on a general plan for moving toward a more normal economic relationship. We agreed it was essential to clear away the long-standing Soviet lend-lease debt to the United States. We also decided that a formal trade agreement was needed to provide the basis for resolving the many technical problems resulting from the long absence of economic intercourse. We agreed to act in accord with generally established international practice as regards: arbitration of disputes, establishment of commercial facilities in each country, procedures to prevent market disruption, reciprocal extension of Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment, reciprocal extension of commercial credits, and determination of the general level of trade. We established a Joint Commercial Commission to maintain contacts, to resolve issues that might arise, and to be responsible for carrying out the general agreement worked out with the Soviet leaders.

Following the summit, intensive negotiations began under the leadership of U.S. Secretary of Commerce Peterson and Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev. In July 1972, a three-year agreement for the export of United States agricultural products and for the extension of credits to finance these sales was concluded. By October, the principal agreements were completed: a settlement of the lend-lease question, a formal trade agreement, and a maritime agreement.

--We had tried to work out a lend-lease settlement immediately after World War II, again in 1951 and in 1960, but had failed on each occasion. The main issues were the amount of settlement, whether interest payments should be included, and the length of time for repayment. The settlement reached in October 1972 provides for a total repayment of approximately \$722 million, to be paid over a period of about 30 years. This compares favorably with other settlements of wartime obligations.

--The trade agreement anticipates a total exchange over the next three years of goods worth about \$1.5 billion; it also provides for expanded business facilities for American firms in the Soviet Union, a large trade center complex in Moscow, provisions for third-party arbitration of disputes, and procedures to prevent market disruptions.

--Each country will reduce tariffs on the other's imports, so that the level of tariff charges is about the same as that charged against the products of any other country (MFN treatment). This had been the practice in Soviet-American relations from 1935 to 1951, when it was terminated during the Korean War. Extension of Most Favored Nation treatment is consistent with the principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

--The October agreement also provides for the reciprocal extension of credit arrangements, customary in financing an expansion of exports. I authorized the Export-Import Bank to engage in credit transactions with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank and other Soviet organizations will provide credits to American businesses.

--An agreement on maritime relations signed on October 14, 1972, was another essential element to the orderly expansion of commerce. We agreed to ease procedures for access of Soviet and American ships to each other's ports. The agreement also provides that the ships of each side will carry equal and substantial shares of future oceanborne commerce. And it provides for a system of equitable freight rates.

These agreements open the way not only for a prompt invigoration of trade but also for developing these relations into a permanent component of the overall relationship projected at the summit. It is not a question of whether certain elements should be separable, or conditional, but whether we wish the entire process of a broadly based new relationship with the Soviet Union to unfold.

The next step is to end discrimination against imports of Soviet goods into this country so that the Soviet Union can earn the dollars to help it pay for imports from the United States. This step will require action by the Congress to provide the President with authority to negotiate the reciprocal extension of Most Favored Nation treatment. I have submitted

legislation to the Congress in this regard, as I am committed to do under the agreements reached with the Soviet Union. Extension of MFN is a logical and natural step in the emerging relationship; it is not a unilateral concession but a means to expand commerce in the context of broadly improved relations.

We are also prepared to consider possible longer-term cooperative ventures. The Soviet Union has vast natural resources, such as natural gas, that can be developed with the help of American capital and technology. These resources would then be available for export to the United States, thus enabling the Soviet Union to repay our credits and pay for imports from the United States. The role of our government should be to establish a framework within which private firms might work out specific contracts. Since the Soviet Union plans its economic program for five-year periods, its willingness to enter into long-term ventures of this kind suggests an expectation of cooperative relations and imports requiring dollar payments well into the future. Such ventures do not create a one-sided dependence by the United States upon Soviet resources; they establish an interdependence between our economies which provides a continuing incentive to maintain a constructive relationship.

The SALT Agreements. Of historic significance were the two agreements which General Secretary Brezhnev and I reached limiting strategic arms: a treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems, and an interim agreement limiting certain strategic offensive weapons. These agreements are discussed in detail in the Arms Control section of this Report. Technical aspects of arms control were at the core of the negotiations, but the significance of the agreements transcends specific provisions and goes to the heart of the postwar competition between us.

Some years ago, when the United States was strategically predominant, an agreement freezing the strategic balance was unrealistic. It was highly improbable that the Soviet Union would resign itself to permanent inferiority. Indeed, after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union began a major expansion in its strategic weaponry. Had this expansion continued unabated through the 1970's, the United States would have had no choice but to launch a massive new strategic armament program. The present moment thus offered a unique opportunity to strike a reasonable balance in strategic capabilities and to break with the pattern of unlimited competition.

Such an opportunity posed a fundamental question: could both sides accept the risks of restraint explicit in arms limitations? In the defensive field, new programs offered some element of protection but beckoned a new round of competition. Offensive systems were required to guarantee security, but their steady accumulation created a momentum toward capabilities that threatened strategic equilibrium.

Each of us had the power single-handedly to destroy most of mankind. Paradoxically, this very fact, and the global interests of both sides, created a certain common outlook, a kind of interdependence for survival. Although we competed, our conflict did not admit of resolution by victory in the classical sense. We seemed compelled to coexist. We had an inescapable joint obligation to build a structure for peace. Recognition of this reality has been the keystone of United States policy since 1969.

Obviously, no agreement could be reached involving weapons that guaranteed national survival if both sides did not believe their interests were served despite the risks. No decision of this magnitude could have been taken unless it was part of a broader commitment to place relations on a new foundation of restraint, cooperation, and steadily evolving confidence. Even agreements of such overriding importance cannot stand alone, vulnerable to the next crisis. Their tremendous historical and political significance is guaranteed, in part, by the fact that they are woven into the fabric of an emerging new relationship that makes crises less likely.

There is reason to hope that these accords represent a major break in the pattern of suspicion, hostility, and confrontation that has dominated U.S.-Soviet relations for a generation.

Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations. The fourth area of major progress at the summit was the agreement on twelve Basic Principles signed on May 29, 1972. This far-reaching step placed all our other efforts on a broader foundation. A new relationship would require new attitudes and aspirations. It was appropriate that this change be reflected in a formal statement. These principles codify goals that the United States had long advocated, as I did for example, in my address to the

United Nations in October 1970. The main provisions state that both sides will:

--do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war;

--always exercise restraint in their mutual relations and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation, and mutual benefit;

--recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives;

--make no claim for themselves, and not recognize the claims of anyone else, to any special rights or advantages in world affairs.

These are specific obligations. They meet some of our fundamental concerns of the postwar period. They are the elements that made it possible to summarize one general principle governing Soviet-American relations:

"They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the United States and the Soviet Union are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage."

What we have agreed upon is not a vain attempt to bridge ideological differences, or a condominium of the two strongest powers, or a division of spheres of influence. What we have agreed upon are principles that acknowledge differences, but express a code of conduct which, if observed, can only contribute to world peace and to an international system based on mutual respect and self-restraint.

These principles are a guide for future action, not a commentary on the past. In themselves, they will have no meaning if they are not reflected in action. The leaders of the Soviet Union are serious men. Their willingness to commit themselves to certain principles for the future must be taken as a solemn obligation. For our part we are prepared to adhere to these principles, and hope that the Soviet leaders have the same serious intention.

THE ROAD AHEAD

In reporting last year to the Congress on prospects for a summit meeting, I noted that we could not expect to solve the accumulated problems of two decades in one meeting, but that we did have the opportunity to open a new era in international relations. If we were successful, I said, the transformation of Soviet-American relations could become one of the most significant achievements of our time.

I believe we have now taken that essential first step in freeing both of our countries from perpetual confrontation. From confrontation we have moved to negotiation and then to a broadening range of fields. The promise of this beginning obliges us to see it through.

The tasks ahead reflect the successes of this past year as well as the disappointments:

--We are now in the second phase of our effort to limit strategic arms. We can build on what has been achieved. We understand each other's concerns better now than four years ago. We have established a common vocabulary and a technical framework in which to examine issues. And we have developed a measure of respect and confidence in each other's seriousness of purpose.

--But we face a severe challenge: each side is called on to make commitments, limiting its strategic offensive weapons for this decade and beyond. This will require political decisions to respect each other's basic security requirements and a willingness to balance each other's legitimate interests in an equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

--In Europe, the progress in Soviet-American relations has been a catalyst for further change. Whereas East-West relations in Europe were confined to bilateral relations in the past few years, we are now entering negotiations that involve fuller participation by our allies. The issues of European security and cooperation or reciprocal and balanced force reductions cannot be settled by the United States and the Soviet Union alone. We and the Soviet Union, however, can each make a significant contribution to progress on these issues--and that progress, in turn, will reinforce the favorable momentum in our bilateral relations by demonstrating that detente is broadly based and serves the interest of all European countries.

--In the Middle East, the United States and the Soviet Union, separately and perhaps together, can also make a contribution to peace. Each of us plays a different role and has different interests and conceptions. But we have a common interest in averting confrontation. Proceeding from this principle, we can both exert our influence in the direction of a peaceful settlement among the parties directly concerned.

--In bilateral relations we can build on the progress already achieved at the summit. Though less dramatic than the larger political issues, harnessing our technological expertise and creativity in the service of both our peoples can produce lasting benefits for all.

--We have an opportunity and obligation to convert the promise of our agreements on economic relations into reality. We are discovering areas where the American and Soviet economies are complementary. The Soviet Union has certain resources that meet our needs, while we can export commodities and products which the Soviet Union wishes to import.

A year ago, I reported that a new momentum had been given to efforts for achieving a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. I believe that this momentum has carried us across a new threshold.

We are now in a new period, but we have only witnessed its initial phase. It is only realistic to recognize that there have been periods of relaxed tensions before, and earlier hopes for a permanent end to the hostilities of the Cold War. Present trends of course can be reversed; new factors will appear; attitudes can shift. This may be particularly true in a period of transition.

In the past, changes in our relations with the Soviet Union proved episodic, in part because they reflected 'tactical motives or were limited to changes in climate rather than substance. What we created at the summit last year is more durable. It rests on solid, specific achievements that engage the interests of both sides. But it will take patience, hard work, and perseverance to translate our broad understandings into concrete results. If we can do this, the United States and the Soviet Union can move from coexistence to broad cooperation and make an unparalleled contribution to world peace.