The Meetings of President Reagan
and
General Secretary Gorbachev
Reykjavik

October 1986

PRESS
To the Members of the Press:

The meetings General Secretary Gorbachev and I will have in Reykjavik are an important part of our ongoing communications as we seek to resolve the issues between our two nations. These meetings will provide an opportunity for personal, detailed and frank discussions to prepare for a Summit meeting in the United States. The talks in Reykjavik will be private and confidential and are not intended to result in agreements.

In recent weeks, our relationship with the Soviet Union has been a subject of much discussion and debate. But throughout these difficult days, the channels of communication have remained open and both sides have indicated the desire to improve relations. In Geneva last year, General Secretary Gorbachev and I stressed the need to talk to each other instead of about each other. This weekend in Reykjavik we will do just that.

We are grateful to the government of Iceland for agreeing to host our meetings, which we earnestly hope will advance the cause of world peace.
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The Meetings of President Reagan
and
General Secretary Gorbachev
Reykjavik
October 1986

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From/To
Washington, D.C. (Andrews A.F.B.) to Reykjavik, Iceland
Reykjavik, Iceland to Washington, D.C. (Andrews A.F.B.)

Statute Miles
2,880
2,880

Flying Time
5 hours and 20 minutes
6 hours and 5 minutes

6770 10-88 STATE (INR/GE)
PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN'S TRIPS ABROAD  
DURING HIS PRESIDENCY

MEXICO: Juarez - January 5, 1981. Met with President Jose Lopez-Portillo.


CANADA: Ottawa, Ontario; Montebello, Quebec - July 19-21, 1981. As a participant in the Economic Summit met with:
- Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada
- President Francois Mitterrand of France
- Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini of Italy
- Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki of Japan
- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom
- Mr. Gaston Thorn, President of the European Communities Commission

MEXICO: Cancun, October 21-24, 1981. As a participant in the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development, met with:
- President Jose Lopez-Portillo of Mexico
- Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr of Austria
- Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, President and Secretary General of the National Liberation Front of Algeria
- Justice Abdus Sattar, Acting President of Bangladesh
- Ambassador Ramon Saraiva Guerreiro, Foreign Minister of Brazil
- Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada
- Premier Zhao Ziyang, Premier and Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, China
- President Francois Mitterrand of France
- Vice Chancellor Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany
- President Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham of Guyana
- Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India
- Minister of Foreign Affairs Simeon Ake of the Ivory Coast
- Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki of Japan
- President Alhaji Shehu Shagari of Nigeria
- President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines
- Crown Prince Fahd, Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia
- Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin of Sweden
- President Julius Kambarage Nyerere of Tanzania
- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom
- President Luis Herrera Campins of Venezuela
- President Sergej Kraigher of Yugoslavia
- Secretary General Kurt Waldheim of the United Nations

JAMAICA: Kingston - April 7, 1982. Met with:
- Prime Minister Seaga
- Governor General Glasspole.

BARBADOS: Bridgetown - April 8, 1982. Met with:
- Prime Minister Vere C. Bird, Sr. of Antigua and Barbuda
- Prime Minister J.M.G. (Tom) Adams and Governor General and Mrs. Deighton Ward of Barbados
- Prime Minister M. Eugenia Charles of Dominica
- Premier Kennedy A. Simmonds of St. Christopher-Nevis
- Prime Minister R. Milton Cato of St. Vincent and the Grenadines

FRANCE: Paris - June 3, 1982. Met with:
- President Francois Mitterrand of France
- Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy
- Mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac

FRANCE: Versailles - June 4-6, 1982. As a participant in the Economic Summit met with:
- Prime Minister Wilfried Martens of Belgium, EC Presidency
- Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada
- President Gaston Thorn, European Communities Commission
- President Francois Mitterrand of France
- Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini of Italy
- Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki of Japan
- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom
- Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany
ITALY: Rome and The Vatican - June 7, 1982. Met with:
- President Sandro Pertini of Italy
- Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini

THE VATICAN:
- His Holiness Pope John Paul II

UNITED KINGDOM: London - June 8-9, 1982. Met with:
- Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and HRH The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh
- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: Bonn - June 10, 1982. Met with:
- Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
- President Karl Carstens
- NATO Secretary General Josef Luns of the Netherlands

BERLIN: June 11, 1982. Met with:
- Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Governing Mayor Richard von Weizsaecker, FRG


BRAZIL: Brasilia; Sao Paulo - November 30 - December 3, 1982. Met with:
- President Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo
- Governor Jose Maria Marin


COSTA RICA: San Jose - December 3-4, 1982. Met with:
- President Luis Alberto Monge
- President Alvaro Magana of El Salvador

HONDURAS: San Pedro Sula - December 4, 1982. Met with:
- President Roberto Suazo
- Brig. General Jose Rios Montt, President of Guatemala

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JAPAN: Tokyo - November 9-12, 1983. Met with:
- Emperor Hirohito
- Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone


PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
Beijing, Xi'an, Shanghai - April 26-May 1, 1984. Met with:
- President Li Xiannian
- Premier Zhao Ziyang
- General Secretary Hu Yaobang
- Chairman Deng Xiaoping


UNITED KINGDOM: London - June 4-10, 1984. As a participant in the Economic Summit met with:
- HM Queen Elizabeth II and HRH The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh
- Prime Minister Thatcher, United Kingdom
- Prime Minister Nakasone, Japan
- Prime Minister Craxi, Italy
- Chancellor Kohl, Federal Republic of Germany
- President Mitterrand, France


FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:
May 1-6, 1985. As a participant in the Bonn Economic Summit and visits to Bitburg, Hambach Castle and Hanover, met with:
- President Richard von Weizsacker, Federal Republic of Germany
- Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Federal Republic of Germany
- Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, Japan
- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, United Kingdom
- Prime Minister Francois Mitterrand, France
- Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, Italy
- Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Canada
- Mr. Jacques Delors, President of the European Communities Commission

SPAIN: Madrid - May 6-8, 1985. Met with:
- King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia
- President Felipe Gonzalez

FRANCE: Strasbourg - May 8, 1985. Met with:
- Pierre Pflimlin, President of the European Parliament

PORTUGAL: Lisbon - May 8-10, 1985. Met with:
- President Antonio Eanes
- Prime Minister Mario Soares

SWITZERLAND: Geneva - November 16-20, 1985. Met with:
- Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev, The Soviet Union
- President Kurt Furgler, Switzerland

BELGIUM: Brussels - November 20, 1985. Met with:
- King Baudouin I and Queen Fabiola, Belgium
- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, United Kingdom
- Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, Turkey
- Foreign Minister Fernandez Ordonez, Spain
- Prime Minister Cavaco Silva, Portugal
- Prime Minister Kare Willoch, Norway
- Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, The Netherlands
- Prime Minister Jacques Santer, Luxembourg
- Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, Belgium
- Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Canada
- Prime Minister Poul Schluter, Denmark
- Foreign Minister Dumas, France
- Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Germany
- Vice Premier Haralambopoulos, Greece
- Foreign Minister Steingrimur Hermannsson, Iceland
- Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, Italy

MEXICO: Mexicali - January 3, 1986. Met with:
- President Miguel de la Madrid
GRENADA: St. George's - February 20, 1986. Met with:
- Governor General Sir Paul Scoon
- Prime Minister Herbert Blaize, Grenada
- Prime Minister Viere Bird, Antigua
- Prime Minister Bernard St. John, Barbados
- Prime Minister Eugenia Charles, Dominica
- Prime Minister Edward Seaga, Jamaica
- Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds, St. Christopher-Nevis
- Prime Minister John Compton, St. Lucia
- Prime Minister James Mitchell, St. Vincent
- Prime Minister George Chambers, Trinidad & Tobago

INDONESIA: Bali - April 29 - May 2, 1986. Met with:
- President Soeharto, Indonesia
- Minister Sudharmono, Indonesia
- Foreign Minister Mochtar, Indonesia
- Minister A. Tahir, Indonesia
- Foreign Minister Salvador Laurel, the Philippines
- Foreign Minister Mohamed Bolkiah, Brunei Darussalam
- Foreign Minister Ahmad Rithauddeen, Malaysia
- Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan, Singapore
- Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila, Thailand

JAPAN: Tokyo - May 2 -7, 1986. Met with:
- Prime Minister Nakasone, Japan
- Prime Minister Craxi, Italy
- Chancellor Kohl, Germany
- Prime Minister Thatcher, Great Britian
- Prime Minister Mulroney, Canada
- President Mitterrand, France
**PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEETINGS WITH SOVIET LEADERS**

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<td>Chairman, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet - Andrey Gromyko</td>
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<td>Politburo Member, First Secretary of Ukranian Communist Party - Vladimir Shcherbitskiy</td>
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<td>9/86</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs - Eduard Shevardnadze</td>
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Ronald Wilson Reagan was born February 6, 1911, in Tampico, Illinois, the son of Nellie Wilson Reagan and John Reagan. He was educated in Illinois public schools and was graduated from Eureka College (Illinois) in 1932, with a degree in economics and sociology.

Following a brief career as a sports broadcaster and editor, Ronald Reagan moved to California to work in motion pictures. His film career, interrupted by three years of service in the Army Air Corps during World War II, encompassed 50 feature-length motion pictures. He served six terms as president of the Screen Actors Guild and two terms as president of the Motion Picture Industry Council.

In 1952 he married Nancy Davis. They have two grown children, Patricia Ann and Ronald Prescott. President Reagan has two other children, Maureen and Michael, by a previous marriage.

From motion pictures he went into television in the 1950's as production supervisor and host of "General Electric Theatre." In 1964-1965 he was host of the television series "Death Valley Days."

In 1966 Ronald Reagan began his public service career with his election -- by nearly a million-vote margin -- as Governor of California. Mr. Reagan was Chairman of the Republican Governors Association in 1969. He was elected to a second term as Governor of California in 1970. After completing his second term, Mr. Reagan began a nationally syndicated radio commentary program and newspaper column and undertook an extensive speaking schedule, speaking to civic, business, and political groups. In 1974-1975 he served as a member of the Presidential Commission investigating the CIA.

In November 1975 he announced his candidacy for the 1976 presidential nomination. He lost narrowly, but campaigned vigorously for the Republican ticket and for scores of local candidates in 1976. After the election, he renewed his radio commentary program, newspaper column, and national speaking schedule. He became a member of the Board of Directors of the Committee on the Present Danger and founded the Citizens for the Republic. In the 1978 elections he campaigned on behalf of 86 candidates.

In November 1979 Ronald Reagan announced his candidacy for the 1980 presidential nomination. At the Republican National Convention in July 1980 he was nominated unanimously on the first ballot. On
November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected to the Presidency, by an electoral vote of 489-49, and on January 20, 1981, he was sworn in as the 40th President of the United States.

After nearly four years as the nation's chief executive, Ronald Reagan announced his candidacy for re-election in a nationally televised address on January 29, 1984. He was renominated unanimously on the first ballot at the Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas, in August 1984. On November 6, 1984, Ronald Reagan was re-elected by more than 59% of the popular vote and an electoral vote of 525-13. He was officially sworn in to serve a second term on January 20, 1985 in a private ceremony at the White House. He was ceremonially sworn in on January 21, 1985 at the United States Capitol.

The President has received a number of awards, including: National Humanitarian Award from the National Conference of Christians and Jews; City of Hope "Torch of Life" Award for Humanitarian Service; Horatio Alger Award; Distinguished American Award from the National Football Foundation Hall of Fame; American Patriots Hall of Fame; and Medal of Valor of the State of Israel. He has also received honorary degrees from St. John's University (1985); the University of Galway, Ireland (1984); the University of South Carolina (1983); Seton Hall (1983); Notre Dame University (1981); Azusa Pacific (1973); Pepperdine University (1970); and Eureka College (1957).

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## Time Conversion Table

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+1 day
Notes on Customs for Traveling Press

Everyone will be expected to fill out a customs declaration form to be returned to the steward just prior to returning to a U.S. point of entry. You will need to note on the declaration when:

- The total fair retail value of articles acquired abroad exceeds $400, or if acquired in American Samoa, Guam, or the U.S. Virgin Islands, $800.
- More than 1 liter (33.8 fl. oz.) of alcoholic beverages, 200 cigarettes, or more than 100 cigars are included. Or if returning from American Samoa, Guam, or the U.S. Virgin Islands: more than 4 liters (135.2 fl. oz.) of alcoholic beverages, 100 cigars, and 1,000 cigarettes.
- Some of the items are not intended for your personal or household use, such as commercial samples, items for sale or use in your business, or articles you are bringing home for another person.
- Articles acquired in the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, or Guam are being sent to the United States.
- A customs duty or internal revenue tax is collectible on any article in your possessions.

Note: “Courtesy of the Port” does not mean you do not have to fill out a declaration or that you will not have to pay customs duty. Your declarations will be reviewed by customs officials at the U.S. point of entry and you will be billed for any dutiable items purchased.

Prohibited and Restricted Articles

Some items must meet certain requirements, require a license or permit, or may be prohibited entry. Among these are:

- Absinthe
- Biological material
- Books protected by American copyright if unauthorized foreign reprints
- Candy, liquor-filled
- Copies of gold coins if not properly marked
- Electronic products subject to radiation emission standards
- Firearms & ammunition
- Food, drugs, and certain other items not approved by FDA
- Fruits, plants, vegetables & their products
- Hazardous articles (e.g., fireworks, dangerous toys, toxic or poisonous substances)
- Lottery tickets
- Meats, poultry & products (e.g., sausage, pate, canned items)
- Motor vehicles not conforming to safety and emission standards
- Narcotics & dangerous drugs including medicine containing same
- Objects of Central and South American pre-Columbian Indian cultures
- Obscene articles & publications
- Pets (e.g., dogs, birds, turtles, monkeys)
- Seditious or treasonable matter
- Trademarked items (e.g., certain cameras, watches, perfumes)
- Switchblade knives
- Wildlife (birds, fish, animals) & endangered and protected species (e.g., pheasants; furskin; feathers, eggs, or skins of wild birds; articles from reptile skins, ivory, and whalebone).

Special Note: A U.S. Customs Official will be aboard the Press Plane to facilitate Customs procedures.
Iceland

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs

August 1986

PROFILE

Geography
Area: 102,845 sq. km. (39,769 sq. mi.); slightly smaller than Kentucky. Cities: Capital—Reykjavik (pop. 89,000). Other cities—Kopavogur (17,000), Akureyri (15,000). Terrain: Rugged. Climate: Maritime temperate.

People

Government


Subdivisions: 20 Sýslur (counties).

Political parties: Independence (IP), Progressive (PP), Social Democrats (SDP), People’s Alliance (PA), Social Democratic Alliance (SDA), Women’s List (WL). Suffrage: Universal over 18.

National holiday: June 17, anniversary of the establishment of the republic.

Flag: Red cross edged in white on a blue field.

Economy
GNP (1985 est.): $2.6 billion. Annual growth rate (1986 est.): 2.8%. Per capita income (1984): $10,216. Avg. inflation rate (last 4 yrs.): 50%.

Natural resources: Fish, hydroelectric and geothermal power, diatomite.

Agriculture (6% of GNP): Products—livestock, hay, fodder, cheese.

Industry (36% of GNP): Types—fishing, aluminum processing.


Fiscal year: Calendar year.

Membership in International Organizations
UN, NATO, Nordic Council, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Council of Europe, European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
GEOGRAPHY

Iceland is an island in the North Atlantic Ocean east of Greenland and immediately south of the Arctic Circle. It lies about 4,200 kilometers (2,600 mi.) from New York and 830 kilometers (520 mi.) from Scotland.

Almost 80% of Iceland’s land area, which is of recent volcanic origin, consists of glaciers, lakes, a mountainous lava desert (highest elevation 2,000 meters—6,600 ft.—above sea level), and other wasteland. The remaining 20% is used for cultivation or grazing. The inhabited areas are on the coast, particularly in the southwest.

Due to the Gulf Stream’s moderating influence, the climate is characterized by damp, cool summers and relatively mild but extremely windy winters. In Reykjavik, the average temperature is 11°C (52°F) in July and –1°C (30°F) in January.

PEOPLE

Most Icelanders are descendants of Norwegian settlers and Celts from the British Isles, and the population is remarkably homogeneous. Some 85% of Icelanders live in urban areas. Of the Nordic languages, the Icelandic language is closest to the Old Norse language and has remained relatively unchanged since the 12th century.

About 97% of the population belong to the state church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, or other Lutheran churches. However, Iceland has complete religious liberty, and other Protestant and Roman Catholic congregations are present.

Cultural Achievements

Iceland’s proudest cultural achievement is its literary contributions. In the 12th and 13th centuries, Icelandic writers recorded Eddic and Skaldic poetry portraying many of the legends, religious beliefs, and ideas of the pre-Christian Nordic/Germanic people, thereby preserving much of this invaluable heritage.

The Sagas, almost all of which were written between 1180-1300, remain Iceland’s best-known literary accomplishment. Based on Norwegian and Icelandic histories and genealogies, the Sagas present views of Nordic life and times up to 1100, and they have no counterpart anywhere in the Nordic world. The Saga writers sought to record their heroes’ great achievements and to glorify the virtues of courage, pride, and honor, focusing in the later Sagas on the early settlers of Iceland.

Iceland’s fine arts did not flourish to the same extent as its literature until the 19th century because the population was small and scattered. Perhaps Iceland’s most famous painters are Asgri- mar Jónsson, Jon Stefansson, and Johannes Kjarval, all of whom worked during the first half of the 20th century. The best-known modern sculptor, Arnar Sigurðsson (1893-1982), drew his inspiration from Icelandic folklore and the Sagas.

HISTORY

Iceland was settled in the late 9th and early 10th centuries, principally by Norwegians. In A.D. 930, the ruling chiefs of Iceland established a republican constitution and an assembly called the Althing—the oldest parliament in the world. Iceland remained independent until 1262 when the Norwegian king succeeded in extending his sovereignty to Iceland. It passed to Denmark late in the 14th century when Norway and Denmark were united under the Danish crown.

Early in the 19th century, national consciousness revived in Iceland. The Althing had been abolished in 1800, but in 1843, it was reestablished as a consultative assembly. In 1874, the Althing obtained limited legislative authority, and a constitution was granted to Iceland. The constitution was revised in 1903 when home rule was granted, and a minister for Icelandic affairs, residing in Reykjavik, was made responsible for the Althing. The Act of Union, a 1918 agreement with Denmark, recognized Iceland as a fully sovereign state united with Denmark under a common king.

Iceland established its own flag and asked that Denmark represent its foreign affairs and defense interests.

German occupation of Denmark in 1940 severed communications between Iceland and Denmark. In May 1940, Iceland was occupied by British military forces. In July 1941, responsibility for Iceland’s defense passed to the United States under a U.S.-Icelandic defense agreement. Following a plebiscite, the country was formally established as an independent republic on June 17, 1944.

In October 1946, the Icelandic and U.S. Governments agreed to terminate U.S. responsibility for the defense of Iceland, but the United States retained certain rights at Keflavik. Iceland became a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. After the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in 1950, and pursuant to the request of NATO military authorities, the United States and Iceland agreed that the United States should again be responsible for Iceland’s defense. This
agreement, signed on May 5, 1951, is the authority for U.S. military presence in Iceland. Iceland is the only NATO country with no military forces of its own.

GOVERNMENT

The president, elected to a 4-year term, has limited powers. The prime minister and the Cabinet exercise most executive functions.

The Althing (Parliament) is composed of 60 members, normally elected every 4 years. In 1987, this number will be increased to 63. After elections, the Althing divides into Upper (20 members) and Lower (40 members) Houses, but the two houses often meet together. Suffrage for presidential and parliamentary elections is universal, and the electoral system combines direct and proportional representation.

The judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, district courts, and various special courts. The constitution protects the judiciary from infringement by the other two branches.

Principal Government Officials

President—Vigdis Finnbogadottir
Prime Minister—Steingrimur Hermannsson (PP)

Ministers

Foreign Affairs—Matthias A. Mathiesen (IP)
Fisheries—Halkdor Asgrinsson (PP)
Social Affairs—Alexander Stefansson (PP)
Commerce and Communications—Matthias A. Bjarnason (IP)
Agriculture, Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs—Jon Helgason (PP)
Industry and Energy—Albert Gudmundsson (IP)
Finance—Thorsteinn Palsson (IP)
Education and Culture—Sverrir Hermannsson (IP)
Health and Social Security—Ragnhildur Helgadottir
Ambassador to the United States—Ingui S. Ingvarsson
Ambassador to the United Nations—Hans G. Aandraen


POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Growing economic difficulties led to the resignation in March 1983 of the center-left coalition government led by a faction of the Independence Party under Prime Minister Gunnar Thoroddsen. As a result of elections in April 1983, a center-right coalition comprising the Independence Party and Prime Minister Steingrimur Hermannsson’s Progressive Party assumed power on May 26. The People’s Alliance, the Social Democratic Party, the Women’s List, and the Social Democratic Alliance are in opposition. New elections must be held by the spring of 1987.

The present coalition is committed to Iceland’s continued membership in NATO and to maintaining the presence of U.S. forces at the Keflavik NATO Base. The principal goal of the coalition has been to adopt economic measures to confront Iceland’s economic difficulties.

ECONOMY

The fishing industry is the backbone of the Icelandic economy. In 1985, marine product exports accounted for 72% of the value of total Icelandic exports.

Further Information

These titles are provided as a general indication of the material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse unofficial publications.


Although much of the fishing and fish-processing industry is beset with debt, and the fishing fleet may be too large, there are clear signs that the stock of the most valuable fish species, especially cod, may be on the rise. Catches fell off significantly in 1982 and 1983, but rose again in 1985.

Gross national product (GNP) rose by an annual average rate of 4.5% in the 1951–1971 period and 1.6% in the years 1974–1983. The GNP growth rate was 2.5% in 1985. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP), calculated at $10,216 in 1984, is one of the highest in Europe. Further, private consumption per capita, calculated by the OECD at $6,024 in 1983, is well above the average for member countries. Figures on occupational distribution indicate that services and like employment account for 30.1% of the labor force, with manufacturing taking 16.2%, commerce 15.5%, and fisheries and processing 14.3%.

The United States continues to be Iceland’s major overseas market for fish products, with sales in 1985 accounting for over 27% of total export revenues.

The U.S. share of Iceland’s market, on the other hand, declined in 1985 to about 7%. Total U.S. exports to Iceland amounted to $61.5 million (c.i.f.) in 1985. Other important markets for Iceland are the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the Soviet Union, respectively.

There is considerable concern in Iceland about the need to spur greater GNP growth rates, especially in view of the high level of foreign debt and interest payments on that debt. Consequently, there is renewed interest in identifying and supporting the growth of new industries, as well as streamlining established industries to make them more self-sufficient and competitive internationally.

Iceland has few proven mineral resources, although deposits of diatomite
Travel Notes

Climate and clothing: The climate in Iceland is similar to that in the US northwest. Woolen or other warm clothing is worn all year.

Health: Iceland has no endemic health problems. The major cities have adequate medical facilities.

Telecommunications: Telephone and telegraph service is state owned and is available to all parts of Iceland and principal points abroad. Reykjavik is five time zones ahead of eastern standard time.

Transportation: Iceland has no railroads or streetcars. Local taxi and bus services are safe and efficient, but taxi fares are higher than on the US east coast. Most roads outside the immediate vicinity of Reykjavik are dirt or gravel and are only of poor to fair quality. Cars or four-wheel-drive vehicles may be rented.

Tourist attractions: The main attraction of Iceland is its scenery, particularly during the late spring and summer. The rugged landscape includes geysers and hot springs in various parts of the country and numerous waterfalls streaming from the glaciers and volcanic fields. The major historic site, now a national park, is Thingvellir, where the world's first parliament convened.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Iceland wishes to maintain and strengthen its economic and political independence and a balanced foreign trade without becoming unduly involved in controversies among other nations. While Iceland maintains diplomatic and commercial relations with the leading nations of the East and West, its ties with the other Nordic nations and with the United States are particularly close.

U.S.-ICELANDIC RELATIONS

U.S. policy aims at maintaining the present close, cooperative relations with Iceland, both as a NATO ally and as a friend interested in the shared objectives of establishing world peace and freedom and encouraging global economic and social development.

The question of whether U.S. defense forces stationed at Keflavik under NATO auspices should be requested to leave the country has periodically surfaced as a major political issue in Iceland. The question was hotly debated in the 1974 general election campaign after the outgoing leftist government had invoked the termination provision of the Iceland-U.S. defense agreement. In October 1974, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the two governments which called for continued use by the United States of defense facilities on mutually acceptable terms. The present Icelandic Government and the United States have continued the close and friendly relations they have enjoyed since the conclusion of the 1974 agreement.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—L. Nicholas Ruwe
Deputy Chief of Mission—James K. Connell
Political Officer—Richard H. Zorn
Economic Officer—James V. Ledesma
Administrative Officer—William N. Campbell
Consular Officer—Fredericka Semadel-Heard
Political/Military Officer—Juha O. Merikoski
Public Affairs Officer—Hugh J. Ivory
Commander, Iceland Defense Force—Rear Adm. Edwin K. Anderson (USN)

The U.S. Embassy in Iceland is located at Laufasvegur 21, Reykjavik (tel. 29100).
ICELAND KRONA (IKr) CONVERSION TABLE AT IKr 40.4 = U.S. $

(Krona = 100 eyrir)

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NOTE: ALL U.S DOLLAR VALUES ARE ROUNDED TO NEAREST U.S. CENT. VALUE OF THE KRONA FLUCTUATES ACCORDING TO CURRENCY MARKET CONDITIONS.

October 1, 1986
City of Reykjavik: Reykjavik is the capital and largest city of Iceland. When the population of surrounding suburban areas is taken into account, over one-half of all Icelanders live in the greater Reykjavik area. This year, the city is celebrating its 200th anniversary, 1786 - 1986. It is situated on a peninsula extending from the southwest coast and despite its location close to the Arctic circle, Reykjavik's climate is similar to that of the northwestern U. S. coast, although cooler and windier. The Gulf Stream keeps the annual mean temperature at 41°F. Cooler weather lasts from October through April; snow may fall in Reykjavik as early as September, but often does not come until October or November. During winter and spring, winds in the capital can reach hurricane force.

Reykjavik is the focal point of Iceland's cultural activity with the national university, several theaters and museums found there. The harbor with its extensive shipping and commercial fishing activity is the economic heart of the city. The terrain around the city is essentially barren lava; however, the mountains and natural harbor form a scenic setting. The city is modern with new buildings of reinforced concrete rapidly replacing older wooden frame and corrugated iron structures. Most of the city's central heating is supplied by hot springs. Reykjavik has thermally-heated outdoor pools which are open year round, as well as three small lakes and several parks. The city boasts eight daily Icelandic language newspapers, plus one monthly review in English.

The Ambassador's Residence

The residence is a three-story concrete building with white stucco exterior that adjoins the Embassy. Entry into the residence is possible from the street level or from the second story of the Embassy. The residence faces the street and has no front lawn; however, there is a small garden at the rear. The first floor has the living room, den with fireplace, dining room and covered patio. The second floor has the master bedroom with adjoining dressing room, bathroom and study; there are two other double bedrooms, one single bedroom and two additional baths.

Hofdi House

The building is located in the eastern part of the city on Borgatun street. The house is isolated from the surrounding area with a circular driveway in front and a large surrounding lawn. The view from the drawing room looks directly out to the sea and Esja mountain. The building is now used as the guest
and reception house for the city of Reykjavik. It was formerly the residence of the British Ambassador, who reportedly left the premises due to activity by a ghost also in residence. (For those seeking a more scientific explanation, the house apparently sits over an area of thermally heated underground water, which causes the porous lava soil under the house to expand and contract slightly, leading to creaking and movement by the building.) The building is two stories high with a basement.

It is likely that the Reykjavik mayor, David Oddsson, will greet the President and General Secretary when they enter the meeting site since it belongs to the City of Reykjavik.

The Holt Hotel

The Holt is a small hotel, with 50 rooms. It is situated just a few blocks from the Embassy and Ambassador's Residence. The rooms in the rear have a lovely view of the National Cathedral, while those in the front overlook the downtown area. The restaurant has the reputation of serving Reykjavik's finest food. The rooms are not furnished to the standards of the grand European hotels; however, they are modern, comfortable and well-appointed. The hotel will cash travellers checks and accepts major credit cards. It is possible to direct dial to the U.S. from the hotel.

The Loftleider, Saga and Esja Hotels

The Saga Hotel with 160 rooms will host the U.S.S.R. delegation. It is located on the edge of the downtown area, adjacent to the University of Iceland. The Saga is the most recently renovated of the three hotels. All rooms will have bath or shower. The Loftleider is the largest of the three, with 210 rooms. It is located on the grounds of the in-town airport, which is used for domestic flights. All rooms will have bath or shower. The Esja hotel is located next to Iceland Television Studios and has 135 rooms, all with bath or shower. The Esja is not considered to be easy walking distance from the downtown area.

All three hotels have restaurants and will cash travellers checks and accept major credit cards. They all are modern concrete-and-glass construction; rooms are small but comfortable. Some double rooms will only have two single beds available. It will be possible to direct dial to the U.S. from all three hotels.
Mr. Nicholas Ruwe was appointed Ambassador to Iceland on July 19, 1985.

Prior to his appointment, Mr. Ruwe served as senior consultant to the Reagan/Bush campaign and as a member of the 50th American Presidential Inaugural Committee. From 1980 to 1984 he served as former President Richard Nixon’s Chief of Staff in New York City, New York. He accompanied the former President on all his trips, including visits to western and central Europe, Egypt, and the Middle East to attend the funeral of President Sadat, and to the People’s Republic of China on the 10th anniversary of the Shanghai Communiqué.

From 1969 to 1975, Mr. Ruwe served in the Department of State as Assistant Chief of Protocol. He undertook various assignments for the White House, including directing Col. Frank Borman’s European good will tour of the Astronauts of Apollo 8 and 11, following their historic landing on the moon.

Mr. Ruwe was born in 1933 in Detroit, Michigan. He is a graduate of Brown University and has studied at the University of Michigan Graduate School of Business Administration.

Mr. Ruwe, an avid sportsman who has hunted on four continents, has also been a leader in the National Organization of Ducks Unlimited.

He is married to the former Nancy Lammerding, who was Social Secretary at the Ford White House.
Iceland

Chief of State and Cabinet Members

Vigdis Finnbogadottir, President
Steingrimur Hermannsson, Prime Minister
Matthias A. Mathiesen, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Thorsteinn Palsson, Minister of Finance
Matthias Bjarnason, Minister of Commerce and Communication
Ragnhildur Helgadottir, Minister of Health and Social Security
Jon Helgason, Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs
Sverrir Hermannsson, Minister of Education
Albert Gudmundsson, Ministry of Industry
Halldor Asgrimsson, Minister of Fisheries
Alexander Stefansson, Minister of Social Affairs
Vigdís FINNBOGADÓTTIR
(Phonetic: FINbohgahDOHter)

President (since August 1980)

Addressed as: Madam President

Vigdís Finnbogadóttir is Iceland's first female President and the first woman in the world to become a head of state through democratic election. A former theater director and teacher, she had not previously held public office. Finnbogadóttir has used her largely ceremonial position primarily to promote Icelandic culture, language, and exports. Her most important political duty is to appoint a prime minister when representatives of the major parties are unable to agree.

During the early 1950s Finnbogadóttir studied theater history at the Sorbonne. She subsequently majored in French at the University of Iceland, where she received a B.A. degree. She has also studied art history in Copenhagen. Finnbogadóttir began work as a tour guide with a tourist bureau in the late 1950s and eventually became a public relations representative for the bureau. She later taught French on television. During 1972-80 she was director of the Reykjavik Municipal Theater and taught French theater history at the University of Iceland. A member of the Nordic Council Cultural Affairs Committee during 1976-80, she was its chairman during 1978-80.

Finnbogadóttir, 56, speaks fluent English. Divorced, she has an adopted daughter, Aðrídur Magnusdóttir.
Key U.S. Officials in Iceland

AMBASSADOR: Nicolas Ruwe
DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION: James K. Connell
POLITICAL OFFICER: Richard Zorn, II
POLITICAL/MILITARY OFFICER: John O. Merikoski
ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL OFFICER: James V. Ledesma
CONSUL: Frederica Schmabel-Heard
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: William N. Campbell
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER: Hugh Ivory
CULTURAL AFFAIRS OFFICER: Stephen Gangstead
United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs

October 1985

PROFILE

People
Nationality: Noun and adjective—Soviet(s).
Population (1984): 273.8 million. Annual growth rate: 0.9%. Density: 12 per sq. km. (31/sq. mi.). Ethnic groups (1979): 52% Russian, 16% Ukrainian, 8% Uzbek, 4% Belorussian. Religions (reliable statistics unavailable): Russian Orthodox, Muslim (major; Georgian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Protestant, Jewish.
Languages: Russian (lingua franca); more than 100 spoken, 18 by groups of more than 1 million each. Education: Years compulsory—11. Attendance—over 90%. Literacy—99.8% (between 9-49 yrs., 1979). Health: Infant mortality rate—30/1,000 (by Soviet definition); 34/1,000 (by US definition). Life expectancy (1982)—62 yrs. (males); 73 yrs. (females). Work force (129.1 million, 1983): Agriculture—19%. Industry—29%. Transportation and communications—10%. Services—20%. Government—2%.

Geography
Area: 22,402,076 sq. km. (8.65 million sq. mi.), about 2% times the size of the US. Cities: Capital—Moscow (pop. 8.5 million). Other cities—Leningrad (4.5 million), Kiev (2.4 million), Tashkent (2 million). Terrain: Varied; low mountains, prairies, tundra. Climate: Varied; generally long, cold winters and short summers.

Government
Type: One-party state in which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union controls the state apparatus. Federal Union (est. December 30, 1922).
State Organs: USSR Council of Ministers, USSR Supreme Soviet (750-member Council of the Union, 749-member Council of Nationalities), Supreme Court of the USSR.

Administrative subdivisions: 15 union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 6 krays, 120 oblasts, 8 autonomous oblasts.
Defense (1983): 12%—14% of GNP.
Flag: Red with a yellow hammer and sickle below a yellow star in the upper left corner.

Economy
Natural resources: Fossil fuels, water-power, timber, manganese, lead, zinc, nickel, mercury, potash, phosphate.
Agriculture (14% of GNP, 1983): Products—wheat, rye, oats, potatoes, sugar beets, linseed, sunflower seed, cotton and flax, cattle, pigs, sheep. Land—27%.
Industry (37% of GNP, 1983): Types—mining, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, fuels and power, building materials, chemicals, machine building.

Membership in International Organizations
The U.S.S.R. is the largest country in the world. Its territory stretches from the Baltic Sea across the northern Eurasian landmass to the Bering Strait, where an island belonging to the Soviet Union lies only 4.8 kilometers (3 mi.) from one that is part of Alaska. Most of the U.S.S.R. is above 50 north latitude (Winnipeg, Canada lies on that latitude). The latitude of Moscow is the same as that of southern Alaska.

In the west, from the Pripyat Marches near the Polish border to the Ural Mountains, Soviet territory stretches over a broad plain broken only by occasional low hills. Crossing this plain to the south are a number of rivers, the most important being the Dnieper, which empties into the Black Sea, and the Volga, which empties into the Caspian Sea. Between the Black and Caspian Seas lie the scenic Caucasian Mountains.

The Urala mark the traditional division between European and Asiatic Russia. To the east are the vast Siberian lowlands and the deserts of central Asia. Beyond are the barren Siberian highlands and the mountain ranges of the Soviet far east. Farther to the east lie the higher mountain ranges, including the Pamirs, Altai, and Tien Shan.

The climate of the Soviet Union, though varied, tends to be long, cold winters and brief summers. In parts of the eastern Siberian tundra, temperatures of -68°C (-90°F) have been recorded, and the January average is about -51°C (-60°F). South of the tundra is a large forest belt covering more than half the country.

St. Basil’s Cathedral, Red Square.

South of the forests are the steppes (prairies), where the soil is rich and dark. In this zone are located the “black earth” or chernozem soils, some of the best in the world. However, this zone is hampered by its rainless climate and desiccating flows of hot, dry air, the famous Russian sukhovoy, so that it is not as productive as some areas of the world with less fertile soils. The steppes make up 12% of the U.S.S.R.’s area and contain two-thirds of the arable land.

A small subtropical zone lies south of the steppes along the shores of the Black and Caspian Seas. To the southeast, in the deserts of central Asia, rainfall amounts in some places to only 10 centimeters (4 in.) per year.

More than 100 ethnic groups live in the U.S.S.R., but most are very small. Of the total population, 72% are Eastern Slavs. More than 70% of the Slavs (slightly more than one-half the total population) are Russians; the rest are Ukrainians and Belorussians, who live in the southwestern and western sectors of the European part of the U.S.S.R. The remainder of the population includes peoples belonging to Turkic, Finno-Ugric, Caucasian, other Indo-European,
and less numerous ethnic groups, including Eskimos. Although each group has its own language, Russian is widely used and is promoted as a second language for all non-Russians.

School programs are governed by ministries of education in the various republics under the control and guidance of the national Ministry of Education, established in July 1919. The programs emphasize science, include the study of at least one foreign language (often English), and are permeated with political indoctrination. A limited number of elective subjects are being introduced in secondary schools on a trial basis for outstanding students. Otherwise, all students are expected to follow the same curriculum.

According to the provisions of a 1924 educational reform, Soviet children are to begin elementary school at age 6, following 1 or 2 (or more) years in state-operated nursery schools and kindergartens. The goal is to increase compulsory schooling to 11 years (from the previous 10) for all children between the ages of 6 and 17.

The Soviet Union also maintains an extensive network of vocational and professional schools, with classes lasting from 6 months to 2 years. These schools supply industry and agriculture with semiskilled and skilled labor. In most cases, students enter vocational schools after 7-8 years of general school; present policy envisions eventually providing all vocational students with a general secondary education as well. In addition, schools and institutions providing semi-professional and professional training are available. These generally require complete secondary education for admission. Graduates of the 2-5-year program become "middle-grade specialists."

A small proportion of 11-year-school graduates may enroll in an institution of higher learning. Admission is highly competitive and is based on academic records; entrance examination scores; and, to some extent, on social, political, and ethnic background. A higher educational institution may be either a university (a center of general studies normally with a 5-year program) or a more specialized institute (where the course may last 4-6 years). In either case, the curriculum is only slightly less rigid than that of the general secondary schools, and political indoctrination courses are required. The costs of higher education are paid by the state, and students are given small monthly stipends.

Upon completion of a university or institute course of study, most students go to work in areas and jobs specified by national planning authorities. Eventually, a few may return to do postgraduate work in preparation for the advanced degrees of candidate of sciences or doctor of sciences.

HISTORY

Modern Russian history dates from March 1917, when, after pressuring Tsar Nicholas II into abdicating, representatives of the national legislature formed a provisional government. Like the Tsarist regime, the new government continued its participation in World War I, which led to widespread economic and social dislocation and popular discontent. On November 7, 1917, the government was overthrown by a revolutionary group known as the Bolshevik ("Majority") wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, leader of the Bolsheviks, was named head of the first Soviet Government. The new regime concluded the treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany and the other Central Powers on March 3, 1918, ending its participation in World War I. The Soviets declared all land the property of the state, and a rapid succession of decrees nationalized factories, banks, railroads, and other sectors of the economy. A bitter civil war ensued, lasting until 1922.

Lenin's death in 1924 intensified an intraparty struggle between groups led by Josef Stalin, General Secretary of the Party, and, most notably, Leon Trotsky, Grigori Zinoviev, and Nikolay Bukharin. Stalin defeated his rivals in the late 1920s and later had them executed or assassinated. Untold numbers of other Soviet political, military, economic, and cultural leaders were imprisoned.
and many died in the purges of the 1930s. Over 11 million people died in an artificially induced famine from 1932-33 as part of Stalin's attempt to gain foreign exchange by selling grain. The Soviet regime also saw in the famine a means of subduing the rebellious Ukrainian peasantry. As many as 12 million others died during the period of the 1930s in labor camps. Party purges reached a climax in the late 1930s, and, virtually the entire Soviet leadership was purged in 1938. The effects on military preparedness were especially severe, since the Red army leadership was also caught up in the arrests. Throughout the 1930s, Stalin also enforced a program of extremely rapid industrialization, particularly in heavy industry.

In the interwar years, Soviet diplomacy was directed toward gaining acceptance by other European countries. It succeeded only partially, however, because the Soviet-led third Communist International (Comintern), founded in March 1919, attempted through local communist organizations to undermine West European governments. Soviet Russia was recognized by many European countries in 1924. The United States recognized the U.S.S.R. in 1933, but relations soon became strained.

**World War II**

In the spring of 1939, Stalin made overtures to Nazi Germany, and on August 23 of that year, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. This 2-year nonaggression treaty included secret provisions for the division of Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and the Soviets followed on September 17. The Soviet Government then abrogated its nonaggression pact with Finland and invaded in November 1939. Although there was strong and stubborn Finnish resistance, the Soviets prevailed by virtue of overwhelming numbers. Peace negotiations concluded on March 12, 1940, led to the cession of a large part of eastern Finland to the U.S.S.R. In June 1940, the independent nations of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union. The United States has never recognized the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. In July, the U.S.S.R. also forcibly annexed two eastern provinces of Romania—Bessarabia, and northern Bukovina.

Hitler turned on his newfound ally and invaded the U.S.S.R. on June 22, 1941. German troops advanced as far as the outskirts of Moscow before being driven back. Four years of fighting and heavy casualties left widespread devastation in the European part of the Soviet Union. Seven and one-half million Soviet soldiers and up to 20 million Soviet civilians perished in the conflict. However, the ultimate victory of the Allies found Soviet forces in a dominant position in Eastern Europe. Protection of this position and enforcing the division of Germany have been fundamental tenets of Soviet foreign policy since 1945.

To engender patriotic support for the war in an appeal to tradition and nationalism, Stalin permitted certain noncommunist elements of Russia's pre-revolutionary past, such as the church, to play a larger role in society. Postwar reconstruction, however, brought a return to the oppressive policies of the 1930s.

**Postwar Period**

Profound differences over the postwar order in Europe led almost immediately to a deep chill in relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The United States responded with a policy of "containment" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, which in turn led to the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, and the development of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliance systems. The victory of communist forces in China in 1949, the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in September 1949, and the Soviet-sponsored invasion of South Korea by North Korea in June 1950 led to a further deterioration in East-West relations.

Stalin died on March 3, 1953. As his successors maneuvered for power, they modified some of the more repressive aspects of the regime but did not alter its totalitarian structure. Nikita S. Khrushchev, installed as First Secretary of the Communist Party in September 1953, consolidated his power when he defeated an attempt by G.M. Malenkov,
V. Molotov, and others to unseat him as party leader in June 1957.

In a secret speech to the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, Khrushchev denounced Stalin as a despot who had sacrificed much of the party's best talents through misguided purges and mistaken military tactics. "Destalinization" was accompanied by the introduction of certain reforms into the political system, and under Khrushchev's leadership, the principle of "peaceful coexistence" with the West was given greater emphasis. Party rule remained supreme, but some discussion and controversy within the party was permitted. Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964, although the Soviet news agency TASS announced that he had resigned because of poor health and advanced age. Aleksey Kosygin became Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Leonid Brezhnev was made First Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee.

Brezhnev's Leadership

Brezhnev emerged from the 24th Party Congress (March-April 1971) as first among equals in a collective leadership. The new leadership's desire to build a more solid, institutional consensus for policy decisions was shown in April 1973, when heads of the army, secret police, and foreign ministry were given full membership in the ruling Politburo. Official actions under this leadership reflected the sharing of power among leaders reluctant to permit significant changes in the internal or external political status quo. Although some attempt was made to repair the damage inflicted on Stalin's image during the Khrushchev era, there was no return to the mass terror of the Stalin period.

In the early 1970s, Soviet relations with Western countries improved, and trade with the West expanded. Several arms control agreements, the cornerstone of which was SALT I (1972), were concluded with the United States. For a brief period in the mid-1970s, it also appeared as if internal controls were easing. Dissidents emerged in large numbers; Brezhnev signed the Helsinki Final Act, which committed the Soviet Union to observe certain human rights standards; and emigration from the Soviet Union increased dramatically. As the decade progressed, however, the regime initiated a gradual internal tightening of controls, which coincided with a more aggressive Soviet arms buildup and foreign policy. Soviet and Soviet-proxy interference in Angola and the Horn of Africa, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the suppression of the labor movement "Solidarity" in Poland, and a brutal crackdown on human rights in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to a renewed chilly period in East-West relations.

Following the death of Brezhnev in November 1982, Yury Andropov, former Chairman of the KGB, became General Secretary. Andropov initiated a campaign to eliminate corruption and began to chart a new program of economic reform. Seriously ill for most of his 15-month tenure, he did not live long enough to implement fully his new policies. East-West relations deteriorated further under his brief tenure with the Soviet suspension of the START [strategic arms reduction talks] and INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] talks, the attack on Korean Air Lines Flight 007, and other developments. When Andropov died on February 9, 1984, the Politburo selected Konstantin Chernenko to succeed him as General Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee. Chernenko also proved
to be in poor health and died after barely a year in office. To succeed him, the Politburo promptly chose Mikhail Gorbachev, 54, thereby beginning the transfer of power to a new generation.

Present Leadership

Gorbachev's rise in the Soviet power structure was unusually swift: from a regional party leader to the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] General Secretary in only 6 years. After 8 years as head of the Stavropol region party apparatus, Gorbachev moved to Moscow in 1978 to become national party secretary supervising agriculture. A year later, he became a candidate Politburo member and in November 1980, a full member. He succeeded Chernenko as General Secretary on March 11, 1985.

In his first 6 months in office, Gorbachev moved rapidly to put his own people into positions of authority and to consolidate his control over the party and governmental apparatus. His principal rival for political power, Grigory Romanov, was ousted from the Politburo at a July 1986 plenum. The same plenum named Eduard Shevardnadze Foreign Minister to replace Andrey Gromyko, who was promoted to the largely ceremonial role of Chairman of the President of the Supreme Soviet. On September 17, 1985, Nikolai Ryzhkov was named Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, or Premier. Gorbachev's leadership style is activist and decisive. He has projected a new sense of purpose and is oriented to making the system work more effectively. He has stressed the need for greater discipline and efficiency in dealing with the Soviet economy, but it remains to be seen whether or not he will make the fundamental changes required to bring about sustained increases in Soviet economic performance. His domestic agenda may become clearer following the adoption of a new party program at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986.

In the Soviet system, ultimate power is exercised by the leaders of the Communist Party. The party imposes its will through a government apparatus patterned after Western political democracies but with little real separation of powers. Government functions are dictated by the party, whose hegemony is explicitly acknowledged by the Constitution. The party makes state policy and supervises its implementation, and party influence and power pervade all phases of life.

One of the major tools at the party's disposal to maintain its hegemony is the KGB, or Committee for State Security. This organization not only conducts intelligence operations abroad but also, through networks of agents and informers, keeps careful check on the political reliability of Soviet citizens at home and abroad. The KGB has modified its role since the death of Stalin, but its presence is still felt by all Soviet citizens.

Since Stalin's death, many of the most infamous forced labor camps have been closed and the number of political prisoners reduced significantly. The camps continue to function, however, and since 1966, increased publicity has been given to political trials and the sentencing of prominent dissident intellectuals and representatives of national minority groups. Psychiatric abuse has partially replaced more traditional means of repression.

The Party

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has a membership of more than 18.4 million, or about 6% of the total population. Party membership is the main avenue to positions of real authority in the Soviet system. Bound by rigid discipline, party members are expected to carry out faithfully those policies set by party leaders.

The most powerful policymaking organ of the Communist Party is the Politburo of the party's Central Committee. The Politburo has 13 members and 5 candidate members. The 10-member Secretariat of the party's Central Committee provides day-to-day executive and administrative direction for the entire party machine. Together, the Politburo and Secretariat constitute the real seat of power in the Soviet Union. The General Secretary (head of the Secretariat) traditionally holds the top position in the Soviet Communist Party.
In theory, the Politburo and Secretariat are accountable to the party's Central Committee. In fact, however, the Central Committee is largely a forum for presenting party policy to the most important members. Normally, it gives party policies unanimous approval. It is not in a position to initiate policy, although on rare occasions the Central Committee has been called on to mediate a serious deadlock which has developed within the Politburo.

According to party statutes, the Central Committee should meet twice yearly. It met rarely in Stalin's time but more frequently under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and now under Gorbachev. The membership includes approximately 305 full members and approximately 139 candidates.

The Party Congress is, theoretically, the highest authority of the party. Party statutes call for a congress to be held every 5 years. The 25th Congress met in February and March 1981; the 26th is expected to convene in February 1986. Like the role of the Central Committee, the real role of the Party Congress is to give approval to policies set by the party leaders and to provide these policies with an aura of legitimacy. The Party Congress is also a forum for listing past achievements and describing future tasks.

**Government Apparatus**

The party operates through a government apparatus which has little independent authority. The legislative organ is the Supreme Soviet, theoretically the highest state authority in the Soviet Union. It has two equal houses—the Council of the Union, with 750 members elected on the basis of population, and the Council of Nationalities, with 749 members elected on the basis of territorial units. Elections are called for every 5 years. Only one deputy, approved by the party, runs from each constituency.

Between the semiannual sessions of the Supreme Soviet, which last approximately 4 days, formal power is vested in the 41-member Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Its chairman, Andrey A. Gromyko, is chief of state. The Supreme Soviet formally names the Council of Ministers, the highest executive organ and most important part of the government structure. Under party direction, it supervises the work of the ministries and other governmental bodies.

**Soviet Republics**

Party and government organizations in each of the 15 constituent union republics are patterned after the central party and government organizations and are subject to direction from Moscow. The constituent union republics are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Moldavia, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The United States does not recognize the forcible incorporation of the latter three into the U.S.S.R., and it maintains diplomatic relations with representatives of the free governments of these three Baltic States.

**ECONOMY**

The Soviet Union has the world's second largest industrial base. Western observers estimate Soviet gross national product (GNP) for 1984 at about $2.04 trillion and per capita GNP at about $7,400.

Once an underdeveloped peasant society, the U.S.S.R. has made considerable economic progress since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, largely by forcing the pace of basic industrialization. However, the high priority given heavy industrialization has meant a serious neglect of the consumer sectors of the economy.

The Soviet economy is largely self-sufficient with a broad industrial base. Except in such top priority sectors as defense and space, Soviet technology lags well behind the West. The Soviet economic system historically has been resistant to technological innovation, largely because of the emphasis on large-scale industrial expansion. The system places a premium on high quotas and the quantity of production, generally at the expense of quality. Similarly, in contrast to a competitive market economy with its strong incentive to innovate and develop new technologies, the bureaucratically mired and overcentralized Soviet system tends to stifle innovation.

Despite a relatively low rate of technological progress, the Soviet economy maintained high growth rates until the mid-1970s. Economic growth has been one of the leadership's top priorities and has been maintained largely by high rates of capital investment in industry, coupled with ever-growing numbers of industrial workers. Much of this expanding labor force has come from workers leaving rural and agricultural areas. The share of production and profits devoted to reinvestment has always been high, thus fostering rapid expansion in the number of plants and equipment. Capital investment consistently has risen faster than GNP as a whole; as a percentage of GNP it was 34%, compared to 24% in 1960.

Although still reasonably fast by Western standards, Soviet economic growth has decelerated. The average annual rate of GNP increase was about 6% in the 1960s, slipped to about 5% in the 1970s, fell below 4% in the 1980s, and has remained between 2 and 3% in the 1990s. Declining growth rates are partially attributable to declining growth in industry, which in turn has resulted from a drop in the productivity of capital and falling growth rates in labor productivity. Evidence is strong that worker alienation, as evidenced by widespread alcoholism, is a major factor in poor labor productivity.

Shortages of skilled labor are another growing problem for Soviet industry. Increasing shortages in the European U.S.S.R. contrast greatly with the abundant labor pool in the Central Asian region. Not only will natural growth in the labor force drop from about 2 million persons per year in the 1970s to about 400,000 per year in the mid-1980s, but nearly all of the 400,000 will come from the less-skilled and less-mobile populations of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. This will compound the problem further for industry concentrated in the European U.S.S.R. of imported technology. Efficiency can best be enhanced by the solution of other problems endemic to the Soviet system. These include 'storming' (irregular production schedules with a last-minute rush to fill quotas), hoarding of inventories (because of unreliable delivery), pricing of goods that does not properly reflect real costs, inflexible plans and quotas, and political interference in enterprise management and decision-making.

To a considerable degree, the inefficiencies of the Soviet economy are a result of the U.S.S.R.'s highly centralized, bureaucratic planning and administration. The Communist Party leadership makes basic economic decisions that are incorporated into the annual plan and the 5-year plan. Although it has expanded at a faster rate than GNP as a whole, growth in capital investment has been declining since the 1960s. The 1981-85 plans intended for
capital investment to increase no faster than GNP as a whole.

The expansion of Soviet trade with the West over the past decade and a half has stemmed largely from hopes of achieving technological progress through large-scale imports of Western technology. However, increased imports from the West alone cannot bring about the modernization and increased efficiency that the Soviets seek. A long-standing resistance to innovation in the Soviet system impairs the efficient adoption into plans covering virtually every aspect of the economy. Though the much-heralded 5-year plans set general outlines for development, the annual plans are considerably more significant for the actual operation of the economy. Much of the planner's control is executed through the allocation of resources.

Industrial and commercial enterprises are state-owned and operated. Government control of the economic system is reinforced by financial and accounting controls. The state controls the budget, the banks, and accounting and statistical systems. The largest sources of state revenue are the taxation of enterprise profits and the "turnover tax," a sales tax levied on all transactions of consumer goods and services. Direct income taxes provide less than 10% of the government revenue.

While most of Stalin's rule saw an overwhelming orientation toward heavy industry, the years following his death in 1953 saw a significant economic reorientation. Khrushchev did not abandon the priority given heavy industry, but he put more emphasis on improving living standards. The Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko regimes continued this trend: agricultural investment, consumer goods, and housing development have all been expanded in an attempt to improve the lives of Soviet citizens.

The results of the tenth 5-year plan (1976-80) were a disappointment to the Soviet leadership. Though supposedly more realistic and moderate than earlier plans, several of the plan's major goals were not reached. Transportation problems and inadequate supplies of raw materials and intermediate goods impeded growth. Shortfalls in the production of key industrial commodities—especially steel, oil, coal, construction materials, and chemistries—were particularly serious. Although production shortfalls are common in the Soviet economy, the 1979-80 problems were unusually severe and reflected the Soviet economy's endemic problems. In addition, bad weather contributed to
poor harvests in 1979 and 1980, leaving the agricultural sector in disarray and dashing consumers' hopes of a significant improvement in diet.

The planned 4% annual growth rate of the current eleventh 5-year plan (1981–85) has proved unattainable. In 1981 and 1982, the GNP increased by 2.1% and 2.6%, respectively. Due to improved weather conditions, increased labor discipline, and additions to production capacity, the growth rate reached 3% in 1983.

The plan places the greatest emphasis on developing heavy industry and agriculture, with the highest growth targeted for military-related branches of industry. Although the directives contain much rhetoric on the need to boost living standards, few gains in consumption are likely in the near future. Whatever anxiety the leadership feels about the Soviet consumer's plight has not been enough to cause a significant reallocation of resources in the consumer's favor.

The guidelines of the present 5-year plan contain nearly 50% less statistical data than previous plans, suggesting delays, uncertainties, and possible conflicts among Soviet decisionmakers.

To meet their ambitious targets, Soviet leaders are calling for stricter discipline and increased efficiency for workers and managers. Science and technology are also to be given an expanded role in boosting the productivity of labor and other resources. Without an acceleration in growth of productivity to offset the slower growth in the skilled labor force, Soviet economic growth will continue to fall.

Resources
Within its vast expanse of territory, the U.S.S.R. has a generous endowment of most natural resources. Energy resources, fuel, and hydroelectric power are estimated to be at least 25% of the world's total, but their extraction and utilization is hampered by difficult terrain and inhospitable weather. Because the most easily accessible energy resources are becoming exhausted, the Soviets are turning increasingly to Siberian minerals and energy deposits, which are difficult and costly to exploit. Although oil and coal production have peaked, natural gas and nuclear energy have significant growth potential in the near future. Soviet timber and manganese resources are the largest in the world. The U.S.S.R. also has ample supplies of lead, zinc, nickel, mercury, potash, and phosphate. It lacks a large domestic reserve of only two major minerals—tin and uranium. Despite the wealth of energy resources, energy conservation is becoming increasingly important due to high energy prices and tightening supplies of oil and coal.

Trade
Total Soviet foreign trade amounted to $172 billion in 1983—$91.7 billion in exports and $80.4 billion in imports. Of this $172 billion, 56% was with other communist countries, mainly with the six East European members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The Soviet Union exports primarily fuels and raw materials. Soviet imports are primarily machinery, industrial equipment, and manufactured consumer goods. The Soviets are pressuring CEMA partners to increase exports to the U.S.S.R. to reduce the Soviet trade surplus with them. Higher oil prices accounted for a large part of the increase in value of Soviet exports to CEMA countries in 1983. Soviet trade with China doubled in 1983 to reach $650 million, the highest level of Sino-Soviet trade since 1969.

In 1983, 14% of Soviet trade was conducted with noncommunist developing countries. Trade with these countries consists typically of exports of Soviet machinery and equipment, often associated with economic aid projects, in return for agricultural raw materials, foodstuffs, and some light manufactured goods. In recent years, half or more of Soviet deliveries to these countries have been military goods.

The remaining 30% of 1983 Soviet trade was with the developed Western countries. This percentage was down from 32.6% in 1981 and largely reflected a 25% cut in purchases from the United States and Japan in 1983. Imports from the United States fell because of a decline in agricultural purchases as the U.S.S.R. enjoyed an improved grain harvest that year. The drop in imports from Japan reflected reduced purchases of steel pipe and machinery. In contrast, Soviet trade with Western Europe continued to rise with machinery imports increasing by 15% as the U.S.S.R. continued to purchase Western technology needed to modernize its economy. The Federal Republic of Germany remains the U.S.S.R.'s leading Western trading partner, with Finland, Italy, and France following closely behind. U.S.S.R. imports from the United States, exceeding $2 billion in 1983, consisted primarily of wheat, corn, and phosphoric acid, which is used primarily for the production of fertilizer. U.S.S.R. exports
Mechanized tea-picking on a collective farm in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.
(Courtesy United Nations)

to the United States in 1983 totaled $445 million and included gold, platinum, ammonia, and oil.

The Soviet hard-currency trade deficit for 1983 was down to $1.3 billion. Oil exports, which currently account for 60% of Soviet hard-currency exports, increased in volume by 15% in 1983. In addition, better harvests in 1983 helped the Soviets cut back on grain imports.

The Soviets have been able to finance their hard-currency trade deficits through borrowing, gold sales, and earnings from other components of the balance of payments. However, in order to preserve its credit rating, the U.S.S.R. will probably exercise some restraint with respect to non-grain imports. In the short term, the Soviets will be under great pressure to maintain oil production, which will become increasingly difficult and expensive, in order to keep up hard-currency earnings. Any significant drop in oil production would confront the Soviets with the hard option of reducing hard-currency exports to the West, lowering deliveries to Eastern Europe, or squeezing domestic consumption. Over the longer term, the Soviets plan to increase exports of natural gas as a hard-currency earner, which should compensate for the anticipated decline in oil exports.

Agriculture

Despite increased investment and a rise in farming incomes, agriculture remains the Soviet Union’s greatest economic problem. Harsh and unpredictable weather has added to the U.S.S.R.’s major shortcoming, namely, the failure to introduce efficient management practices and technologies needed to stimulate and boost production. The U.S.S.R. has about 60 million square kilometers (2.3 million sq. mi.) of arable land and pasture. However, much of this land is poor by Western standards. Sown crops occupy only 10% of the total land area.

Agriculture is organized into about 28,000 collective farms (average area is 64 sq. km. or 25 sq. mi.) and 18,000 state farms (average area is 194 sq. km. or 75 sq. mi.). State farms operate as “agricultural factories” on which farm workers are paid wages. Theoretically, collective farms function like cooperatives, although decisionmaking is more centralized. On state and collective farms, workers and peasants are permitted the use of small, private plots. Although they account for only 3% of the total sown area, these plots produce 33% of the country’s meat, milk, eggs, and vegetables, and 65% of its potatoes.
However, in the production of livestock products, the small private sector depends heavily on state and collective feed supplies. When shortfalls have occurred, as in 1972, 1975, 1979, and 1986, the government may only be exercising greater tolerances toward private agriculture.

In 1983, investment in agriculture accounted for 27% of total investment. In particular, investment in fertilizer facilities, storage and refrigeration facilities, and farm machinery increased as part of a plan to increase investment in industries that directly support agriculture. In 1983, gross agricultural output rose by 5%, reaching a new all-time high. The livestock sector performed particularly well as a result of strong emphasis given by the leadership to the building of herds. Meat and milk output reached new records as well.

A recent Soviet agricultural goal has been to increase meat supply to improve the diet and standard of living of the Soviet population. However, their targets have not been reached. In 1983, meat supply increased only slightly to 51.7 kg. per capita. To meet the Soviet goal of 85 kg. per capita in 1990 will require large, stable, domestic grain production in addition to imports, as well as increased use of food proteins. Given the continued inability of the farm sector to produce sufficient amounts of grain to support the ambitious goals of the meat program, demand for imported grain is likely to remain high.

Economic Future

The overall outlook for the Soviet economy for the remainder of the 1980s is for continued growth, although probably at increasingly modest rates. Labor shortages will place a premium on increased productivity; however, ingrained worker attitudes and probable continued reluctance by the leadership to risk the uncertainties of meaningful economic reform may make productivity breakthroughs unlikely. The export of oil and, increasingly, natural gas should continue to be the chief earner of hard currency for the Soviets, while Soviet manufactures, with the exception of chemicals, are likely to remain non-competitive in Western markets. If energy sales falter, it would not be surprising to see the Soviets step up borrowing in Western Europe in order to help meet hard-currency needs. Bilateral trade between the United States and the Soviet Union is likely to continue to be a modest proportion of both countries’ overall foreign trade. If, as it appears, large-scale U.S. grain sales continue, U.S. exports to the Soviet Union should exceed imports from the U.S.S.R. sizably.

Since taking office in the spring of 1985, Gorbachev has made a determined effort to improve output through the imposition of a discipline campaign—including a crackdown on alcoholism—and high-level personnel changes. Economic experiments, such as broader managerial rights, labor brigades, and wages based on final output, which have been underway in several industrial ministries, are to be expanded; investment in the renovation of existing industrial facilities—as opposed to the construction of new ones—is to be stressed; the decision-making power of individual enterprises will apparently be broadened, and greater efforts will be made to promote closer cooperation between the Soviet scientific establishment and production facilities. It is not clear, however, how far the leadership is prepared to go with reforms that might mean greater reliance upon the market.
to set prices and a willingness to shut down inefficient enterprises. Unless major reforms are undertaken, it is difficult to see how the Soviets can overcome the inefficiencies built into their economic system and significantly improve economic performance in the upcoming (1986-1990) twelfth 5-year plan.

DEFENSE

The Soviet Union maintains large and growing military forces. It is estimated that the Soviets spend between 12% and 15% of their GNP on defense, compared to 5% by the United States.

The armed forces of the U.S.S.R. number more than 4.4 million members. Men are legally required to serve, although deferments and exemptions may be granted in special cases. Modern mechanized ground forces are well equipped with tanks. The Soviet Navy is the largest in the world, and the Soviets possess a vast arsenal of strategic missiles.

The Soviet Union dominates the Warsaw Pact, established in 1955. The alliance joins the U.S.S.R. and its East European allies—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. A Soviet officer heads the pact's joint command.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Three broad interrelated areas of Soviet foreign policy concern are the industrialized democracies, the developing nations, and the communist world.

Soviet theoreticians point to the Leninist concept of "peaceful coexistence" as the central feature of Soviet foreign policy. This concept is "a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism in the international arena...[the] basically antagonistic conflict between the two opposing socioeconomic systems is transferred from the level of military clashes to that of economic competition, comparison of political systems and ways of life, and ideological struggle." In practical terms, the U.S.S.R. has sought to avoid direct conflict with the industrialized democracies while promoting communism in developing nations. The U.S.S.R. is the first among equals in the Warsaw Pact, a military alliance among East European communist states (Yugoslavia excepted). The U.S.S.R.

places a high priority on maintaining communist rule in the "fraternal socialist" states, by military force if necessary, as in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). Recent years, however, have seen the rise of the "Solidarity" labor movement in Poland, a movement which was suppressed only after the declaration of martial law under pressure from the U.S.S.R. in 1983.

Afghanistan

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, installing the puppet regime of Babrak Karmal. Opposition to the Soviets and the Karmal regime has grown and spread throughout the country, and the Afghan resistance fighters (mujahidin) have held the Soviet invader to a military standoff. The number of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan has risen to over 115,000, with 30,000-40,000 additional troops serving in support roles across the Soviet border. Soviet tactics against the mujahidin and Afghan civilians have been usually brutal, including the use of chemical and toxin weapons and antipersonnel mines disguised as toys. Close to 3 million refugees are estimated to have fled to Pakistan, with another 1.5 million Afghans in Iran, half of whom are refugees. The UN General Assembly has condemned the Soviet invasion in six resolutions, and in 1984, the vote of 119 to 20 with 14 abstentions was the largest ever. The United States fully supports the UN indirect negotiating process on Afghanistan, which is based on four elements:

- The complete withdrawal of all foreign troops;
- The restoration of the independent and nonaligned status of Afghanistan;
- Self-determination for the Afghan people; and
- Return of the refugees with safety and honor.

Eastern Europe

In the years immediately following World War II, the Soviet Union installed communist regimes in East European countries occupied by the Red army. Czechoslovakia fell to the communists after a Soviet-inspired coup d'état in February 1948. Yugoslavia, liberated from the Nazis by indigenous forces, resisted Moscow's control, maintained its independence, and has been separate from the Soviet bloc since 1948. In addition to its failure to integrate Yugoslavia into the Soviet bloc, the Kremlin has been confronted with a series of upheavals and rebellions against Soviet authority in Eastern Europe including:

- The Berlin uprising of June 17, 1953, suppressed by Soviet troops;
- The 1956 Hungarian revolution, suppressed by Soviet troops;
- Albania's defection from the Warsaw Pact in 1960-61;
- Romania's assertion of foreign policy and national independence from 1962 onward;
- The Czechoslovakian "Prague Spring" uprising of 1968, suppressed by Soviet troops;
- The Polish "workers' revolt" of December 1970–Polish popular disturbances over food price increases in June 1976; and
- Strikes by Polish workers in August 1980, leading to the establishment of the independent "Solidarity" trade and farm unions (suppressed by a December 1980 declaration of martial law).

The record shows that the Soviets have not hesitated to use armed force, when practicable, to contain what they
regard as dangerous manifestations of independence in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union has two principal concerns in the preservation of subservient regimes in Eastern Europe: the security of the approaches to Soviet western borders and the ideological necessity of demonstrating that communism is the wave of the future.

Berlin

After World War II, Berlin was made a separate area under four-power (United States, United Kingdom, France, and U.S.S.R.) control. It is still under this quadrupartite responsibility. Soviet claims to have turned over responsibility for their sector to the German Democratic Republic have never been recognized as legal by the other governing powers.

Berlin was a constant focus of East-West crises because of Soviet attempts to isolate the city, located more than 160 kilometers (100 mi.) inside the communist-controlled portion of Germany. By the late 1960s, both sides were ready to attempt to end these confrontations. In mid-1969, the three Western powers, with the Federal Republic of Germany's (F.R.G.) support, approached the Soviet Government with a proposal for negotiations.

Begun in March 1970, the negotiations resulted in September 1971, in the Quadrupartite Agreement on Berlin, which was brought into effect in June 1972. This agreement embodied Soviet commitments to permit unhindered access to Berlin, to provide for improved movement and communications within the city, and to acknowledge F.R.G. ties with West Berlin and the F.R.G.'s right to represent West Berlin abroad.

Although implementation of the Berlin agreement has not been without difficulties and disagreements, it has, to date, resulted in amelioration of the Berlin situation.

CSCE

Progress in East-West relations, particularly the 1971 Quadrupartite Agreement on Berlin and the 1970 treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the F.R.G., opened the way to the convening in 1973 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Final Act was signed in Helsinki by the heads of all European countries except Albania, as well as by the United States and Canada, on August 1, 1975. The accord covered principles of state conduct, "confidence-building measures" with respect to military maneuvers, cooperation in the economic, scientific, technical, and environmental areas; and freer human contacts and exchanges of information.

Differences between Soviet and Western compliance with the Final Act, particularly on human rights issues, have become an increasingly important issue in East-West relations and were a focal point of East-West clashes at the 1978 Belgrade CSCE Review Conference and the 1981 Madrid Conference.

Cuba

Cuba has played a special role in U.S.-Soviet relations. The surreptitious installation in 1962 of medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba represented an attempt to gain a quick, major improvement in Moscow's strategic position vis-a-vis the United States. This confrontation was resolved when, at President Kennedy's insistence and under a U.S. threat to blockade the island, the Soviets withdrew all offensive weapons from Cuba and pledged not to reintroduce them.

Later in the decade, Moscow's ties with Cuba grew stronger as the Soviets subsidized the failing Cuban economy and provided substantial amounts of military assistance. Current Soviet support for Cuba is estimated to be more than $10 million per day. Especially since 1975, Cuba's growing military capabilities and certain aspects of Soviet military activities in and around Cuba have been of concern to the United States and the subject of diplomatic exchanges with Moscow. The United States closely monitors all aspects of Soviet-Cuban military cooperation to ensure that U.S. interests are not threatened.

Politically, Cuban activity in other countries is periodically an issue in U.S.-Soviet relations. Cuban activities in Latin America in the 1960s and in Africa in the 1970s have been irritants in U.S. relations with Havana and, to the extent such activities are encouraged or supported by Moscow, with the Soviet Union as well.

The Developing Nations

In the Stalin era, the "two-camp" philosophy of foreign affairs prevailed, in which most of the nonindustrialized nations tended to be lumped with the "imperialist" powers of the West as targets of communist struggle. Stalin's successors soon altered this approach and chose the developing world as an area where the U.S.S.R. could change the global "correlation of forces" to the U.S.S.R.'s favor.

The 20th Party Congress (1956) set the theoretical justification for this policy. Moscow perceived the developing nations as a "zone of peace" and the political leaders there as potential "progressives" deserving Soviet support, especially in encouraging radical, anti-Western sentiment. In the years since that Party Congress, Moscow has usually supported antiestablishment and liberation movements as well as communist parties in the developing world, providing propaganda support, training, and in certain cases, substantial amounts of economic and military assistance. Article 28 of the Soviet Constitution adopted in 1977 commits the U.S.S.R. to "supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress." Soviet aid to developing nations is overwhelmingly military, rather than economic. Cumulative Soviet economic aid dispersed to developing nations from 1964 to 1984 amounted to about $14 billion; military aid totaled $7.5 billion.

Soviet support for African liberation movements gave Moscow important political influence in southern Africa, following the Portuguese revolution of 1974. In Mozambique and Angola, longstanding Soviet support for liberation movements led to enhanced Soviet influence following independence. Soviet and Cuban military aid was vital to the new rulers of those countries in their efforts to consolidate their power to defeat their opponents. Similarly, the Soviet Union played a crucial role following the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, coming to the aid of the new military government of Lt. Col. Mengistu and later providing assistance in the Ogaden War with Somalia.

Soviet-Asian Affairs

The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). Moscow hailed the advent of the Chinese communists to power in October 1949 as a major accretion of the strength of international communism and moved quickly to cement relations with the new regime in Beijing with the conclusion on February 14, 1950, of a 30-year treaty of alliance and friendship. The Beijing regime was troubled by destalinization and the foreign policies of
Stalin's successors, however, and differences between the two communist giants began to surface in the late 1950s.

In 1960, these differences of both doctrine and national interest became public when the Chinese made a thinly-veiled theoretical attack on Khrushchev's strategy for the international communist movement. There were several desultory efforts to patch up differences, but, for all intents and purposes, the breach was final. For the rest of the decade, Moscow and Beijing competed for influence with communist-ruled countries, national communist parties, and throughout the world. After the Chinese exploded a nuclear device in 1964, the Soviets began to view the problem in military, as well as political terms. During the next 20 years, they dramatically increased military forces along the border, and in 1969, relations reached a nadir when the two countries had an armed clash over an island in the Ussuri River. Since then, both sides have periodically engaged in negotiations over the demarcation of the 6,750-kilometer (4,200-mile) border. These talks have not resolved the dispute.

By the 1970s, the Sino-Soviet split had become an accepted part of the geopolitical landscape. Relations between Moscow and Beijing began to reflect Soviet concern about China's steadily improving relations with the highly industrialized nations of Western Europe and Japan, especially after President Nixon's 1972 visit to the P.R.C. At the end of the 1970s, a combination of Soviet policies in the Far East, in response to China's invasion of Cambodia, complicated the prospects for a rapprochement. Beijing has said that these three issues pose "obstacles" to the normalization of relations. Over the past few years, however, both Moscow and Beijing have been working to improve their relations. The Soviets and Chinese have held several rounds of political consultations, but have, so far, been unable to make much progress on the three "obstacles." Greater progress has been made in the area of economics and cultural relations, where the two sides have been able to reach some agreements on expanding trade and academic ties. Gorbachev, on his accession to power, said that improved relations with the P.R.C. was high on his foreign affairs agenda. While progress continues to be hampered by the serious geopolitical differences which divide them, Moscow and Beijing have agreed to reciprocal visits by their respective foreign ministers.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (S.R.V.). Vietnam has emerged as one of the Soviet Union's most important client states. Soviet ties to the S.R.V. provide a strategic lever on China's southern flank and have also allowed a dramatic expansion of Soviet naval and air power in the South China Sea through the use of the former U.S. facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. It is largely Soviet economic and military aid to Vietnam which allows Hanoi to maintain the occupation of Cambodia which it launched in 1978. Continued Soviet support for the S.R.V. has damaged relations with the countries making up the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as with the P.R.C. Despite the economic and political costs which this relationship has imposed on

Further Information

These titles are provided as a general indication of material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse unofficial publications.


the Soviets, they appear to believe that the geostrategic benefits they derive from their ties with Hanoi are more important.

**Japan.** Soviet relations with Japan have been strained in the postwar years, in part because of failure to conclude a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty after World War II. The Soviet Union claims that the 1945 Yalta accords give the U.S.S.R. sovereignty over the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai Islands. Japan, however, considers these islands to be the Japanese "Northern Territories." The Soviets have refused to acknowledge that there is any territorial issue to be resolved with Japan. The buildup of Soviet military forces in the region and revelations of KGB defector Stanislav Levchenko of Soviet espionage activities in Japan have further strained the relationship.

**The Middle East**

The Middle East is a region of major political, economic, and strategic importance to Moscow because it lies close to the U.S.S.R.'s southern border, flanks NATO countries, and has the world's largest proven oil reserves.

The Arab-Israeli conflict provided the opportunity for Soviet entry into the area. Moscow took advantage of this opening in the mid-1950s by inaugurating a military and economic assistance program in Egypt. Exploitation of this regional conflict remained the key element in Moscow's growing presence and influence in the area throughout the three Arab-Israeli wars (1956, 1967, 1973). Heavy-handed Soviet involvement in Egypt's internal affairs led to their expulsion in 1972, but Moscow continued to be the major supplier of arms and economic assistance to the reactionary Arab belligerents, as well as the other states in the area, and has, when necessary, ignored the anti-communist sentiments of many Arab governments there. Arms supply has been the principal means of Soviet entry into the region, and the Soviets continually probe to exploit new markets.

Today, Syria is the linchpin of Soviet policy in the Middle East, although the Soviets have limited control over Syrian policies. After the defeat of Syria and other Soviet-supported parties by Israel in the 1982 Lebanon war, the Soviets massively resupplied Syria with military equipment that was more advanced than that which had been lost in the fighting. Some of this equipment was being shipped outside the Soviet bloc for the first time. The Soviets are also the principal arms supplier to Iraq.

In the summer of 1984, the Soviet Union put forward a plan calling for an international peace conference on the Middle East. This Soviet initiative represented a modification of a proposal made by Brezhnev several years earlier. It calls for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, perhaps in confederation with another state. The plan has received pro forma endorsement from Arab states but is opposed by Israel and the United States because it is not based on UN Security Council Resolution 242, which is the only internationally agreed basis for peace, and it does not call for direct negotiations between the parties at issue, which would give them a stake in the settlement.

Libyan-Soviet relations remain cooperative, centering on massive Soviet arms sales to the Mu'amar Qadafi regime. It is estimated that as of 1983, the U.S.S.R. and its allies have provided $28 billion worth of weaponry to Qadafi, an inventory far in excess of Libya's legitimate national defense needs and even beyond its capacity to man. Although Soviet sales have not been constrained by the Libyan regime's revolutionary Islamic objectives and use of terrorism, Qadafi's erratic behavior gives Moscow pause in defining its long-term relationship. A long-promised treaty of friendship and assistance remains unsigned.

**International Communism**

Moscow's repeated efforts at tightening organizational and ideological unity in the international communist movement have met increasing resistance. When the European Communist Party Conference met in Berlin in 1976, it gave a boost to pluralism within the communist community by acknowledging each party's independence and its right to deviate from the Soviet model by taking national characteristics into consideration. This was in contrast to the world communist meetings convened in 1960 and 1965. Moscow, concerned with the problem of ideological orthodoxy in Eastern Europe, stresses the need for unity in the communist movement, while the Spanish, French, and Italian Communist Parties—the "Eurocommunists"—continue to assert their independence.

**Arms Control**

**Multilateral Agreements and Negotiations**

The Soviet Union and the United States have entered into a variety of agreements on arms control. Major multilateral agreements include the following:

- The 1961 Antarctic Treaty, providing for the peaceful use and non-militarization of that continent;
- The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting nuclear-weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater;
- The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, prohibiting placement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and requiring peaceful use of celestial bodies;
- The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and
- The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

The Soviet Union is currently engaged with other nations in a variety of multilateral negotiations:

- The Vienna talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) began in 1973. The goal is to improve stability in central Europe by a reduction in forces and establishment of parity at lower levels in the form of a common ceiling on each side's military manpower in a designated "zone of reductions." The main impasse has centered on two issues: calculation of Eastern force levels, which the United States estimate are significantly higher than the figures tabbed by the East; and on the consequent reductions necessary to bring about equality at lower levels of forces.
- The Stockholm talks on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDSE) opened in January 1984, as mandated by the 1975 Madrid CSCE Review Conference. The CDE was directed to negotiate a set of mutually complementary confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. In the CDE forum, measures are being discussed which would promote greater openness and predictability in military activities, in order to reduce tensions, diminish the danger of miscalculation, and limit the likelihood of surprise attack in Europe.
- The U.S.S.R. is a participant in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), a body which addresses an array of arms control topics, including chemical weapons and nuclear nonproliferation. It was in this body, on
April 18, 1984, that Vice President George Bush presented a U.S. draft treaty to ban chemical weapons.

**Bilateral Agreements and Negotiations.** The first strategic arms limitation talks (SALT I) resulted in the signing of two agreements on May 26, 1972: a treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems (ABM) and an interim agreement limiting certain strategic offensive arms for a 5-year period. These agreements set the stage for the second round of SALT, which culminated in the signature of the SALT II Treaty in June 1979. The treaty was withdrawn from Senate consideration in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; it has not been resubmitted. The United States pledged in 1982, however, that it would not undercut the provisions of SALT II, provided the U.S.S.R. exercised equal restraint. U.S. policy was affirmed by President Reagan on June 10, 1985, when he called on the Soviets to correct their noncompliance with existing agreements and to join in establishing a regime of truly mutual restraint while negotiations continue.

By 1972, when SALT I was signed, the Soviet Union had equaled the United States in several measures of strategic capability, and had taken the lead in the number of strategic ballistic missiles. The United States did not respond to what appeared to be Soviet efforts to attain strategic equality, believing that such parity could provide the basis for a more stable East-West relationship. The Soviet Union continued its military buildup, however, and today equals or surpasses the United States in most quantitative measures of strategic capability. (For a comprehensive look at U.S.-Soviet negotiations, see the Department of Defense publication, *Soviet Military Power.*)

The question of intermediate-range nuclear arms has proved to be an important facet of the arms control issue. In 1977, the Soviet Union began deployment of the SS-20, an advanced three-warhead intermediate-range missile in addition to considerable quantities of earlier generation INF [Intermediate-range nuclear forces] missiles. In response to these deployments, the NATO alliance, in December 1979, reached its “two-track” decision: to press for elimination of the Soviet missiles through U.S.-Soviet negotiations, or in the absence of an agreement, proceed with deployment of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. The United States and the U.S.S.R. initiated talks on INF in 1982, with the United States proposing a complete ban on U.S. and Soviet INF missiles, or failing that, equality at the lowest possible levels. The U.S.S.R. responded negatively, advancing counterproposals unacceptable to the United States and NATO. In the absence of an agreement, U.S. missile deployments proceeded on schedule, with the first in December 1983, whereupon the Soviet Union broke off negotiations.

Moscow and Washington initiated strategic arms reduction talks (START) in June 1982. The United States sought in these negotiations to reach an agreement that would enhance stability and achieve major reductions in the level of strategic weaponry on both sides. The U.S. approach to START reflected the judgment that the approach taken in SALT had failed to ensure real reductions in strategic forces or to redress dangerous asymmetries in forces. Thus, the U.S. START approach proposed a broader set of limitations including direct constraints on the number of ballistic missile warheads (i.e. a one-third cut to a level of 5,000 for each side), along with efforts to reduce the destructive potential of U.S. and Soviet military forces. In contrast, the Soviet approach centered on capping existing levels of weaponry. After five rounds of businesslike but inconclusive discussions, the U.S.S.R. refused to set a date for resumption of talks, following the deployment in Europe of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in December 1983.

**Current Bilateral Negotiations.** The Soviet walkout from arms control talks ended on January 8, 1985, when Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko agreed in Geneva to enter into new negotiations on “the complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and intermediate-range—with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship.” Talks began in Geneva on March 12, 1985. Each delegation is divided into three groups to negotiate strategic, intermediate-range, and defense and space arms.

Until the beginning of the third round, the talks made little progress.
because the Soviets refused to enter into serious negotiations on offensive reductions. The Soviet delegation insisted that no progress could be made until the United States agreed to a ban on research and development of so-called "space strike arms," in which they included President's Strategic Defense Initiative. The United States rejected such preconditions and repeatedly called on the Soviet Union to begin serious bargaining on deep reductions in offensive weapons. The U.S. delegation stressed that numerous U.S. arms control proposals in both strategic and intermediate-range weapons remained on the negotiating table and that the U.S. delegation had been given unprecedented flexibility to negotiate significant reductions.

On September 20, and October 1, 1985, the Soviet delegation in Geneva presented a formal counterproposal which included concrete suggestions on reducing offensive arms for the first time. Although encouraged that the Soviets had finally put forward specific ideas, the United States was disappointed that the proposal was lopsided in the Soviet's favor. Senior U.S. officials stressed that the United States intended to hear out the full Soviet proposal and closely examine it to see where there might be common ground on which to move forward.

An early product of U.S.-Soviet bilateral cooperation in reducing the risk of war was the "hotline" agreement of 1963, which established a direct communications link between the U.S. and Soviet Governments. This link not only continues in operation today, but agreement was reached on July 17, 1984, in Washington to upgrade the hotline by adding facsimile capability. A series of technical discussions on implementing that agreement have been held in 1985, with the expectation that the system will be fully operational in the near future.

Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements. Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements has called into question the important security benefits of arms control and undermined the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. In Presidential reports to the Congress in January 1984 and February 1985, the United States determined that the U.S.S.R. has committed violations and probable violations of arms control agreements including the following: the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva protocol; the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty; the 1979 SALT II accord; the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty; the 1976 Threshold Test Ban Treaty; and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

**U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS**

Since the Russian Revolution of 1917, the U.S.-Soviet relationship has evolved through several phases, including a period of minimal contact, a wartime alliance, "containment," and an intense cold war rivalry. In recent years, the high hopes of the 1970s for detente have given way to reassessment of this fundamentally adversarial relationship.

The adversarial nature of U.S.-Soviet relations stems from several factors:
- Competing strategic interests;
- The Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Soviet regime, with its messianic, expansionist implications; and
- The absence of political freedoms in the U.S.S.R., which permits the Soviet leadership to conduct foreign policy without the domestic constraints known to democratic states.

There are, however, strong incentives for U.S.-Soviet cooperation, foremost among which is the need to avoid nuclear war. The United States has therefore sought to engage the Soviet Government in constructive dialogue at all levels on the full range of issues which affect both nations. The November 19–20, 1985, meeting in Geneva between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev is an important part of that effort.

Because of the U.S. military deterrent, the U.S.S.R. has avoided direct aggression against the United States and its allies. Nonetheless, the United States has been concerned by certain Soviet actions in recent years, including:
- A continuing quest for military superiority;
- The occupation of Afghanistan by 115,000 Soviet troops;
- The unrelenting effort to impose an alien Soviet "model" on nominally independent Soviet clients and allies, particularly Poland;
- Harsh suppression of human rights within the Soviet Union; and
- Violation of certain treaties and agreements and "stretching" the letter of others.

To manage relations with the Soviet Union, the United States has constructed a policy based on three principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. U.S. dealings with the U.S.S.R. must be grounded in a realistic appraisal of the following Soviet strengths and objectives.

- The United States must not overstate the Soviet challenge, but neither can it overlook the potential dangers.
- If the United States intends to counter Soviet objectives, it must have the necessary strength—military, economic, and social—to do so.
- The United States strongly prefers resolution of differences through negotiation, however; and it has conducted a broad dialogue designed to develop peacefull solutions to its problems, and to encourage the U.S.S.R. to live up to its international obligations.

The United States is committed to maintain the military balance against the U.S.S.R. through its own and allied defense programs and, where possible, through mutual and verifiable arms reductions. To counter the Soviet use of force and the threat of force in its foreign policy, the United States has
made clear that it will resist encroach-
ment on its vital interests and those of
its allies and friends. In Europe, the
allies remain united on the need to
counter Soviet missile deployments;
deployments of Pershing II and ground-
launched cruise missiles have proceeded
on schedule. The United States also is
continuing its efforts to upgrade
NATO's conventional forces. To deter
threats to vital interests outside Europe,
the United States is developing the
ability, with allied support, to move
forces rapidly to key areas of potential
instability such as Southwest Asia. In
the Western Hemisphere, the deter-
mination of the United States and its
friends to resist destabilization of
democratic countries in Central America
remains firm. The United States is also
working to restrict Soviet expansion by
responding positively to the problems of
developing nations and by working to
strengthen democratic institutions
worldwide.

The United States desires an im-
proved relationship with the Soviet
superpower. Prime U.S. goals vis-a-vis
the U.S.S.R. include:

• Respect for the human rights of
Soviet citizens;
• Verifiable reductions in nuclear
arms;
• Cessation of Soviet interference in
the affairs of sovereign states; and
• Improvement in people-to-people,
economic and other bilateral relations
based on reciprocity and mutual
interest.

The United States does not threaten
the Soviet Union. The United States
does not accept difficult U.S.-Soviet
relations as an unchangeable state of af-
fairs and is working to build coopera-
tion, not confrontation, with the
U.S.S.R. While the United States is
keenly aware that important differences
will persist and that the relationship will
continue to be adversarial, it also
believes that cooperation is possible in a
number of areas. The United States con-
tinues to hope that the Soviet Govern-
ment will join in a vigorous effort to
achieve concrete results in areas of con-
structive cooperation.

Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador—Arthur A. Hartman
Deputy Chief of Mission—Richard E.
Comb
Counselor for Political Affairs—Mark
Ramee
Counselor for Economic and Commercial
Affairs—Robert F. Ober, Jr.
Counselor for Administration—David R.
Buell
Counselor for Cultural Affairs—
Raymond E. Benson
Head of Consular Section—Eugene C.
Zajac

Science Officer—John C. Zimmerman
Director, Commercial Office—Robert S.
Krause
Defense Attache—Rear Adm. Ronald J.
Kurth
Army Attache—Col. Richard M. Naab
Navy Attache—Capt. Thomas T. Holme,
Jr.
Air Attache—Col. Robert E. Berls, Jr.
Agricultural Counselor—Weyland
Beeghly
Counsel General, Leningrad—Charles T.
Magee
Deputy Principal Officer, Leningrad—
James F. Schumaker

The U.S. Embassy in the Soviet
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The Consulate General in Leningrad
is at Ulitsa Petra-Lavrova 15
(tel. 274-8285).
SOVIET CHIEF OF STATE AND CABINET MEMBERS

USSR Supreme Soviet

Andrey Andreyevich GROMYKO, Chairman of the Presidium
Petr Nilovich DEMICHEV, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium

USSR Council of Ministers

Nikolay Ivanovich RYZHKOV, Chairman

Geydar Aliyevich ALIYEV, First Deputy Chairman
Ivan Vasil'evich ARKHIPOV, First Deputy chairman
Vsevolod Serafimovich MURAKHOVSKIY, First Deputy Chairman
Nikolay Vladimirovich TALYZIN, First Deputy Chairman

Aleksey Konstantinovich ANTONOV, Deputy Chairman
Yuriy Petrovich BATALIN, Deputy Chairman
Vladimir Kuz'mich GUSEV, Deputy Chairman
Vladimir Mikhaylovich KAMENTSEV, Deputy Chairman
Guriy Ivanovich MARCHUK, Deputy Chairman
Yuriy Dmitriyevich MASLYUKOV, Deputy Chairman
Boris Yevdokimovich SHECHERBINA, Deputy Chairman
Ivan Stepanovich SILAYEV, Deputy Chairman
Gennadiy Georgiyevich VEDERNIKOV, Deputy Chairman
Lev Alekseyevich VOIRONIN, Deputy Chairman

Key Ministers

Eduard Amvrosiyevich SHEVARDNADZE, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergey Leonidovich SOKOLOV, Minister of Defense
Viktor Mikhailovich CHEBRIKOV, Chairman, Committee of State Security
Mikhail Sergeyevich GORBACHEV
(Phonetic: gorbahCHA WF)

General Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (since March 1985)

Addressed as: Mr. General Secretary

Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to the position of General Secretary of the CPSU has brought a dynamism to Soviet political affairs not evident for over two decades. He has initiated a domestic and foreign political offensive with an eye toward maximizing economic performance, addressing social problems, and improving the USSR's image abroad. Gorbachev, 55, is the youngest and one of the best educated members of the ruling Politburo. As General Secretary, he also heads the Defense Council, the coordinating body for Soviet military activity.

Gorbachev achieved national prominence in 1978, when he became the Central Committee secretary for agriculture. In the ensuing years, his responsibilities increased rapidly. He became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979 and a full member in 1980. From 1979 until 1984 he chaired the Legislative Proposals Commission of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet (legislature). In addition, he held the position of chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission from early 1984 until July 1985, when he was elected to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Of peasant stock, Gorbachev has spent most of his life in Stavropol' Kray, a major agricultural area between the Black and Caspian Seas, located in the RSFSR. As a youth he worked on an agricultural combine. From 1950 until 1955 he studied law at Moscow State University, where he gained recognition as a leader in the Komsomol (Young Communist League). Subsequently, he also acquired a degree in agriculture. Gorbachev's early career included various Komsomol and party posts in Stavropol'. He became first secretary of the Stavropol' Kray Party Committee in 1970, when only 39 years old, and held that post until his appointment to the CPSU Secretariat. Gorbachev was elected a full member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1971. He has been a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet since 1970, continuing to represent a district from Stavropol' on that body even though he moved to Moscow in 1978.

In addition to visiting Eastern Europe, Gorbachev has led several delegations to countries in the West, including Canada, France, Great Britain, and Switzerland. Gorbachev's wife, Raisa, has studied philosophy at Moscow State University and has lectured on that subject. She speaks a little English. The couple has a married daughter, Irina, and a young granddaughter, Ksenia. Irina and her husband are physicians.

LDA M 86-12305
2 October 1986
While the Communist party supplies the command center and nervous system of the Soviet Union, the government structure furnishes the muscle of the Soviet state.

The legislature, the bicameral Supreme Soviet of the USSR appointed every five years, is theoretically the supreme organ of the land. Its executive organ, the Presidium, technically is the head of state of the Soviet Union. Politburo member Andrey Gromyko currently chairs the Presidium. Similar "soviets" (councils) are appointed in all the country's territorial-administrative units as well, and like the Supreme Soviet, theoretically are popularly elected and theoretically name the executive committees and local executives who constitute the local government down to the village level. In fact, all such appointments are made from above and require approval from the Party.

The government structure itself follows the European ministerial pattern, with a Premier (Nikolay Ryzhkov) at the head. He chairs a Council of Ministers, which ordinarily has about 103 members based in Moscow. The government is highly centralized with an enormous bureaucracy. Furthermore, the USSR Council of Ministers has counterparts in each of the 15 union republics subordinated both to it and, to a lesser extent, to the individual republic Supreme Soviets or "legislatures." Republic-level premiers are ex-officio members of the Council as well.

In structure, each Council of Ministers at the USSR and republic level is headed by a Premier. The various ministries themselves, however, are of three categories: all-union, union-republic, and republic ministries. All-union ministries deal with nation-wide matters, are located in Moscow, and directly supervise local divisions throughout the country; examples are defense, railways, civil aviation, and the like. Union-republic ministries have a central ministry in Moscow and subordinate ministries in the republics, supervising such activities as agriculture and light industry which are nationwide but may vary from area to area. Republic ministries report only to their respective republic governments and usually handle issues of local significance (tea growing in Georgia, for example).

Security and public order fall under the purview of the all-union Committee for State Security (KGB) (with ministerial status) and the union-republic Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The KGB is headed by a full member of the Party Politburo (Viktor Chebrikov). It is responsible for VIP protection and communications, as well as for guarding against foreign espionage and domestic security threats. It also controls the para-military border guards and has special internal security troops under its command. The MVD directs the regular police and militia, the urban firefighting force and has uniformed troops of its own. It also operates the forced labor camps and colonies whose inmates number more than four million, and the vast civil registry system which keeps tabs on the life of the population.
THE SOVIET ECONOMY

THE 12th FIVE YEAR PLAN

Main elements of the plan are annual increases in national income, industrial production, and agricultural output. The plan's basic strategy calls for a 25% increase in the "productive sectors" of the economy -- the machine building, energy, and agro-industrial sectors. The share of total investment in modernization of existing factories is to reach 50% by 1990, and the replacement rate for machinery is to increase to 13% per year.

This is part of an ambitious program to double national income, labor productivity, and industrial production by the year 2000, cover 75-80% of increased raw material needs through conservation and increased efficiency, and "satisfy fully" demand for consumer goods and provide each family with a separate apartment or house in the next 15 years.

DOMESTIC ECONOMIC REFORMS

Gorbachev's first concern is to get the economy moving. His primary focus is on making the existing system work better, not on introducing fundamental systemic "reform". Emphasis is being placed on improved management, more efficient use of existing resources, and modernization through the renovation of existing plants. Initial investment will be concentrated in machine building, where the emphasis is on output of sophisticated technologies by the 1990s. Gorbachev also has moved to introduce a wage differentiation policy and to bring consumer prices more into line with production costs.

REORGANIZATION IN FOREIGN TRADE SECTOR

The thrust of Gorbachev's changes is to permit greater autonomy for selected ministries and enterprises. These entities will be allowed to participate more directly in foreign trade and to establish their own financing. The Ministry of Foreign Trade is also being reorganized and a Foreign Economic Commission, under the Council of Ministers, is being created to oversee the changes and coordinate the activities of entities involved in trade.

Reorganization in the foreign trade sector is prompted by Soviet concern with their poor export profile and by their desire for greater access to Western high technology, which Gorbachev needs to achieve his domestic economic goals. The Soviets also hope the changes will make their trade structure more compatible with the structure of world trade, and gain for them a more influential role in international economic matters.
U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITS, 1943-1985

Every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt has participated in at least one meeting with the Soviet Premier or First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. All such meetings through 1960 also included British and sometimes French leaders, except for the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting in 1959. Following the Paris summit of 1960 which ended prematurely because of the U-2 incident, all the meetings have been on a bilateral basis, although the occasion for the Helsinki summit of 1975 was a multilateral gathering. Ten of the 15 meetings have occurred during the months of May, June, or July.

Tehran (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin),
November 27-December 2, 1943

The discussion centered on military matters, such as planning for the cross channel invasion (Operation OVERLORD) and the invasion of southern France. The three powers also agreed to try to get Turkey to join the war and to split Finland away from the Axis. There was general discussion about several political questions, such as a future world organization and postwar policy toward Germany. On certain contentious issues, such as the Polish question, decisions were postponed, which assured the conference an air of great cordiality.

Yalta (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin),
February 4-11, 1945

The three leaders discussed the future of Poland and Eastern Europe, the nature of Security Council voting in the United Nations, the status of postwar Germany, and the conditions for Soviet entry into the Pacific War. In a Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Allies pledged to work toward the establishment of representative governments in the nations liberated from Axis domination through free elections.
In a secret agreement, the Soviet Union promised to enter the Pacific War two to three months after Germany's surrender in return for certain Far Eastern concessions.

_Potsdam (Truman, Churchill-Attlee, and Stalin),_  
_July 16-August 1, 1945_  

Except for the military details of the Soviet entry into the Pacific War, the conference dealt with political questions, primarily the occupation of Germany and the question of German reparations. The three powers created a Council of Foreign Ministers to work on peace treaties with the Axis powers. In a declaration issued on July 26, they also demanded that Japan surrender unconditionally or be destroyed. During the conference, Truman learned of the successful test of the atomic bomb and informed Stalin in general terms.

_Geneva (Eisenhower, Eden, Faure, and Bulganin and Khrushchev),_  
_July 18-23, 1955_  

At this conference Eisenhower advanced the "Open Skies" proposal calling for an exchange of military blueprints with the Soviet Union and allowing aerial reconnaissance of each other's military installations. The participants also discussed disarmament, German reunification, and the need for greater East-West contacts through travel and the exchange of information.

_Washington-Camp David (Eisenhower and Khrushchev),_  
_September 26-27, 1959_  

During Khrushchev's visit to the United States, arranged mainly by Eisenhower to acquaint the Soviet leader with the American way of life, the two leaders engaged in substantive talks for two days at Camp David. They agreed to expand exchanges and to remove the Soviet deadline for a Berlin settlement, but on other issues, such as disarmament and the reunification of Germany, no progress was made.

_Paris (Eisenhower, Macmillan, De Gaulle, and Khrushchev),_  
_May 16-17, 1960_  

The four leaders were planning to discuss Germany and Berlin, disarmament, nuclear testing, and the general state of East-West relations. On the second day of the conference, before any of the issues could be considered, Khrushchev
demanded that Eisenhower apologize for the U-2 intelligence overflight of the Soviet Union in May. When Eisenhower refused, Khrushchev left the conference.

Vienna (Kennedy and Khrushchev), 
June 3-4, 1961

The status of Berlin was the major subject of discussion, but the conflict in Laos and the general question of disarmament were also on the agenda. Khrushchev's truculence on Berlin surprised and sobered Kennedy, but some progress was made when the two leaders agreed that further discussions on Laos should be continued at the Foreign Minister level.

Glassboro (Johnson and Kosygin), 
June 23 and 25, 1967

The meeting at Glassboro, New Jersey was hastily arranged and only agreed on after considerable haggling over a suitable location. It was appended to Kosygin's visit to the United Nations where he had come to support the Arab nations' proposals for ending the Middle East conflict that had erupted earlier that month. In addition to the Middle East, disarmament and the Vietnam war were also discussed. Nothing came of a Soviet offer during the conference to serve as an intermediary with the North Vietnamese to negotiate a halt to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

Moscow (Nixon and Brezhnev), 
May 22-30, 1972

At this meeting Nixon and Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and the SALT I Interim Agreement, both of which had been in negotiation for many months. Also concluded at Moscow were agreements on public health, environmental cooperation, incidents at sea, exchanges in science, technology, education and culture, and a Declaration of Basic Principles of Mutual Relations.

Washington (Nixon and Brezhnev), 
June 18-25, 1973

Nixon and Brezhnev discussed the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and a number of international and bilateral questions. The two leaders signed Agreements on the Prevention of Nuclear War and on the Basic
Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Other agreements signed at the summit dealt with scientific cooperation, agriculture, trade, and other bilateral issues. The joint communique expressed "deep satisfaction" with the conclusion during the preceding January of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam. President Nixon stated at Brezhnev's departure that the meeting had "built on the strong foundation that we laid a year ago."

**Moscow (Nixon and Brezhnev), June 28-July 3, 1974**

The President and the General Secretary discussed arms control and several international and bilateral issues. The two leaders signed a protocol which further limited each side to one ABM site apiece instead of the two allowed in the 1972 ABM Treaty. The two also signed a Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The governments signed several other instruments dealing with scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges, and other bilateral matters. The communique "reaffirmed their agreement to hold such meetings regularly and when considered necessary for the discussion and solution of urgent questions."

**Vladivostok (Ford and Brezhnev), November 23-24, 1974**

At the Vladivostok meeting, which followed visits by President Ford to Japan and Korea, discussions focused on strategic arms limitations but included a number of bilateral and international issues, including the Middle East. Ford and Brezhnev in the SALT II negotiations reached agreement in principle on some of the basic elements subsequently incorporated in the 1979 treaty. They issued a joint statement on strategic offensive arms (the Vladivostok agreement) and a joint communique calling for continuing efforts at arms limitation and the development of economic cooperation.

**Helsinki (Ford and Brezhnev), July 30 and August 2, 1975**

During two meetings at Helsinki, where both were attending the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ford and Brezhnev attempted unsuccessfully to reach further agreement on strategic arms limitations. In an exchange with reporters after their July 30 meeting, both called it "businesslike" and "friendly."
Vienna (Carter and Brezhnev),
June 15-18, 1979

The SALT II Treaty was signed at the Vienna summit. Carter and Brezhnev also discussed other arms control issues including the continuation of the SALT process, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and several other international, bilateral, and trade issues. The two leaders signed several related agreements and issued a joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms.

Geneva (Reagan and Gorbachev)
November 19-21, 1985

The two leaders discussed the reduction of nuclear armaments, the role of space defense systems, and human rights practices in the Soviet Union. They reaffirmed existing national commitments to the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Reagan and Gorbachev supported the concept of an agreement to ban chemical weapons and called for the successful conclusion of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks and Conference on Disarmament in Europe. They endorsed a policy of regular exchanges between senior U.S. and Soviet officials, and announced that each leader would visit the other's nation. At the end of the meeting, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an Agreement on Contacts and Exchange in the Scientific, Educational and Cultural Fields, and announced that the two countries would resume civil air service.

Office of the Historian
October 1986
THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

A short walk from this chamber is the delegates' Meditation Room, a refuge from a world deafened by the noise of strife and violence. "We want to bring back the idea of worship," Dag Hammarskjold once said about this room, "devotion to something which is greater and higher than we are ourselves."

Well, it's just such devotion that gave birth to the United Nations, devotion to the dream of world peace and freedom, of human rights and democratic self-determination, of a time when, in those ancient words, "...and they shall beat their swords into plowshares...nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

The United States remains committed to the United Nations. For over 40 years, this organization has provided an international forum for harmonizing conflicting national interests and has made a significant contribution in such fields as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and eradicating disease. And yet, no one knows better than those in this chamber how the noble ideals embodied in the Charter have often remained unfulfilled. This organization itself faces a critical hour—that is usually stated as a fiscal crisis. But we can turn this "crisis" into an opportunity. The important reforms proposed by a group of experts can be a first step toward restoring this organization's status and effectiveness. The issue, ultimately, is not one of cash but of credibility. If all the members of this universal organization decide to seize the moment and turn the rhetoric of reform into reality, the future of the United Nations will be secure. And you have my word for it: my country, which has always given the United Nations generous support, will continue to play a leading role in the effort to achieve its noble purposes.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

When I came before you last year, an important moment in the pursuit of those purposes had not yet occurred. The leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States were to meet in Geneva. These discussions have now been held. For over 15 hours, Soviet and American delegations met. For about 6 hours, General Secretary Gorbachev and I talked alone.

Our talks were frank. The talks were also productive—in a larger sense than even the documents that were agreed. Mr. Gorbachev was blunt, and so was I. We came to realize again the truth of the statement: nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they mistrust each other. And I did not hesitate to tell Mr. Gorbachev our view of the source of that mistrust: the Soviet Union's record of seeking to impose its ideology and rule on others. So, we acknowledged the deep and abiding differences between our systems of government, our views of history and the future of mankind. But, despite these differences, we resolved to work together for real reductions in nuclear arms as well as progress in other areas.

DELEGATES TO THE 41ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, today I want to report to you on what has transpired since the summit: notably the important letter I sent July 25th to Mr. Gorbachev. In that letter, I dealt with the important issues of reducing nuclear arms, agreeing on strategic defenses, and limiting nuclear testing. In addition to those issues, which concern the military aspects of Soviet-American relations, I would also like to address other essential steps toward peace: the resolution of political conflicts, the strengthening of the international economy, and the protection of human rights.

Before I do this, however, let me, in the tradition of candor established at Geneva, tell you that a pall has been cast over our relations with the Soviet Union. I refer here to a particularly disturbing example of Soviet transgressions against human rights.

Recently—after the arrest of a Soviet national and UN employee accused of espionage in the United States—an American correspondent in Moscow was made the subject of fabricated accusations and trumped-up charges. He was arrested and jailed in a callous disregard of due process and numerous human rights conventions. In effect, he was taken as a hostage—even threatened with the death penalty.

Both individuals have now been remanded to their respective ambassadors. But this is only an interim step, agreed to by the United States for humanitarian reasons. It does not change the facts of the case: Gennady

Following are the text of an address by President Reagan before the UN General Assembly in New York City on September 24, 1986, and a White House fact sheet.
Arms Control

It is for this reason that I wrote last summer to Mr. Gorbachev with new arms control proposals. Before discussing the proposals, let us be clear about which weapons are the most dangerous and threatening to peace. The threat does not come from defensive systems, which are a shield against attack, but from offensive weapons—ballistic missiles that hurtle through space and can wreak mass destruction on the surface of the earth, especially the Soviet Union's heavy, accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), with multiple warheads, which have no counterparts in size or number in any other country.

That is why the United States has long urged radical, equitable, verifiable reductions in these offensive systems. Note that I said reduction; for this is the real purpose of arms control: not just to codify the levels of today's arsenals, not just to channel their further expansion, but to reduce them in ways that will reduce the danger of war. Indeed, the United States believes the prospect of a future without such weapons of mass destruction must be the ultimate goal of arms control.

I am pleased to say that the Soviet Union has now embraced our idea of radical reductions in offensive systems. At the Geneva summit last November, we agreed to intensify work in this area. Since then, the Soviets have made detailed proposals which, while not acceptable to us, appear to represent a serious effort. So, we continue to seek a 50% reduction of American and Soviet arsenals—with the central focus on the reduction of ballistic missile warheads. If the Soviet Union wants only a lesser reduction, however, we are prepared to consider it but as an interim measure. In other provisions, as well, we have sought to take account of Soviet concerns. So, there has been movement.

Similarly, in the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces, the United States seeks the total elimination of such missiles on a global basis. Again, if the Soviet Union insists on pursuing such a goal in stages, we are prepared to conclude an interim agreement without delay.

All this given me hope. I can tell you the exchanges between our two sides this summer could well have marked the beginning of a serious, productive negotiation on arms reduction. The ice of the negotiating stalemate could break—if both sides intensify their effort in the new round of Geneva talks and if we keep the promises we made to each other last November.

For too long a time, however, the Soviet response has been to downplay the need for offensive reductions. When the United States began work on technology to make offensive nuclear weapons someday obsolete, the Soviets tried to make that the main issue—as if the main danger to strategic stability was a defense against missiles that is still on the drawing boards, rather than the menacing ballistic missiles themselves that already exist in excessive numbers.

Still, the United States recognizes that both the offensive and defensive sides of the strategic equation must be addressed. And we have gone far to meet Soviet concerns expressed about the potential offensive use of strategic defensive systems. I have offered firm and concrete assurances that our Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) could never be used to deploy weapons in space that can cause mass destruction on earth. I have pointed out that the radical reduction we seek now in offensive arsenals would be additional insurance that SDI cannot be used to support a first-strike strategy. And our preference from the beginning has been to move forward cooperatively with the Soviets on strategic defenses, so that neither side will feel threatened and both can benefit from the strategic revolution that SDI represents.

The United States continues to respect the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in spite of clear evidence the Soviets are violating it. We have told the Soviets that if we can both agree on radical reductions in strategic offensive weapons, we are prepared right now to sign an agreement with them on research, development, testing, and deployment of strategic defenses based on the following:

First, both sides would agree to confine themselves through 1991 to research, development, and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, to determine whether advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible.

Second, a new treaty, signed now, would provide that if, after 1991, either side should decide to deploy such a system, that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles. And this plan would be negotiated over a 2-year period.

Third, if the two sides can agree after 2 years of negotiation, either side would be free to deploy an advanced strategic defense system, after giving 6-months notice to the other.

As the United States has repeatedly made clear, we are moving toward a future of greater reliance upon strategic defense. The United States remains prepared to talk about how—under what ground rules and process—we and the Soviet Union can do this cooperatively. Such strategic defenses, coupled with radical reductions in offensive forces, would represent a safer balance and would give future statesmen the opportunity to move beyond it to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

In addition to our proposals on offensive reductions and strategic defense, we have suggested new steps in another area—nuclear testing. Just as eliminating all nuclear weapons is our long-term goal, so, too, is a total ban on nuclear testing. But both must be approached with practical steps. For the reality is that, for now, we still must rely on these weapons for the deterrence of war. Thus the safety and reliability of our deterrent are themselves critical to peace.

The United States is proud of its record of nuclear safety and intends to maintain it. Nevertheless, we are, as I said, ready now to take two important steps toward limiting nuclear testing. First, we are ready to move forward on ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, once agreement is reached on improved verification procedures. We have proposed new ideas to make this possible.

Second, upon ratification of those treaties, and in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons, we are prepared to discuss ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

These are steps we could take in the near future to show the world that we are moving forward. And I, therefore, call upon the Soviet Union to join us in practical, attainable progress in limiting nuclear testing.
Just a few days ago, I received a reply from General Secretary Gorbachev to my letter of July 25. And, for the moment, let me say simply that we are giving it serious and careful consideration.

As we move toward our goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, it is vital that we also address important imbalances of other kinds of weapons. This is why the United States has proposed a comprehensive global ban on all chemical weapons and why we and our allies have tried hard to break the stalemate in the conventional force negotiations in Vienna. And, in the Stockholm conference, a major advance has been achieved—a concrete new set of confidence-building measures which includes inspections.

Regional Conflicts

But we must remember from the experience of the 1970s that progress in arms control cannot be divorced from regional political developments. As I said at the beginning, political tensions cause the military competition, not the other way around.

But while the United States and the Soviet Union disagree over the root causes of political tension, we do agree that regional conflicts could escalate into global confrontation. Last year from this rostrum, I presented a formula for peace which would apply to five critical regional conflicts that are potential flashpoints for wider conflict. I pointed out how difficult it is for the United States to accept Soviet assurances of peaceful intent when 120,000 Soviet troops prosecute a vicious war against the Afghan people; when 140,000 Soviet-backed Vietnamese soldiers wage war on the people of Cambodia; when 1,700 Soviet advisers and 2,500 Cuban combat troops are involved in military planning and operations in Ethiopia; when 1,300 Soviet military advisers and 36,000 Cuban troops direct and participate in combat operations to prop up an unpopular, repressive regime in Angola; when hundreds of millions of dollars in Soviet arms and Soviet bloc advisers help a dictatorial regime in Nicaragua try to subvert and betray a popular revolution. The danger inherent in these conflicts must be recognized. Marxist-Leninist regimes tend to wage war as readily against their neighbors as they routinely do against their own people. In fact, the internal and external wars often become indistinguishable.

In Afghanistan, for example, the puppet regime has announced its intention to relocate tens of thousands of people from border areas. Can anyone doubt this will be done in classic communist style—by force? Many will die, to make it easier for the Soviets and their satellite troops to intimidate Pakistan. It is just such transgressions that make the risk of confrontation with democratic nations so acute. So, once again, I propose a three-point peace process for the resolution of regional conflicts:

First, talks between the warring parties themselves, without which an end to violence and national reconciliation are impossible;

Second, discussions between the United States and Soviet Union—not to impose solutions but to support peace talks and eventually eliminate the supply of arms and the proxy troops from abroad; and

Third, if the talks are successful, joint efforts to welcome each country back into the world economy and the community of nations that respect human rights.

Terrorism

In addition to regional disputes, the grave threat of terrorism also jeopardizes the hopes for peace. No cause, no grievance can justify it. Terrorism is heinous and intolerable. It is the crime of cowards—cowards who prey on the innocent, the defenseless, and the helpless. With its allies and other nations, the United States has taken steps to counter terrorism directly—particularly state-sponsored terrorism. Last April, the United States demonstrated that it will defend its interests and act against terrorist aggression. And let me assure all of you today, especially let me assure any potential sponsors of terrorism, that the American people are of one mind on this issue. Like other civilized peoples of the world, we have reached our limit. Attacks against our citizens or our interests will not go unanswered. We will also do all in our power to help other law-abiding nations threatened by terrorist attacks. To that end, the United States believes that the understandings reached by the seven industrial democracies at the Tokyo summit last May made a good start toward international accord in the war on terrorism. We recommend to the General Assembly consideration of the Tokyo resolutions.

International Economy

Moving to the economic realm, how ironic it is that some continue to espouse such ideas as a "new international economic order" based on state control when the word is learning, as never before, that the freedom of the individual, not the power of the state, is the key to economic dynamism and growth. Nations have turned away from centralization and government controls and toward the incentives and rewards of the free market. They have invited their citizens to develop their talents and abilities to the fullest and, in the process, to provide jobs, to create wealth, to build social stability and foster faith in the future for all.

The economic summits of the industrial democracies have paid tribute to these principles—as has the historic UN Special Session on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa in May. We applaud the African nations' call for reform leading to greater reliance on their private sectors for economic growth. We believe that overcoming hunger and economic stagnation requires policies that encourage Africans' own productivity and initiatives; such a policy framework will make it easier for the rest of the world, including the United States, to help. The laws of economic incentives do not discriminate between developed and developing countries. They apply to all equally.

Much of the recent recovery in the world economy can be directly attributed to this growth of economic freedom. And it is this trend that offers such hope for the future. And yet this new hope faces a grave threat: the menace of trade barriers.

History shows the imposition of such barriers invites retaliation, which in turn sparks the very sort of trade wars that plunged the world in the 1930s deeper into depression and economic misery. True protectionism is destructionism. That is why the United States seeks the assistance of all countries represented here in the General Assembly in protecting the practice of free and fair trade. We applaud the success of the meeting of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] trade ministers last week in Uruguay, where agreement was reached to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations covering a wide range of topics important to economic growth. With over 90 other countries of the GATT, the United States is working to maintain the free flow of international trade.

In addition to resistance to protectionism, the United States is also seeking to stimulate world economic growth in other ways. Our Treasury bill interest rate is now just over 5%, the lowest it has been in 9 years, which provides enormous relief to debtor countries.

America's new tax structure will open
the way for greater prosperity at home, which will contribute to greater prosperity abroad. And, finally, the United States is working with other countries to minimize currency swings, to promote stability in the monetary markets, to establish predictability as a basis for prosperity.

But the United States believes the greatest contribution we can make to world prosperity is the continued advocacy of the magic of the marketplace—the truth, the simple and proven truth, that economic development is an outgrowth of economic freedom just as economic freedom is the inseparable twin of political freedom and democratic government.

Human Rights
And it is here that we come to our final category—human rights—the indispensable element for peace, freedom, and prosperity. I note that Mr. Gorbachev has used in recent speeches the same categories I have used here today: the military, the political, and the economic; except that he listed his fourth category: humanitarian.

Well, the difference is revealing. The United States believes that respect for the individual, for the dignity of the human person—those rights outlined in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights—does not belong in the realm of charity of "humanitarian" causes.

Respect for human rights is not social work; it is not merely an act of compassion. It is the first obligation of government and the source of its legitimacy.

It also is the foundation stone in any structure of world peace. All through history, it has been the dictatorships and the tyrannies that have surrendered first to the cult of militarism and the pursuit of war. Countries based on the consent of the governed, countries that recognize the unalienable rights of the individual, do not make war on each other. Peace is more than just the absence of war. True peace is justice; true peace is freedom.

And true peace dictates the recognition of human rights.

Commitments were made more than 10 years ago in Helsinki concerning these rights and their recognition. We need only look to the East today to see how sadly unfulfilled those commitments are. The persecution of scientists, religious leaders, peace activists, political dissenters, and other prisoners of conscience continues unabated behind the Iron Curtain. You know, one section of the Helsinki accords even speaks to "improvement of working conditions of journalists."

So, it is clear that progress in the human rights area must keep pace with progress in other areas. A failure on this score will hinder further movement in East-West relations.

Hope: The Highest Reality
These, then, are the areas of concern and of opportunity that the United States sees in the quest for peace and freedom—the twin objectives of the UN Charter.

Last year, I pointed out in my address to the General Assembly that the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union are deep and abiding. But I also called for a fresh start in relations between our two nations, a fresh start that could benefit our own people and the people of every nation. Since that time, the United States has taken action and put forth new proposals that could lead to our two countries and the entire world in a direction we all have long sought to go. Now more than ever, it is the responsibility of the Soviet Union to take action and demonstrate that they, too, are continuing the dialogue for peace.

As I’ve said, I believe that we can be hopeful about the world and the prospects for freedom. We only need look around us to see the new technologies that may someday spare future generations the nightmare of nuclear terror, or the growing ranks of democratic activists and freedom fighters, or the increasing movement toward free market economies, or the extent of worldwide concern about the rights of the individual in the face of brute, state power.

In the past, when I have noted such trends—when I have called for a “forward strategy for freedom” and predicted the ultimate triumph of democratic rule over totalitarianism—some have accused me of telling people what they want to hear, of urging them not to engage the day but to escape it. Yet, to hope is to believe in humanity and in the future. Hope remains the highest reality, the age-old power; hope is at the root of all the great ideas and causes that have bettered the lot of mankind across the centuries.

History teaches us to hope—for it teaches us about man and about the irrepressible human spirit. A Nobel laureate in literature, a great figure of the American South, William Faulkner, once said that the last sound heard on earth would be that of the two remaining humans arguing over where to go in the spaceship they had built. In his speech to the Nobel committee in 1959, Faulkner spoke of the nuclear age, of the general and universal physical fear it had engendered, a fear of destruction that had become almost unbearable. But, he said: “I decline to accept the end of man. I believe that man will not merely endure, he will prevail. He is immortal...because he has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice and endurance.”

Faulkner spoke of “the old verities and truths of the heart,” of the courage, honor, pride, compassion, pity, sacrifice, and, yes, that hope which is the glory of our past. And all of these things we find today in our present; we must use them to build our future. And it’s why today we can lift up our spirits and our hearts; it is why we resolve that, with God’s help, the cause of humanity “will not merely endure” but prevail; that someday all the world—every nation, every people, every person—will know the blessings of peace and see the light of freedom.

FACT SHEET
The President today addressed the 41st session of the UN General Assembly and reviewed events since he addressed the Assembly a year ago.

The President said “a pall has been cast” over relations between the two superpowers because of the Soviet’s arrest of Nicholas Daniloff, an American reporter in Moscow, on “trumped-up charges.” The President said Mr. Daniloff is “an innocent hostage who should be released” and warned that the “Soviet Union bears the responsibility for the consequences of its action.”

The President described proposals that he has made to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on nuclear arms reductions, strategic defenses, and nuclear testing. He described in detail the U.S. proposal to sign agreements now with the Soviet Union on strategic defenses and reductions in offensive nuclear arms. “[W]e are moving,” the President said, “toward a future of greater reliance upon strategic defense. The United States remains prepared to talk about how—under what ground rules and process—we and the Soviet Union can do this cooperatively.”

Noting that “political tensions cause the military competition, not the other way around,” the President reintroduced his proposal for reducing regional conflicts, which he made at last year’s General Assembly.

The President said the United States remains committed to the United Nations, but that many of the noble ideals embodied in the UN Charter remain unfulfilled. In discussing the UN
fiscal crisis, the President said that reforms proposed by the Group of Experts "can be a first step" toward restoring the organization's status and effectiveness. He promised the United States will continue to play a leading role in efforts to achieve the purposes of the United Nations as set forth in its Charter.

The President applauded the success of last week's GATT talks in Uruguay, where, with 90 other countries, agreement was reached on holding a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. The President concluded his remarks on a note of optimism. He pointed to the growing ranks of freedom fighters and other advocates of democracy; the growing world movement toward market economies; and the extent of worldwide concern about the rights of individuals as hopeful indicators of the prospects for freedom.

The 1985 Geneva Summit and U.S.-Soviet Relations

The President said he and Mr. Gorbachev acknowledged at Geneva the deep and abiding differences between the U.S. and Soviet systems of government and views of the history and future of mankind. "But despite these differences," the President said, "we resolved to work together for real reductions in nuclear arms as well as progress in other areas."

A sign of progress: the Soviet Union has "embraced our idea of radical reductions in offensive systems." Referring to the events of this summer, the President said: "The ice of the negotiating stalemate could break—if both sides intensify their effort in the new round of Geneva talks and if we keep the promise we made to each other last November."

The President recalled his speech last year to the General Assembly, in which he called for a "fresh start" in relations between the two superpowers. Since last year, he said, the United States has taken action and put forth new proposals. "Now more than ever," the President said, "it is the responsibility of the Soviet Union to take action and demonstrate that they, too, are continuing the dialogue for peace."

U.S. Proposals on Arms Reduction and Strategic Defenses. The President referred to his July letter to Mr. Gorbachev and outlined U.S. proposals on nuclear arms, strategic defense, and nuclear tests. The President reviewed the following points:

- The United States continues to seek a 50% reduction of American and Soviet arsenals—with the central focus on the reduction of ballistic missile warheads. The President said that if the Soviet Union prefers a lesser reduction, however, we are prepared to consider it as an interim measure.
- The President also emphasized that the United States seeks total elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles on a global basis, but that we are also prepared to conclude without delay an interim agreement which would move us toward that objective.
- The radical reduction in offensive arsenals America seeks will be additional assurance that strategic defenses cannot be used to support a first-strike strategy.
- The United States is prepared now to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union now on research, development, testing, and deployment of strategic defenses.
  (1) Both sides would agree to confine themselves, through 1991, to research, development, and testing, which is permitted by the 1972 ABM Treaty, to determine whether advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible.
  (2) A new treaty signed now would provide that if, after 1991, either side should decide to deploy such a system, that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and eliminating offensive ballistic missiles. This plan would be negotiated over a 2-year period.
  (3) If the two sides cannot agree after 2 years of negotiation, either side would be free to deploy an advanced strategic defense system, after giving 6-months notice to the other.
- The President also suggested new steps on limiting nuclear testing with the ultimate goal being a total ban on nuclear tests. The President said he was ready to take these steps:
  (1) Move forward on ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions once agreement is reached on improved verification procedures; and
  (2) Upon ratification, discuss ways to implement a program of limiting—and then ending—nuclear testing, in parallel with reductions and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
- Finally, the President made clear that as we move toward our goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, it is equally vital to address the serious imbalances in chemical and conventional weapons.

The President stated that he had received a reply from General Secretary Gorbachev to his letter of July 25. The President said he is giving Gorbachev's reply "serious and careful" consideration.

The Daniloff Arrest. The President said the charges against Nicholas Daniloff, an American journalist stationed in Moscow, have cast a pall over our relations with the Soviet Union. In strong terms, the President objected to the Soviets' "fabricated accusations and trumped-up charges" against Mr. Daniloff, who was "arrested and jailed in a callous disregard of due process and numerous human rights conventions."

"In effect," the President said, "he was taken as a hostage—even threatened with the death penalty."

The President stated that Gennadiy Zakharov, a Soviet citizen and UN employee accused of espionage charges, should stand trial. "Misusing the United Nations for purposes of espionage," the President stated, "does a grave disservice to this organization."

Regional Conflicts Persist

The President, reminding the General Assembly of his address last year, said it is difficult for the United States to accept Soviet assurances of peaceful intent when:

- 120,000 Soviet troops prosecute a vicious war against the Afghan people;
- 140,000 Soviet-backed Vietnamese soldiers wage war on the people of Cambodia;
- 1,700 Soviet advisers and 2,500 Cuban combat troops are involved in military planning and operations in Ethiopia;
- 1,300 Soviet military advisers and 36,000 Cuban troops direct and participate in combat operations to prop up an unpopular, repressive regime in Angola; and
- Hundreds of millions of dollars in Soviet arms and advisers help a dictatorial regime in Nicaragua try to subvert its neighbors and betray its revolution.

As the President said: "Marxist-Leninist regimes tend to wage wars as readily against their neighbors as they routinely do against their own people."

Speaking of the Afghan puppet regime's intention to relocate border populations, the President said: "Many will die, to make it easier for the Soviets and their satellite troops to intimidate Pakistan."


The President again outlined a process to resolve these regional conflicts and lessen the risk that they might spark a wider conflict:

- Talks between the warring parties;
- Discussions between the United States and Soviet Union to support peace talks and eliminate the supply of arms and proxy troops from abroad; and
- Joint efforts to welcome each country back into the world economy and community of nations that respect human rights.

**Terrorism's Threat**

Terrorism jeopardizes the hopes of peace, the President said. "No cause, no grievance can justify it. Terrorism is heinous and intolerable. It is the crime of cowards—cowards who prey on the innocent, the defenseless, the helpless."

The United States has taken steps to counter terrorism directly—particularly state-sponsored terrorism. The President alluded to the April 1986 raid on Libyan terrorist-related facilities and said: "Like other civilized people of the world, we have reached our limit. Attacks against our citizens or our interests will not go unanswered."

The President recommended to the General Assembly consideration of resolutions adopted at the May 1986 Tokyo economic summit on terrorism. These resolutions made clear that the war on terrorism can be won through a combination of national measures and international cooperation.

**Economic Freedom**

The President noted that the recovery of the world economy can be directly attributed to the growth of economic freedom. The President applauded the African nations' call at a UN special session in May for reform leading to greater reliance on their private sectors for economic growth. A policy framework based on encouraging Africans' own productivity and initiative "will make it easier for the rest of the world, including the United States, to help," the President said.

However, the President said economic freedom and the world recovery face a grave threat—the menace of high tariffs and import quotas. Trade barriers invite retaliation that sparks trade wars and that plunged the world deeper into depression and economic misery in the 1930s. As the President said, "Protectionism is destructionism."

The President requested the assistance of all countries of the General Assembly in protecting free and fair trade. He applauded the success of last week's GATT talks in Uruguay where, with 50 other countries, agreement was reached on holding a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.

The President also noted many ways in which the United States is attempting to stimulate world economic growth, examples:

- Lower interest rates;
- Reforms to America's tax structure, which will open the way for greater prosperity at home and hence greater investment abroad by the United States; and
- Leadership represented in the "Baker plan" to minimize currency swings, promote stability in the monetary markets, and establish predictability as a basis for prosperity.

**Human Freedom**

The President said human freedom is the indispensable element for peace, freedom, and prosperity. Noting that the Soviet Union prefers to speak of "humanitarian" issues, the President said that human rights do not belong in the category of humanitarian causes. "Respect for human rights is not social work," the President said.

The President declared human rights as the foundation for any stable structure of world peace. He said: "Peace is more than just the absence of war. True peace is justice; true peace is freedom. And true peace dictates the recognition of human rights."

Ten years ago in Helsinki, commitments were made on these rights and their recognition. But the President said that in the East today these commitments are sadly unfulfilled, referring to confirmed "persecution of scientists, religious leaders, peace activists, political dissidents," and others.

The President said that progress in the human rights area must keep pace with progress in other areas. "A failure on this score," the President said, "will hinder further movement in East-West relations."

To Believe in Hope Is To Believe in Humanity

The President concluded his address on a note of optimism, saying he believes "we can be hopeful about the world and the prospects for freedom. As sources of this hope, the President pointed, in particular, to the increasing conversions to free market economies and the extent of worldwide concern about the rights of the individual."

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REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE 1986 GRADUATING CLASS
OF GLASSBORO HIGH SCHOOL
The High School Gymnasium
Glassboro, New Jersey

5:30 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: (Applause.) Thank you. Governor Kean, President Beach, Mr. Mayor, Superintendent Mitcho, Principal Holland, ladies and gentlemen -- and especially you, the Glassboro High School Class of 1986, thanks for the greeting, but I know why you're so enthusiastic -- you probably heard about my earlier Hollywood connections and think I might be able to introduce you to Tom Cruise or Michael J. Fox. (Laughter and Applause.)

You know, your principal, Mr. Holland, showed me your American history book and I was startled to see that it took almost 400 pages to tell the story of our nation. When I was your age, it only took two stone tablets. (Laughter.) But there are advantages to being President. The day after I was elected, I had my high school grades classified "Top Secret." (Laughter.)

By the way, I understand this is the biggest crowd, here in the gym, since the last time the Bulldog basketball team played a home game. (Laughter.) Am I correct in thinking there may be one or two Bulldog fans here today? (Applause.) I was looking at those championship banners back there.

Seriously, it is an honor to join you today for this commencement ceremony -- an event that marks your coming of age and means so much to you and your families. And I know you want to join me in congratulating your principal, Roy Holland, on 11 years of outstanding service. (Applause.)

But what I have to say today I've come to say to you, the students of Glassboro High School who are about to graduate. Mothers and fathers, families and friends -- you have our permission to eavesdrop. But you must understand that this is between us -- one who has seen more than seven decades of American life, and the bright young people seated before him, who have not yet seen all of two.

Glassboro High School Class of 1986: If we had time today, I might talk with you about good citizenship, all that we've been trying to achieve in Washington, or even the things I think we both enjoy -- things like football games and going to the beach.

It's hard for you to believe that grownups, parents, etc., can understand how you feel and what it's like to be your age. When you get to be parents yourselves, you'll be surprised how clear your memories will be of these days at Glassboro High. You'll remember how you felt about things, about successes, and, yes, disappointments. You'll discover as you get older that certain things are so much a part of your life that you'll remember them always, and high school, I assure you, is one. I was -- but as I was saying, it's in the very nature of time that it runs on more quickly than any of us would wish, and I must compress all that I want to say into a few brief and fleeting minutes. Now, perhaps that in itself represents one of the lessons that I can impart -- the preciousness
of each moment.

And if you're ever a commencement speaker, try to keep in mind the importance of brevity in a speech. You know every generation is critical of the generation that preceded it and feels it must discard many of the mores and customs of those who had gone before. Our generation felt that way and so will yours. But in casting aside the old, don't throw out those values that have been tested by time just because they're old. They're old because their value has been proven by many generations over the years and, yes, the centuries.

Now, I know that in recent days you've been bidding farewell to your teachers and friends, and I wonder whether you've noticed as you've done so that this time of year tends to bring out some old and familiar phrases -- phrases like, "The future belongs to you," and, "You are the hope of tomorrow."

I must tell you that each of these phrases speaks deep truths: You are the future. Oh, the phrases may sometimes sound worn; perhaps because you've already heard them so many times. And they can seem inadequate to your parents and me because we want to tell you all that we have learned. We want to paint for you our own experience so vividly that you'll be able to avoid our heartaches while you double and re-double your joys. And then we find we have nothing at our disposal but words, weak and feeble instruments, that cannot possibly carry the full freight of our meaning.

Still we must try -- every modicum of knowledge that can be truly and rightly transmitted from one generation to the next can prove invaluable. So it is that I want to speak to you about this nation of which you will so soon become the leaders -- in particular, about those qualities of our national life that we Americans have always cherished in our own country and hoped to extend to all the world: freedom and peace. Perhaps you could think of our talk on this matter as writing a high school essay, an essay on peace -- one last assignment before we let you go.

English teachers sometimes suggest opening essays vividly, with a dramatic scene or story that helps to set the tone. Well, it so happens that you and I have just such a dramatic story at hand. For 19 years ago -- the very year before most of you were born -- Glassboro received a visit from the President of the United States.

In June of 1967, President Johnson flew from the White House to Glassboro -- just as I've done today -- to hold a summit meeting with Soviet Premier Kosygin. The meeting was scheduled to last one day. But the two men talked for more than five hours, then held a second meeting two days later. If you were to research the meeting in your school library, you would find that the U.S. News wrote, that "Among the problems they discussed were some of the world's biggest: Vietnam, the Middle East, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

Well, today, historians have concluded that the Glassboro Summit was not, in fact, one of the most momentous -- no major breakthroughs were made or agreements reached. Nevertheless, the two men met. They were frank. They worked to understand each other and to make themselves understood. In this alone, I would submit, they taught us a great deal.

Let us then remain mindful of that Glassboro Summit of 19 years ago. And let us remember that as we look back upon the Glassboro Summit, others -- perhaps 19 years in the future -- will look back upon us. It's my fervent hope that they will say we worked to break the patterns of history that all too often resulted in war -- that we reached for accord, that we reached for peace. Hope finds its expression in hard work, so let us move on to the body of our essay and the tasks of analysis and organization. Let us begin by
Considering our attitude toward our country and ourselves.

Certainly the American story represents one of the great epics of human history. Yet ours is a story of goodness as well as of greatness. After World War II, our goodness received a dramatic manifestation in the Marshall Plan -- the vast program of assistance to help war-ravaged nations recover from World War II. And we can be proud that we helped restore not only our allies but those who had been our enemies as well. Pope Pius XII said of us at that time, "The American people have a genius for splendid and unselfish action and into the hands of America, God has placed the destinies of an afflicted humanity." And in our own times, the United States continues to bear the burdens of defending freedom around the world. Listen to the words of former Prime Minister of Australia John Gorton: "I wonder if anybody has thought what the situation of comparatively small nations would be if there were not in existence the United States, if there were not this great, giant country prepared to make those sacrifices."
Do we have faults? Of course. But we have as well the courage and determination to correct them. Consider the darkest blot upon our history, racial discrimination. We fought the Civil War and passed the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to bring slavery to an end. But discrimination still made itself felt, but so did the American sense of decency and this ultimately gave rise to the Civil Rights movement. Sweeping legislation has passed to ensure that all Americans, regardless of race or background, would be able to participate fully in the life of the nation. Today bigotry has been beaten down but not yet totally destroyed; it falls now to you to carry on the battle. So fight racism. Fight anti-Semitism. Fight in all its variations the bigotry and intolerance that we Americans have worked so hard to root out.

I make much of all we've done to combat discrimination in our country because it seems to me of central importance to our essay on peace. Here in this green and gentle land people of all nations — people of all races and faiths — have learned to live in harmony to build one nation. Nor is the story over. Listen indeed to this roll of some of your schoolmates: born in India, Sajad and Khatija Bilgrani; born in China, Wen Ting Geng; born in Japan, Tomoko Sasaki; and born in Laos, Boumay Chomma, and Rasami Sengvoravong and Sisouva Phatsodavong.

If ever in coming years you grow disillusioned with your nation — if ever you doubt that America holds a special place in all the long history of humankind — remember this moment and these names that I've just read. And then you'll understand — you will find new strength — and then you will know how it is that we Americans can look to all the other peoples of this planet with self-confidence and generous friendship.

Call it mysticism if you will; I have always believed there was some divine plan that placed this great land between the two oceans to be found by peoples from every corner of the earth — those people who had in common that extra love of freedom and that extra ounce of courage that would enable them to pack up, leave their friends and relatives and homeland to seek their future in this blessed place.

And that brings me to the international scene and our relations with the Soviet Union. It's important to begin by distinguishing between the peoples inside the Soviet Union and the government that rules them. Certainly we have no quarrel with the peoples — far from it. Yet we must remember the peoples in the Soviet Union have virtually no influence on their government.

There's a little story that indicates what I mean. It seems that an American and a Soviet citizen were having a discussion about who had more freedom. And the American said, "Look, I can march into the White House — the Oval Office — and I can pound the desk and say to the President, 'Mr. President, I don't like the way you're running our country.'" And the Soviet citizen said, "Well, I can do that." And the American said, "You can?" He said, "Yes, I can walk into the Kremlin, into the General Secretary Gorbachev's office, and I can say, 'Mr. General Secretary, I don't like the way President Reagan's running his country.'" (Laughter.) Well, you know — (applause.) You know, I told that story to General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. And thank goodness he laughed, too. (Laughter.)

We must remember that the Soviet government is based upon and drawn from the Soviet Communist party — an organization that remains formally pledged to subjugating the world to Communist domination. This is not the time to delve deeply into history, but you should know that the emergence of the Soviet Union is in many respects an expression of the terrible enchantment with the power of the state that became so prominent in the first half of our century. In his widely-acclaimed book, "Modern Times," Paul Johnson has argued just this point — that modern ideologies had exalted the state above
the individual.

This rise of state power affected my life as it did the lives of many of your parents and nearly all of your grandparents. In the late 1920's, I graduated from high school full of hope and expectation -- like you today. Then, just as I'd established myself in a career -- just as my generation had established itself -- we were at war. We fought valiantly and well, but not without a sense of all that might have been. In the end representative government defeated statism -- indeed, Japan, Germany, and Italy, once our deadly enemies, all soon became thriving democracies themselves and are now our staunchest allies. But not the Soviet Union. There statism persists.

You know, there's something you should be very proud of and aware of. Back through the history of man there have been revolutions many times. Ours was unique. Ours was the only revolution that said, we, the people, control the government. The government is our servant. Those other revolutions just exchanged one set of rulers for another set of rulers.

Well, what then are we to make of the Soviet Union? My own views upon the character of the regime are well-known, and I am convinced that we must continue to speak out for freedom, again and again making the crucial moral distinctions between democracy and totalitarianism. So, too, I am convinced that we must take seriously the Soviet history of expansionism and provide an effective counter.

At the same time, we must remain realistic about and committed to arms control. It is indeed fitting to pay particular attention to arms negotiations in these days, for if the Soviet Union proves willing, this can represent a moment of opportunity in relations between our nations.

When I met Mr. Gorbachev last November in Geneva, he and I agreed to intensify our effort to reduce strategic arms. We agreed on the next steps -- negotiating a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear forces, and an interim agreement to cover intermediate-range missiles. And we both spoke of the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons.

By November last, we had presented new strategic arms reduction proposals designed to bridge the gap between earlier Soviet and American proposals. Our proposal would have achieved a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear forces in a manner both equitable and responsible. Then, in mid-February we proposed a detailed, phased approach for eliminating an entire class of weapons -- the so-called longer-range intermediate range weapons, or INFs -- by 1990. And we repeated our offer of an "open laboratories" exchange of visits to facilities performing strategic defense research. Until recently, the Soviet response has been disappointing in a number of ways.

But in recent weeks, there have been fresh developments. The Soviets have made suggestions on a range of issues, from nuclear power plant safety to conventional force reductions in Europe. Perhaps most important, the Soviet negotiators at Geneva have placed on the table new proposals to reduce nuclear weapons. Now, we cannot accept these particular proposals without some change, but it appears that the Soviets have begun to make a serious effort.

If both sides genuinely want progress, then this could represent a turning point in the effort to make ours a safer and more peaceful world. We believe that possibly an atmosphere does exist that will allow for serious discussion.

I have indicated to General Secretary Gorbachev my willingness for our representatives to meet to prepare for the next summit. The location is unimportant. What matters is that such a meeting take place in mutual earnestness so that we can make progress
at the next summit.

Certainly Mr. Gorbachev knows the depth of my commitment to peace. Indeed, when we went to Geneva my advisors told me that if we could achieve nothing more than an agreement to meet again, it would be -- if we could do no more than that -- then all our work at that summit would have been worthwhile. Well, on the first day of meetings, Mr. Gorbachev and I took a little walk together alone. He happened to mention that there was a great deal in the Soviet Union that he wanted me to see. And I answered that I wished that he could visit the United States. Next thing you knew, we had an agreement to meet here in 1986 and in the Soviet Union in 1987. Now, that wasn't so hard, was it?

In this essay on peace, then, we can assert that the time has come to move forward. Let us leave behind efforts to seek only limits to the increase of nuclear arms and seek instead actual arms reductions -- the deep and verifiable reductions that Mr. Gorbachev and I have agreed to negotiate. The goal here is not complicated. I am suggesting that we agree not on how many new, bigger and more accurate missiles can be built but on how to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear missiles.

Let us leave behind, too, the defense policy of Mutual Assured Destruction -- or MAD, as it's called -- and seek to put in its place a defense that truly defends.

You know, let me interrupt right here and say that possibly you haven't considered much about this system, this "MAD policy," as it's called -- and incidentally, MAD stands for Mutual Assured Destruction, but MAD is also a description of what the policy is. It means that if we each keep enough weapons that we can destroy each other, then maybe we'll both have enough sense not to shoot those weapons off. Well, that's not exactly the way for the world to go on with these massed, terribly destructive weapons aimed at each other and the possibility that some day a madman somewhere may push a button and the next day the world starts to explode. Even now we're performing research as part of our Strategic Defense Initiative that might one day enable us to put in place a shield that missiles could not penetrate -- a shield that could protect us from nuclear missiles just as a roof protects a family from rain.

And let us leave behind suspicion between our peoples and replace it with understanding. As a result of the cultural exchange agreement Mr. Gorbachev and I signed in Geneva, the Soviet Union has already sent to our nation just recently the Kirov Ballet and an exhibition of impressionist paintings. We in turn will send to the Soviet Union scholars and musicians -- indeed, the Russian-born American pianist, Vladimir Horowitz, has already performed in Moscow. And we hope to see a large increase in the number of everyday citizens traveling between both countries -- just last week at the White House I met with high school students your age who will visit the Soviet Union this summer. Surely it's in our interest that the peoples in the Soviet Union should know the truth about the United States. And surely it can only enrich our lives to learn more about them. As a matter of fact, I believe with all my heart that if a generation of young people throughout the world could get to know each other, they would never make war upon each other. (Applause.)

This brings us at last to our conclusion -- if I may, then, a few final thoughts. From the heart, I have tried to speak to you today of peace and freedom. As your President it's my duty to do so, and because in my lifetime I have seen our nation at war four times. During the Second World War, hundreds of thousands of Americans died -- including friends and relatives of mine and including friends and relatives of your families. Perhaps some of you have pictures in your homes of great-uncles you never knew, soldiers who fell fighting. The Soviets suffered even more painfully than we. As many as 20 million people in the Soviet Union died in World War II, and the western third of their country was laid waste
-- parallel, if you will, to what would be the destruction of all the United States east of Chicago.

All the world has cherished the years of relative peace that have followed. In the United States, we have seen the greatest economic expansion and technological breakthroughs known to man -- the landing on the moon, the development of the microchip. But our greatest treasure has been that you, our children, have been able to grow up in prosperity and freedom.

It falls to us now -- as it soon shall fall to you -- to preserve and strengthen the peace. Surely no man can have a greater goal than that of protecting the next generation against the destruction and pain of warfare that his own generation has known.

There can, therefore, be no more important task before us than that of reducing nuclear weapons. I am committed -- utterly committed -- to pursuing every opportunity to discuss and explore ways to achieve real and verifiable arms reductions. What our two nations do now in arms control will determine the kind of future that you -- and, yes, your children and your children's children -- will face. So I have come here today to say that the Glassboro summit was not enough, that indeed the Geneva summit was not enough -- that talk alone, in short, is not enough. I've come here to invite Mr. Gorbachev to join me in taking action -- action in the name of peace.

My friends, let us dare to dream that when you return for your own son or daughter's graduation, you'll do so in a world at peace, a world that celebrates human liberty and a world free from the terror of nuclear destruction. And let us work -- first my generation, then soon, very soon, your own -- to make that dream come true.

But here again, mere words convey so little. There are moments, indeed, when those of my generation fear that your youth and health and good fortune will prove too much for us -- too much for us who must tell you that good fortune is not all that life can present; that this good fortune has come to you because others have suffered and sacrificed; that to preserve it, there will come times when you, too, must sacrifice. Then our fears are dispelled. It happens when we turn from our own thoughts to look at you. We see such strength and hope. Such buoyancy, such good will, such straightforward and uncomplicated happiness. And if we listen, before long we hear joyful laughter.

And we know then that God has already blessed you and that America has already imprinted the love of peace and freedom on your hearts. We look at you, and no matter how full our own lives have been, we say with Thomas Jefferson, "I like the dreams of the future better than the history of the past."

Congratulations, Class of 1986, and God bless all of you.

(Appause.)

It is a great honor to be your speaker this evening. I bring you greetings from the Secretary of State who, along with all Americans, shares your deep concern about the plight of Soviet Jewry. I should like to address my remarks this evening to the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and the impact this has on U.S.-Soviet relations.

The State of U.S.-Soviet Relations

First, a comment about the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. The world is awash with commentary on the subject as preparations intensify for the November meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. The question leaders on both sides must address is whether the basis for a more durable U.S.-Soviet rapprochement can be established. A distinguished Harvard historian, Adam Ulam, has recently commented that: "What concretely upsets ... Americans about the U.S.S.R. is what the Kremlin does, and what must be a continuing source of apprehension to the latter springs from what America is."

American hopes for detente in the 1970s foundered on Soviet efforts to achieve geopolitical advantage in Indochina, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan; to back anti-American forces in Central America and the Caribbean; to quash attempts at liberalization in Poland; and to build military forces beyond any reasonable need for defense.

If there is to be real improvement in the relationship, these underlying difficulties must be addressed. For our part, we are determined to make such an effort. The task is great.

• A basis must be found for resolving through political means such regional issues as Afghanistan. It is not, after all, weapons themselves that cause wars but political actions.
• In coping with problems of arms competition, propagandistic offers of moratoria are not the answer. The test is whether we can achieve major, stabilizing reductions in offensive nuclear arms now, while examining whether in the future deterrence can rely more heavily on defense than on threats of mutual annihilation.
• In our bilateral relations the range of mutually beneficial contacts and exchanges must be expanded.

Moreover, there is the burden on our relations imposed by the way Soviet authorities treat their own people. We raise human rights questions with our Soviet counterparts not to score debating points, nor to achieve political advantage, but because of the kind of people we are. Freedom is fundamental in our society. Americans have always attempted to hold the torch of freedom alive not merely for themselves but for others around the world. It is to this subject that I would like to turn.
Deterioration of the Human Rights Situation

In recent years the Soviet human rights situation has deteriorated sharply. In 1980, Andrey Sakharov was exiled from Moscow and placed under house arrest, Jewish emigration was cut in half, and the KGB began moving even more freely against dissident activists.

The KGB, under Chairman Yuri Andropov, refined existing techniques of repression and developed more sophisticated but no less harsh measures:

- Many prominent dissidents were allowed or forced to emigrate.
- Others were arrested on criminal charges or confined in psychiatric hospitals.
- Induction of could-be Jewish emigrants into the military enabled authorities cynically to claim reasons of "state security" to deny them permission to leave the U.S.S.R.
- The criminal code was revised to make repression of dissidents less cumbersome and more brazen.
- "Timidation of Western journalists was stepped up to stop their reporting about dissidents.

Why was the repression intensified? Internal and external causes seem to have been at play. At home, Moscow faced serious problems—an inefficient economy, social malaise, troubles in the empire from Poland to Afghanistan, and, until recently, immobility in the leadership. Abroad, the Soviet regime faced more steadfast resistance by the West and in the Third World following its invasion of Afghanistan and crackdown in Poland.

One way Soviet authorities reacted to these problems was to intensify control and repression at home and cut back contacts between their citizens and the outside world. Arrests of dissidents increased. All forms of emigration were reduced dramatically. Jewish emigration—which peaked in 1979 at over 51,000—had fallen by last year to below 900. A similar fate befell Germans and Armenians living in the U.S.S.R.

Soviet leaders sanctioned renewed manifestations of anti-Semitism. In cutting off the safety valve of Jewish emigration, Soviet authorities may have brought upon themselves a new upsurge of religious and national consciousness in one of the U.S.S.R.'s most assimilated minority communities.

They embarked on a campaign of arresting and convicting teachers of the Hebrew language and others in the forefront of this new awareness and identity. Since July 1984 at least 16 Jewish cultural activists, including 9 Hebrew teachers, have been arrested. Thirteen have been convicted, several on crudely trumped-up criminal charges. Soviet authorities have planted drugs in the apartments of two of them, a pistol and ammunition in the apartment of a third.

Yet another was convicted for stealing books he had borrowed from a synagogue library. Three were beaten following their arrests; one, Iosif Bereshtien, was virtually blinded.

Many Jews have also been fired from their jobs or had their apartments searched, phones disconnected, or mail seized. Soviet newspapers and television have branded Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural activists as "Zionist" subversives. Zionism has been equated with nazism. World War II Jewish leaders have been accused of helping the Nazis round up Jews for the death camps.

A notorious episode in this campaign was the recent stage-managed television recantation of convicted Moscow Hebrew teacher Dan Shapiro. Shapiro was given a suspended sentence after agreeing to condemn publicly the movement with which he had become so closely associated. Reportedly, he did so after threats to charge him with treason and sentence him to death. The choice that the dilemma facing Soviet Jews to:

Unofficial religious activity is currently the most vigorous form of dissent in the U.S.S.R., but it has been hit hard across the board. In addition to Jews, the Ukrainian Uniates, Lithuanian Roman Catholics, and unregistered Baptists and Pentecostalists have come in for severe repression.

Nor has there been progress on the cases of major human rights figures such as Andrey Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, Anatoly Shcharansky, and Yuri Orlov. Dr. Sakharov, in forced and isolated exile in the closed city of Gorkiy, was apparently ab ducted from his apartment last spring after beginning another hunger strike, this time to resurface in a cynical yet sadly poignant KGB film showing him eating in a hospital bedroom. What his true condition is today we cannot say. Just last week Vasyli Stus, a leading member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group, died tragically in a Soviet labor camp.

We look for signs of progress on human rights, but the evidence is not encouraging. Monthly emigration figures this year have been up slightly one month and down the next—to be sure, all at a very low level. Whether these fluctuations represent anomalies or a deliberate cease is unclear.

In a slightly more positive vein, one of our long-time dual national cases was resolved this spring, and three longstanding cases involving the spouses of American citizens have also been resolved. While we welcome these gestures—however calculated or isolated—many more cases remain unresolved. Meanwhile, the arrest of Hebrew teachers, religious believers, and human rights activists persists.

Impact on Bilateral Relations

Why do we attach such importance to Soviet human rights performance? First, human rights abuses have major impact on American perceptions of the Soviet Union. When Americans hear that Soviet authorities have abducted an Andrey Sakharov from his home, planted drugs on Hebrew teachers, or treated their own citizens as captives in their own country, they wonder about the possibilities for constructive relations between our two governments. In this way, Soviet human rights abuses influence U.S. public opinion and constrain the flexibility of any U.S. administration to deal with the Soviet Union on a pragmatic basis.

So let leaders allege that expressions of our concern amount to interference in their internal affairs. They claim that human rights issues are not legitimate topics for dialogue between governments. Yet, the Soviet Union assumed solemn international obligations, such as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, to respect specific human rights of their citizens. Violations of these obligations cannot but affect perceptions of Soviet willingness to abide by other agreements and erode political confidence needed to make progress on a variety of issues.

At meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), such as the recent one in Ottawa of human rights experts, we have pressed vigorously for Soviet compliance with the human rights provisions of the Final Act. We hope progress can be made seen in the Stockholm conference. A unique aspect of the Final Act is its recognition that respect for human rights is essential to development of security and cooperation in Europe. In pursuit of this commitment to balanced progress in the CSCE process, we are sending a distinguished delegation, led by former Deputy Secretary of State Walter Stoessel, to the Budapest Cultural Forum this autumn. There, and at the Human Contacts Experts Meeting in Bern, we will continue to press our concerns.
While we have not hesitated to speak out in international meetings, we have also consistently raised our concerns in confidential channels. We have made human rights a prominent part of our dialogue with Soviet leaders. We have detailed our specific concerns, including those about Soviet Jewry, and made clear their importance to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We tell Soviet leaders that our relations cannot be put on a long-term, constructive basis without significant gains in this area.

On some occasions, we have presented the Soviets with representation lists of persons denied permission to leave the Soviet Union. One list names about 20 U.S.-Soviet dual nationals, another about 20 Soviet spouses of U.S. citizens, and still another over 100 Soviet families denied permission to join their loved ones in the United States. Many individuals on these lists are Soviet Jews. We also regularly present a list of over 3,400 Soviet Jewish families who have been refused permission to emigrate to Israel.

It is our hope that Soviet authorities are coming to recognize that human rights will remain central to the U.S.-Soviet agenda. We are not asking Soviet authorities to do the impossible but only to live up to their international obligations and loosen the screws of repression tightened so cruelly in recent years. We watch the patterns of Soviet Jewish emigration, as you do. We are prepared to respond as improvements occur. On this score, we appreciate your counsel and that of others interested in Soviet Jewry.

We do not expect miracles overnight. But Soviet leaders must surely be confident enough to be able to lessen repression and increase emigration without endangering the so-called “leading role of the Communist Party.” We repeatedly made the point to Soviet leaders that this could benefit our relations.

Soviet officials hint that improvements in human rights, including Jewish emigration, can follow an upward swing in overall relations. There are those who believe that at times in the past better relations meant more emigration. Whether or not this was true, we reject the notion that improvements in human rights can come last. The reality is that Soviet abuses of human rights undermine the political confidence needed to improve relations, negotiate arms control agreements, and cooperatively lessen regional tensions.

Soviet leaders seek to create the impression that they are more serious than American leaders in seeking to improve relations. They aver that better relations depend on U.S. and Western political “will,” not on changes in Soviet behavior. They are mistaken. Let us look at what the United States has tried to accomplish and what it seeks for the future.

Steps Toward Improved Relations

We will start with bilateral issues. Last year following the commencement of NATO missile deployments in Europe, the Soviets tried to freeze bilateral relations. Nevertheless, we persevered and ultimately signed modest accords on consular affairs and hotline modernization. This year there has been slightly more progress, mainly the conclusion of the North Pacific air safety agreement and visits of legislative delegations and Secretary [of Agriculture] Block. We look forward to better exchanges in these areas and to making progress in maritime boundary talks and peaceful space cooperation.

Finding ways to reduce regional tensions could have enormous benefit. Over the past year, teams of U.S. and Soviet experts have had talks on the Middle East, southern Africa, and Afghanistan and will hold them this week on East Asia. These talks have not yet, however, met our expectations.

A continuing exchange of views can help avoid misunderstandings. But specific steps are needed, too. For example, the Middle East remains a sensitive area that affects directly the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union seeks a greater role in the peace process, yet has offered nothing but procedural suggestions. One immediate step it can take is to lessen its unremittingly hostile propaganda directed against Israel. It should also call upon its friends in the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] to forswear violence.

Afghanistan may be the most pressing regional issue for the new Soviet leadership. Moscow’s brutal occupation and continuing repression spur resistance, not acquiescence, from the brave Afghan people. Informed Soviets ought to realize by now that the hope of building communism in Afghanistan, even in the long term, is futile. In our view it should be possible to find a solution which protects the legitimate interests of all parties, the right of the Afghan people to live in peace under a government of their own choosing, and the Soviet interest in a secure southern border. Soviet commitment to early troop withdrawals would be a good beginning and would promote progress in the UN negotiations on Afghanistan.

The arms control dialogue was revived earlier this year when the two sides agreed to commence nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva. The United States is prepared for concrete progress on arms control, based on an enduring and realistic foundation. The President is fully committed to achieving major, stabilizing reductions in nuclear arsenals. He has given our negotiators great flexibility to achieve this end.

We welcome General Secretary Gorbachev’s expressed interest in achieving radical reductions, but we must also explore the potential of strategic defenses to strengthen deterrence. Our research in this field is vital to the long-term prospects for maintaining the peace. Soviet work on strategic defenses has long been greater than ours. The Soviets would gain from engaging us on how strategic defenses—if they prove feasible—might play a greater role in the future, to our mutual benefit.

We would like to believe the Soviet Union wants improved relations with the United States. For our part, we are taking steps that can lead to that end. In the months ahead, and at the meeting of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva this November, we hope political confidence can be developed that will lead to concrete progress in all areas—arms control, regional and bilateral issues, and human rights. Human rights is an essential part of this process. We are willing to discuss our human rights concerns with the Soviets in an atmosphere free from rancor and recrimination. If the new leadership shows the foresight and the confidence to improve the human rights situation, important political confidence can be generated. Certainly, our willingness to improve trade and other aspects of our relationship would be enhanced. Let us hope that Soviet leaders will take advantage of this opportunity. Both our peoples and people everywhere will benefit if they do.

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The human rights situation in the Soviet Union began to deteriorate in the late 1970's as Soviet authorities moved to eliminate all forms of internal dissent. By late 1982 the Helsinki Monitors movement, created in the wake of Soviet signing of the Helsinki Final Act, had been effectively destroyed. Leading human rights activists such as Andrey Sakharov, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy and Yuriy Orlov had been imprisoned or forced into internal exile. Jewish emigration, which reached a high of over 5,000 in 1979, began to plummet. Progress in in resolving outstanding divided family cases came to a halt. Pressure against religious believers was stepped up.

Since Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985, there has been some progress in certain limited human rights areas, but the overall trend has continued to be sharply negative. Soviets authorities, in the wake of the Geneva summit, have shown a greater willingness to resolve divided family cases. More cases have been resolved since Geneva than at any previous time in U.S.-Soviet relations. They have also released Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, permitted Yelena Bonner to travel to the West for medical treatment and granted exit permission to several well-known refuseniks.

These recent actions have been supplemented by a more media-conscious approach to human rights. The Soviets have created a new Humanitarian Affairs Administration in their Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have spoken often and publicly about their interest in cooperation on humanitarian issues. These developments reveal a new Soviet human rights policy based on generating maximum publicity for the resolution of a relatively small number of high-profile human rights cases. The policy appears designed as a low cost way of creating a positive image in the West while diverting attention away from the continuing draconian crackdown on internal dissent and record low levels of Jewish emigration.

The crackdown on internal dissent now encompasses up to 10,000 prisoners of conscience. Many have seen their sentences cruelly extended at the last minute under new legislation enabling authorities to resentence prisoners for alleged violations of labor camp rules. Religious believers, especially Evangelical Christians and Ukrainian Catholics, have increasingly been singled out for particularly harsh treatment. Andrey Sakharov and Yelena Bonner have once more dissappeared into incommunicado detention in Gor'kiy. The situation for Soviet Jews has become particularly urgent. During the past two years, at least 20 Jewish cultural activists have been sentenced to labor camps, many on patently trumped up charges. Jewish emigration, meanwhile, has fallen to the lowest level since it began in earnest following the 1967 Six-Day War. These developments amply demonstrate that although Soviet authorities have attempted to create an image of progress on human rights, the reality is quite different.
PROMINENT HUMAN RIGHTS CASES

Andrey Sakharov  Renowned physicist and human rights activist, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Arrested following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in January 1980 and exiled without trial to the closed city of Gor'kiy. He continues to be held incommunicado with his wife and fellow human rights activist Yelena Bonner.

Anatoliy Koryagin  Psychiatrist, member of the Working Commission on Psychiatric Abuse, and preeminent in exposing Soviet use of psychiatry for political purposes. Sentenced in June 1981 to seven years in labor camp plus five years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." In weakened condition after numerous hunger strikes.

Anatoliy Marchenko  Worker, writer, campaigner for worker rights and founding member of the Moscow Helsinki monitoring group. Sentenced in September 1981 to ten years in labor camp plus five years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Suffers from numerous ailments after years of beatings and mistreatment in Soviet prisons and labor camps.

Iosif Begun  Electronics engineer, refusenik, father of the Hebrew teachers movement and a leader of the Jewish cultural activist community. Sentenced in October 1983 to seven years in labor camp plus five years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Irina Ratushinskaya  Internationally renowned poet, physicist, and human rights activist. Sentenced in March 1983 to seven years in labor camp plus five years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." The Soviet prosecutor alleged her poetry was anti-Soviet.

Mykola Horbal  Poet, member of Ukrainian Helsinki monitoring movement. In late 1984, two days before his release on a trumped up criminal charge, he was rearrested and later sentenced to eight years in labor camp plus three years internal exile for his participation in the Ukrainian group.

Mart Niklus  Zoologist, prominent Estonian human rights activist. Sentenced in January 1981 to ten years in labor camp plus five years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Balys Gajauskas  Electrician, member of the Lithuanian Helsinki monitoring group. Sentenced in April 1978 to ten years in labor camp plus five years internal exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Anna Chertkova  Baptist, Evangelical Christian activist, committed to a psychiatric hospital in 1974 for conducting unauthorized religious services and circulating religious materials.
The State Department maintains three representation lists of persons denied permission to emigrate to the United States: separated spouses, divided families, and dual nationals. Periodically we present these lists to Soviet officials at high-level bilateral meetings and urge that they permit these individuals to emigrate.

The separated spouses representation list contains the names of Soviet citizens who are married to Americans citizens and have been denied permission to emigrate to the United States. The longest-standing case, that of U.S. citizen Anatoly Michelson and his wife, Galina Goltzman Michelson, has gone on for thirty years. Mr. Michelson has never known his daughter as an adult, and has never seen his grandchild. Only one of U.S. citizen Elena Kusmenko Balovlenkov's children has ever seen her father. Susan Graham, expecting her first child, can be with her husband only by flying to the Soviet Union to visit him. Other spouses have not even been permitted to visit. Since the Soviet officials must give their approval for a wedding to take place between an American and a Soviet, it is difficult to understand why, in 10-20% of such binational marriages, the Soviet spouse is not then permitted to emigrate. Sometimes security grounds have been cited for a refusal; sometimes no grounds have been given. Several separated spouse cases were resolved at the time of the Geneva summit, then one case in August, and four in September. Sixteen cases, however, still remain on the list.

There are 21 persons on the dual nationals representation list. These are U.S. citizens who are also considered by the Soviet authorities to be Soviet citizens, and this fact makes these cases particularly difficult to resolve. Only two such cases have been resolved this year. Abe Stolar has received exit permission but, understandably, will not leave until the Soviets grant permission to his entire family. Vytautas Skuodis moved with his family in the 1920's to Lithuania. He was sentenced to 12 years in 1980 for national and human rights work there; the Soviets have routinely denied our requests for consular access to him. The Soviet authorities have informed the U.S. Government that Mr. Karo Chrovian and Mrs. Margaret Barseghian would receive exit permission, but so far there has been no resolution of their cases.

There are approximately 110 persons on the divided families list, those who have close relatives in the United States. This year the Soviet Union has promised to resolve almost 100 cases on our representation lists, a welcome development. Most of these 100 cases were on the divided families list. So far only 45 of these cases have been resolved by the individual either being granted exit permission or actually departing from the Soviet Union. In at least one case, exit permission was refused. The remaining cases appear to be moving through the bureaucratic process to resolution, although we have expressed our unhappiness to the Soviet authorities over the slow pace. We have also asked them to turn their attention to the other equally deserving persons which still remain on our representation lists, and to resolve these cases favorably.
A number of well-known cases of Jewish refuseniks have been resolved this year, for instance those of Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Vladimir Brodskiy, and Benjamin Bogomolniy. While the favorable outcome of these cases is welcome, it should not be forgotten how poor the overall situation is for Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

In the peak year of 1979, there were 51,320 Soviet Jews who were able to emigrate. In contrast, only 1,140 emigrated in 1985. As of September 30 of this year, only 631 had received exit permission. The Soviets often claim that all those wishing to leave have done so. And yet we have the names of 11,000 individuals who have applied for permission and been refused. Another 370,000 Soviet Jews have requested vyzovs, or invitations, from relatives in Israel.

The Bogomolniys had waited twenty years for their exit visas. Other families have waited nearly as long. Most have spent these years in very difficult circumstances. Many refuseniks have been deprived of work, or have had to take menial jobs. Scientists and other professionals have been forced to become janitors and laborers. There are many other forms of harassment, such as social ostracism and lack of educational opportunities for refuseniks' children.

Mrs. Bogomolny is suffering from cancer. There are other cancer patients seeking emigration. Some of them are Benjamin Charny, Inna Meiman, Rimma Bravve, and Leah Mariyasin. Not only has the basic human right of freedom of movement been denied to them, but also the opportunity to seek advanced treatment in the West.

To name just a few of the other refuseniks whose names have become familiar: Ida Nudel, known for her efforts to help other prisoners, served four years of exile, and now endures a de facto exile in a town of 100,000 in Moldavia. David Goldfarb lost a leg as the result of wounds suffered in the battle of Stalingrad, and his other leg is now threatened by diabetes. Vladimir Slepak, a refusenik and Helsinki monitor, has been refused permission to emigrate on security grounds, although he left his job as a radio engineer 15 years ago.

An extremely disturbing development of the last two years is the increasing crackdown on Jewish cultural activists. Since July 1984, 20 cultural activists have been arrested and 19 convicted, some on trumped-up charges specifically designed to discredit them, such as possession of illegal drugs. Joseph Begun, despite his poor health, was transferred from labor camp to the even harsher regime of Chistopol prison. Iosif Berenshtein was savagely beaten while in custody and has lost most of his sight. Yuli Edelshtein suffered a serious fall and camp authorities were slow to get him the operation he badly needed. These men are forced to suffer because they wanted to preserve their ethnic heritage and teach and learn their historic language.
Danilooff Case

Soviet authorities arrested U.S. News and World Report correspondent Nicholas Danilooff August 30 on trumped up charges of espionage. The arrest was an obvious effort to pressure the United States into trading Soviet spy Gennadiy Zakharov, a U.N. Secretariat employee arrested August 23 in New York, for an innocent American.

From the start the U.S. maintained Danilooff's innocence and made it clear to the Soviets that they would not win Zakharov's freedom by taking Danilooff hostage. We insisted that Zakharov be dealt with in full accordance with U.S. law despite the crude Soviet attempt to link his case to Danilooff's.

Final resolution of the case, in which Danilooff left the USSR without coming to trial and Zakharov was sentenced in a U.S. federal court, constituted tacit Soviet recognition that the two cases were not parallel. It also served to put the Soviets on notice that they cannot gain de facto immunity for their spies by threatening innocent Americans, and they cannot use the U.N. as a safehaven for their espionage activities.

While the U.S. based its actions on these important principles, it was not blind to the opportunity to take advantage of the situation and free a courageous human rights activist from years of suffering in labor camp and exile. The U.S. Government is deeply gratified at having been able to secure the release of Yuriy Orlov and his wife.
YURIY ORLOV AND IRINA VALITOVA

Yuriy Orlov, a physicist by profession and member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, was Chairman of Moscow's Helsinki Monitoring Group until his arrest in October 1977 for alleged anti-Soviet activity. The Helsinki monitors, a courageous group of human rights activists, openly attempted to hold the Soviet authorities accountable to their commitments under the Helsinki accords of 1975. They maintained direct contact with western diplomats and journalists in an effort to keep them informed of Soviet human rights abuses. Such well known figures as Andrey Sakharov, Yelena Bonner and Anatoliy Shcharanskiy participated in the Moscow Helsinki monitoring group, and similar groups, modelled on the Moscow example, sprang up in other major Soviet cities.

Orlov was a founding member and driving force behind the Helsinki monitors. As Chairman of the Moscow group he singled himself out for particular attention from the KGB, and was caught up in the first wave of arrests of group members. In 1978 he was sentenced to 7 years in a strict regime labor camp and five years of internal exile. Since 1984 he has been forced to live in a remote Siberian village, in extremely harsh physical conditions. At age 62 Orlov is in extremely poor health as a result of prolonged periods of solitary confinement (up to six months at a time) in labor camp and severe beatings suffered both in camp and in exile.

Orlov's wife, Irina Valitova, shared his commitment to the Helsinki process. She has maintained regular contact with western embassies and journalists over the years since her husband's arrest and has steadfastly worked to ameliorate the harsh conditions of his confinement.
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Eleven years ago today the United States, Canada and thirty-three European countries signed in Helsinki the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The signatories undertook to observe important standards of international conduct and to pursue practical steps to reduce the barriers dividing Europe between East and West. Of special importance to the West, the Final Act affirmed basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Final Act is an eloquent statement of hopes and goals to which the United States fully subscribed because its principles were rooted in our own philosophy and traditions. The United States remains firmly committed to the full implementation of the Final Act in all its provisions and to the indivisibility of its human, security and economic dimensions.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and its East European allies have repeatedly failed to carry out many of their Helsinki pledges. There has been limited progress since the signing of the Final Act, but the reality of Europe's division remains and the most important promises of a decade ago have not been kept. That was our assessment on the tenth anniversary last year. It remains our assessment today. Eastern governments continue to impede the free flow of people, information and ideas. They continue to repress those who seek to exercise freedoms of religion, thought, conscience and belief. They continue to disregard Final Act provisions as they choose.

As we commemorate this eleventh anniversary, we should recall the hopes for greater peace and freedom in Europe expressed a decade ago. The Final Act recognized the interrelationship between these goals — that the interests of individual human beings are a fundamental part of progress toward peace in Europe, that a more stable peace among nations depends on greater freedom for the people of Europe. The ambitious goals of the Helsinki process can be achieved only through balanced progress on all fronts.

The next follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will open in Vienna this November. An important task of that meeting will be to take stock of the promises made and the promises kept, and to weigh the balance among the various dimensions of the Helsinki process. Governments must be made to account at Vienna for their commitments. The meeting must also address the challenge of achieving balanced progress if the Final Act is to have meaning in the daily lives of all citizens whose governments have undertaken its obligations.

The United States takes its commitments under the Final Act seriously, and will continue to strive for the full realization of its goals for all the peoples of Europe. We call upon others to do likewise. We will work to ensure that the upcoming meeting in Vienna will mark a step toward making the promises of Helsinki's first decade a reality in its second.

# # #
THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON REGIONAL CONFLICT: A SUMMARY

The Initiative

President Reagan's initiative aims at achieving peace and internal reconciliation, ending foreign military involvement, and fostering economic reconstruction in five of the most pressing international conflicts of the day: the wars in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola, and Ethiopia. As the President said in his October 24 speech to the United Nations, "the recurrent pattern of conflict that we see in these five cases ought to be broken as soon as possible."

The President's plan sets forth a comprehensive and flexible framework for cooperation toward these goals among the warring parties themselves, between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and among other interested parties. The plan, which would complement and bolster existing peace-making efforts, involves action at three levels:

-- The starting point is a process of negotiation among the warring parties themselves. "The form of these talks may and should vary," the President explained, "but negotiations -- and an improvement of internal political conditions -- are essential to achieving an end to violence, the withdrawal of foreign troops and national reconciliation."

-- The second level involves joint U.S. and Soviet talks about how best to support the ongoing talks among the warring parties, when those negotiations make genuine progress. "In every case," the President said, "the primary task is to promote this goal: verified elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside arms".

-- The third level entails an international effort to welcome these countries back into the world economy. "Despite past differences," the President pledged, "the United States would respond generously to their democratic reconciliation with their own people, their respect for human rights, and their return to the family of free nations."

This plan puts the primary responsibility on the warring parties themselves to reach accommodation; as the President points out, it is not for the United States or the Soviet Union to impose solutions. Yet it also provides a framework for the Soviet Union to cooperate with the United States in helping to bring peace to these five countries. "Let us begin where there is great need and great hope," the President stated. "This will be a clear step forward to help people choose their future more freely. Moreover, this is an extraordinary opportunity for the Soviet side to make a contribution to regional peace which in turn can promote future dialogue and negotiations on other critical issues."
The Five Conflicts

The five wars cited by the President lie at the core of international tensions. Although all originate in local disputes, they share common characteristics. As the President stated:

"They are the consequence of an ideology imposed from without, dividing nations and creating regimes that are, almost from they day they take power, at war with their own people."

"These wars are exacting a staggering human toll and threaten to spill across international boundaries and trigger dangerous confrontations."

"These wars played a large role in building suspicions and tensions...over the purpose of Soviet policy."

The unpopular Soviet-style régimes in each of the five cases have often been imposed by direct military intervention or kept in power by Soviet military aid. The polices of these regimes have given rise to indigenous opposition seeking to liberalize or overthrow them. The President has made clear that our sympathies are with those who resist Soviet expansionism, fight for freedom, and seek genuine self-determination. "Until such time as these negotiations result in definitive progress," the President affirmed, "America's support for struggling democratic resistance forces must not and shall not cease.

If these problems cannot be resolved through negotiations and by Soviet restraint, they will only worsen. The President's proposal is meant to provide a means by which to pursue political rather than military solutions to these problems.

"This plan is bold," the President stated, "and it is realistic. It is not a substitute for existing peace-making efforts; it complements them. We are not trying to solve every conflict in every region of the globe, and we recognize that each conflict has its own character. Naturally, other regional problems will require different approaches."

"With hard work and imagination," the President concluded, "there is no limit to what, working together, our nations can achieve. Gaining a peaceful resolution of these conflicts will open whole new vistas for peace and progress."
AFGHANISTAN

US policy towards Afghanistan is aimed at achieving a comprehensive political settlement which encompasses the four elements in seven successive UN Afghanistan resolutions:

--the prompt and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops;
--restoration of Afghanistan's independent, and non aligned status;
--return of the refugees with safety and honor;
--self-determination for the Afghan people.

We support the UN-sponsored negotiations led by Under Secretary General Diego Cordovez and have expressed our willingness to serve an appropriate guarantor's role in the context of a comprehensive and balanced settlement. To date, three of the four instruments that will comprise a settlement have been substantially resolved. The remaining obstacle to a settlement is Soviet refusal to present a realistic timetable for the complete withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan.

In July, 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev announced that six Soviet regiments - three air defense, one tank, and two motorized rifle regiments - would be withdrawn by year's end. He characterized the proposed withdrawal as "intended to hasten a political settlement." Since the Soviet invasion almost seven years ago, the Soviets have steadily upgraded their weaponry and altered their order of battle to improve their counter-insurgency warfare capability. They continue to refine their deployments to meet the needs of this tactical refocus. The withdrawal of the six Soviet regiments may be an integral part of this effort to reshape the Soviet army in Afghanistan into a more effective anti-guerilla force.

Four of the six regiments - 3 air defense, 1 tank -- have not been active in combat. The Afghan resistance clearly has no air force; the Soviets' sole remaining tank regiment has long been understrength and its tanks dispersed and largely employed in static defense roles where mortars and mines would be more appropriate. Our preliminary assessment leads us to question whether there will be a net reduction in Soviet military capabilities in Afghanistan.

The Afghan resistance fighter or mujahidin continue to develop both militarily and politically and their morale remains high. Despite stepped-up fighting and more aggressive Soviet tactics, the invaders have been unable to consolidate their conquest. Until and unless the Soviets find the political will to withdraw all their troops from Afghanistan, the Afghan mujahidin will continue to fight, the 2-3 million refugees in Pakistan and Iran will not return home, and the United States will continue to support the Afghan people's struggle for freedom.
CENTRAL AMERICA

Until the mid-1970's, Soviet involvement in Latin America was concentrated in Cuba. Since that time the USSR has become heavily involved in Central America. Soviet assistance to Cuba (over 4 billion dollars per year the last several years) in effect finances Havana's support of violent, radical forces in the region. While portraying a limited economic commitment to Nicaragua as evidence of restraint, the Soviets and their allies since 1981 have provided the Sandinistas arms sales and grants on the order of $400-500 million. Direct and substantial Soviet military aid to the Sandinistas began in 1984 including T-55 tanks, MI-24 HIND D attack helicopters, and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. This aid has created an enormous Central American military imbalance and promoted tension in the region. There are also approximately 150 Soviet military and civilian advisors in Nicaragua as well as 3,000-3,500 Cuban military/security personnel and several thousand militarily trained civilians.

The primary U.S. objective in Central America is to support the institutionalization of democracy. The trend in Central America is toward open, pluralistic democracies. Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica will hold elections in the next few months; El Salvador continues democratic reforms under the Duarte Government. Nicaragua's suspension of civil liberties on October 15 is recent evidence that the Sandinistas continue to go against the trend.

U.S. objectives in Nicaragua are to get the Sandinistas to: end support for subversion in neighboring countries; reduce Nicaragua's military inventories and troop levels to levels that restore equilibrium in the region; sever Nicaraguan military and security ties to the Soviet Bloc and Cuba; and implement Sandinista promises on democracy. The United States supports a comprehensive and verifiable implementation of the September 1983 Contadora Document of Objectives which addresses these four objectives. The Soviet Union does not have an official position on Contadora beyond vague expressions of support. (Contadora negotiations resumed October 8 with the aim of reaching an agreement within 45 negotiating days.)

We are aware of Sandinista interest in acquiring jet combat aircraft, and have warned the Soviets and Cubans that acquisition of such aircraft by Managua would be unacceptable to the United States. Soviet support for Salvadoran insurgents is also a matter of deep concern. We have advised Moscow that Soviet interference in Central America and the Caribbean carries a heavy cost in overall relations with the U.S. As part of a U.S. initiative to exchange views on regional conflicts, U.S. and Soviet experts discussed Central America and the Caribbean in Washington October 31-November 1.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

U.S. strategy is working; this is demonstrated by Taba Agreement, Peres-Mubarak summit, and Peres visit to Morocco. Dramatic breakthroughs remain unlikely, and further progress will be incremental. Parties (Israel, Jordan, Egypt) are committed to process; they now recognize that achieving peace is their problem. We can help, but final responsibility rests with parties in the area. If Soviets desire more active involvement in peace process, it is incumbent on them to demonstrate they are prepared to play a positive role. Evidence of their bona fides, to date, is lacking.

Recent Taba Agreement, Peres-Mubarak Summit and Peres visit to Morocco demonstrate that negotiations work. Resolution of the Taba dispute was a major test of Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. With this issue behind them, leaders of Israel and Egypt can now concentrate on a broader agenda. The Israeli-Egyptian relationship remains a key building block for regional peace.

The United States has been extremely active in seeking peace. The President has met with all principal players; the Vice President recently visited area; Assistant Secretary Murphy and Legal Advisor Sofaer have been intensely involved. Secretary Shultz remains prepared to visit the region when he feels that he can make a significant contribution.

We will continue to work with the parties in an effort to achieve further progress, and are prepared to consider any suggestions which bring us closer to the goal of direct negotiations.

While we are not enthusiastic about the concept of an international conference, we are prepared to listen to the ideas of others as to how this will advance the parties towards direct negotiations.

The Soviets declare their interest in a peaceful resolution of Middle East issues. We note recent Soviet-Israeli contacts, including the Helsinki meeting and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's meeting with Peres at the United Nations in September. At the same time, the Soviets continue to ally themselves with the "rejectionist" forces of the region.

If the Soviets desire greater involvement in the search for Middle East peace, it is incumbent upon them to demonstrate that they are prepared to play a positive role. It is hard to see how they can expect to participate when they lack diplomatic relations with one party to dispute. Other steps they could take include such things as easing Jewish emigration and adopting a more responsible regional arms policy.

To date, Soviets have given no indication that they are prepared to play such a role.
The Soviet Union and East Asia

Over the past twenty years the Soviet Union has expanded its military presence significantly in East Asia. Under Gorbachev Moscow has sought to make its political influence commensurate with its military presence. This may reflect Soviet recognition that its military buildup in Asia over the past twenty years, rather than increasing its political influence in the region, has engendered a great deal of suspicion.

Since 1965, Soviet ground forces east of the Urals have tripled in size and now total almost half a million. The Soviet Pacific Fleet contains roughly one-third of Soviet submarines, one fourth of its principal surface combatants and one-third of its naval aircraft. In the last three years, the number of SS-20 intermediate range missiles in Asia has more than doubled.

Gorbachev signaled upon taking office that one of his highest priorities was improved relations with China. In a major address in Vladivostok in July 1986, Gorbachev made a number of new proposals aimed both at increasing economic development in the Soviet Far East and at addressing some concerns of other states in the region, in particular those of China: Gorbachev indicated Soviet readiness to discuss "concrete steps" to reduce land forces along the Sino-Soviet border; proposed the removal of a "substantial part" of Soviet troops in Mongolia; and announced that the Soviet Union would withdraw six regiments from Afghanistan by the end of 1986.

The January visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Japan was symbolic of Moscow's increased interest in Asia. Although the trip improved the atmosphere of Soviet-Japanese relations, the disputed status of the Northern Island Territories remains an obstacle to any dramatic improvement.

The Soviets have steadily improved relations with North Korea over the past few years, apparently at Beijing's expense. Moscow's willingness to supply a squadron of MiG-23 aircraft to North Korea has provided a tangible sign of the warming trend. Despite its support for North Korea's call for joint hosting of the 1988 Olympics, Moscow has been careful to keep open the possibility of participation in the Seoul Games.

In Cambodia, Vietnam's intransigence, underwritten by almost $2 billion a year in Soviet aid, continues to block a political settlement. In return, the Soviets have received access to former U.S. facilities at Cam Ranh Bay which provide them with a base to project power into the South China Sea. The increased Soviet military presence has damaged relations with the ASEAN states, who have been in the forefront of
efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Cambodia which would lead to complete withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces and free elections under international auspices. Soviet clumsiness in supporting Marcos to the bitter end has also damaged Moscow's standing in the region.

The Soviets have shown interest in increasing their influence among the Pacific island states and have been seeking fishing agreements and access to commercial port facilities.
SOVIET POLICIES IN AFRICA

While the Soviets perceive their interests in Africa as important, they are clearly subordinate to interests in the Middle East and East Asia. The Soviets continue to wield significant influence in Ethiopia and Angola, where the governments depend on substantial amounts of Soviet military aid and Cuban troops, but their influence in Mozambique has lessened relative to that of the West in recent months. The Soviets continue to cultivate relations with other African countries, including Zimbabwe in southern Africa and Ghana and Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) in West Africa. In South Africa, the Soviets maintain ties to the African National Congress but have not made dramatic moves to take advantage of the civil unrest there.

The principal Soviet regional objectives are to counter Western influence, gain military access to the area (air and port facilities), exploit the political instability in the region and further their economic interests (trade and fishing agreements). The Soviets seek to achieve their goals through arms sales, the provision of military aid and advisors, and deployments of Cuban troops. Soviet unwillingness or inability to play a constructive role in Africa is illustrated by their general failure to provide significant economic assistance in Africa. Even in Ethiopia, Soviet economic aid of approximately $7 million compares with U.S. assistance of $240 million in FY 85, and is in marked contrast to the nearly $4 billion in Soviet military aid provided to Ethiopia since 1977.

In seeking to counter Soviet influence, throughout the continent but particularly in Southern Africa, we have attempted to reduce cross-border violence, encourage diplomatic resolution of problems, and direct the attention of the region's leaders to their countries' economic problems. This policy stands in clear contrast to Soviet reliance on military assistance to maintain their regional influence.

The Soviets have attempted to thwart US diplomatic efforts in southern Africa through pressures and threats, but have not openly opposed the process since African front-line states support it. The increased violence and the dangers of greater outside intervention have led both Angola and South Africa to express renewed interest in negotiations, a process in which we remain the sole credible mediator.
EASTERN EUROPE

Following World War II, a string of Soviet-dominated Communist governments were put into place throughout Eastern Europe. In 1948, Tito's Yugoslavia broke from Moscow to follow a path of non-alignment between East and West. In 1961, tiny Albania severed relations with Moscow to follow a fiercely independent, neo-Stalinist path. To prevent similar defections, the Soviet Union resorted to brutal force to crush popular movements in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In 1981, the "Solidarity" trade union movement was suppressed in Poland through the imposition of martial law. East Germany, Poland Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are members of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact alliance. These nations are also members of CEMA, the Moscow-led regional economic grouping.

Notwithstanding the Soviet Union's military and political control over the region (except for Yugoslavia and Albania), Eastern Europe is not monolithic. Each country has its own distinct cultural and history. Nationalism is a potent force, overshadowing the waning influence of communist ideology. The trends in this area are toward somewhat greater economic, social and even political diversity. Romania, for example, often acts as a maverick on foreign policy issues. Hungary has pursued liberalizing economic reforms.

In its approach to the region, the United States seeks to advance its overall interests through recognition of the diversity of each nation's situation. We differentiate between these countries and the Soviet Union. We also differentiate among individual East European countries to the degree that they distinguish themselves from Soviet policies, whether through adoption of distinct and more independent foreign policies; greater political and economic exchange with the non-communist world; greater tolerance of emigration and respect for human rights; encouragement of a more flexible climate for political expression and economic change; or, experimentation with economic decentralization.

The United States accepts no permanent division between the peoples of Europe. We share with the peoples of Eastern Europe their basic aspirations for freedom, prosperity and peace. Overall, we seek to maintain a prudent balance among our political, security, human rights and trade interests.

The United States does not and has never recognized the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the Soviet Union. The recent Chautauqua Conference held in Latvia in no way alters this long-standing policy.

U.S. relations with the non-Warsaw Pact states in Eastern Europe are a special case. The U.S. maintains a well-developed, productive relationship with non-aligned Yugoslavia, based on our support for that country's unity, independence and territorial integrity. Although we have had no relations with Albania since 1939, the U.S. is prepared to respond should Albania express an interest in resuming relations.
US-USSR Cultural and Educational Exchanges

During the 1945-58 period there were very few cultural contacts between the US and the USSR. A significant one, however, was the 1956 agreement to exchange America magazine and Soviet Life. America continues today as the US Information Agency's (USIA) extraordinarily popular monthly magazine on American life.

Many of the programs that have come to be traditionally associated with US-Soviet exchanges took shape between 1959 and the late 1960s. Key events during this period included the first American National Exhibit in the USSR—which served as the setting for Vice President Nixon's famous "kitchen debate" with Khrushchev—the first exchanges of university graduate students and faculty, and delegation visits in the arts and professional and musical fields.

The range and size of exchange programs grew rapidly during the 1970s. New programs included the 1974 Fulbright scholars and lecturers program; direct university-to-university agreements; the National Academy of Sciences interacademy agreement with the Soviet Academy of Science; and regular exchanges of performing arts groups.

The US Government allowed the US-Soviet general exchanges agreement to expire at the end of 1979, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This led to an eventual reduction in educational exchanges and a complete cessation of government-sponsored performing arts groups and exhibitions.

On November 21, 1985 at Geneva, Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed a new general exchanges agreement marking the resumption of official cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries. This agreement provides for both sides to facilitate exchanges in the fields of performing arts, exhibits, television and film, publications, science and technology, and many others.

At Geneva, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev also endorsed a new, broad-based people-to-people initiative to expand direct contact between citizens of both countries, particularly the young. Known as the President's US-Soviet Exchange Initiative, it is intended to promote openness, honest communications, and opportunities for the two peoples to get to know each other directly. In an address before his departure for Geneva, the President proposed that both sides "find the yet undiscovered avenues where American and Soviet citizens can cooperate fruitfully for the benefit of mankind."

Since Geneva, there have been a number of major high visibility exchanges. Vladimir Horowitz performed in the Soviet Union last spring, and the Kirov Ballet and Moiseyev Dance Ensemble have performed in the U.S. this year. In September 250 Americans and 2,000 Soviets and Latvians participated in a "town meeting" in Riga, Latvia sponsored by the Chautauqua Institution. Finally, the first U.S. cultural exhibit since 1979, "Information-USA," is due to open in Moscow in the spring of 1987.
Between 1971 and 1974 bilateral cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union was expanded by executing eleven cooperative exchange agreements in various fields of science and technology. This framework of agreements led to a significant increase in scientific exchanges which reached a peak of several thousands of scientists and experts traveling between the two countries annually in the mid-seventies.

The eleven science and technology agreements were: Science and Technology (1972); Environmental Protection (1972); Medical Science and Public Health (1972); Space (1972); Agriculture (1973); World Oceans (1973); Transportation (1973); Atomic Energy (1973); Artificial Heart Research and Development (1974); Energy (1974); and Housing (1974).

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the imposition of martial law in Poland, and the shooting down of the KAL airliner, agreements in Science and Technology, Space, Transportation, and Energy were permitted to expire.

In June, 1984, the President called for reinvigoration of science and technology agreements in environmental protection, housing, agriculture, and health. In response, there have been recent efforts to develop new cooperative programs in these fields. In July 1985, the world ocean agreement was renewed for an additional 5 years. In September 1985, Housing Secretary Pierce met in Moscow with his Soviet counterpart to establish new housing and construction projects running through 1989. In November 1985 the two sides updated US-Soviet cooperative programs in environmental protection and research. In December 1985 the atomic energy agreement was extended through June 1988. The first Joint Committee Meeting in seven years under this agreement was held in Moscow in August 1986, where, in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster, the two sides agreed on expanded cooperation in nuclear reactor safety. Finally, in September 1986, the US and Soviets conducted successful exploratory talks which could lead to the resumption of government-to-government space cooperation.

U.S. objectives in scientific exchanges with the Soviet Union are to provide a better understanding of the capabilities of Soviet science, an opportunity to conduct joint research in areas where the Soviets are more advanced or have unique research facilities or resources, and a chance for Americans to communicate their views directly to an influential segment of the Soviet scientific community.

All science and technology agreements with the Soviets must be carefully balanced to insure there is scientific gain for the U.S. side. Scientific and technological cooperation at all levels must also be structured to insure there is no loss of critical technology. There exist a variety of interagency groups that review all exchange projects to insure there are sufficient safeguards against undesirable technology transfer.
CONSULATE EXCHANGE - KIEV AND NEW YORK

At the Geneva Summit the President and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to establish consulates in Kiev and New York. We are working with the Soviets to resolve a number of practical issues which must be settled before we can exchange advance parties to set up the consulates.

We are insisting, for example, that we occupy our consulate facilities in Kiev under conditions equivalent to those the Soviets enjoy in New York where they own their consulate building. We are also insisting on conditions that will ensure our ability to build or remodel our facilities in Kiev in a secure fashion.

The accident at Chernobyl has not lessened our interest in establishing a consulate in Kiev but is obviously a factor in our planning. We do not yet have personnel in Kiev, and we will not send anyone until we are satisfied that they will be safe.

Exchanging consulates is a useful step in promoting constructive contacts between our two peoples. Several million Americans have family ties to the Ukraine, more than from all other areas of the USSR combined. The Ukraine is a major industrial and agricultural center, roughly comparable to France in size and population. Kiev, the capital, is the third largest city in the Soviet Union. A consulate in Kiev will allow us to observe firsthand the social, political, and economic life of this vital area of the USSR.
U.S.-SOVIET TRADE

General

Trade with the Soviet Union has never represented more than approximately one percent of total U.S. trade in any given year. It has consistently produced a surplus for the United States, the largest of which was $3.3 billion in 1979. The surplus dropped from $2.7 billion in 1984 to $2.0 billion in 1985 with the decrease in Soviet grain purchases. The surplus is projected to be about $1.8 billion this year.

U.S. Exports to the Soviet Union

U.S. exports to the Soviet Union declined approximately 26% in 1985. Agricultural items have dominated U.S. exports since 1972, but the proportion of total exports they represent has declined. Recently, U.S. exports to the Soviets have declined as their grain purchases have dropped. In 1984, U.S. grain sales were $2.8 billion and total U.S. exports were $3.3 billion; in 1985, grain sales were $1.9 billion, total exports were $2.4 billion. Projected grain sales for 1986 are $1.5 billion and projected total exports are $2.3 billion. U.S. exports to the Soviet Union of manufactured goods and crude materials have decreased significantly, as well.

U.S. Imports from the Soviet Union

U.S. imports from the Soviet Union constitute only about 0.2% of all U.S. imports and about 2.8% of total Soviet exports to the industrialized West. These imports, which are primarily non-agricultural, declined approximately 27% in 1985 following increases in the two previous years. Except for 1982, when total U.S. imports from the Soviets were low, agricultural items have represented only 2-3% of these imports.

1985 TOP 10 US EXPORTS TO THE USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Value (in millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizers</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phosphoric Acid</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almonds</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres. Sens. Tape</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallow</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soybean Oil</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Coke</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Above</td>
<td>2,185</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>2,422</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1985 TOP 10 US IMPORTS FROM THE USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Value (in millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ammonia</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urea</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Fuel Oils</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palladium</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead Gasoline</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naphthas</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Fuel Oils</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vodka</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodium</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crabs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Above</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>441</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EAST-WEST TRADE

The state of U.S.-Soviet economic relations mirrors largely the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations. During the 1970's the U.S. business community saw the Soviet Union as an enormous potential market; the Soviets felt that large U.S. companies might be effective in tackling priority industrial projects and acquiring much needed modern technology. High hopes faded following Soviet refusal to comply with the 1974 Jackson Vanik amendment (linking Most Favored Nation Tariffs and government backed credits to free emigration), subsequent Soviet human rights abuses, and the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

Beginning in 1985, dialogue with the Soviets resumed on economic issues. In May 1985 the first meeting since 1978 of the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission was held. In December, the Secretary of Commerce met with General Secretary Gorbachev and other Soviet officials and attended a meeting of the U.S - U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council.

As a result, both sides agreed to encourage non-strategic trade. The Soviets pledged to provide U.S. firms with equal access to information and bids on projects as is given to other Western firms. The U.S. resumed trade promotion activities in the U.S.S.R. -- in September Commerce Undersecretary Smart opened the US exhibit at a Moscow trade fair, -- and agreed to work with Congress on the removal of a 35-year old ban on the import of certain Soviet fur skins. Earlier this year, foreign policy controls on the export of oil and gas equipment to the U.S.S.R. were also loosened. And in April, air service between the U.S. and Soviet Union resumed after a several year hiatus.

Although the resumption of a dialogue has produced an improved atmosphere, major problems remain. The Soviets complain that the U.S. does not grant MFN to Soviet goods. We respond that, given the Jackson-Vanik amendment of the 1974 Trade Act, we see little prospect that MFN could be granted, barring a significant change in Soviet human rights and emigration policies. They also criticize U.S. export controls, particularly foreign policy controls, and charge that an imposition of these controls raises doubts as to whether U.S. firms can be counted on to honor contract commitments.

U.S. manufactured goods exports were $694 million in 1985, after inflation, a drop from levels of the 1970's. Following a record 18.6 million metric tons in 1983-84, U.S. agricultural exports to the Soviet Union declined to only 8.6 MMT in 1985-86. Agricultural exports have traditionally led the large U.S. trade surplus with the U.S.S.R. In 1985 the U.S. exported $2.8 billion to the U.S.S.R., and imported $389 million.

The principal reasons for the stagnation in U.S. - Soviet non-agricultural trade have been USG reservations about supporting large scale Soviet energy and industrial development projects, the absence of a government to government dialogue on trade issues, and restrictions on government-backed financing. The Soviet failure to honor their obligation under the grain agreement in 1985 and again this year is an additional negative factor into the trade relationship.
US-USSR BILATERAL ISSUES - GRAIN

US grain sales to the USSR are governed by the Long Term Agreement (LTA) of 1983, which runs through 1988. In each agreement year (October 1-September 30) the US guarantees to supply, and the USSR to purchase, a minimum of 9 million metric tons (MMT) of grain. This consists of at least 4 MMT of corn and 4 MMT of wheat. The remaining tonnage may be any combination of wheat and/or corn, or 500,000 metric tons (MT) of soybeans. The Soviets may buy up to 12 MMT of grain without further consultations. Should they want to purchase more than 12 MMT, and US supplies are judged adequate, USDA may offer them an additional amount. They were offered an additional 10 and 15 MMT respectively in the first two years of the LTA.

In the first year the Soviets purchased 14,485 MMT of grain, composed of 7,593 MMT of wheat, 6,476 MMT of corn, and 416,000 MT of soybeans. In the second year they bought a record 18,675 MMT: 15,750 MMT of corn, but only 2,887 MMT of wheat and no soybeans. They missed their wheat purchase minimum by 1.1 MMT. This year, the Soviets purchased only 153,000 MT of wheat, 6,935 MMT of corn, and 1,535 MMT of soybeans. They failed to fulfill both their wheat purchase minimum commitment by 3.85 MMT.

The Soviets' claim their reason for not buying US wheat is price. US grain prices are often higher than those of our major competitors. For the Soviets, the situation has been exacerbated by the US Export Enhancement Program (EEP), begun in June 1985, which has been used to combat subsidized agricultural exports by the EEC. The EEP targets countries which primarily buy subsidized EEC grain. Refusal to include the Soviets in the EEP was based on their failure to meet our criteria for the program. These include the principles that EEP sales should be additions to customary sales to the target country, and that we not displace traditional exports by non-subsidizing countries.

The Soviets maintain that as our best customer, they should be included in the EEP, or that we should at least offer wheat at less than the current US market price. Although our international economic policy is to discourage subsidies, President Reagan, on August 1, offered the Soviets a one time subsidy to enable them to fulfill their minimum commitment to purchase US wheat by the end of this agreement year. Despite this subsidy, the Soviets made no further purchases of US wheat.

We have pointed out to the Soviets the importance we place on each side's fulfilling its commitments under the LTA. If the situation were reversed, with grain being in short supply here, we would nevertheless provide the levels guaranteed by the agreement.
SOVIET UN MISSION Reductions

On March 7, 1986 we informed the Soviets that they must reduce the size of their Missions to the United Nations by more than 100. This decision was based on several considerations.

- The Soviet UN Missions were larger than the next two largest missions combined.
- There was no way the size of the Soviet UN missions could be explained by the needs of official UN business.
- There was evidence that a growing number of employees from the Soviet UN Missions were engaged in espionage activities against the United States.

We made clear to the Soviets at this time that the U.S. was not seeking to interfere in legitimate UN business, but that we could not tolerate the use of the UN for espionage.

The Soviet UN Mission had until October 1, 1986 to reach the first stage of the reductions (down to 218 mission personnel). The reductions are to be achieved in four equal stages, with the last one occurring April 1, 1988. By that time, the Soviet UN Mission will be reduced to 150 personnel. The Ukrainian and Byelorussian UN Missions are being reduced to ten members each in two stages ending respectively in April 1987 and April 1988. Currently they have approximately 14 and 12 members each.

The Soviet UN Mission rebuffed repeated U.S. requests that it cooperate in implementing the necessary reductions by advising us which positions would be eliminated to achieve the ceilings established. They declared our actions to be illegal and, on September 12, Soviet Permanent Representative to the UN Aleksandr Belonogov declared that the Soviets were not making preparations to comply with the first round of reductions.

As a result of the Soviets' refusal to cooperate in the reduction plan, the U.S. was obliged to take steps of its own to ensure compliance. On September 17, Ambassador Walters advised the Soviet Mission to the United Nations that we were requesting the departure from the U.S. of 25 specific members of the staff of the Soviet Mission by October 1.

As of October 1, the size of the Soviet UN Mission was in compliance with the 218 member ceiling. In addition, the majority of the 25 people on the list Ambassador Walters gave the Soviets had departed the U.S. We have given the Soviets a "grace period" on the rest. By the end of that period we expect that 25 Soviets will have left the US.

The United States approaches with the utmost seriousness its responsibilities as host country to the UN and to individual Missions to the UN. We will not, however, allow any state to abuse its UN membership to engage in actions detrimental to our security. We remain committed to the reduction plan outlined in March. The next phase of reductions is to take place by April 1, 1987, with a ceiling for the Soviet UN Mission of 195.
US Arms Control Initiatives

Strategic Weapons

The US seeks 50% reductions in strategic offensive weapons, as agreed at the November 1985 summit. We are willing, however, to agree to an interim step of less than 50% reductions and have made such a proposal, which takes into account Soviet concerns. Our objective remains to achieve an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement that greatly reduces the most destabilizing weapons, i.e., ballistic missile warheads and heavy, MIRVED, ICBMs.

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

The US favors the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles. We support rapid implementation of the November 1985 summit commitment to an interim agreement which should reduce LRINF warheads to the lowest possible equal number on a global basis. An agreement must include reductions in Soviet INF forces in Asia, and constraints on shorter-range systems, and it must be effectively verifiable.

Defense & Space Issues

The US proposes that both sides confine themselves to activities permitted by the terms of the ABM Treaty through 1991, and possibly beyond, until such time as one side determines that effective defenses are feasible, and submits a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defenses and eliminating offensive ballistic missiles. At that point a new treaty regime, to be negotiated as soon as possible, will be triggered. Under the new Treaty regime, the sides will negotiate on the plan for sharing the benefits of defenses and eliminating offensive ballistic missiles. If agreement is reached, then deployment will proceed according to that agreement. If agreement is not reached after two years of such negotiations, either side will be free to deploy after providing six months notice of its intention to do so. The US has also proposed an "open laboratories" initiative as a confidence building measure.

Chemical Weapons (CW)

The US proposed a draft treaty to ban completely chemical weapons, coupled with requirements for mandatory challenge inspection to ensure effective verification. Separately, we have discussed CW proliferation issues with the Soviets, particularly in conjunction with CW use in the Iran/Iraq war and Soviet use of CW in Afghanistan.
Nuclear Testing

The Soviet Union has accepted President Reagan's offer to open bilateral discussions at the expert level on nuclear testing issues without preconditions. The two sides have held two sessions in Geneva; a third session is scheduled to begin in November. We have proposed new ideas to improve the verification procedures of the existing Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Should the Soviets accept these ideas, we are prepared to move forward on ratification of these two treaties. Upon ratification -- and in association with a program to reduce and ultimately to eliminate all nuclear weapons -- we are prepared to discuss ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

The 35-nation Stockholm CDE Conference finished its work September 22, with the adoption of a set of concrete measures designed to limit the possibility of surprise attack or accidental war in Europe. These measures are built around NATO-proposed measures, but also reflect Soviet interest in the principle of the non-use of force. They provide for prior notification of all military activities above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, observation of military activities above a threshold of 17,000 troops, annual forecasts of upcoming military maneuvers, and on-site air and ground inspections.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMS)

The US proposal for measures to upgrade Hotline communications was agreed to by the Soviet Union and is now being implemented. The US proposal for Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers is now being considered by the Soviet Union. CBM initiatives on military-to-military exchanges, and on notifications of ballistic missile launches and strategic military exercises have also been proposed by the United States.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

On December 5, 1985, NATO tabled a new initiative designed to meet Eastern concerns. The proposal called for a time-limited first phase withdrawal of 5,000 US and 11,500 Soviet troops, followed by a three year no-increase commitment by both sides. It also deferred until after implementation of the agreement the Western demand for data agreement on Eastern forces, to respond to what the Soviets had claimed was the primary roadblock to agreement. Residual force levels would be monitored by 30 annual on-site inspections. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have not responded constructively to this major Western initiative.
A CHRONOLOGY

RECENT US-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EXPERT-LEVEL MEETINGS

Nuclear and Space Talks

-- August 11-12 in Moscow
-- September 5-6 in Washington

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks

-- August 6-7 in Moscow
-- September 10-11 in Washington

Conference and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

-- August 14-15 in Stockholm

Chemical Weapons (CW)

-- March 5-6 in Bern (CW non-proliferation)
-- August 18-20 in Geneva (CW ban)
-- September 4-5 in Bern (CW non-proliferation)

Nuclear Testing

-- July 25-August 1 in Geneva
-- September 4-18 in Geneva
-- (To meet again in November in Geneva)

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

-- May 5-6 in Geneva
-- August 25 in Geneva
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

September 17, 1986

The Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) resume tomorrow with the opening of Round Six in Geneva. This could prove to be a very important phase in the strong effort being made by the U.S. to get Soviet agreement to deep reductions in nuclear arms. If the Soviets are as determined as we are, there is a real chance for such reductions.

The U.S. is fully committed to achieving genuine arms reductions -- and soon. It is in this spirit that I wrote to General Secretary Gorbachev in July, further amplifying our positions on the full range of arms control issues. In this letter, I specifically sought areas of "common ground" where we and the Soviet Union could most productively focus our efforts to reach agreement. My letter dealt with expressed Soviet concerns and identified immediate practical steps that can move us in the direction of our ultimate goal -- the total elimination of nuclear arms.

We are now awaiting a constructive Soviet response. Our ideas offer a solid basis for negotiations toward agreements beneficial to both sides. If the Soviets offer a serious response, we can look forward to a productive round.

In the weeks leading up to Friday's meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the U.S. has undertaken expert-level discussions with the Soviets in the four key areas of the US/Soviet agenda. This includes human rights, regional, bilateral and arms control issues. We hope that these discussions have helped to facilitate progress in some areas, including the Nuclear and Space Talks.

Our goals in the Nuclear and Space Talks -- and in arms control in general -- remain constant. We seek to strengthen strategic stability and truly diminish the risk of nuclear war. This means removing the capability and incentive for the Soviet Union to conduct a disarming first strike. It means preserving the ability to deter war, at the lowest possible level of forces. Therefore, our overriding priority in these talks is the achievement of agreements which will bring about deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Of course, if the benefits of such agreements are to be realized, they must be fully complied with by both sides. The Soviet Union has continued to violate key provisions of existing arms control agreements, and this pattern of violations threatens to undermine the entire arms control process. We therefore will continue to press the Soviets to correct their non-compliance, and thereby strengthen the prospects for achieving real arms reductions. We also will insist that verification be a key feature of any new agreement.

In the Geneva negotiating forum, the U.S. has put forward concrete proposals in all three areas of the Nuclear and Space Talks:

Our strategic arms (START) proposals are based on the concept, on which Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed at the Geneva Summit last November, of 50 percent reductions in the strategic offensive nuclear arsenals of both sides. Further, we seek to enhance stability by concentrating on reductions in ballistic missiles, since they are the most destabilizing in a crisis.
In the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks, we have proposed a phased approach for global elimination of the entire class of U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles.

In the Defense and Space negotiations, we have advanced new ideas on how to ensure a stable transition to strategic defenses, should these prove feasible. Additionally, we have proposed an "open laboratories" exchange to enable each side to reassure itself concerning the other's strategic defense research.

In my July letter to Mr. Gorbachev, I expanded upon these American proposals and offered some new ideas. In Geneva, our negotiators will be able to offer concrete new details in all three areas. In addition, Secretary Shultz is prepared to discuss these issues, along with our human rights, regional, and bilateral concerns, with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. These discussions can help to lay the groundwork for a second summit meeting between Mr. Gorbachev and myself in the U.S. later this year, as agreed at our first summit meeting in Geneva.

I want to emphasize, however, that the Soviet treatment of American journalist Nicholas Daniloff continues to limit severely what is achievable in our bilateral relations. I therefore urge the Soviet Union to resolve this case promptly before it does even more damage to the relationship between our two countries.

The time has come for practical achievements, in all areas of our relations. As far as the Geneva negotiations are concerned, the U.S. has demonstrated that we are doing our part to bring about meaningful arms reductions. This round should tell us whether the Soviet Union is similarly dedicated. If the Soviets do share our commitment, there can be real progress on nuclear arms reductions—and it can begin soon.
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)

- In March 1983, President Reagan challenged the American scientific community to determine if there are promising technologies that one day could be used to defend against attacking missiles and eventually render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

- For a generation, the U.S. and her allies have been defenseless against a deliberate nuclear attack, accidental firings, or attacks by terrorists or rogue regimes.

- The U.S. presently deters nuclear attack by threatening retaliation. SDI offers a safer and more moral alternative: employing technology to protect people instead of threatening their annihilation.

- SDI is not a bargaining chip. Our research will be pursued as a vital component of the overall U.S. national security effort.

The Challenge and the Critics

- SDI is a research program, pure and simple. SDI is not a deployment plan.

- Like the challenge of Apollo, SDI is a revolutionary program that merits a full-scale national effort. New visions of the future naturally attract skeptics. Take a page from history:

  Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible.

  --- British physicist Lord Kelvin, 1895

  More recently:

  ...the President's 'Buck Rogers' missile defense scheme...cannot work....

  --- Walter Mondale, 1984

- SDI is a broad-based, exploratory program that taps the finest scientific minds to investigate a range of defensive options for America's future security. This research will lead toward an informed decision on defensive options in the early 1990s.

SDI Funding Must be Sustained and Comprehensive

- If fully funded, SDI will cost approximately $26 billion in the five fiscal years 1985-1989. By comparison, Social Security payments of $26 billion occur every two months.
WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

o Some in Congress would cripple SDI with short-sighted budget cuts, forcing the scope of SDI research to shrink. This would have serious harmful effects on SDI progress.

-- Promising research areas would be abandoned, causing the termination of already funded contracts.

-- Early 1990s timetable for a decision on the project's technological feasibility would be postponed.

o Indeed, sustained research to date has already produced technical advances:

-- June 1984 -- a non-nuclear interceptor destroyed an unarmed warhead in mid-course.

-- Fall 1985 -- SDI scientists successfully compensated for atmospheric distortion of a laser beam pointed toward a rocket in flight.

-- June 1986 -- a self-guided missile intercepted a target moving at three times the speed of sound.

o All this has been achieved with sound financial management through SDI Office centralized planning and control. This is a program that works.

SDI: Prudent Response to Existing Soviet Missile Defenses

o The Soviet Union has an extensive effort to develop new strategic defense technologies. Recent Soviet developments include:

-- Significantly upgrading the world's only deployed Anti-Ballistic Missile defense system, which protects Greater Moscow.

-- Constructing a large missile tracking radar in Siberia, in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. This radar closes the only gap in Soviet missile detection coverage.

-- Deploying the world's only operational weapon for destroying satellites.

o Taken together, these plus other developments in Soviet missile defense, as well as the continuing Soviet offensive buildup, threaten our deterrent, which continues to be based solely on retaliatory forces.

o Why are the Soviets eager for the U.S. to negotiate SDI away? Answer: The Soviets recognize America's principal advantage: a free and creative society which can employ superior technology for enhanced security.

For additional information, call the White House Office of Public Affairs; 456-7170.
The Strategic Defense Initiative

June 1985

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

In his speech of March 23, 1983, President Reagan presented his vision of a future in which nations could live secure in the knowledge that their national security did not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation but rather on the ability to defend against potential attacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program is designed to determine whether and, if so, how advanced defensive technologies could contribute to the realization of this vision.

The Strategic Context

The U.S. SDI research program is wholly compatible with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, is comparable to research permitted by the ABM Treaty which the Soviets have been conducting for many years, and is a prudent hedge against Soviet breakout from ABM Treaty limitations through the deployment of a territorial ballistic missile defense. These important facts deserve emphasis. However, the basic intent behind the Strategic Defense Initiative is best explained and understood in terms of the strategic environment we face for the balance of this century and into the next.

The Challenges We Face. Our nation and those nations allied with us face a number of challenges to our security. Each of these challenges imposes its own demands and presents its own opportunities. Preserving peace and freedom is, and always will be, our fundamental goal. The essential purpose of our military forces, and our nuclear forces in particular, is to deter aggression and coercion based upon the threat of military aggression. The deterrence provided by U.S. and allied military forces has permitted us to enjoy peace and freedom. However, the nature of the military threat has changed and will continue to change in very fundamental ways in the next decade. Unless we adapt our response, deterrence will become much less stable and our susceptibility to coercion will increase dramatically.

Our Assumptions About Deterrence. For the past 20 years, we have based our assumptions on how deterrence can best be assured on the basic idea that if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and thereby impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly out of balance with any potential gains, this would suffice to prevent conflict. Our idea of what our forces had to hold at risk to deter aggression has changed over time. Nevertheless, our basic reliance on nuclear retaliation provided by offensive nuclear forces, as the essential means of deterring aggression, has not changed over this period.

This basic idea—that if each side maintained roughly equal forces and equal capability to retaliate against attack, stability and deterrence would be maintained—also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) process of the 1970s. At the time that process began, the United States con-
cluded that deterrence based on the capability of offensive retaliatory forces was not only sensible but necessary, since we believed at the time that neither side could develop the technology for defensive systems which could effectively deter the other side.

Today, however, the situation is fundamentally different. Scientific developments and several emerging technologies now do offer the possibility of defenses that did not exist and could hardly have been conceived earlier. The state of the art of defense has now progressed to the point where it is reasonable to investigate whether new technologies can yield options, especially non-nuclear options, which could permit us to turn to defense not only to enhance deterrence but to allow us to move to a more secure and more stable long-term basis for deterrence.

Of equal importance, the Soviet Union has failed to show the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and defensive forces, that was hoped for when the SALT process began. The trends in the development of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces, as well as the growing pattern of Soviet deception and of noncompliance with existing agreements, if permitted to continue unchecked over the long term, will undermine the essential military balance and the mutuality of vulnerability on which deterrence theory has rested.

Soviet Offensive Improvements. The Soviet Union remains the principal threat to our security and that of our allies. As a part of its wide-ranging effort further to increase its military capabilities, the Soviet Union's improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard-target kill capability, has increasingly threatened the survivability of forces we have deployed to deter aggression. It has posed an especially immediate challenge to our land-based retaliatory forces and to the leadership structure that commands them. It equally threatens many critical fixed installations in the United States and in allied nations that support the nuclear retaliatory and conventional forces which provide our collective ability to deter conflict and aggression.

Improvement in Soviet Passive Defenses. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development and improvement of active defenses. These active defenses provide the Soviet Union a steadily increasing capability to counter U.S. retaliatory forces and those of our allies, especially if our forces were to be degraded by a Soviet first strike. Even today, Soviet active defenses are extensive. For example, the Soviet Union possesses the world's only currently deployed antiballistic missile system, deployed to protect Moscow. The Soviet Union is currently improving all elements of this system. It also has the world's only deployed antisatellite (ASAT) capability. It has an extensive air defense network, and it is aggressively improving the quality of its radars, intercepter aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. It also has a very extensive network of ballistic missile early warning radars. All of these elements provide them an area of relative advantage in strategic defense today and, with logical evolutionary improvement, could provide the foundation of decisive advantage in the future.

Improvement in Soviet Passive Defenses. The Soviet Union is also spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership. These efforts range from providing rail and road mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] to extensive hardening of various critical installations.

Soviet Research and Development on Advanced Defenses. For over two decades, the Soviet Union has pursued a wide range of strategic defensive efforts, integrating both active and passive elements. The resulting trends have shown steady improvement and expansion of Soviet defensive capability. Furthermore, current patterns of Soviet research and development, including a longstanding and intensive research program in many of the same basic technological areas which our SDI program will address, indicate that these trends will continue space for the foreseeable future. If unanswered, continued Soviet defensive improvements will further erode the effectiveness of our own existing deterrent, based as it is now almost exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation by offensive forces. Therefore, this longstanding Soviet program of defensive improvements, in itself, poses a challenge to deterrence which we must address.

Soviet Noncompliance and Verification. Finally, the problem of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements in both the offensive and defensive areas, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of very serious concern. Soviet activity in constructing either new phased-array radar near Krasnarsk, in central Siberia, has very immediate and ominous consequences. When operational, this radar, due to its location, will increase the Soviet Union's capability to deploy a territorial ballistic missile defense. Recognizing that such radars would make such a contribution, the ABM Treaty expressly banned the construction of such radars at such locations as one of the primary mechanisms for ensuring the effectiveness of the treaty. The Soviet Union's activity with respect to this radar is in direct violation of the ABM Treaty.

Against the backdrop of this Soviet pattern of noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, the Soviet Union is also taking other actions which affect our ability to verify Soviet compliance. Some Soviet actions, like their increased use of encryption during testing, are directly aimed at degrading our ability to monitor treaty compliance. Other Soviet actions, too, contribute to the problems we face in monitoring Soviet compliance. For example, Soviet increases in the number of their mobile ballistic missiles, especially those armed with multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicles, and other mobile systems, will make verification less and less certain. If we fail to respond to these trends, we could reach a point in the foreseeable future where we would have little confidence in our assessment of the state of the military balance or imbalance, with all that implies for our ability to control escalation during crises.

Responding to the Challenge

In response to this long-term pattern of Soviet offensive and defensive improvements, the United States is compelled to take certain actions designed both to maintain security and stability in the near term and to ensure these conditions in the future. We must act in three main areas.

Retaliatory Force Modernization. First, we must modernize our offensive nuclear retaliatory forces. This is necessary to reestablish and maintain the offensive balance in the near term and to create the strategic conditions that will permit us to pursue complementary actions in the areas of arms reduction negotiations and defensive research. For our part, in 1981 we embarked on our strategic modernization program aimed at reversing a long period of decline. This modernization program was specifically designed to preserve stable deterrence and, at the same time, to provide the incentives necessary to cause the Soviet Union to
join us in negotiating significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. In addition to the U.S. strategic modernization program, NATO is modernizing its longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF). Our British and French allies also have underway important programs to improve their own national strategic nuclear retaliatory forces. The U.S. SDI research program does not negate the necessity of these U.S. and allied programs. Rather, the SDI research program depends upon our collective and national modernization efforts to maintain peace and freedom today as we explore options for future decision on how we might enhance security and stability over the longer term.

New Deterrent Options. However, over the long run, the trends set in motion by the pattern of Soviet activity, and the Soviets' persistence in that pattern of activity, suggest that continued long-term dependence on offensive forces may not provide a stable basis for deterrence. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition could destroy the theoretical and empirical foundation on which deterrence has rested for a generation. Therefore, we must now also take steps to provide future options for ensuring deterrence and stability over the long term, and we must do so in a way that allows us both to negate the destabilizing growth of Soviet offensive forces and to channel longstanding Soviet propensities for defenses toward more stabilizing and mutually beneficial ends. The Strategic Defense Initiative is specifically aimed toward these goals. In the near term, the SDI program also responds directly to the ongoing and extensive Soviet antiballistic missile effort, including the existing Soviet deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. The SDI research program provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any near-term Soviet decision to expand rapidly its antiballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. This, in itself, is a critical task.

However, the overriding, long-term importance of SDI is that it offers the possibility of reversing the dangerous military trends cited above by moving to a better, more stable basis for deterrence and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in existing offensive nuclear arsenals.

The Soviet Union recognizes the potential of advanced defense concepts—especially those involving boost, postboost, and mid-course defenses—to change the strategic situation. In our investigation of the potential these systems offer, we do not seek superiority or to establish a unilateral advantage. However, if the promise of SDI technologies is proven, the destabilizing Soviet advantage can be redressed. And, in the process, deterrence will be strengthened significantly and placed on a foundation made more stable by reducing the role of ballistic missile weapons and by placing greater reliance on defenses which threaten no one.

Negotiation and Diplomacy. During the next 10 years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. A world free of the threat of military aggression and free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

To support these goals, we will continue to pursue vigorously the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to significant reductions of existing nuclear arsenals. As we do so, we will continue to exercise flexibility concerning the mechanisms used to achieve reductions but will judge these mechanisms on their ability to enhance the security of the United States and our allies, to strengthen strategic stability, and to reduce the risk of war.

At the same time, the SDI research program is and will be conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the research yields positive results, we will consult with our allies about the potential next steps. We would then consult and negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviet Union, pursuant to the terms of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how deterrence might be strengthened through the phased introduction of defensive systems into the force structures of both sides. This commitment does not mean that we would give the Soviets a veto over the outcome anymore than the Soviets have a veto over our current strategic and intermediate-range programs. Our commitment in this regard reflects our recognition that, if our research yields appropriate results, we should seek to move forward in a stable way. We have already begun the process of bilateral discussion in Geneva needed to lay the foundation for the stable integration of advanced defenses into the forces of both sides at such time as the state of the art and other considerations may make it desirable to do so.

The Soviet Union's View of SDI As noted above, the U.S.S.R. has long had a vigorous research, development, and deployment program in defensive systems of all kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain important advantages in the area of active and passive defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to protect this massive, long-term investment.

Allied Views Concerning SDI Our allies understand the military context in which the Strategic Defense Initiative was established and support the SDI research program. Our common understanding was reflected in the statement issued following President Reagan's meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher in December, to the effect that:

First, the U.S. and Western aim was not to achieve superiority but to maintain the balance, taking account of Soviet developments;

Second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation;

Third, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine, deterrence; and,

Fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

This common understanding is also reflected in other statements since then—for example, the principles suggested recently by the Federal Republic of Germany that:

• The existing NATO strategy of flexible response must remain fully valid for the alliance as long as there is no more effective alternative for preventing war; and,

• The alliance's political and strategic unity must be safeguarded. There must be no zones of different degrees of security in the alliance, and Europe's security must not be decoupled from that of North America.
Some options which could provide interim capabilities may be available earlier than others, and prudent planning demands that we maintain options against a range of contingencies. However, the primary thrust of the SDI research program is not to focus on generating options for the earliest development/deployment decision but options which best meet our identified criteria.

4. Within the SDI research program, we will judge defenses to be desirable only if they are survivable and cost effective at the margin.

Two areas of concern expressed about SDI are that deployment of defensive systems would harm crisis stability and that it would fuel a runaway proliferation of Soviet offensive arms. We have identified specific criteria to address these fears appropriately and directly.

Our survivability criterion responds to the first concern. If a defensive system were not adequately survivable, an adversary could very well have an incentive in a crisis to strike first at vulnerable elements of the defense. Application of this criterion will ensure that such a vulnerable system would not be deployed and, consequently, that the Soviets would have no incentive or prospect of overwhelming it.

Our cost-effectiveness criterion will ensure that any deployed defensive system would create a powerful incentive not to respond with additional offensive arms, since those arms would cost more than the additional defensive capability needed to defeat them. This is much more than an economic argument, although it is couched in economic terms. We intend to consider, in our evaluation of options generated by SDI research, the degree to which certain types of defensive systems, by their nature, encourage an adversary to try simply to overwhelm them with additional offensive capability while other systems can discourage such a counter effort. We seek defensive options which provide clear disincentives to attempts to counter them with additional offensive forces.

In addition, we are pressing to reduce offensive nuclear arms through the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements. This effort includes reductions in the number of warheads on ballistic missiles to equal levels significantly lower than exist today.

5. It is too early in our research program to speculate on the kinds of defensive systems—whether ground-based or space-based and with what capabilities—that might prove feasible and desirable to develop and deploy.

Discussion of the various technologies under study is certainly needed to give concrete to the understanding of the research program. However, speculation about various types of defensive systems that might be deployed is inappropriate at this time. The SDI is a broad-based research program investigating many technologies. We currently see real merit in the potential of advanced technologies providing for a layered defense, with the possibility of negating a ballistic missile at various points after launch. We feel that the possibility of a layered defense both enhances confidence in the overall system and compounds the problem of a potential aggressor in trying to defeat such a defense. However, the paths to such a defense are numerous.

Along the same lines, some have asked about the role of nuclear-related research in the context of our ultimate goal of non-nuclear defenses. While our current research program certainly emphasizes non-nuclear technologies, we will continue to explore the promising concepts which use nuclear energy to power devices which could destroy ballistic missiles at great distances. Further, it is useful to study these concepts to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of similar defensive systems that an adversary may develop for use against future U.S. surveillance and defensive or offensive systems.

6. The purpose of the defensive options we seek is clear—to find a means to destroy attacking ballistic missiles before they can reach any of their potential targets.

We ultimately seek a future in which nations can live in peace and freedom, secure in the knowledge that their national security does not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation. Therefore, the SDI research program will place its emphasis on options which provide the basis for eliminating the general threat posed by ballistic missiles. Thus, the goal of our research is not, and cannot be, simply to protect our retaliatory forces from attack.

If a future president elects to move toward a general defense against ballistic missiles, the technological options that we explore will certainly also increase the survivability of our retaliatory forces. This will require a stable concept and process to manage the transition to the future we seek. The
To the extent that the United States and its allies meet their own existing defense and modernization needs to maintain the forces, both nuclear and conventional, that provide today's deterrence.

12. Our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. By necessity, this is a very long-term goal, which requires, as we pursue our SDI research, equally energetic efforts to diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, both through conventional force improvements and the negotiation of arms reductions and confidence-building measures.

We fully recognize the contribution nuclear weapons make to deterring conventional aggression. We equally recognize the destructiveness of war by conventional and chemical means, and the need both to deter such conflict and to reduce the danger posed by the threat of aggression through such means.

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In the late 1960s, given the state of defensive technology at the time, the United States came to believe that deterrence could best be assured if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and thereby impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly beyond any potential gains. That concept called for a reduction by both the Soviet Union and the United States in their strategic defensive forces, the maintenance of a balance between the two sides' offensive nuclear forces, and negotiated nuclear arms reductions which would maintain the balance at progressively lower levels.

In accordance with those principles, the United States exercised great restraint in offensive nuclear arms and at the same time dramatically lowered its defensive forces. Thus, we removed most of our defenses against Soviet bombers; decided to maintain a severely limited civil defense program; ratified the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which placed strict limits on US and Soviet defenses against ballistic missiles; and then deactivated the one ABM site which we were allowed under that Treaty. The basic idea that stability and deterrence would be maintained if each side had roughly equal capability to retaliate against attack also served as the foundation for the US approach to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process of the 1970s.

The Soviet Union, however, failed to show the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and defensive forces, that the United States hoped for when the SALT process began. Over the years the USSR has consistently refused to accept meaningful and verifiable negotiated reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals. Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have greatly expanded and modernized their offensive nuclear forces and invested an approximately equal sum in strategic defenses. The USSR has an extensive, multifaceted operational strategic defensive network which dwarfs that of the United States as well as an active research and development program in both traditional and advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements in both the offensive and defensive areas, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of very serious concern. The aggregate of current Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory -- precisely what the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent.
Soviet offensive and defensive force developments pose a serious challenge to the West. If left unchecked and unanswered, they would undermine our ability to retaliate effectively in case of Soviet attack. The situation would be even more severe if the Soviet Union were to have a monopoly on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles in addition to its sizable offensive and defensive forces. In that case, the USSR might come to believe that it could launch a nuclear attack against the United States or our allies without fear of effective retaliation.

Important recent Soviet activities in strategic defenses include:

- Upgrading and expansion of the world's only operational Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system around Moscow;

- Construction of the Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile detection and tracking radar that violates the 1972 ABM Treaty;

- Extensive research into advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles including laser weapons, particle beam weapons, and kinetic energy weapons;

- Maintenance of the world's only operational anti-satellite (ASAT) system;

- Modernization of their strategic air defense forces; and

- Improvements in their passive defenses by maintaining deep bunkers and blast shelters for key personnel, and enhancing the survivability of some offensive systems through mobility and hardening.
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Today in Stockholm, the United States and 34 other governments adopted an accord that will, if faithfully implemented, reduce the risk of war in Europe, where there is the greatest concentration of military forces of the East and the West. I welcome this positive outcome at the CDE conference. It will contribute to greater security in Europe and to improved East-West relations.

This accord also sends messages that should be welcomed by people throughout the world. It demonstrates that East and West, with seriousness of purpose and hard work, can establish common ground on which to build a more secure future. It also demonstrates that the nations of the West, around whose proposals the Stockholm accord was built, constitute a powerful force for peace.

The set of militarily significant and verifiable measures adopted by the Stockholm CDE conference marks a substantial advance over those in the Helsinki Final Act. These measures will make military activities more predictable and inhibit opportunities for political intimidation. In particular, the Stockholm accord commits the 35 nations to notify one another of military activities above certain levels, to invite observers, to forecast activities a year in advance, and to allow inspectors to verify compliance with those commitments. This is the first East-West accord in which the Soviet Union has agreed to inspection of military activities on its territory. Although these inspection provisions are very different from those we would require to verify agreements which reduced or limited forces, they are appropriate to the Stockholm confidence and security-building measures and offer us the opportunity to gain experience in conducting inspections.

The Stockholm document, of course, must become more than promises on paper. Implementation of its commitments will be the true measure of its contribution to European security. For its part, the United States will meet its commitments fully. Soviet compliance, especially with the verification provisions, will be an important gauge of the possibilities for future progress in conventional arms control.

By advancing the principle of openness in the military-security field, this CDE accord can also contribute to progress in the broader Helsinki CSCE process. The accord achieved at Stockholm on security issues makes all the more imperative balanced progress on human rights and fundamental freedoms. At the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting which begins in November, the United States delegation will press for fulfillment of all CSCE commitments and for balanced progress across the full CSCE agenda.

These accomplishments are also a testimony to the skill, dedication and energy of our negotiators. I want to congratulate Ambassador Robert L. Barry and his negotiating team on a job well done.
FACT SHEET: CDE ACCORD

**Purpose:** Make military activities more predictable. Raise political cost of using military force for political intimidation.

**Significance:** Significant advance over Helsinki Final Act confidence building measures. For the first time challenge inspection for verification.

Step forward in making military activities in Europe more open, predictable.

Good faith implementation is key.

**Zone:** All of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals

**Participants:** U.S., Canada and all of Europe except Albania.

**Forecast:** Each state required to predict two years in advance exercises with over 75,000 troops; over 40,000 troops one year in advance.

November 15 each year, each state required to provide detailed forecast of all significant military activities above agreed threshold of 13,000 troops.

**Notification:** 42 days in advance, each state required to give detailed information about military activities above agreed threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks.

**Observation:** Each state required to invite observers to military activities above agreed threshold of 17,000 troops.

**Inspection:** States committed to permit inspection to resolve doubts about compliance with confidence-building measures from the ground and the air not more than three times each year.

Will use Soviet aircraft over USSR, but inspectors will have access to plane's navigational equipment, radios, be given continuous view of ground, can use helicopters or fixed-wing planes, can take photographs.

Inspectors must be permitted to enter territory within 36 hours after requested; inspectors will have 48 hours to complete their work.

**Non-use of Force:** States reaffirm commitment to principle of non-use of force. At West and neutral and nonaligned insistence, this section of the accord refers specifically to the human rights commitments in the Helsinki Final Act.
Representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Pact resume the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks today in Vienna. It has long been NATO's goal to reach a verifiable agreement that would reduce and limit conventional forces in the crucial region of Central Europe. This round of talks offers an opportunity to make progress toward that end.

For its part, NATO has made every effort to lay the groundwork for success. On December 5, 1985, in order to achieve a breakthrough in these negotiations, the West tabled a proposal that accepted the framework the Warsaw Pact had proposed for a time-limited, first-phase agreement calling for initial reductions by US and Soviet ground forces, followed by a no-increase commitment on all forces of the two alliances in the area. Underscoring further its desire to achieve tangible progress in Vienna, the West at the same time changed its long-held position that there should be agreement on the numbers of forces of both sides in Central Europe before initial reductions were taken -- a major compromise step in the East's direction.

The Eastern response to this significant move has not contributed to progress in the talks. Despite public claims by Warsaw Pact leaders that they were willing to incorporate reasonable verification measures in an agreement, the Warsaw Pact, in the draft MBFR agreement it tabled on February 20, 1986, again proposed inadequate and unacceptable measures for ensuring compliance. Moreover, the East actually took a step backward from its 1983 verification position, and would now exempt the half-million Soviet troops on annual rotation into and out of Central Europe from any requirement to pass through monitoring points.

Despite this lack of movement by the East in the previous two negotiating sessions, the United States and its allies remain hopeful that success can be achieved at the Vienna negotiating table. We look to the Soviet Union to seriously respond to the important compromise proposal tabled by the West last December.

The President has instructed the US Delegation under Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, in conjunction with other NATO delegations, to continue to make every effort to demonstrate how the Western position in MBFR would enhance peace and stability in Central Europe. All NATO nations hope that the East is capable of mustering the political will necessary to do its part to advance the Vienna negotiations. It is time for the Warsaw Pact to demonstrate that it is indeed committed to meaningful and verifiable reductions in conventional forces.

# # #
Following are texts of the President's statement and a White House fact sheet of May 27, 1986, concerning U.S. interim restraint policy and the U.S. response to Soviet arms control violations.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT

On the eve of the strategic arms reduction talks (START) in 1982, I decided that the United States would not under-cut the expired SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] interim offensive agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action, despite my concerns about the flaws inherent in those agreements, to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals through the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a Poseidon submarine, U.S.S. *Sam Rayburn*, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded last June that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try, once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our objective of deep reductions. In existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals through the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a Poseidon submarine, U.S.S. *Sam Rayburn*, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their noncompliance, reversing their unwarranted military buildup, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

Last June, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy. I found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain. As I have documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, most recently in December 1985, the Soviet Union, regrettably, has not. I noted last June that the pattern of Soviet noncompliance with their existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process itself. A country simply cannot be serious about effective arms control unless it is equally serious about compliance.

In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded last June that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try, once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our objective of deep reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals through the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a Poseidon submarine, U.S.S. *Sam Rayburn*, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their noncompliance, reversing their unwarranted military buildup, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

Later this month, the eight Trident submarine, U.S.S. *Nevada*, begins sea trials. In accordance with our announced policy, I have assessed our options with respect to that milestone. I have considered Soviet actions since my June 1985 decision and U.S. and allied security interests in light of both those actions and our programmatic options. The situation is not encouraging.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas, there has been no real progress toward meeting U.S. concerns with respect to the general pattern of Soviet noncompliance with major arms control commitments, particularly in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet noncompliance with the SALT and ABM [antiballistic missile] agreements. The deployment of the SS-26, a forbidden second new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) type, continues apace. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing in a manner which impedes verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force buildup. Finally, since the November summit, we have yet to see the Soviets follow up constructively on the commitment made by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

Based on Soviet conduct since my June 1985 decision, I can only conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate its readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. At
the same time, I have also considered
the programmatic options available to
the United States in terms of their
overall net impact on U.S. and allied
security.

When I issued guidance on U.S. pol-
icy on June 10, 1985, the military plans
and programs for fiscal year 1986 were
about to be implemented. The amount of
flexibility that any nation has in the
near term for altering its planning is
modest at best. Our military planning
will take more time to move out from
under the shadow of previous assump-
tions, especially in the budgetary condi-
tions which we now face. These
budgetary conditions make it essential
that we make the very best possible use
of our resources.

The United States had long planned
to retire and dismantle two of the oldest
Poseidon submarines when their reactor
cores were exhausted. Had I been
saddled with refueling and retaining
these two Poseidon submarines would
certainly contributed significantly and
cost-effectively to the national security, I
would have directed that these two
Poseidon submarines not be dismantled
but be overhauled and retained.

However, in view of present circum-
cstances, including current military and
economic realities, I have directed their
retirement and dismantlement as
planned.

As part of the same decision last
June, I also announced that we would
take appropriate and proportionate
responses when needed to protect our
own security in the face of continuing
Soviet noncompliance. It is my view
that certain steps are now required by
continued Soviet disregard of their
obligations.

Needless to say, the most essential
near-term response to Soviet noncompli-
ance remains the implementation of our
full strategic modernization program, to
undertake deterrence today, and the
continued pursuit of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) research pro-
gram, to see if it is possible to provide a
safer and more stable basis for our fu-
ture security and that of our allies. The
strategic modernization program, includ-
ing the deployment of the second 60
Peacekeeper missiles, is the foundation
for all future U.S. offensive force op-
tions. It provides a solid basis which can
and will be adjusted over time to
respond most efficiently to continued
Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program
represents our best hope for a future in
which our security can rest on the in-
creasing contribution of defensive sys-
tems that threaten no one.

It is absolutely essential that we
maintain full support for these pro-
grams. To fail to do so would be the
worst response to Soviet noncompliance.
It would immediately and seriously
undercut our negotiators in Geneva by
removing the leverage that they must
have rather than unilaterally reducing in
both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would
send precisely the wrong signal to the
leadership of the Soviet Union about the
seriousness of our resolve concerning
their noncompliance. And it would sig-
nificantly increase the risk to our secu-
ritv for years to come. Therefore, our
highest priority must remain the full im-
plementation of these programs.

Secondly, the development by the
Soviet Union of its massive ICBM
forces continues to challenge seriously
the essential balance which has deter-
med both conflict and coercion. Last June,
I cited the Soviet Union's SS-25 missile,
a second new type of ICBM prohibited
under SALT II, as a clear and irreversi-
ble violation. With the number of
deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing,
I now call upon the Congress to restore
bipartisan support for a balanced, cost-
effective, long-term program to restore
both the survivability and effectiveness
of the U.S. ICBM program. This
program should include the full deploy-
ment of the 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs. But
it must also look beyond the Peacekeeper
and toward additional U.S. ICBM re-
quirements in the future, including the
small ICBM to complement Peace-
keeper. Therefore, I have directed the
Department of Defense to provide to me
by November 1986 an assessment of the
best options for carrying out such a
comprehensive ICBM program. This as-
essment will address the basis of the
second 60 Peacekeeper missiles and
specific alternative configurations for the
small ICBM in terms of size, num-
ber of warheads, and production rates.

Finally, I have also directed that the
advanced cruise missile program be
accelerated. This would not direct any in-
crease in the total program procurement
at this time but rather would establish a
more efficient program that both saves
money and accelerates the availability of
additional options for the future.

This brings us to the question of the
SALT agreements. SALT II was a fun-
damentally flawed and unratified treaty.
Even if ratified, it would have expired on
December 31, 1986. When presented to
the U.S. Senate in 1979, it was con-
sidered by a broad range of critics, in-
cluding the Senate Armed Services
Committee, to be unequal and unverifi-
able in important provisions. It was,
therefore, judged by many to be inimical
to genuine arms control, to the security
interests of the United States and its al-
lies, and to global stability. The pro-
posed treaty was clearly headed for
defeat before my predecessor asked the
Senate not to act on it.

The most basic problem with
SALT II was that it codified major
arms buildup rather than reductions.
For example, even though at the time
the treaty was signed in 1979, the
United States had, and only planned for,
550 MIRVed [multiple independently-
targetable reentry vehicle] ICBM
launchers, and the Soviet Union pos-
sessed only about 600, SALT II per-
mitted each side to increase the number
of such launchers to 820. It also per-
mitted a buildup to 1,200 MIRVed bal-
listic launchers (both ICBMs and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles)
even though the United States had only
about 1,080 and the Soviet Union had
only about 750 when the treaty was
signed. It permitted the Soviet Union to
retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles.
Finally, it limited ballistic missile
launchers, not the missiles or the war-
heads carried by the ballistic missiles.

Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet
ballistic missile forces have grown to
within a few launchers of each of the
820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits and from
about 5,000 to over 9,000 warheads
today. What is worse, given the failure
of SALT II to constrain ballistic missile
warheads, the number of warheads on
Soviet ballistic missiles will continue to
grow very significantly, even under the
treaty's limits, in the continued absence
of Soviet restraint.

In 1982, on the eve of the START
negotiations, I undertook not to under-
cut existing arms control agreements to
the extent that the Soviet Union demon-
strated comparable restraint. Unfor-
tunately, the Soviet Union did not
exercise comparable restraint, and un-
corrected Soviet violations have seri-
ously undermined the SALT structure.

Last June, I once again laid out
the steps necessary to join us in estab-
lishing an interim framework of truly
mutual restraint. The Soviet Union has
not used the past year for this purpose.

Given this situation, I have deter-
mined that, in the future, the United
States must base decisions regarding its
strategic force structure on the nature
and magnitude of the threat posed by
Soviet strategic forces and not on stan-
such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim INF agreement. If the Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world.

FACT SHEET

Summary

The United States has completed a comprehensive review of its interim restraint policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. Based on this review, and following consultations with the Congress and key allies, we have been forced to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate a readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the expired SALT II agreement of 1972. The President has indicated that since the United States will continue to exercise utmost restraint, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat will demand, we implement the strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task which faces us. I call on the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Finally, I want to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim INF agreement. If the Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world.
ply themselves seriously and flexibly toward these goals, as the U.S. negotiators are prepared to do, we can move together now to build a safer and more stable world.

Introduction
Over the past 2½ years, the President has sent three reports to the Congress detailing the serious realities of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, including major agreements on strategic arms. The United States has unsuccessfully pressed the Soviet Union in the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and through other diplomatic channels to resolve our concerns.

In spite of this pattern of Soviet noncompliance, the President decided last June to go the extra mile in dismantling U.S. Poseidon submarine, U.S.S. San Rayburn, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the opportunity to join the United States in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms. He stated that such a framework required that the Soviets correct their noncompliance, reverse their unwarranted military buildup, and make progress at the Geneva negotiations. In addition, he indicated that the United States, which has scrupulously complied with its arms control obligations and commitments, would be required to develop appropriate and proportionate responses to assure U.S. and allied security in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance. He directed that all programmatic responses be kept open, and he requested specific programmatic recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In recent months, the President has reviewed these issues in great detail with his senior advisers and has consulted extensively with Members of Congress and allied leaders. He announced his decision in the statement issued today. This fact sheet reports on the President's decision.

Background

1982 Decision. In 1982, on the eve of the strategic arms reductions talks, the President decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unrelated SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite his serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, he took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint on force deployments conducive to serious negotiations as we entered START. He made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup. The Soviet Union also made a policy commitment not to undercut these agreements.

1985 Decision. In a decision reported to the Congress on June 10, 1985, the President reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy concerning strategic agreements in light of the continuing pattern of the Soviet Union's noncompliance with its arms control obligations and commitments. He found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain and had scrupulously complied with the terms of its obligations and commitments. By contrast, he noted with regret that the Soviet Union had repeatedly violated several of its major arms control obligations and commitments. His three reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance in January 1984, February 1985, and December 1985 enumerated and documented in detail the serious facts and U.S. concerns about Soviet violations. The overall judgment reached by the President in his June 1985 decision was that while the Soviets had observed some provisions of existing arms control agreements, they had violated important elements of those agreements and associated legal obligations and political commitments.

The President noted that these were very crucial issues, for to be serious about effective arms control is to be serious about compliance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our national security. But, perhaps even more significant than the near-term military consequences of the violations themselves, they raise fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process, concerns that, if uncorrected, undercut the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world.

The President also noted that the United States had repeatedly raised our serious concerns with the Soviet Union in diplomatic channels, including the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission. His assessment was that, despite long and repeated U.S. efforts to resolve these issues, the Soviet Union had neither provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective action. Instead, Soviet violations had expanded as the Soviets continued to modernize their strategic forces.

U.S. interim restraint policy has always been conditioned on Soviet reciprocity. In his June assessment, the President was consequently forced to conclude that the Soviet Union was not exercising the equal restraint upon which U.S. interim restraint policy had been conditioned. He continued that to provide a double standard of unilateral U.S. compliance coupled with Soviet noncompliance, and that such Soviet behavior was fundamentally inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of our country and that of our allies.

At the same time, given the goal of reducing the size of Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals, the President made the judgment that it remained in the interest of the United States to go the extra mile in seeking to persuade the Soviet Union to join us in establishing an interim framework for truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms, as we pursued with renewed vigor through the negotiations in Geneva, our goal of deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

The President made clear, however, that the United States could not establish such a framework alone. Movement toward an acceptable framework required the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse or substantially reduce its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup. Although the Soviet Union had not demonstrated a willingness to move in this direction, the President announced that in the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, he was prepared to go the extra mile.

The President thus decided last June that to provide the Soviets a further opportunity to join us in establishing an interim framework for truly mutual restraint which could support ongoing negotiations, the United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reductions agreements in the nuclear and space talks in Geneva. Further, he stated that the United States would constantly review the implications of this interim policy on the long-term security interests of the United States and its allies. He indicated that, in doing so, the United States would consider Soviet actions to resolve our concerns with the pattern of Soviet noncompliance, continued growth in the strategic
force structure of the Soviet Union, and Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negotiations.

As an integral part of the implementation of this policy, the President announced that the United States would take those steps made necessary by Soviet noncompliance to assure U.S. national security and that of our allies. He noted that appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to make it perfectly clear to Moscow that violations of arms control arrangements entail real costs. He stated clearly that the United States would, therefore, develop appropriate and proportionate responses and would take those actions necessary in response to, and as a hedge against, the military consequences of uncorrected Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.

The President decided last June that to provide still more time for the Soviet Union to demonstrate by its action a commitment to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the United States would deactivate and dismantle, according to agreed procedures, an existing older Poseidon submarine as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class Trident submarine put to sea in August 1985. However, the President also directed that the United States keep open all future programmatic options for handling such strategic deployment milestones as they occurred in the future. He made it clear that, as these later milestones were reached, he would assess the overall situation and make a final determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet actions in meeting the criteria which he cited.

U.S. Compliance

In accordance with U.S. interim restraint policy and our efforts to build an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing agreements. We have continued scrupulously to live within all arms control agreements, including the SALT I and II agreements. For example, we have fully dismantled one Poseidon and eight Polaris missile-carrying submarines and 27 Titan II ICBM launchers as new Trident missile-carrying submarines have been deployed. Unfortunately, while the United States has been attempting to hold to the structure of SALT through our policy of interim restraint, the Soviet Union, through its continued noncompliance, has undermined the very foundation of that structure.

Soviet Noncompliance

In the most recent of his three reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, issued on December 23, 1985, the President confirmed that the Administration’s continuing studies supported the conclusion that the pattern of Soviet noncompliance continues largely uncorrected. As documented in the President’s reports, particularly the detailed classified versions, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligations under, or political commitments to, the SALT II agreement of 1979, the SALT I interim offensive agreement of 1972, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1967, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, the Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons of 1925, and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. In addition, the U.S.S.R. has likely violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974.

In his December 1985 report to the Congress, the President noted that through its noncompliance with arms control agreements, the Soviet Union has made military gains in the areas of strategic offensive arms as well as chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. The President added that in the area of strategic defense, the possible extent of the Soviet Union’s military gains by virtue of its noncompliance with the ABM Treaty is also of increasing importance and serious concern to the United States.

The President noted in his December report that in a fundamental sense all deliberate Soviet violations are equally important. He made clear that as violations of legal obligations or political commitments, they cause grave concern regarding Soviet commitment to arms control and darken the atmosphere in which current negotiations are being conducted in Geneva and elsewhere.

In another sense, the President noted, Soviet violations are not of equal importance. Some Soviet violations are of significant military importance—like the illegal second type of new ICBM, telemetry encryption, and the Krasnoyarsk radar. While other violations are of little apparent military significance in their own right, such violations can acquire importance if, left unaddressed, they are permitted to become precedents for future, more threatening violations. Moreover, some Soviet actions that individually have little military significance could conceivably become significant when taken in their aggregate. Finally, even if a specific violation does not contain an inherent military threat, it still undermines the viability and integrity of the arms control process.

Specific Soviet Violations

Concerning SALT II, the President’s December report, in addition to citing the Soviet’s SS-25 ICBM development and extensive encryption of telemetry on ICBM missile flight tests as violations, also enumerated additional clear Soviet violations of SALT II, including exceeding the numerical limit of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and concealment of the association between the SS-25 missile and its launcher. In addition, the President’s report cited three areas of ambiguous Soviet behavior as involving possible violations or inconsistencies with regard to SALT II—SS-16 ICBM activity, the Backfire bomber’s international operating capability, and the Backfire bomber’s production rate.

Concerning the SALT I interim offensive agreement of 1972, the President’s December 1985 report cited a violation in Soviet use of former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs.

Concerning the ABM Treaty of 1972, the President’s December 1985 report indicated that in addition to illegal construction of the ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk, the combination of other Soviet ABM-related activities involving mobility of ABM system components, concurrent testing, rapid reload, etc., also suggested that the Soviets might be preparing an ABM defense of their national territory, which is prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Such an action, if left without a U.S. response, would have serious adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has kept the peace.

Three key Soviet violations of strategic arms agreements enumerated below are particularly disturbing—the SS-25 ICBM, encryption of telemetry, and the Krasnoyarsk radar.

- **SALT II: SS-25 ICBM.** The President stated in his December 1985 report that the SS-25 mobile ICBM is a clear and irreversible violation of the Soviet Union’s SALT II commitment and has important political and military implications. Testing and deployment of this missile violates a central provision of the SALT II agreement, which was intended to limit the number of new ICBMs. The agreement permits only one new type of ICBM for each party. The Soviets have informed us that their
one new ICBM type will be the SS-X-24, which is now undergoing testing, and, as the Soviets have falsely asserted, the SS-25 is a permitted modernization of their old silo-based SS-18 ICBM. The President also concluded that the technical argument by which the Soviets sought to justify the SS-25, calling it "permitted modernization," is also troublesome as a potential precedent, as the Soviets might seek to apply it to additional prohibited new types of ICBMs in the future.

**SALT II: Telemetry Encryption.** The President stated in his December report that Soviet use of encryption impedes U.S. verification of Soviet compliance and thus contravenes the provision of the SALT II Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment measures, including encryption, which impede verification of compliance by national technical means. This deliberate Soviet concealment activity, he explained, impedes our ability to know whether a type of missile is in compliance with SALT II requirements. It could also make it more difficult for the United States to assess accurately the critical parameters of any future missile.

Since the SALT I agreement of 1972, the President reported, Soviet encryption practices have become more extensive and disturbing. The President noted that these Soviet practices, Soviet responses on this issue, and Soviet failure to take corrective actions which the United States has repeatedly requested, demonstrate a Soviet attitude contrary to the fundamentals of sound arms control agreements, undermine the political confidence necessary for concluding new agreements, and underscore the necessity that any new agreement be effectively verifiable.

**ABM Treaty: Krasnoyarsk Radar.** The President stated in his December 1985 report that the radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is disturbing for both political and military reasons. First, it violates the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prohibits the siting of an ABM radar, or the siting and orienting of a ballistic missile detection and tracking radar, in the way the Krasnoyarsk radar is sited and oriented. Politically, he said, the radar demonstrates that the Soviets are capable of violating arms control obligations and commitments even when they are negotiating with the United States or when they know we will detect a violation.

Militarily, he noted, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation goes to the heart of the ABM Treaty. Large phased-array radars (LPARs), like that under construction near Krasnoyarsk, were recognized during the ABM Treaty negotiations as the critical, long lead-time element of a nationwide ABM defense.

When considered as a part of a Soviet network of new LPARs, the President concluded, the Krasnoyarsk radar has the inherent potential to contribute to ABM radar coverage of a significant portion of the central U.S.S.R. Moreover, the Krasnoyarsk radar closes the remaining gap in Soviet ballistic missile detection and tracking coverage. Together with other Soviet ABM-related activities, it suggests, as noted above, that the Soviets might be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory, which is prohibited by the treaty and would have serious adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has kept the peace.

**The Current U.S. Deployment Milestone.**

On May 28, the eighth U.S. Trident submarine, USS Nevada, begins its sea trials. As called for by the U.S. interim restraint policy announced last June, the President has carefully assessed our options with respect to that milestone. He has considered Soviet behavior since his June 1985 decision to go the extra mile, and he has considered U.S. and allied security interests in light of that Soviet behavior and our own programmatic options.

Since the President made his decision in June 1985 to dismantle a Poseidon, U.S.S. San Rayburn, in order to give the Soviets adequate time to join us in establishing a truly mutual framework of interim restraint, the situation has not been encouraging with respect to the three criteria that the President established for gauging constructive Soviet action—i.e., 1) correction of Soviet noncompliance, 2) reversal of the Soviet military buildup, and 3) promoting progress in the Geneva negotiations.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas of U.S. concern—for example, with respect to the production rate of Backfire bombers—there has been no real progress by the Soviets in meeting the most serious U.S. concerns. The deployment of the SS-25, a second new ICBM type forbidden by SALT II, continues. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing and impedes SALT II verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force buildup. Finally, after a hopeful meeting in Geneva last November between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, we have yet to see the Soviet Union follow up in negotiations on the commitment made in the joint statement issued by the two leaders to seek common ground, especially through the principle of 50% strategic arms reductions, appropriately applied, and through an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces. In light of these circumstances, it is the President's judgment that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken actions that would indicate by deed its readiness to join us in a framework of truly mutual interim restraint.

As the President has considered options associated with the current deployment milestone with the sea trials of the eighth Trident, he has also carefully reviewed the military programmatic options available to the United States in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and allied security. It should be noted in this context that when the President issued guidance on U.S. policy in June of last year, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near term for altering its planning is modest at best, and our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions. This shadow lengthens and darkens with each reduction made in the funds available for our defense. Operating under such a shadow, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face, makes it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

It had long been planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest Poseidon submarines. The President indicated in the decision announced today that had he been persuaded that refueling and retaining these particular two Poseidon submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, he would have directed their overhaul and retention. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities, it is the President's judgment that, at this particular juncture, the proper course with respect to these two older Poseidon submarines is to retire and dismantle them, according to agreed procedures.

**Proportionate U.S. Responses.**

In announcing his decision last June, the President made clear at the same time that the United States would take ap
propriate and proportionate actions when needed to assure U.S. and allied security in the face of Soviet noncompliance. It is the President's view that, while two Poseidon submarines should be dismantled for military and economic reasons, certain new programmatic U.S. steps focused on the Administration's strategic modernization program are now necessitated by the continued lack of Soviet action up to this point in meeting the criteria established by the President's interim restraint policy decision last June.

Strategic Modernization Program. The Administration's highest priority in the strategic programs area remains the full implementation of the U.S. strategic modernization program to underwrite deterrence today and the full pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative research program to seek to provide better alternatives in the future. The President's decision to retire the two older Poseidon submarines at this point is fully in accordance with that program. Under any set of assumptions, our modernization program is, and will always be, designed to guarantee that our nation always has modern forces in sufficient quantities to underwrite our security and that of our allies—nothing more and nothing less. This goal ensures that the appropriate, best, and proper use is made of our national resources.

The U.S. strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles to the full program of 100 missiles, which was called for in 1983 by the Scowcroft commission, is fully supported by our military leadership. The Administration's full strategic modernization program, however, is very carefully crafted by our best defense planners. It is the foundation for all future U.S. strategic program options and provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The President believes it is absolutely critical that this program not be permitted to erode. That would be the worst way to respond to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance, would increase the risk to our security and that of our allies, and would undercut our ability to negotiate the reductions in existing arsenals that we seek. It, therefore, would send precisely the wrong signal to the Soviet leadership.

**Bipartisan Support for the U.S. ICBM Program.** Soviet actions to continue the accelerated development of their ICBM force are of great concern. Last June, the President cited the Soviet Union's flight-testing of the SS-25 missile, a new and dangerous ICBM prohibited under the SALT II agreement, as a clear and irreversible violation and noted that deployment would constitute a further violation. He noted that since the noncompliance associated with the development of this missile cannot, at this point, be corrected by the Soviet Union, the United States reserved the right to respond proportionately and appropriately. At that time, he also noted that the U.S. small ICBM program was particularly relevant in this regard. Given the events that have occurred since last June, including the Soviet Union's deployment of over 70 SS-25 mobile ICBMs, the President calls upon the Congress to join him in restoring bipartisan support for a balanced, cost-effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of our own ICBM program.

- **Peacekeeper (MX).** The program we require should include the full 100-missile deployment of the Peacekeeper ICBM. It is sometimes forgotten by critics of the Administration's 100-missile Peacekeeper program that this represents a number only one-half that requested by the previous Administration. The Peacekeeper missile has just completed another flawless flight test. It makes both good military and economic sense fully to exploit the great technical success that we have had with this missile.

- **Small ICBM.** The President believes that our ICBM program must also look beyond the Peacekeeper and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future. Our small ICBM program makes a significant contribution not only in this regard but also as an appropriate and proportionate U.S. response to the irreversible Soviet violation associated with their SS-25 mobile ICBM.

**A Comprehensive Program.** To ensure that he has a more robust range of options as he approaches future milestones, the President has, in the decision announced today, directed the Department of Defense to provide to him by November 1986 an assessment of the best options for carrying out a comprehensive ICBM program.

- **Advanced Cruise Missile.** Finally, the President has also directed the Secretary of Defense to take the steps necessary, working with the Congress, to accelerate the production of the advanced cruise missile (ACM) program. The President is not, at this time, directing any increase in the total ACM program procurement but rather is establishing a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

**The U.S. and SALT**

Having completed a comprehensive review of U.S. restraint policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, and following consultations with the Congress and key allies, the President has been forced to conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate a readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT II agreement of 1979 or the SALT I interim offensive agreement of 1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I interim offensive agreement of 1972 was unequal, has expired, and is also being violated by the Soviet Union.

After reviewing the programmatic options available to the United States, the President has decided to retire and dismantle two older Poseidon submarines this summer. The United States will thus remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II agreement until we equip our 131st heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. The President has determined that, given the decision that he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, the United States will later this year continue deployment of B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II agreement.

**Continued U.S. Restraint**

The President emphasized that the United States will continue to seek to meet its strategic needs, in response to the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The President pointed out that, as the United States
modernizes, it will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. Therefore, he does not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. The President also emphasized that, assuming no significant change in the threat that we face, as we implement the needed strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two Poseidon submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II agreement until the United States equips its 131st heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that the President has been forced to make, he announced today that, at that time, he intends to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II agreement. Of course, since the United States will remain in technical observance of the terms of the expired SALT II agreement for some months, the President continues to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, the President noted that the United States will certainly take this into account.

In sum, the United States will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while ensuring the credibility of our strategic deterrent, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task that faces us.

The ABM Treaty

Our obligations under the ABM Treaty remain unchanged. The President has made it clear that U.S. programs are, and will continue to be, in compliance with our obligations under the ABM Treaty. The President's statement today also makes it clear that we remain deeply concerned over Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty. In contrast with SALT I and SALT II, however, the ABM Treaty is not an expired or unratiﬁed agreement. One of our priority objectives remains to have the Soviet Union return to compliance with their obligations under this treaty.

Hope for Progress in Geneva Negotiations

Time has not altered the basic truth that a policy of interim restraint is not a substitute for an agreement on deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, our highest priority.

It, therefore, remains our hope that the Soviet Union will take the necessary steps to give substance to the agreement which President Reagan reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to negotiate 50% reductions in strategic nuclear arms, appropriately applied, and an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear arms. If the Soviets agree to take those steps with us, we can together achieve greater stability and a safer world.

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Interim Restraint: U.S. and Soviet Force Projections

Special Report
No. 151

United States Department of State
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August 5, 1986

Following is the President’s letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President of the Senate, and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services of August 5, 1986, transmitting an unclassified report to the Congress.

Transmittal Letter

Dear Mr. Speaker; (Dear Mr. President:)
(Dear Mr. Chairman)

Enclosed is an unclassified version of a classified report which I provided on June 19 in response to related Congressional requests, including a request for projections and comparisons of U.S. and Soviet strategic force dismantlements, inventories, etc., in terms of adherence to existing arms control agreements.

As I noted in my letter of June 19 transmitting the classified report, it is clear that SALT II and I codified a very major arms buildup including a quadrupling of Soviet strategic weapons (warheads and bombs) since SALT I was signed in 1972 and near doubling of Soviet ballistic missile warheads from about 6,000 to more than 9,000 since SALT II was signed in 1979.

The report further found that the SALT I and II agreements, even if fully complied with, would not prevent a very substantial further expansion of Soviet capabilities. We believe that, absent SALT II, the Soviets would not necessarily expand their forces significantly beyond the increases already projected with SALT II since the Soviet forces are very large and would appear, in our judgment, more than enough to meet reasonable military requirements.

In my letter of June 19, I noted that in view of the adverse implications of Soviet noncompliance for our security and for the arms control process, I had determined on May 27 that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance, and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

I have also noted that the full implementation of the Strategic Modernization Program is critical both to meeting our future national security needs and to appropriately responding to Soviet noncompliance. However, we will exercise utmost restraint. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as national security requirements permit. We do not anticipate any appreciable growth in the size of U.S. strategic forces.

I want again to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions continues to receive my highest priority. This is the most direct path to achieving greater stability and a safer world.

Sincerely,
RONALD REagan

Unclassified Report

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON U.S.
INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY AND
REPRESENTATIVE SOVIET AND U.S.
DISMANTLEMENT AND STRATEGIC FORCE
PROJECTIONS WITH AND WITHOUT
SALT I AND II

I. Introduction: U.S. Interim
Restraint Policy and U.S. Responses to Soviet Noncompliance

This report is an unclassified version of a report forwarded to the Congress on June 19, 1986, in response to the requirements of the fiscal year 1986 Department of Defense Authorization Act (Title X, Section 1001(b)) for a report on certain data and assessments related to U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive forces and on possible Soviet political, military, and negotiating responses to changes in the U.S. policy of interim restraint. As requested by this legislation, the report covers a 5-year period. It is provided in conjunction with material including the President’s statement of May 27 and a White House fact sheet of the same date on “U.S. Interim Restraint Policy: Responding to Soviet Arms Control Violations.”

The U.S. policy of interim restraint as first announced by the President in 1982 has been that, in spite of the flaws inherent in the SALT [strategic arms limitation talks] agreements and in an effort to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations on arms reductions, the United States would not under the expired SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972 or the unratified SALT II Treaty of 1979 so long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint.

In three detailed Administration reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, and through diplomatic channels including the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, the President has consistently made clear that this U.S. policy required Soviet reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup and uncorrected Soviet noncompliance.

In accordance with U.S. interim restraint policy and our efforts to build a framework of truly mutual restraint, the United States has not taken any actions that would undercut existing agreements. We have continued scrupulously to live within all arms control agreements, including the SALT I and II strategic arms agreements. Unfortunately, while the United States has been attempting to hold to the structure of
SALT through our policy of interim restraint, the Soviet Union has undercut the very foundation of that structure through its continued violations.

In June of 1985, the President went the extra mile. He decided to dismantle a U.S. Poseidon submarine, in order to give the Soviet Union adequate time to correct its noncompliance, reverse its unwarranted military buildup, and seriously undermine and verifiable arms reduction agreements in the Geneva negotiations. Regrettably, the Soviet Union has so far failed to move constructively in these three areas.

In spite of our expressed concerns and our diplomatic efforts for corrective Soviet actions, the Soviet Union has not corrected its noncompliance. Concerning SALT II, the President’s most recent report, of December 23, 1985, to the Congress cited as Soviet violations: (1) the development of the SS-25 missile, a prohibited second new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM); (2) extensive encryption of telemetry on ICBM missile flight tests, which impedes verification; (3) concealment of the association between the SS-25 missile and its launcher during testing; and (4) exceeding the SALT II numerical cap of 2,504 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). In addition, the President’s report cited three areas of ambiguous Soviet behavior as involving possible violations or other problems with regard to SALT II: (1) SS–16 ICBM activity, (2) the Backfire bomber’s intercontinental operating capability, and (3) the Backfire bomber’s production rate. Concerning SALT I, the President’s report cited a violation in the Soviet use of former SS–7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS–25 mobile ICBMs. These SALT II and SALT I violations and other ambiguous situations involving these treaties remain matters of serious concern, as does Soviet violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 and of other major arms control agreements.

The Administration has now concluded a comprehensive review, and extensive consultations with our allies and friends abroad and with Members of the Congress on the continuing Soviet pattern of noncompliance, the Soviet strategic arms buildup, and the lack of progress by the Soviets at the Geneva negotiations. The President announced on May 27 that in the future the United States would base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, not on standards contained in the flawed SALT structure, which has been seriously undermined by Soviet noncompliance.

In his May 27 announcement on U.S. interim restraint policy and on the U.S. response to continued Soviet noncompliance, the President pointed out the inappropriateness of continuing with the SALT II agreement. SALT II codified continuing major arms buildups. It was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions. It was never ratified by the U.S. Senate and was clearly headed for defeat before the President’s predecessor asked the Senate not to act on it. With SALT II the Soviets have nearly doubled their strategic ballistic missile warheads from about 8,000 to 9,000, and with SALT II they could legally undertake a further significant increase. Even if SALT II had been ratified, it would have expired on December 31, 1985.

Finally, continued Soviet violations have seriously undercut the agreement for several years in spite of repeated U.S. requests for corrective Soviet action. Concerning SALT I, this agreement expired in 1977, and since it was signed in 1972, the Soviet Union has quadrupled the number of its strategic nuclear warheads. As for the United States, even if we did not retire older systems, the United States would, under current plans, remain in technical observance of the SALT I numerical limits until mid-1989.

The President made clear in his May 27 announcement that the United States would continue to exercise utmost restraint in the future, seeking to meet U.S. strategic needs, given the Soviet buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. The President stated that, as we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit and that we do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic forces. He also indicated that, assuming no significant change in the threat we face as we implement the strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

The President also noted that, as a result of his decision to dismantle two older Poseidon submarines, the United States will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty for some months. He continues to hope that the Soviet Union will use this additional time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, the President has stated that this would be taken into account.

Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet noncompliance remains the implementation of our full strategic modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our allies. The strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive force options. It provides a solid basis that can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

In his May 27 statement, the President emphasized that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and will continue to receive, his highest priority. We hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement reached by the President and General Secretary Gorbachev at the summit meeting last November to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations. It was agreed to focus, in particular, on areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions, appropriately applied, in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, as well as an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces. If the Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world.

The classified report transmitted to the Congress on June 19 provided a comparison of representative U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons dismantlement that would be required over the next 5 years if both countries were actually to observe all of the quantitative limits of the SALT I and SALT II agreements. It then presented representative projections of the strategic offensive forces of the two sides, assuming that the SALT I and SALT II limits no longer apply. If provided on an equal footing, it is possible we would outspend the Soviet Union by $200 billion, which is substantial. The total amount of U.S. SDI funding would be more than double that of the SALT II program.

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At the outset, it must be noted that there are important uncertainties in the assessments presented herein. With respect to the data on Soviet forces, the projections represent broad trends—based on both evidence and assumptions—and are not intended to be precise forecasts. On the basis of U.S. experience, it is unlikely that Soviet strategic forces 5 years from now will be identical (or necessarily even extremely close) to these force projections. Nevertheless, we believe that Soviet strategic forces in the next 3-5 years can be reasonably characterized, based on evidence of ongoing programs that would be difficult to alter radically in this timeframe.

By contrast, the size and complexity of future U.S. strategic forces are relatively easier for the Soviets to determine. We must contend with potential increases in Soviet strategic programs and capabilities. However, the principal source of uncertainty for Soviet planners about the scope and size of future U.S. strategic programs is, in all likelihood, the extent to which future U.S. programs may be reduced by congressional or executive branch action.

The data presented here assume full implementation of the Administration's strategic modernization program. It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet noncompliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their noncompliance. And, it would significantly increase the risk to our security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must remain the full implementation of these programs.

II. Projected Soviet and U.S. Dismantlements

This section of the report provides representative projections on dismantlements that would result if SALT limitations were extended. They should be considered to be approximations and would be subject to alteration by policy decisions or programmatic adjustments by either side. It should be pointed out that, as documented in the President's December 23, 1985, report to the Congress on "Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements," the Soviet Union's SALT-accountable strategic nuclear delivery vehicle level is above the SALT II cap of 2,500, in violation of the Soviets' political commitment not to undercut the treaty.

Representative Soviet Dismantlements. The Soviet Union has several programs underway to introduce new strategic delivery systems that would necessitate dismantling of older systems if the Soviets were to restrict their overall force to SALT levels. Under a representative projection of such programs, consistent with SALT limits over the next 5 years the Soviets would deploy significant numbers of new delivery vehicles, including SS-25 and SS-X-24 ICBMs, Typhoon- and Delta-type SSBNs, and Backfire bombers and ALCM (air-launched cruise missile) carriers.

If SALT I and II limits were to be complied with, these actions would necessitate dismantling some older systems in the Soviet inventory, as well as some modern systems. The older systems include SS-11 and SS-13 ICBMs, SS-N-6 SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] on Y-class SSBNs, and BISON and Bear aircraft. Because the Soviets are very close to the SALT II sublimit of 820 MIRVed (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) ICBM launchers, deployment of the MIRVed SS-X-24 would require dismantling of existing MIRVed ICBMs—most likely SS-17s and possibly some SS-19s—to stay within the ceiling. Similarly, with the continued deployment of SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 SLBMs, their total of MIRVed missile launchers would exceed the ceiling of 1,200 in a year or two; then they would need to dismantle more MIRVed ICBMs or some SS-N-18 launchers on relatively new D-III-class SSBNs to continue observing the cumulative sublimit of 1,200 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBM launchers. They have, for some time, been at the limit of 62 modern SSBNs established by SALT; thus deployment of new SSBNs would require continued dismantling of older submarines.

The dismantlements that would derive from these actions probably would total over the next 5 years slightly more than 600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, with some 1,000-1,200 associated ballistic missile warheads. (The SNDV figure also includes heavy bombers judged to have a capacity for some 300 nuclear weapons.) Some dismantling of older systems would occur eventually in any case, with or without SALT limits. These projected dismantlement actions do not take into account the Soviet potential for additional cheating, while nominally observing SALT numerical limits. This might be intended to avoid compensatory dismantlement of other ICBMs, including MIRVed ICBMs.

Representative U.S. Dismantlements. With respect to U.S. programs and dismantlements, full implementation of the strategic modernization program would require continued dismantlements under SALT of U.S. older strategic programs, most of which are nearing the end of their useful life based on both military and economic considerations.

III. Projected Soviet and U.S. Strategic Forces

Projected Soviet Forces. In projecting Soviet strategic offensive force deployments, assuming SALT limits no longer apply, the caveats discussed above regarding assumptions and uncertainties underlying such projections are relevant.

To place these figures in historical perspective, since 1972 when SALT I was signed, there has been a fourfold increase in the number of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons (missile warheads and bombs) and nearly a doubling of Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight. Indeed, since the signing of SALT II in 1979, the number of Soviet strategic ballistic missile warheads has nearly doubled from about 6,000 to more than 9,000. This great expansion of Soviet strategic forces has been possible for the most part with SALT. (The agreements limited launchers and only indirectly affected deployed weapons.) As noted, however, the Soviet Union has also violated the arms control limitations imposed by these agreements.

The Soviet Union now has about 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons (missile warheads and bombs). The SALT I and II Treaties, even if fully complied with, would not prevent a very substantial further expansion of Soviet capabilities. Even assuming future Soviet compliance with SALT II—other than the continuation of current Soviet violations—deployed Soviet weapons are projected to increase to over 12,000 in the next 5 years. Moreover, by further violating the agreements, the Soviets could plausibly add in the same time period a relatively modest increase of even more weapons to their forces.

It is difficult to predict precisely what the Soviets might do absent SALT constraints. They would not necessarily expand their forces significantly beyond the increases discussed above, which are very large and would appear, in our judgment, much less than enough to meet reasonable military requirements. Thus there might well be little appreciable difference, in terms of total weapons, between the forces that the Soviets might deploy with and without SALT.
constraints. It is reasonable to expect that in the absence of SALT, the Soviets would not dismantle all their older systems as rapidly as under SALT. Some classes of weapons (e.g., SSBNs) might not be dismantled at all during the next 5 years without SALT constraints. Given the great extent of the Soviet strategic modernization program, however, many of these older systems would have relatively little impact on the overall threat to U.S. security.

The Soviets have the potential to expand their forces somewhat further, should they decide to do so for either military or political reasons. If a deliberate effort were made by the Soviet Union to expand its strategic forces beyond SALT II levels, they might increase their forces somewhat further, to about 15,000 weapons by 1991. However, the costs associated with such an expansion of capability, on top of an already very aggressive and expensive modernization program, would be a disincentive against any such Soviet effort.

With or without SALT, the Soviets are, in any case, likely to modernize their intercontinental nuclear attack forces further by replacing most of their currently deployed land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers by the mid-1990s. This impressive Soviet modernization program, which will result in significantly improved survivability, flexibility, and hard-target capability, has been in train for a long time.

Projected U.S. Forces. The United States could achieve roughly 14,000 weapons by fiscal year 1991 in a no-SALT environment by introducing the full strategic modernization program without undertaking the dismantlements that would otherwise be required by SALT.

IV. Soviet Political and Negotiating Responses

It is difficult to predict specific moves the Soviets might decide to take politically or in the negotiations to try to increase criticism of, and build pressure against, the President's May 27 decision. They have already leveled a propaganda campaign against the decision. Ironically, in light of ongoing Soviet violations of SALT II, including violation of the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles numerical limit, they have warned that they will go beyond the SALT limits if the United States does. While they have stated that they would take the "necessary practical" steps, e.g., increasing missiles and warheads, it is not at all clear that they would further expand their forces beyond the increases already planned, as discussed above. However, they are likely to portray any expansion, including that already planned, as a response to U.S. actions.

The Soviets may decide to make political or negotiating moves as a matter of tactics that seek to discredit the U.S. decision. However, the May 27 decision is not likely permanently to alter their basic, overall objectives for negotiations or for a summit. These objectives include increasing opposition to the U.S. modernization program, particularly the Strategic Defense Initiative, and weakening the Western alliance.

We hope that the Soviet Union will join us in a framework of truly mutual restraint. For its part, the United States will continue to exercise utmost mutual restraint in the future, seeking to meet U.S. strategic needs, given the Soviet continuing buildup, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face as we implement the strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

No policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. We hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement reached by the President and General Secretary Gorbachev at the summit meeting last November to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations.

Our objectives in Geneva remain the same as stated at the summit: to seek common ground in negotiating deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear arsenals and to discuss with the Soviet Union how we could enhance deterrence and stability by moving toward a world in which we would no longer rely exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation to preserve the peace. We hope the Soviet Union will negotiate seriously with us toward these important goals.

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Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements

December 1985

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is the President's unclassified report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements along with his letter of transmittal to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate on December 23, 1985.

Transmittal Letter

Dear Mr. Speaker (Dear Mr. President):

In response to Congressional requests as set forth in Public Law 99-145, I am forwarding hereewith classified and unclassified versions of the Administration's report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.

Detailed classified briefings will be available to the Congress early in the new year.

I believe the additional information provided, and issues addressed, especially in the detailed classified report, will significantly increase understanding of Soviet violations and probable violations. Such understanding, and strong Congressional consensus on the importance of compliance to achieving effective arms control, will do much to strengthen our efforts both in seeking corrective actions and in negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

Unclassified Report

In reporting to the Congress on February 1 of this year on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, I have stated that:

In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less. To do so would undermine the arms control process and damage the chances for establishing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship.

I further stated that:

Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. With regard to the issues analyzed in the January 1984 report, the Soviet Union has thus far not provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective actions sufficient to allivate our concerns. The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.

The important role of treaty compliance for future arms control was recently recognized by the United Nations. On December 12, 1986, the General Assembly passed by a vote of 151-0 (with 16 abstentions) a resolution on arms control compliance which had been introduced by the United States and other co-sponsors. The resolution:

• urges all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions;

• calls upon those parties to consider the implications of noncompliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament; and

appeals to all U.N. members to support efforts to resolve noncompliance questions "with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements."

At the request of the Congress, I have in the past two years provided three reports to the Congress on Soviet compliance issues. The first, forwarded in January 1984, reviewed seven compliance issues, concluding that the Soviet Union had, in fact, violated a number of important arms control commitments.

In September 1984 I provided, at the request of the Congress, a report on Soviet noncompliance prepared by the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. That report concluded that over a 25-year span the Soviets had violated a substantial number of arms control commitments.

In February 1986, I submitted a report to the Congress updating the Administration's January 1984 report and reviewing 13 issues that could be treated in unclassified terms and an additional group of six issues treated on a classified basis. That report discussed the pattern of Soviet arms control violations, probable violations, or ambiguous
activity in seventeen cases. The U.S. Government found seven Soviet violations, three probable violations, one likely and one potential violation. The Soviets continue to be in compliance in two other cases examined.

One of those issues, Yankee-Class submarine reconfiguration, is not addressed in the current report. While a submarine reconfigured to carry long-range cruise missiles constitutes a threat similar to that of the original SSBN, I reported in February that Soviet reconfiguration activities have not been in violation of the SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] Interim Agreement. This issue, therefore, requires no further judgment in terms of compliance at present.

Public Law 99–145 requires the Administration to provide on an annual basis by December 1 of each year a classified and unclassified report to the Congress containing the findings of the President. I have added information necessary to keep the Congress informed on Soviet compliance with arms control agreements.

The current report responds to this Congressional requirement. It is the product of months of careful technical and legal analysis by all relevant agencies of the United States Government and represents the Administration’s authoritative updated treatment of this important matter.

The current unclassified report examines one new issue and updates all of the issues studied in the classified report of February 1985, except the issue of Yankee-Class submarine reconfiguration. There are violations in nine cases. Of the nine cases involving violations, one SALT II issue—that of Soviet concealment of the association between missiles and their launchers—is examined for the first time. The Soviet Union has now also violated its commitment to the SALT I Interim Agreement through the prohibited use of remaining facilities at former SS–7 ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] sites. In addition, Soviet deployment of the SS–25 ICBM during 1985 constitutes a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second new type of ICBM. Several other issues involve potential, probable or likely violations.

The current unclassified report reaffirms the findings of the February 1985 classified report concerning ABM anti-ballistic missile issues, making public two of them for the first time. It also reaffirms the February findings concerning SALT II issues involving violations, including one concerning strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which has not previously been made public. In two SALT II issues with respect to which the Soviets were not judged to be in clear violation in the classified report of last February, the findings are altered or updated. These two issues are the SS–16 and an issue made public for the first time—backfire bomber production rate.

The Administration’s most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. As documented in this and previous reports, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligation under or political commitment to the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the U.S.S.R. has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

While we remain concerned about Soviet violations of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act and the Limited Test Ban Treaty, there is no unambiguous evidence of new 1985 Soviet violations of these two treaties. With regard to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, or the General Protocol on Chemical Weapons, there also is no unambiguous evidence of new 1985 Soviet lethal attacks that meets our strict standards of evidence. However, the Soviets clearly remain in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE

Through its noncompliance, the Soviet Union has made military gains in the areas of strategic offensive arms as well as chemical, biological and toxin weapons. If the yields of Soviet nuclear tests have been substantially above 150 kilotons, then Soviet testing would allow proportionately greater gains in nuclear weapons development than the U.S. could achieve. The possible extent of the Soviet Union’s military gains by virtue of its noncompliance in the area of strategic defense also is of increasing importance and serious concern.

In a fundamental sense, all deliberate Soviet violations are equally important. As violations of legal obligations or political commitments, they cause grave concern regarding Soviet commitment to arms control, and they darken the atmosphere in which current negotiations are being conducted in Geneva and elsewhere.

In another sense, Soviet violations are not of equal importance. While some individual violations are of little apparent military significance in their own right, such violations can acquire importance if, left unaddressed, they are permitted to become precedents for future, more threatening violations. Moreover, some issues that individually have little military significance could conceivably become significant when taken in their aggregate.

The Krasnoyarsk Radar

The radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is disturbing for both political and military reasons. Politically, the radar demonstrates that the Soviets are capable of violating arms control obligations and commitments even when they are negotiating with the United States or when they know we will detect a violation. The 1972 ABM Treaty prohibits the Soviets from siting an ABM radar, or siting and orienting a ballistic missile detection and tracking radar, as the Krasnoyarsk radar is sited and orientated.

Militarily, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation goes to the heart of the ABM Treaty. Large phased-array radars (LPARs) like that under construction near Krasnoyarsk were recognized during the ABM Treaty negotiations as the critical, long lead-time element of a nationwide ABM defense. When considered as a part of a Soviet network of new LPARs, the Krasnoyarsk radar has the inherent potential to contribute to ABM radar coverage of a significant portion of the central U.S.S.R. Moreover, the Krasnoyarsk radar closes the remaining gap in Soviet ballistic missile detection and tracking coverage.

ABM Territorial Defense and Other ABM Activities

The Krasnoyarsk radar appears even more menacing when considered in the context of other Soviet ABM-related activities. Together they cause concern that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM territorial defense. Some of these activities, such as permitted LPARs and the Moscow ABM deployment area, are consistent with the ABM Treaty. Others involve potential or probable Soviet violations or other ambiguous activity, including:

- the apparent testing and development of components required for an ABM system which could be deployed to a site in months rather than years;
- the probable concurrent testing of air defense components and ABM components;
- the development of a modern air defense system, the SA–X–12, which may have some ABM capabilities; and
- the demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers and to refine the
interceptor missile in a period of time shorter than previously noted.

Soviet deployment of an ABM territorial defense treaty contrary to the ABM Treaty would have profound implications for Western security and the vital East-West strategic balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility. Such a capability might encourage the Soviets to take increased risks in crises, thus degrading crisis stability.

SS-25

The SS-25, a clear and irreversible violation of the Soviet Union's SALT II commitment, also has important political and military implications. Testing and deployment of this missile violates a central provision of the SALT II Treaty, which was intended to limit the number of new ICBMs. The Treaty permits only one new type of ICBM for each Party. The Soviets have informed us that their one new type will be the SS-X-24, which is now undergoing testing, and have falsely asserted that the SS-25 is a permitted modernization of the silo-based SS-13 ICBM.

Under the pretext of permitted modernization, the Soviets, since the last compliance report, have deployed a prohibited second new type of missile, the SS-25, which is mobile and could be made more lethal. The SS-25 also could be modified to carry more than a single warhead. Most worrisome is the technical argument by which the Soviets sought to justify the SS-25, for it might be applied to additional prohibited new types of ICBMs in the future.

Teleretry Encryption and Concealment of Missile/Launcher Association

Two other Soviet violations impede our ability to verify the Soviet Union's compliance with its political commitments. Soviet use of encryption impedes U.S. verification of Soviet compliance and thus contravenes the provision of the SALT II Treaty, which prohibits use of deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance by national technical means. A new finding of this report is that current Soviet activities violate the provision of the Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing. These deliberate Soviet concealment activities impede our ability to know whether a type of missile is in compliance with SALT II requirements. They could also make it more difficult for the United States to assess accurately the critical parameters of any future missile.

Since the SALT I agreement in 1972, Soviet encryption and concealment activities have become more extensive and disturbing. These activities, Soviet responses on these issues, and Soviet failure to take the corrective actions which the United States has repeatedly requested, are indicative of a Soviet attitude contrary to the fundamentals of sound arms control agreements. Soviet encryption and concealment activities present special obstacles to maintaining existing arms control agreements, undermine the political confidence necessary for concluding new treaties, and underscore the necessity that any new agreement be effectively verifiable. Soviet noncompliance, as documented in current and past Administration reports and exemplified by the encryption and concealment issues, has made verification and compliance pacing elements of arms control today.

Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons

The Soviet Union's violations of its legal obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol have important political and military implications. The Soviets had a program of biological and toxin weapons before they signed the multilateral Treaty. Upon signing the Treaty, the Soviets not only did not stop their illegal program but they expanded facilities and were instrumental in the use of prohibited agents. The Soviet Union has a prohibited offensive biological warfare capability which we do not have and against which we have no defense. This capability may include advanced biological agents about which we have little knowledge. Evidence suggests that the Soviets are expanding their chemical and toxin warfare capabilities in a manner that has no parallel in NATO's retaliatory or defensive programs. Even though there has been no unambiguous evidence of lethal attacks during 1985, previous activities have provided testing, development and operational experience.

Nuclear Testing

With respect to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Soviet testing at yields above the 150 kiloton limit would allow development of advanced nuclear weapons with proportionately higher yields than the yields of weapons that the U.S. could develop under the Treaty. The U.S. Government judges that Soviet test activities constitute likely violations of the 150 kiloton limit.

Other Issues

Military significance is evidently not necessarily the determining factor in Soviet decisions or actions which violate their arms control commitments. The Soviet Union has also violated or probably violated arms control obligations and commitments from which it appears to reap little military gain. The following cases are relevant in this regard:

- the use of remaining facilities at former SS-7 ICBM sites since the February 1985 compliance report (SALT I Interim Agreement);
- exceeding the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limits (SALT II);
- probable deployment of the SS-16 (SALT II) and
- underground nuclear test venting (Limited Test Ban Treaty).

The 1981 Soviet violation of the military exercise notification provisions of the Helsinki Final Act involved an action contrary to the confidence building measures included in that agreement. Soviet deployments of Backfire Bombers to Arctic staging bases are inconsistent with the Soviet Union's political commitment to the SALT II Treaty. In addition, while there are ambiguities concerning the data, there is evidence that the production rate of the Backfire Bomber was constant at slightly more than 30 per year until 1984, and slightly less than 30 per year since then. These Soviet Backfire Bomber activities will continue to be monitored and assessed.

THE SOVIET RESPONSE

At the same time as the Administration has reported its concerns and findings to the Congress, the United States has had extensive exchanges with the Soviet Union on Soviet noncompliance in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), where SALT-related issues (including ABM issues) are discussed, and through other appropriate diplomatic channels. I expressed my personal concerns directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my recent meeting with him in Geneva.

All of the violations, probable violations and ambiguous situations included in this report and previously reported on have been raised with the Soviets, except certain sensitive issues. The Soviet Union has thus far not provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on these issues, nor has the Soviet Union taken actions needed to
correct existing violations. Instead, they have continued to assert that they are in complete compliance with their arms control obligations and commitments.

U.S. POLICY

In contrast with the Soviet Union, the United States has fully observed its arms control obligations and commitments, including those under the SALT I and SALT II agreements. As I stated in my message to the Congress on June 10 of this year concerning U.S. interim restraint policy:

In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Despite my serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START.

Since then, the United States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing arms control agreements. The United States has fully kept its part of the bargain. However, the Soviets have not. They have failed to comply with several provisions of SALT II, and we have serious concerns regarding their compliance with the provisions of other accords.

The pattern of Soviet violations, if left uncorrected, undercuts the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world. The United States will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our concerns over Soviet noncompliance. We cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance.

On June 10, I invited the Soviet Union to join the United States in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms and to pursue with renewed vigor our top priority of achieving deep reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals in the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. I noted that the U.S. cannot establish such a framework alone and that it would require the Soviet Union to take positive, concrete steps to correct its noncompliance, to reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup, and actively to pursue arms reduction agreements in the Geneva negotiations.

In going the extra mile, I have made clear that as an integral part of this policy, we will also take those steps required to assure our national security and that of our Allies that were made necessary by Soviet noncompliance.

Thus, as I indicated to the Congress on June 10, “appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to ensure our security, to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their noncompliance, and to make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail real costs.”

As we monitor Soviet actions for evidence of the positive, concrete steps needed on their part to correct these activities, I have directed the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment aimed at identifying specific actions that the United States could take to augment as necessary the U.S. strategic modernization program as a proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of those Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements which the Soviets fail to correct. We will carefully study this report as soon as it has been completed.

As we press for corrective Soviet actions and while keeping open all programmatic options for handling future milestones as new U.S. strategic systems are deployed, we will continue to assess the overall situation in light of Soviet actions correcting their noncompliance, reversing their military buildup, and promoting progress in Geneva.

I look forward to continued close consultation with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.

The findings on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements follow.

THE FINDINGS

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

Treaty Status

The 1972 ABM Treaty and its Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems except that each party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around the national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are therefore, violations of a legal obligation.

1. The Krasnoyarsk Radar

• Obligation: The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.

• Issue: The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined the issue of whether the Krasnoyarsk radar meets the provisions of the ABM Treaty governing phased array radars. This report reexamines this issue.

• Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the February 1985 report that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that it in its associated sitting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction and the absence of credible alternative explanations have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

2. Mobility of ABM System Components

• Obligation: The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.

• Issue: The February 1985 report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a system, in violation of its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty. This report reexamines this issue.

• Finding: The U.S. Government judges that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the U.S.S.R.’s development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

3. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components

• Obligation: The ABM Treaty and its Protocol limit the Parties to one ABM deployment area. In addition to the ABM systems and components at
that one deployment area, the Parties may have ABM systems and components for development and testing purposes so long as they are located at agreed test ranges. The Treaty also prohibits giving components of other than ABM system components, the capability "to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" and prohibits the Parties from testing them in "an ABM mode." The Parties agreed that the concurrent testing of SAM (surface-to-air missile) and ABM system components is prohibited.

• Issue: The February 1985 compliance report examined whether the Soviet Union has concurrently tested SAM and ABM system components in violation of its legal obligation since 1978 not to do so. It was the purpose of that obligation to further constrain testing of air defense systems in an ABM mode. This report reexamines this issue.

5. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers

• Obligation: The ABM Treaty limits to 100 the number of deployed ABM interceptor launchers and deployed interceptor missiles. It does not limit the number of interceptor missiles that can be built and stockpiled. The Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of "automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload" of the permitted launchers.

• Issue: The February 1985 classified report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed, tested or deployed automatic, semi-automatic, or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This report reexamines this issue.

• Finding: The U.S. Government judges, on the basis of the evidence available, that the U.S.S.R.'s actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. These and other ABM-related activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

6. ABM Territorial Defense

• Obligation: The ABM Treaty allows each party a single operational site, explicitly permits modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components, and explicitly recognizes the existence of ABM test ranges for the development and testing of ABM components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, however, the deployment of an ABM system for defense of the national territory of the parties and prohibits the parties from providing a base for each such a defense.

• Issue: The February 1985 report examined whether the Soviets have deployed an ABM system for the defense of their territory or provided a base for such a defense. This report reexamines this issue.

• Finding: The U.S. Government judges that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload and ABM mobility) suggests that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

SALT II Treaty

Treaty Status

SALT II was signed in June 1979 and has not been ratified. In 1981 the United States made clear to the Soviet Union its intention not to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Prior to this clarification of our position in 1981, both nations were obligated under customary international law not to take actions which would defeat the object and purpose of the signed, but unratified, Treaty. Such Soviet actions prior to 1981 are violations of legal obligations. Since 1981, the United States has observed a political commitment to refrain from actions that undercut the SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviet Union does likewise. The Soviets have told us they also would abide by these provisions. Soviet actions inconsistent with this commitment are violations of their political commitment with respect to the SALT II Treaty.

1. The SS-25 ICBM

• Obligation: In an attempt to constrain the modernization and proliferation of new, more capable types of ICBMs, the provisions of SALT II permit each side to "flight test and deploy" just one new type of "light" ICBM. A new type is defined as one that differs from an existing type by more than 5 percent in length, largest diameter, launch-weight or throw-weight or differs in number of stages or propellant type. In addition, it was agreed that no ICBM of an existing type with a post-boost vehicle and a single reentry vehicle would be flight-tested or deployed whose reentry vehicle weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM. This latter provision was intended to prohibit the possibility that single warhead ICBMs could quickly be converted to MIRVed systems.

• Issues: The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined the evidence: whether the Soviets have tested or deployed a second new type of ICBM (the SS-25) which is prohibited; whether the reentry vehicle (RV) on that missile, if it is not a new type, is in compliance with the provision that for existing types of single RV missiles, the weight of the RV be equal to at least 50 percent of total throw-weight; and
whether encryption of SS-25 flight test telemetry impedes verification. This report reexamines these issues.

**• Findings:**

a. Second New Type—Testing and Deployment: The U.S. Government judges, based on convincing evidence about the SS-25, that the throw-weight of the Soviet SS-25 ICBM exceeds by more than 5 percent the throw-weight of the Soviet SS-13 ICBM and cannot therefore be considered a permitted modernization of the SS-13 as the Soviets claim. The SS-25 is a prohibited second "new type" of ICBM and its testing, in addition to the testing of the SS-X-24 ICBM, thereby is a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new type" provision of the SALT II Treaty. The deployment of this missile during 1985 constitutes a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second "new type" of ICBM.

b. RV-to-Throw-weight Ratio: The U.S. Government reconfirms the conclusion of the January 1984 report regarding the SS-25 RV-to-throw-weight ratio. That is, if we were to accept the Soviet argument that the SS-25 is not a prohibited "new type" of ICBM, it would be a violation of their political commitment to observe the SALT II provision which prohibits the testing of such an existing ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of the ICBM.


Despite U.S. requests for explanations and corrective actions with regard to the SS-25 ICBM-related activities, Soviet actions continue unchanged, and the Soviet Union has proceeded to deployment of this missile.

2. Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle Limits

**• Obligation:** The Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by SALT II is interpreted by the U.S. Government as including an obligation not to increase the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) in its arsenal. The Soviet Union had 2,504 SNDVs when it signed SALT II.

**Issue:** The February 1985 classified report reexamines the issue of whether the Soviet Union has abided by its commitment not to exceed the level of 2,504 SNDVs. This report reexamines this issue.

**• Finding:** The U.S. Government interprets the Soviet commitment to abide by SALT II as including the existence of a cap on SNDVs— at a level of 2,504 existing at the time SALT II was signed. The Soviet Union has deployed SNDVs above the 2,504 cap in violation of its political commitment under SALT II. Such activity is indicative of a Soviet policy inconsistent with this political commitment.

3. SS-16 Deployment

**• Obligation:** The Soviet Union agreed in SALT II not to produce, test or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type and, in particular, not to produce the SS-16 third stage or the reentry vehicle of that missile.

**Issue:** The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined the evidence regarding whether the Soviets have deployed the SS-16 ICBM in spite of the ban on its deployment. This report reexamines this issue.

**Finding:** The President's February 1985 Report to Congress which noted that the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, found the activities at Plesetsk to be a probable violation of the U.S.S.R.'s legal obligation and political commitment under SALT II.

**Issue:** Soviet activity in the past year at Plesetsk seems to indicate the probable removal of SS-16 equipment and introduction of equipment associated with a different ICBM.

4. Backfire Bomber Intercontinental Operating Capability

**• Obligation:** At the signing of SALT II, the U.S.S.R. gave the U.S. assurances about the BACKFIRE bomber's intercontinental operating capability. The Soviet statement of June 16, 1979, read, in pertinent part, as follows:

The Soviet side informs the US side that the Soviet "Tu-22M" airplane, called "BACKFIRE" in the USA, is a medium-range bomber, and that it does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA. Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling...

This unilateral statement is an integral part of the SALT II agreement and the U.S. considers it to be incorporated in the Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by SALT II.

**Issue:** The February 1985 report examined the question of whether the Soviet Union has produced more than 30 BACKFIREs per year and increased the production rate since signing SALT II. This report reexamines this issue.

**Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union is obligated to produce no more than 30 BACKFIRE bomber aircraft per year. There are ambiguities concerning the data. However, there is evidence that the Soviet BACKFIRE production rate was constant at slightly more than 30 per year until 1984 and decreased since that time to slightly below 30 per year.

5. Backfire Bomber Production Rate

**• Obligation:** At the signing of SALT II, the U.S.S.R. gave the U.S. assurances about the BACKFIRE bomber's production rate. The Soviet statement read, in pertinent part, as follows: "...the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate." Soviet President Brezhnev, according to Secretary Vance's SALT II transmittal letter to the Senate, "confirmed that the Soviet BACKFIRE production rate would not exceed thirty per year." President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II Agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations under the Treaty. The U.S. considers the Soviet unilateral statement to be an integral part of the SALT II Agreement and, as such, to be incorporated in the Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by SALT II.

**Issue:** The February 1985 report examined the question of whether the Soviet Union has produced more than 30 BACKFIREs per year and increased the production rate since signing SALT II. This report reexamines this issue.

**Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that the Soviet Union is obligated to produce no more than 30 BACKFIRE bomber aircraft per year. There are ambiguities concerning the data. However, there is evidence that the Soviet BACKFIRE production rate was constant at slightly more than 30 per year until 1984 and decreased since that time to slightly below 30 per year.

6. Encryption of Ballistic Missile Telemetry

**• Obligation:** Provisions of SALT II ban deliberate concealment measures
that impede verification by national technical means. The Treaty permits each party to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including encryption, but bars deliberate denial of telemetry, such as through encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification.

* Issue: The January 1984 compliance report examined whether the Soviet Union has engaged in encryption of missile test telemetry (radio signals) so as to impede verification. This issue was reexamined in the February 1985 compliance report and is examined again in this report.

* Finding: The U.S. Government reafirms the conclusion in the February 1985 report that Soviet encryption practices constitute a violation of a legal obligation under SALT II prior to 1981 and a violation of their political commitment since 1981. The nature and extent of such encryption of telemetry on new ballistic missiles, despite U.S. requests for corrective action, continues to be an example of deliberately impeding verification of compliance in violation of this Soviet political commitment.

7. Concealment of Missile/Launcher Association

* Obligation: Article XV of the SALT II Treaty prohibits "deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty." This obligation is further clarified in a Common Understanding that states that Article XV applies to all provisions of the Treaty and "includes the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing."

* Issue: This report examines for the first time the issue of whether the Soviets have concealed the association between an ICBM and its launcher during testing in violation of their obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification.

* Finding: The U.S. Government judges Soviet activities related to the SS-25 to be a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by the SALT II Treaty provision prohibiting concealment of the association between a missile and its launcher during testing.

SALT I Interim Agreement

Treaty Status

The SALT I Interim Agreement entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. Dismantling procedures implementing the Interim Agreement were concluded in 1974. The Interim Agreement, by its own terms, was of limited duration and expired as a legally binding document in 1977. The applicability of the Interim Agreement to the actions of both parties has, however, been extended by the parties by a series of mutual political commitments, including the President's May 31, 1982, statement that the United States would refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint. The Soviets have told us they would abide by the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II. Any actions by the U.S.S.R. inconsistent with this commitment are violations of its political commitment with respect to the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

Use of "Remaining Facilities" at Former SS-7 Sites

* Obligation: The SALT I Interim Agreement and its procedures prohibit the parties from using facilities remaining at dismantled or destroyed ICBM sites for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs. Any Soviet actions inconsistent with this commitment are violations of a political commitment with respect to the Interim Agreement and its implementing procedures.

* Issue: The February 1985 report examined whether the U.S.S.R. has violated the SALT I Interim Agreement prohibition against using facilities remaining at dismantled former SS-7 ICBM sites for the storage, support, or launch of SS-25 ICBMs. This report reexamines this issue.

* Finding: The U.S. Government judges that Soviet use of former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs is in violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement. Should the Soviets use "remaining facilities" in the future at other former SS-7 sites where the SS-25 is in the process of being deployed, such use will also constitute Soviet violation of its political commitment under the SALT I Interim Agreement.

Biological Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol

Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons

* Treaty Status: The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (the BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral treaties to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are parties. Soviet actions not in accord with these treaties and customary international law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are violations of legal obligations.

* Obligations: The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and transfer of microbial or other biological agents or toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit the first use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices and prohibits use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

* Issues: The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined whether the Soviets are in violation of provisions that ban the development, production, transfer, possession and use of biological and toxin weapons and whether they have been responsible for the use of lethal chemicals. This report reexamines this issue.

* Finding: The U.S. Government judges that ongoing Soviet activities confirm and strengthen the conclusion of the January 1984 and February 1985 reports that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Allegations concerning the use of lethal chemicals or toxins in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan have subsided in 1985. However, there is no basis for amending the February 1985 conclusion that, prior to this time, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

Nuclear Testing and the 150 Kiloton Limit

* Treaty Status: The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 1974. The Treaty has not been ratified but neither party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Therefore, both Parties are subject to the obligation under customary international law to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT. Soviet actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT are therefore violations of their legal obligations. The United States is seeking to negotiate
improved verification measures for the Treaty. Both Parties have separately stated they would observe the 150 kiloton threshold of the TTBT.

- Obligation: The Treaty prohibits any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under the jurisdiction or control of the Parties beginning March 31, 1976. In view of the technical uncertainties associated with estimating the precise yield of nuclear weapon tests, the sides agreed that one or two slight, unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation.

- Issue: The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined whether the Soviets have conducted underground nuclear tests in excess of 150 kilotons. This report reexamines this issue.

- Finding: While ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and verification uncertainties continued in 1985, the U.S. Government reaffirms the February 1985 finding that Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which banned underground nuclear tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. These Soviet actions continued despite U.S. requests for corrective measures.

**Limited Test Ban Treaty**

**Underground Nuclear Test Venting**


- Obligations: The LTBT specifically prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It also prohibits nuclear explosions in any other environment “if such explosions cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.”

- Issue: The February 1985 report examined whether the U.S.S.R.’s underground nuclear tests have caused radioactive debris to be present outside of its territorial limits. This report reexamines this issue.

- Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the February 1985 report that the Soviet Union’s underground nuclear test practices resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union’s territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances despite numerous U.S. demarches and requests for corrective action.

**Helsinki Final Act**

**Helsinki Final Act Notification of Military Exercises**

- Legal Status: The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975. This document represents a political commitment and was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, along with many other States. Soviet actions not in accord with that document are violations of their political commitment.

- Obligation: All signatory States of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to give prior notification of, and other details concerning, major military maneuvers, defined as those involving more than 25,000 troops.

- Issue: The January 1984 and February 1985 reports examined whether notification of the Soviet military exercise “Zapad-81” was inadequate and therefore a violation of the Soviet Union’s political commitment under the Helsinki Final Act. This report reexamines this issue.

- Finding: The U.S. Government previously judged and continues to find that the Soviet Union in 1981 violated its political commitment to observe provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act by not providing prior notification of exercise “ZAPAD-81.” While the U.S.S.R. has generally taken an approach to the confidence-building measures of the Final Act which minimizes the information it provides, Soviet compliance with the exercise-notification provisions was improved in 1983. In 1984, the Soviets returned to a minimalist approach providing only the bare information required under the Final Act. The Soviet Union continued this approach during 1985.
The United States is committed to a national security policy which includes both a strong deterrent to aggression and an active pursuit of deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in Soviet and American nuclear arms as well as effective verification arrangements for existing limitations on nuclear testing. Under existing conditions, neither a comprehensive ban nor a moratorium on nuclear testing would enhance the cause of security, stability, or peace. This Special Report sets forth the principles underlying U.S. policy toward limitations on nuclear testing.

Recent Developments

Shortly before this Special Report went to press, the White House announced that the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to have experts meet, without preconditions, to discuss issues related to nuclear testing. An initial meeting of experts was held in late July 1986 at Geneva.

As this report details, the United States has long sought a meeting of experts.allows the United States to present its ideas and concerns to the Soviets—and to hear Soviet concerns. The United States is ready to present and discuss our views on verification improvements in existing agreements which we believe are needed and achievable at this time. If we are successful in addressing these verification concerns, we could move forward on ratification of these two treaties.

A Collective Security Issue

The maintenance of a strong nuclear deterrent has for four decades ensured the security of the United States and the freedom of our allies and friends. Therefore, while a comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective of the United States and while we are actively investigating technologies that could one day reduce and ultimately eliminate our dependence on offensive nuclear arms for our security, nuclear weapons will remain the key element of deterrence for the foreseeable future. During such a period, where both the United States and our friends and allies must rely upon nuclear weapons to deter aggression, nuclear testing will continue to be required.

A carefully structured nuclear testing program is necessary to ensure that our weapons are safe, effective, reliable, and survivable. The directors of both the Los Alamos and Livermore national weapon laboratories have stated that, while non-nuclear tests sometimes detect problems with the nuclear component of warheads, the most serious problems with the nuclear weapons stockpile are only revealed and solved by actual nuclear testing. Even a seemingly minor modification in a weapon design could seriously undermine confidence in the weapon's effectiveness unless the modified design can be tested with a nuclear yield. Testing also allows us to take necessary steps to modernize our forces to counter the continuing Soviet military buildup, particularly in offensive nuclear capabilities.

The United States has long sought to achieve agreement with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing limitations that could strengthen security for all nations. In 1963, both sides ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. The LTBT also prohibits the release of radioactive debris outside the boundaries of the state conducting a nuclear explosion. In 1974 and 1976, respectively, the United States and Soviet Union signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. These treaties prohibit underground nuclear explosions having a yield that exceeds 150 kilotons. Neither side has ratified the TTB or PNET, but each has stated that it would respect the 150 kiloton limit.

Verification Problems and Soviet Violations

The United States is not currently seeking ratification of the TTB and PNET because we cannot effectively verify Soviet compliance with the 150-kiloton threshold on underground nuclear explosions. The remote seismic techniques we must rely on today to monitor Soviet nuclear tests do not provide yield estimates with the accu-
racy required for effective verification of compliance. Nor will the treaties' verification provisions solve this problem. The TTBT itself provides only for an exchange of data. This data would be of limited value in verification and, in any event, cannot be independently validated by the U.S. Government. This means, for example, that we would have no way of knowing whether the Soviets were providing data for all geophysically distinct testing areas. Yet if the Soviets withheld such knowledge from us, they could conduct high-yield tests in excess of 150 kilotons that, from the perspective of a seismic observer outside Soviet boundaries, could appear to fall within the 150 kiloton limit.

The verification provisions of the PNET Protocol would not resolve the problem of TTBT verification because they are not applicable to weapons tests. They would permit mandatory on-site inspection only of peaceful nuclear explosions—and then only in very restrictive circumstances. Specifically, on-site inspection is mandatory only for a group of explosions whose aggregate yield exceeds 150 kilotons. In fact, since 1976 the Soviets have not conducted any group nuclear explosions of the size which would have required them to permit such inspection. Thus, even if we were to ratify the treaties and implement their verification provisions today, our concerns regarding Soviet compliance with the TTBT would not be resolved.

These verification deficiencies have become a matter of great concern in light of the pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, including existing limitations on nuclear testing. As stated in the President's December 1985 "Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements," the Soviet Union's testing practices have resulted in the release of radioactive debris and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the TTBT. The report notes that Soviet venting has occurred on numerous occasions. In his 1984 report, the President concluded that "while the available evidence is ambiguous, in view of ambiguities in the pattern of Soviet testing and in view of verification uncertainties, and [while] we have been unable to reach a definitive conclusion, this evidence indicates that Soviet nuclear activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the TTBT." In his 1985 reports the President reiterated this concern, finding "that Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the TTBT of 1974..."

U.S. Presidential initiatives

President Reagan has long advocated a dialogue with the Soviet Union to arrive at the required improvements in monitoring procedures for effective verification of the TTBT and PNET, which are the necessary first steps if there is to be progress in the area of nuclear testing limitations. The United States has taken the following initiatives:

- On several occasions in 1983, the United States unsuccessfully sought to engage the Soviet Union in discussions on verification improvements to these treaties.

  - In September 1984, the President proposed, in an address to the UN General Assembly, that the United States and the Soviet Union find a way for Soviet experts to come to the U.S. nuclear test site and for our experts to go to the Soviet test site to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.

  - In July 1985, the President invited Soviet experts to come to the U.S. test site to measure the yield of a U.S. test with any instrumentation devices they deemed necessary for measuring yield. The Canadian government agreed to the United States to have an international on-site inspection of the test.

PRESIDENT’S STATEMENT,
March 14, 1986

I want to make an announcement today concerning the question of limitations on nuclear testing, an important arms control area which has been the subject of special correspondence which I have had recently with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, the leaders of six nations known as the New Delhi Group, and Senate Majority Leader Dole.

I have conveyed to General Secretary Gorbachev today a new, very specific, and far-reaching proposal concerning nuclear testing limitations, a proposal which could be implemented immediately. In this new initiative, I urged the Soviet Union to join us without delay in bilateral discussions on finding ways to reach agreement on essential verification improvements of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET).

In the field of nuclear testing, as in arms control generally, effective verification is a central element. It has also been one of the most difficult problems to resolve. We are seriously concerned about the past pattern of Soviet testing as well as current verification uncertainties and have determined that a number of Soviet tests constitute limitations of obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974. The inadequacy of the monitoring regime provided for in that agreement is underscored by the Soviet Union's own questions concerning the yields of particular U.S. tests, all of which, in fact, have been below the 150-kiloton threshold.

The United States places the highest priority in the nuclear testing area on finding ways of ensuring effective verification of the TTBT and PNET. I have already made several specific suggestions to the Soviet Union in this regard. My new initiative is a further attempt to build the necessary basis for confidence and cooperation between our nations regarding such limitations.

As a reflection of our resolve to make tangible progress, in my new proposal I identified to Mr. Gorbachev a specific new technical method—known as CORRTEX—which we believe will enable both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to improve verification and ensure compliance with these two treaties. This is a hydrodynamic yield measurement technique that measures the propagation of the underground shock wave from a nuclear explosion. I provided to Mr. Gorbachev a technical description of CORRTEX designed to demonstrate how this method will enhance verification procedures.

To allow the Soviet Union to examine the CORRTEX system more fully, I further proposed that Mr. Gorbachev send his scientists to our Nevada test site during the third week of April 1986. At that time, they could also monitor a planned U.S. nuclear weapons test. I would hope this would provide an opportunity for our experts to discuss verification methods and thus pave the way for resolving the serious concerns which have arisen in this area.

In making this offer, I made clear to General Secretary Gorbachev that, if we could reach agreement on the use of an effective verification system incorporating such a method to verify the TTBT, I would be prepared to move forward on ratification of both the TTBT and PNET.

What is unique about this new initiative is its specificity and concreteness and the detailed technical information we have provided to the Soviet Union in trying to solve these verification uncertainties. It is important that the Soviet Union engage with us now in this first practical step to improve the confidence we each must have in treaty compliance with the 150-kiloton threshold on underground tests. If this can be achieved, we believe we will have significantly improved the prospects for verifying other arms control agreements as well through improved verification regimes.

Note: The President's March 7 letter to Senate Majority Leader Dole, to which reference is made in the above statement, is included in Appendix 2.
ments for a reciprocal visit. The President’s purpose was to begin a process to build confidence and cooperation between our nations regarding limitations on nuclear weapons testing.

- In December 1985, the President proposed to General Secretary Gorbachev that U.S. and Soviet experts on nuclear testing limitations meet in February to discuss our respective verification approaches and to address initial tangible steps to resolve this issue.

The President’s Proposal of March 1986

In his most recent initiative, on March 14, 1986, the President urged the Soviet Union to begin bilateral discussions to find ways to reach agreement on essential verification improvements of the TTB and PNET. The President provided General Secretary Gorbachev with a technical description of a specific method known as CORRTEx, which is an accurate method for measuring the yield of a nuclear explosion (see Appendix 1). The President also proposed, on a unilateral basis, that Soviet experts visit our Nevada test site in April to discuss verification methods, examine the CORRTEx system more closely, and monitor a planned U.S. nuclear weapon test. The President stated that if the United States and the Soviet Union could reach agreement on the use of an effective verification system incorporating CORRTEx, the United States would be prepared to move forward with the ratification of the TTB and PNET.

The President’s proposal offers an opportunity for the Soviets to demonstrate that they take testing limitations seriously by recognizing that compliance with such agreements is necessary. The United States must stand by its standard of effective verification with respect to the TTB. Anything less would harm U.S. security interests, undermine our ability to demand effective verification in other arms control areas, and undercut the objectives of the TTB.

Comprehensive Test Ban

A Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) remains a long-term objective of the United States. As long as the United States and our friends and allies must rely upon nuclear weapons to deter aggression, however, some level of nuclear testing will continue to be required. We believe such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability and when we have achieved broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions, substantial improvements in verifiability, expanded confidence-building measures, and greater balance in conventional forces. For our part, the United States is energetically pursuing negotiations and discussions with the Soviet Union on concrete steps in all of these areas. We have made clear our strong and continuing view that Soviet calls for an immediate and unverifiable nuclear testing moratorium are not a basis for meaningful progress to this end.

At the same time, the United States has supported international discussion of verification and compliance problems related to nuclear test limitations. Discussions have taken place in past years at the multilateral Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, in both a technical-level ad hoc group of scientific experts and in the Nuclear Test Ban Working Group. We continue to support consideration of scope, verification, and compliance issues related to a CTB in these two groups at the CD.

Appendix 1

CORRTEx System of Direct Yield Measurement

CORRTEx (Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus Time Experiment) is a hydrodynamic yield measurement technique that measures the propagation of the underground shock wave from an explosion. This technique uses a coaxial cable which can be emplaced in a hole parallel to the device emplacement hole. Precise measurements are made of the length of the cable by timing the return of low-energy electrical pulses sent down to, and reflected from, the cable end. When the nuclear device is detonated, a shock wave emanates through the ground, crushing and shortening the cable. The rate by which the cable length changes is recorded via measurements of the changing pulse transit times. This rate is a measure of the propagation rate of the explosive shock wave through the ground which is, in turn, a measure of the yield of the nuclear explosion.

CORRTEx has been shown to be accurate to within 15% of the more accurate, radiometric yield measurements for tests of yield greater than 50 kilotons and in the geologic media of the U.S. test site in Nevada. Use of CORRTEx-measured yields at the Soviet Shagan River test site should provide accuracies to within 30%. The U.S. estimate is based on its use in over 100 tests with the sensing cable in the device emplacement hole and four tests with cables in a satellite hole. The accuracy of the technique is believed to be relatively, but not wholly, independent of the geologic medium, provided the satellite hole measurements are made in the “strong shock” region near the nuclear device explosion. At greater separation distances, the properties of the medium become much more important factors. A satellite hole separation distance of 14 meters (46 feet) is appropriate for a test near 105 kilotons.

The electronic device that provides the timing signals is a battery-powered, suitcase-sized unit that may be remotely controlled. All equipment for power, recording, and data reduction can be contained in a small trailer.

Appendix 2

The President’s Letter to Majority Leader Dole, March 7, 1986

In early 1986, the U.S. Congress debated a joint resolution “To Prevent Nuclear Testing.” The President expressed his reservations with regard to this resolution in a letter dated March 7, 1986, to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole. Referring to provisions of the resolution, the President noted: “They would undercut the initiatives I have proposed to make progress on nuclear test limitations issues, and they would set back prospects on a broad range of arms control efforts, including the achievement of deep, stabilizing, and verifiable arms reductions.” Following is the full text of that letter:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1986

Dear Bob,

As you know, on February 26 the House of Representatives passed H.R. Res. 3, “To Prevent Nuclear Testing,” and this issue is now before the United States Senate. The resolution calls for the immediate ratification, without needed verification improvements, of both the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). It also calls for the resumption of negotiations with the Soviet Union toward a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), despite the fact that the U.S. Government has made clear its very serious reservations in taking such a step under present conditions.

Any limitations on nuclear testing must be compatible with our security interests and must be effectively verifiable. Because of the continuing threat that we face now and for the foreseeable future, the security of the United States, its friends and its Allies must
CORRTEX YIELD MEASUREMENT CONCEPT

Typical cable emplacement in satellite hole

Moving shock wave from nuclear detonation crushes and shortens cable
The United States does not believe that a testing moratorium is a prudent, effective, or constructive step along the path toward our goal of a safer world. A look back at the 1958-61 testing moratorium demonstrates why the United States believes that moratoria are never acceptable substitutes for negotiated, equitable, and effectively verifiable arms control agreements.

There were three unilateral, voluntary pledges to suspend testing in the late 1950s: the United States and the United Kingdom acted in 1958, followed by the Soviet Union in 1959 (although the Soviet's suspended testing in November 1958). These suspensions amounted to a de facto moratorium. There was, however, no joint formal agreement. Thus, given a de facto moratorium by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union beginning in late 1958, the question is: who was the first to resume testing? The verdict of history is clear: it was the Soviet Union.

The following is a chronology of key statements and actions related to the 1958-61 moratorium:

1958
March 31. The Soviet Union unilaterally suspends testing after a major test series but just prior to an announced U.S. test series. The United States and the United Kingdom reject the Soviet call to suspend testing, but President Eisenhower proposes a meeting of technical experts to study the practical problems regarding international control of an agreed disarmament program.

July 1. An exchange of letters between Eisenhower and Soviet leader Khrushchev results in the convening of a Conference of Experts in Geneva to study the problems of verifying a test ban.

August 21. The Conference of Experts reports that it is technically feasible to establish a workable and effective system, using available capabilities, to monitor compliance with a worldwide suspension of nuclear testing.

August 22. Based on the experts' report, Eisenhower proposes triilateral negotiations on a verifiable test ban. He also expresses willingness to suspend testing for 1 year (on a renewable basis) beginning October 31, 1958, the date of the opening of the Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. The United Kingdom follows suit.

Lessons of the 1958-61 Moratorium

The United States does not believe that a testing moratorium is a prudent, effective, or constructive step along the path toward our goal of a safer world. A look back at the 1958-61 testing moratorium demonstrates why the United States believes that moratoria are never acceptable substitutes for negotiated, equitable, and effectively verifiable arms control agreements.

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February 13. France, which had indicated its intention to become a nuclear power as early as March 1957, conducts its first test.

April 1. France conducts a second test.

December 27. France conducts a third test.

1961

April 25. France conducts a fourth test.

May 15. The Soviet Union states that "if France continues" testing, the Soviet Union would be compelled to test.

August 30. Although the French have not conducted another test, the Soviet Union announces it would resume testing—contrary to its statements of August 28, 1959, and May 15, 1961.

August 31. Khrushchev tells visiting British parliamentarians that he decided to resume testing with a bomb of unprecedented proportions to shock the Western Powers into negotiations on Germany on his terms, and into accepting his demand that Geneva test-ban negotiations be merged with those on general and complete disarmament.

September 1. The Soviet Union resumes atmospheric testing.

September 5. President Kennedy authorizes underground testing, which resumes on September 15.

November 4. The Soviet Union concludes its test series, of over 40 tests, including the largest single explosion in history.

November 7. Seven months after the Soviet warning against continued testing, France conducts a fifth nuclear test.

The preceding chronology clearly demonstrates that the Soviets broke their own pledges as well as the moratorium then still being observed by the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, Khrushchev's candid admission of August 1961, and the size of the ensuing test series, undercuts arguments that French testing or Eisenhower's December 1959 statement in any way "justified" the Soviets' breaking of the moratorium. Indeed, Soviet evidence of bad faith was so clear that, in an address to the American people in March 1962, Kennedy summed up the experience as follows:

September 1st of last year, while the United States and the United Kingdom were negotiating in good faith at Geneva, the Soviet Union callously broke its moratorium with a 2-month series of more than 40 nuclear tests. Preparations for these tests had been secretly underway for many months. Accompanied by new threats and new tactics of terror, these tests—conducted mostly in the atmosphere—represented a major Soviet effort to put nuclear weapons back into the arms race.

Some may urge us to try it [a moratorium] again, keeping our preparations to test in a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice, particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep topflight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an experiment which may or may not take place on an uncertain date in the future. Nor can large technical laboratories be kept fully alert on a standby basis waiting for some other nation to break an agreement. This is not merely difficult or inconvenient— we have explored this alternative thoroughly, and found it impossible of execution.

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Arms Control: Chemical and Biological Weapons  July 1986

Background: The US is party to two existing international arms control agreements affecting chemical and biological weapons.

- The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons, but not the development, production, possession, or transfer of such weapons. Most major states that are party to the protocol have recorded reservations retaining a right to retaliate in kind if such weapons are used against them.

- The 1972 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) bans development, production, stockpiling, or possession and transfer of biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," and also the weapons, equipment, and means of delivery for agents or toxins.

Spread and use: In February 1985, the President's report on noncompliance with arms control agreements indicated that the Soviet Union had been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. This was in violation of Soviet obligations under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol and the BWC. The December 1985 report indicates that although allegations concerning the use of lethal chemicals or toxins in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan subsided in 1985, there is no basis to amend the February 1985 conclusions. In the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq has used chemical weapons against Iran for the last 3 years.

In 1963, the US believed that five countries possessed chemical weapons. The US now believes at least 15 countries have them and that others are trying to acquire the capability.

Proposed chemical weapons ban: The primary US objective in chemical weapons negotiations is to eliminate such weapons through a comprehensive and verifiable global ban. US-Soviet negotiations on a chemical weapons ban began in 1977 but lapsed in 1980, primarily over differences regarding verification issues.

In 1981 efforts to extend legal restraints on chemical weapons shifted to the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. In 1984 the US gave an important impetus to these talks when Vice President Bush presented a draft treaty text for a comprehensive chemical weapons ban. The US proposal would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, transfer, or use of chemical weapons and would require the destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles and production plants. It seeks a complete and verifiable global ban on such weapons. Verification would be accomplished by a combination of national and international measures, including systematic international onsite inspection and mandatory challenge inspection.
Pending agreement on a complete ban on chemical weapons and to complement efforts to achieve that goal, the US has consulted informally with other countries to discuss ways to optimize existing export control programs on chemicals useful in the manufacture of chemical weapons.

At the November 1985 summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons treaty in Geneva and to begin a dialogue on preventing proliferation. We have since held two sessions in Geneva on the chemical weapons ban and one session in Bern, Switzerland, on chemical weapons proliferation. We anticipate further US-Soviet discussions on both topics.

The 1984 US draft chemical weapons treaty and our continuing active participation in both multilateral and bilateral talks on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban reflect the US commitment to negotiate a verifiable treaty.

Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference: The 1972 BWC mandated a review conference 5 years after the convention entered into force. The first such conference, in 1980, called for a second review conference between 1985 and 1990. It will be held September 8-26, 1986, in Geneva. The US objective is to ensure a serious review of the operation of the BWC since 1980. The US publicly has raised concerns about Soviet noncompliance. In addition, we expect the conference to address new scientific and technical developments and the impact of these issues on the BWC. The US feels that the norm established by the BWC against the use or possession of such weapons should be strengthened, and it will encourage other states that are parties to the BWC to join us in this effort.
US and NATO Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Reductions

November 1984

Background: For more than 35 years the NATO alliance has preserved the peace in Europe. Because NATO faces massive Soviet conventional and nuclear forces, the alliance must have the capability to defend itself and deter possible aggression. It must have credible conventional and nuclear forces. At the same time, the allies are committed to maintaining NATO's stockpile of nuclear weapons at the lowest possible level needed for an effective deterrent.

The purpose of US nuclear forces is to deter war. The US nuclear arsenal is designed to provide a strong, militarily effective, and survivable deterrent force, also at the lowest possible level. The US has made proposals to negotiate substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions in the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals. The US has also reduced the number and megatonnage (yield) of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Over the years, the number of weapons in the US stockpile has fluctuated, but the number and yield today are substantially lower than they were 20 years ago, and they are expected to remain well below the peak level of the 1960s.

In contrast, the Soviet Union has consistently increased the size of its nuclear stockpile. The number and total yield of its weapons have exceeded those of the US for some time.

Reductions in the NATO nuclear stockpile: In December 1979, faced with a major and continuing Soviet buildup in intermediate-range land-based nuclear forces (INF), the NATO allies agreed to deploy 572 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles beginning in 1983 and, at the same time, to negotiate with the Soviet Union to try to establish an INF balance at the lowest possible level. The 1979 "dual track" decision also called for the removal of 1,000 warheads from the NATO nuclear stockpile and, in addition, stipulated that for each GLCM and Pershing II deployed, one nuclear weapon already in the NATO arsenal would be withdrawn.

The withdrawal of 1,000 warheads was completed in 1980. In addition, NATO agreed to study the alliance's defense needs further to determine whether additional nuclear weapons could be removed without undermining NATO's ability to deter war. This study laid the groundwork for the October 1983 decision in which NATO defense ministers meeting at Montebello, Canada, agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 warheads from Europe.

Thus, when these latest withdrawals are completed, five nuclear weapons will have been withdrawn from the NATO nuclear stockpile for every GLCM or Pershing II deployed and, as a result of the 1979 dual-track and 1983 Montebello decisions, NATO will have cut its
nuclear arsenal by about one-third, to its lowest level in 20 years. In contrast, the Soviet buildup in intermediate-range and shorter range nuclear weapons continues unabated.

**Reductions in the US nuclear stockpile:** The number of weapons in the US nuclear stockpile was about one-third higher in 1967 than it is today. Moreover, its total detonation energy, measured in megatons (millions of tons), has declined even more dramatically because the US has withdrawn many large, high-yield weapons. Total US megatonnage today is only one-quarter of what it was in 1960.

Most weapons in the US stockpile were built during the 1960s, and they are now becoming obsolete. It is necessary to modernize our forces in order to improve the safety and security of the weapons and to ensure the continued viability of our nuclear deterrent. Greater safety, survivability, and effectiveness are the goals of our nuclear force modernization program. In some cases, we can achieve those aims with fewer--but more modern--weapons than those we now have. As new weapons are produced, old ones will be disassembled. The US nuclear arsenal will thus remain below the peak level of the 1960s.

**Arms control efforts:** As an integral part of our national security policy, the US seeks effective and verifiable arms control agreements. Our principal objective is to establish a stable nuclear balance at substantially lower levels of weaponry. We have made proposals for significant reductions in nuclear arsenals to the Soviet Union. We have negotiated flexibly and in good faith and are ready to do so again. We are prepared to engage the Soviet Union in far-reaching discussions for verifiable and substantial reductions in nuclear forces. Such reductions would be in the interests of both sides and would strengthen the foundation of international stability and peace.

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**Harriet Culley, Editor (202) 632-1208**
STATUS OF U.S. WEAPON STOCKPILE OVER TIME

INVENTORY

MEGATONNAGE

TOTAL U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

RELATIVE SCALE
1972 = 1.00

TOTAL YIELD ALL U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

RELATIVE SCALE
1972 = 1.00

YEAR

YEAR
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
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<td>ballistic missile defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEW</td>
<td>directed-energy weapon</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ground-launched cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>infrared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>intermediate-range ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEW</td>
<td>kinetic-energy weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKV</td>
<td>kinetic-kill vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LWIR</td>
<td>long-wave infrared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MaRV</td>
<td>maneuverable reentry vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILSAT</td>
<td>military satellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>multiple protective shelters, once to be used for basing MX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWIR</td>
<td>medium-wave infrared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MX</td>
<td>experimental missile, newest addition to U.S. ICBM arsenal, also called “Peacekeeper”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBV</td>
<td>post-boost vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RV</td>
<td>reentry vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDIO</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>submarine-launched ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>sea-launched cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWIR</td>
<td>short-wave infrared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UV</td>
<td>ultraviolet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary

This glossary has been designed to provide a reference to the acronyms, words, and phrases associated with the strategic arms limitation negotiations and to clarify concepts and answer questions which arise in this context. It is intended for quick reference only, not as a basis for adjudicating definitional problems that might arise in negotiation or in final treaty or agreement language. This glossary was released by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in April 1979.

Aggregate. The SALT II agreement provides for several "aggregate" numerical limits on various categories of strategic offensive arms. The term "aggregate" refers principally to the overall aggregate of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBM's. The SALT II agreement places an initial ceiling of 2,400 on this aggregate with reductions to 2,250 beginning in early 1981 to be finished by the end of that year. There are also aggregate sublimits of 1,320 on MIRV'ed ICBM launchers, MIRV'ed SLBM launchers, MIRV'ed ASBM's, and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km; 1,200 on MIRV'ed ICBM launchers, MIRV'ed SLBM launchers, and MIRV'ed ASBM's; and 620 on MIRV'ed ICBM launchers through 1985. See also Quantitative Limitation.

Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). A cruise missile designed to be launched from an aircraft. See also Cruise Missile (CM), Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC), and Cruise Missile Range.

Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM). A ballistic missile launched from an airplane against a target on the Earth's surface. For the purpose of SALT II, an ASBM is considered to be such a missile capable of a range in excess of 600 km, when carried by an aircraft. See also Ballistic Missile.

Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Carrier. An airborne carrier for launching a ballistic missile capable of a range in excess of 600 km against a target on the Earth's surface. Bombers equipped for ASBM's are considered to be heavy bombers which themselves are not counted in the aggregate limits imposed by the treaty (unless they are also equipped with gravity bombs or long-range ALCM's). Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM), Ballistic Missile, and Bomber.

Air-to-Surface Missile (ASM). A missile launched from an airborne carrier against a target on the Earth's surface. See also Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM).

Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Formally entitled the "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," this treaty is one of the two agreements signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, known collectively as the SALT I agreements. The ABM Treaty entered into force on October 3, 1972, and is of unlimited duration. The original ABM Treaty limited each side to two ABM deployment areas (one national capital area and one ICBM silo launcher area) with restrictions on the deployment of ABM launchers and interceptors (100 interceptors and 1,000 ABM radars, respectively). A protocol to the treaty signed in 1974 further restricted each side to only one ABM deployment area.

Backfire. The NATO designation of a modern Soviet two-engine, swing-wing bomber. It is currently being deployed to operational units for use in a theater or naval strike role as a replacement for older Soviet medium bombers. Backfire has characteristics which fall between the characteristics generally attributed to existing heavy bombers and those of medium bombers. Under certain flight conditions, the Backfire is assessed to have an intercontinental capability.

Ballistic Missile. Any missile designed to follow the trajectory that results when it is acted upon predominantly by gravity and aerodynamic drag after thrust is terminated. Ballistic missiles typically operate outside the atmosphere for a substantial portion of their flight path and are unpowered during most of the flight. See also Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM), Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM).

Bomber. An aircraft designed to deliver bombs or missiles. See also Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Carrier, Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC), and Heavy Bomber.

Circular Error Probable (CEP). A measure of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system. It is the radius of a circle around a target of such size that a weapon aimed at the target has a 50% probability of falling within the circle.

Cooperative Measures. Measures taken by one side in order to enhance the other side's ability to verify compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Such measures can be voluntary or negotiated.

Cruise Missile (CM). A guided missile which uses aerodynamic lift to offset gravity and propulsion to counter drag. Thus, a cruise missile is very much like an unmanned airplane. A cruise missile's flight path remains within the Earth's atmosphere. See also Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC), Cruise Missile Range, Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), and Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM).

Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC). An aircraft equipped for launching a cruise missile. The limitations of SALT II apply to CMC's equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km. See also Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), Bomber, and Heavy Bomber.

Cruise Missile Range. SALT II provides that the range capability of a cruise missile is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. Thus, range capability is, in effect, defined in terms of the odometer distance traveled by the cruise missile. See also Cruise Missile (CM).

Data Base. As an adjunct to SALT II, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms which lists, for each side, the numbers of strategic offensive arms by category subject to the limitations provided for in the treaty. This data base will be periodically updated in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).

Deliberate Concealment. SALT II provides that verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement shall be by national technical means (NTM). The sides have agreed not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by NTM of compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Deliberate concealment measures are measures carried out deliberately to hinder or deliberately to impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty. Deliberate concealment measures could include, for example, cam-
Outillage, use of coverings, or deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such measures impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement. See also Encryption, Interference, National Technical Means of Verification (NTM), and Telemetry.

Development. Development is the first stage in the process of producing a particular weapon system. Subsequent stages include testing (or flight-testing), production, and deployment.

Encryption. Encryption is encoding communications for the purpose of concealing information. In SALT II, this term has been applied to a practice whereby a side alters the manner by which it transmits telemetry from a weapon being tested rendering the information deliberately indecipherable. See also Deliberate Concealment and Telemetry.

Fixed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Launcher. There are two categories of ICBM launchers—fixed and mobile. Fixed ICBM launchers have traditionally been referred to as either "soft," whereby the missile and most of its launch equipment remain above ground, or "hard," whereby the missile and most of its launch equipment are contained in a hardened underground silo. In both cases the launcher—the equipment which launches the missile—is in a fixed location. See also Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Silo Launcher and Launcher.

Flight-Test. For the purposes of SALT II, a flight-test of an ICBM is an actual launch of the missile (as distinct from a static test) conducted for any purpose, including for development of the missile, for demonstration of its capabilities, and for training of crews. See also Launch and Test Range.

Fractionation. The division of the payload of a missile into several warheads. The use of a MIRV payload is an example of fractionation. The term "fractionation limits" is used to describe the treaty limitations on the maximum number of reentry vehicles per missile. See also Payload and Reentry Vehicle (RV).

Functionally Related Observable Differences (FROD's). The means by which SALT II provides for distinguishing between those aircraft which are capable of performing certain SALT-limited functions and those which are not. FROD's are differences in the observable features of airplanes which specifically determine whether or not these airplanes can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBM's. See also Heavy Bomber and Observable Differences (OD's).

Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM). A cruise missile launched from ground installations or vehicles. See also Cruise Missile (CM), Cruise Missile Range, and Protocol.

Heavy (Ballistic) Missile. For the purposes of SALT II, ballistic missiles are divided into two categories according to their throw-weight and launch-weight—light and heavy. Heavy missiles (ICBM's, SLBM's, and ASBM's) are those missiles which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than the launch-weight or throw-weight of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM.

Heavy Bomber. The term used in SALT II to describe those aircraft included in the aggregate limitations of the agreement. Heavy bombers consist of four categories of airplanes:

- Current types are the B-52 and B-1 for the U.S. and the TU-95 (Bear) and Myasishchev (Bison) for the Soviets;
- Future types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of the bombers listed above;
- Types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km; and
- Types of bombers equipped for ASBM's.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). A land-based fixed or mobile rocket-propelled vehicle capable of delivering a warhead to intercontinental ranges. Once they are outside the atmosphere, ICBM's fly to a target on an elliptical trajectory. An ICBM consists of a booster, one or more reentry vehicles, possibly penetration aids, and, in the case of a MIRV'ed missile, a postboost vehicle. For the purposes of SALT II, an ICBM is considered to be a land-based ballistic missile capable of a range in excess of 5,500 km (about 3,000 nautical miles).

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Silo Launcher. An ICBM silo launcher, a "hard" fixed ICBM launcher, is an underground installation, constructed primarily of steel and concrete, housing an intercontinental ballistic missile and the equipment for launching it. See also Fixed Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Launcher and Launcher.

Interference. The SALT II treaty provides that each party shall use national technical means (NTM) of verification at its disposal to provide assurance of compliance with the treaty. In this connection, each party has undertaken a commitment not to interfere with the NTM of the other party. This means that neither side can destroy or attempt to negate the functioning of the NTM of the other side (e.g., blinding of photoreconnaissance satellites). See also Deliberate Concealment, National Technical Means of Verification (NTM), Telemetry, and Verification.

Interim Agreement. Formally entitled the "Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," this article comprises one of two agreements signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, and known collectively as the SALT I agreements. The Interim Agreement entered into force on October 3, 1972, and formally expired on October 3, 1977. In September 1977, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. separately stated that they did not plan to take any action inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement pending conclusion of the SALT II negotiations.

Joint Statement of Principles, SALT II. The joint statement of principles by the United States and the Soviet Union, which will last through 1985, is a protocol which will last through 1981, and a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms. The joint statement of principles provides a general statement of objectives for negotiation in SALT III.
Launch. For the purposes of SALT II, a launch includes a flight of a missile for testing, training, or any other purpose. The term “launch” would not encompass so-called pop-up tests which are tests of the launcher and ejection mechanism. See also Flight-Test and Launcher.

Launch-Weight. The weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch. This would include the aggregate weight of all booster stages, the postboost vehicle (PBV), and the payload. See also Heavy (Ballistic) Missile, Light (Ballistic) Missile, and Throw-Weight.

Launcher. That equipment which launches a missile. ICBM launchers are land-based launchers which can be either fixed or mobile. SLBM launches are the missile tubes on a ballistic missile submarine. An ASBM launcher is the carrier aircraft with associated equipment. Launchers for cruise missiles can be installed on aircraft, ships, or land-based vehicles or installations.

Light (Ballistic) Missile. For the purposes of SALT II, ballistic missiles are divided into two categories according to their throw-weight and launch-weight—light and heavy. The Soviet SS-19 ICBM is acknowledged by both sides as the heaviest of the existing light ICBM's on either side. See also Heavy (Ballistic) Missile, Launch-Weight, and Throw-Weight.

Mobile ICBM Launcher. Equipment which launches an ICBM and which can move or be moved from one location to another. Mobile ICBM launchers can include ICBM launchers on wheeled vehicles, launchers on vehicles which travel on rails, and launchers which are moved among launchpoints which might themselves be "hard" or "soft."

Modernization. The process of modifying a weapon system such that its characteristics or components are altered in order to improve the performance capabilities for that weapon system. SALT II provides that, subject to provisions to the contrary, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. See also Qualitative Limitation.

Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV). Multiple reentry vehicles carried by a ballistic missile, each of which can be directed to a separate and arbitrarily located target. A MIRV'ed missile employs a postboost vehicle (PBV) or other warhead-dispensing mechanism. The dispensing and targeting mechanism maneuvers to achieve successive desired positions and velocities to dispose each RV on a trajectory to attack the desired target, or the RV's might themselves maneuver toward their targets after they reenter the atmosphere. For the purposes of SALT II, MIRV'ed ICBM's, SLBM's, and ASBM's are defined as those which have been flight-tested with two or more independently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which are not independently targetable. See also Payload and Postboost Vehicle (PBV).

Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV). The reentry vehicle of a ballistic missile equipped with multiple warheads where the missile may have the capability of independently targeting the reentry vehicles—as distinct from a missile equipped for MIRV's. See also Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), Payload, and Reentry Vehicle (RV).

National Technical Means of Verification (NTM). Assets which are under national control for monitoring compliance with the provisions of an agreement. NTM include photographic reconnaissance satellites, aircraft-based systems (such as radars and optical systems), as well as sea- and ground-based systems (such as radars and antennas for collecting telemetry). SALT II provides that the sides undertake not to interfere with the NTM of the other party nor to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by NTM of compliance with the provisions of the agreement. See also Deliberate Concealment, Interference, Telemetry, and Verification.

New Type of ICBM. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have agreed, for the period of SALT II, to limit each side to only one new type of ICBM. Specific technical criteria have been established to distinguish between new types of ICBM's and existing types of ICBM's. These criteria include such physical parameters as missile length, maximum diameter, throw-weight, launch-weight, and fuel type. See also Launch-Weight, Modernization, and Throw-Weight.

Noncircumvention. SALT II provides that each party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of these treaties through any other state or states or in any other manner. This provision simply makes explicit the inherent obligation any state assumes when party to an international agreement not to circumvent the provisions of that agreement. This provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with our allies, including cooperation in modernization of allied forces.

 Observable Differences (OD's). Externally observable design features used to distinguish between those heavy bombers of current types which are capable of performing a particular SALT-limited function and those which are not. These differences need not be functionally related but must be a design feature which is externally observable. See also Functionally Related Observable Differences (FROD's) and Heavy Bomber.

Payload, Weapons and penetration aids carried by a delivery vehicle. In the case of a ballistic missile, the RV(s) and antiballistic missile penetration aids placed on ballistic trajectories by the main propulsion stages or the PBV; in the case of a bomber, those bombs, missiles, or penails carried internally or attached to the wings or fuselage. See also Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MRV), Penetration Aids (Penails), Postboost Vehicle (PBV), and Reentry Vehicle.

Penetration Aids (Penails). Devices employed by offensive weapon systems, such as ballistic missiles and bombers, to increase the probability of penetrating enemy defenses. They are frequently designed to simulate or to mask an aircraft or ballistic missile warhead in order to mislead enemy radar and/or divert defensive antiaircraft or antimissile fire. See also Payload.

Postboost Vehicle (PBV). Often referred to as a "bus," the PBV is that part of a missile which carries the reentry vehicles, a guidance package, fuel, and thrust devices for altering the ballistic flight path so that the reentry vehicles can be dispensed sequentially toward different targets (MRV's). Ballistic missiles with single RV's also might use a PBV to increase the accuracy of the RV by placing it more precisely into the desired trajectory. See also Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), Payload, and Reentry Vehicle (RV).

Production. Series manufacturing a particular strategic nuclear delivery system following its development and testing.

Protocol. The SALT II agreement consists of three parts: a treaty which
will last through 1985, a protocol which will last through 1981, and a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms. The protocol establishes temporary limitations on mobile ICBM launchers, ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and ASHMs.

Qualitative Limitation. Restrictions on capabilities of a weapon system as distinct from quantitative limits (e.g., on numbers of strategic delivery vehicles). In SALT II, such qualitative limitations include, *inter alia*, a prohibition on more than one new type of ICBM for each side, restrictions on missile launch-weight and throwweight, and limitations on the number of reentry vehicles a missile may carry. See also Fractionation, Launch-Weight, Modernization, and Throw-Weight.

Quantitative Limitation. Numerical limits on the number of weapons systems in certain categories, as distinct from qualitative limits on weapon capabilities. For the purposes of SALT II, such limitations include the various _aggregate_ limits. See also Aggregate.

Rapid Reload. The capability of a launcher to fire a second missile within a short period of time after an initial missile firing. See also Launcher.

Reentry Vehicle (RV). That portion of a ballistic missile which carries the nuclear warhead. It is called a reentry vehicle because it reenters the Earth’s atmosphere in the terminal portion of the missile trajectory. See also Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV), Payload, and Postboost Vehicle (PBV).

See-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM). A cruise missile launched from a submarine or surface ship. See also Cruise Missile (CM), Cruise Missile Range, and Protocol.

Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). A permanent U.S.-Soviet commission first established in accordance with the provisions of the SALT I agreements. Its purpose is to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the various treaties and agreements achieved between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the SALT negotiations. The SCC meets at least twice a year. The commission deals with matters such as questions of compliance with the provisions of the treaties and agreements and the working out of procedures to implement the SALT agreements. The SCC will continue these functions with respect to SALT II.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). A series of negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which began in November 1969. The negotiations seek to limit and reduce both offensive and defensive strategic arms. The first round of negotiations, known as SALT I, concluded in May 1972 and resulted in two agreements—the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. SALT II, begun in November 1972, includes a treaty, a protocol of shorter duration, and a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). A ballistic missile carried in and launched from a submarine. For the purposes of SALT II, SLBM launchers are launched on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic missiles installed on any submarine, regardless of its type. "Modern" SLBM’s are, for the U.S., missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the U.S.S.R., missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965, and for both parties, any SLBM first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regardless of its type. See also Ballistic Missile.

Telemetry. Telemetry refers to data, transmitted by radio to the personnel conducting a weapons test, which monitor the functions and performance during the course of the test. See also Deliberate Concealment and Encryption.

Test and Training Launcher. For the purposes of SALT II, these are launchers of ICBM’s or SLBM’s used only for test and training purposes. New test and training launchers may be constructed only at test ranges. Test and training launchers may be replicas or partial launchers without an actual launch capability, or they may be launchers used to launch missiles for test and training purposes. See also Launcher and Test Range.

Test Range. For the purposes of SALT II, an ICBM test range is a facility where ICBM’s are flight-tested. The sides have agreed that such existing test ranges are located as follows: for the U.S., near Santa Maria, California, and at Cape Canaveral, Florida; and for the U.S.S.R. in the areas of Tyuratam and Plesetskaya. Any future additional test ranges will be specified by notification in the SCC. See also Flight-Test, Launch, and Test and Training Launcher.

Throw-Weight. Ballistic missile throw-weight is the useful weight which is placed on a trajectory toward the target by the boost or main propulsion stages of the missile. For the purposes of SALT II, throw-weight is defined as the sum of the weight of:

- The RV or RV’s;
- Any PBV or similar device for releasing or targeting one or more RV’s; and
- Any antiballistic missile penetration aids, including their release devices.

See also Heavy (Ballistic) Missile, Launch-Weight, Light (Ballistic) Missile, and Postboost Vehicle.

Verification. The process of determining, to the extent necessary to adequately safeguard national security, that the other side is complying with an agreement. This process of judging adequacy takes into account the monitoring capabilities of existing and future intelligence-collection systems and analysis techniques and the ability of the other side to evade detection if it should attempt to do so. This process also assesses the political and military significance of potential violations and the costs, risks, and gains to a side of cheating. It also takes into account the degree to which advantages conferred on the United States by a particular provision outweigh the disadvantages caused by problems of monitoring. See also National Technical Means of Verification (NTM) and Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).

Warhead. That part of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other munition which contains either the nuclear or thermonuclear system, the high-explosive system, the chemical or biological agents, or the inert materials intended to inflict damage. See also Payload and Reentry Vehicle (RV).

Yield. The energy released in an explosion. The energy released in the detonation of a nuclear weapon is generally measured in terms of the kilotons (kT) or megatons (Mt) of TNT required to produce the same energy release.