

POST-VIETNAM U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS
NIXON - Report to Congress - May 3, 1973 (Excerpt)

Pre and Post Vietnam Force Levels

	Pre-Vietnam June 1964	Peak Vietnam June 1968	Current June 1973
<i>Ships:</i>			
Attack carriers.....	15	15	14
Anti-submarine, including attack submarines.....	381	379	252
Fleet air defense.....	53	75	73
Amphibious assault.....	134	148	65
	583	617	404
<i>Attack and Fighter Aircraft Squadrons:</i>			
Air Force.....	90	103	71
Navy.....	85	80	70
Marine.....	28	27	25
	203	210	166
<i>Ground Force Divisions:</i>			
<i>Army:</i>			
Airborne.....	2 $\frac{1}{3}$	2 $\frac{1}{3}$	1
Airmobile.....		1	1
Infantry.....	6	7	2 $\frac{2}{3}$
Mechanized.....	4	4	4 $\frac{1}{3}$
Armored.....	4	4	3
<i>Marines:</i>			
Amphibious.....	3	4	3
	19 $\frac{1}{3}$	22 $\frac{1}{3}$	*16

*1 division not shown consists of armored, air cavalry, and airmobile units.

Manpower has been cut to a comparable degree. In the last four years we have reduced our forces by more than a million men. They are now one-third smaller. They are at the lowest level since the Korean War, and are nearly half a million below levels prior to the Vietnam War.

About one-third of our general purpose forces are necessarily deployed abroad to provide a capability for responding rapidly to threats to American and allied interests, for guaranteeing the credibility of our joint defense, and for underpinning our diplomacy. The forces remaining in the United States serve as a ready reserve for reinforcing our forward deployments, and for protecting our interests in other parts of the world.

Given our broad requirements, the uncertainty of the current international situation, and the post-Vietnam contraction of our armed forces, it would be unwise to make further unilateral cuts in deployments or significant reductions in overall force levels in the foreseeable future. To do so would raise questions about the adequacy of our force posture to safeguard our interests.