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January 22, 1987

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 3-87

Southern Africa (S)

The year 1986 saw several significant developments affecting our posture in Southern Africa: the State of Emergency in South Africa; the U.S. sanctions legislation; the death of Samora Machel; U.S. aid to UNITA; the suspension of the 435/CTW negotiations with Angola; and the breakdown of the Nkomati accords. In light of these developments, this directive establishes the terms of reference for an interagency review of our policy with an emphasis on (a) a reexamination of U.S. interests in the region, and (b) possible new approaches which might enhance those interests. (S)

[REDACTED]

-- [REDACTED]

-- [REDACTED]

-- [REDACTED]

-- [REDACTED] (S)

1.5  
(d)

The Interdepartmental Group for Africa, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, should prepare, by February 20, 1987, an options paper for my consideration addressing such issues as the following:

- What are U.S. strategic interests in the region: political, economic, and security?

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
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
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- 2 -

-- What are the appropriate objectives and strategies of our involvement in the Black-White problem of South Africa? In particular:

- o Should the U.S. take the lead vis-a-vis other Western countries, or should we maintain a low profile?
- o What should be our posture toward South Africa's central political problem? Our options range from withdrawal, to offering good offices in assisting a dialogue and mediation, to more detailed reform and constitutional proposals with suggested timetables. Would there be benefit for the U.S. in giving more emphasis to promotion of a negotiation and to stating the democratic standards that we would hope to see govern a solution?
- o What are the implications of our evolving relationship with the African National Congress:  1.5 (d)
- o What is the role of the Frontline States and how might we enlist their support for our policy objectives?
- o What overall posture toward the South African Government will maximize our influence over its actions?
- o How do we ensure sufficient bipartisan domestic and Congressional support for a responsible U.S. policy? (S)

-- In Angola  what are the implications for the effort to promote an acceptable political solution? Specifically: 1.5 (d)

- o What U.S. actions could induce the Angolan government and their Soviet/Cuban patrons to seek a political settlement in the next two years rather than wait out this Administration?
- o What new pressures, including economic, should the U.S. bring to bear against the Angolan government?
- o What is the impact of U.S.-South African relations on the Angolan war?

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
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- 3 -

- o What new pressures could be brought to bear on Cuba and other Soviet proxies engaged in Angola? (S)

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1.5  
(d)

An analysis and options paper should be prepared for NSPG review by February 13, 1987. (TS)

*Ronald Reagan*

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